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Wwv_-i>t:) ^^

SarbarD College Itbrats

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

■■<■

r

— OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIOENCE.

War Notes No. I.
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD.

BATTLES AND CAPITULATION

OF

SANTIAGO DE CUBA

(COMl'LKXKU.)

BY

Lieutenant JOSfi MtJLLER Y TEJEIRO,

SSCUNb IK CuMHAMD OF NaVAL FoKCKS uF THE PttOVlNC'E OF SANTIAGO 1»K CUKA.

TUANSLATKD FROM TIIK SPANISH.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of Naval Intelligence.

WASHINGTON :

CiOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.

1899.

1 1 o ^^^'^ *^e
"■ 5>. Governm

ent

INTRODUCTORY.

The publication by this office of the partial translation of " Battles and Ca-
pitnlation of Santiago de Caba," by Lieutenant MWer y Tejeiro, was received
with so much interest both in and out of the service that the small edition of
1,000 copies was soon exhausted. The chapters there omitted were :

I. Some Historical Antecedents.
XL The United States and the Maine,
ni. The First Shots.
IV. The Scene of Events.
V. Forces of the Jurisdiction (Santiago).
VI. Works of Defense.
Vn. Artaiery Set Up.
Vin. The Crvdaer Beina Mercedes,
XIV. The Volunteers.

XXX. Escario's Ck>lumn (being a description of General Escario's march
across the country from Manzanillo to Santiago).
XXXTTT, Suspension of Hostilities.

XXXVII. Traders, not the Spanish People (responsible for the Cuban trouble).
XXXVin. G^rona and Santiago de Cuba (comparison of the two battles).

These have since been translated, and are given in this edition, excepting
Chapters I, H, and HI, which are again omitted, as they contain no original or
new matter, and have no connection with the subject of the jook.

Among the newly translated chapters, the one giving the diary of General
Escario's march, with 8,752 men, from Manzanillo to Santiago, a distance of
52 leagues through the enemy's country, is one of great interest. Considering
the nature of the country, which forced them generally to march single file, the
heavy rains, and the continual harassment by the Cubans, the effectiveness of
which is shown by the large number of killed and wounded on both sides, it may
be classed as one of the most noticeable military feats of the war. It shows what
the Cubans did toward the fall of Santiago, and a study of the situation will be
interesting, considering what would have been the temporary effect if Escario's
march had been unopposed, and he had arrived at Santiago with his force unim-
paired a day or two before that critical iwriod — July 2 — ^just previous to the
departure and destruction of Cervera's fleet.

BicHABDSON Clover,

Chief Intelligence Officer.
December SI, 1898.

(»)

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Page.

Introductory notes - 3

Preface - 7

Chap.I-III. Omitted.

rV. The Scene of Events 9

V. Forces of the Jurisdiction 14

VI. Works of Defense — - 17

VII. Artillery Set Up 21

Vni. The Cmieer Reina Mercedes ■- 24

rx. The Two Fleets ! 27

X. Provisions of the City - 31

XL Coaling 34

Xn. Opinions as to Why the Fleet did not go out 87

Xni. The Blockade 40

XIV. Thte Volunteers 45

XV. Waiting 48

XVI. The Merrimac - 51

XVII. The Blockade Continues __ i 55

XVm. The Bombardment Increases 58

XIX. The Firing Continues _ 62

XX. The Landing Expedition Appears 65

XXI. Line of Observation 69

XXIL Events of June 22d to 27th 74

XXm. End of the Month of June 81

XXrV. Battles of El Caney and San Juan 85

XXV. Actions of the 2d and 8d_ 92

XXVL Sortie of the Fleet 96

XXVn. Naval Battle of Santiago de Cuba 100

XXVin. Causes of the Loss of the Naval Battle of Santiago de Cuba 108

XXIX. Sinking of the Jtfcrcedes-- 113

XXX. Escario's Column- 116

XXXL In the City and in the Bay . 126

XXXIL BattlesandBombardmentsof the 10th and 11th 130

XXXm. Suspension of Hostilities 138

XXXIV. Capitulation 144

XXXV. The Emigration to El Caney 146

XXXVL Surrender of the City : 150

XXXVII. Traders, not the Spanish People _ 155

XXXVIIL Gerona and Santiago de Cuba 159

(5)

PREFACE.

On the 18th of May, the first hostile ships were sighted from the Morro of
Santiago de Cuba and the first g^onshots were heard, which since that date, for
the space of two months, have hardly ceased for a single day.

On the following day, fhe 19th, the SiMmish fleet, commanded by Bear Admi-
ral Gervera, entered with very little coal, which it vras absolutely necessary to
replenish.

It did not require great power of penetration to understand that, owing to
the scant resources available at this harbor, ifwould take more days to get the
neceesary fuel on board than it would \9Jke Admiral Sampson, Commander of
the United States fleet, to find out that circumstance, and that consequently the
Spanish fleet would be blockaded^ as indoed it was; and as a natural and logical
inference, that the 6B«»y>ob9eoiiTe woidd be the city and harbor of Santiago,
where the only battle ships that Spain had in the Antilles, or at least in the
Greater Antilla, had taken refuge.

Thus, the arrival of the fleet gave this city a military importance which
without that event it would never have acquired, and changed it to the princi-
pal— ^not to say, the only— scene of operations in the island, the denouement of
which would necessarily be of great interest and of powerful influence on the
result of the campaign and the war. Subsequent events have shown the truth
of my assumption, which was also the assumption of everybody else in the city.

From that time on, I have kept an exact diary, from day to day, from hour
to hour, from minute to minute even— and when I say this I am not exagger-
ating, for it is still in existence and may be seen— of everything I saw, or thftt
came to my notice, or that ixassed through my hands in my official capacity, or
that I knew to be acculate and trustworthy.

When some official duty prevented me, I was ably replaced by my friend, Mr.
Dario Laguna, aid of the captaincy of the port (ayudante de la capitanla de
puerto), who gladly rendered the service I asked of him, in spite of his
constant and manifold obligations.

If truth is a merit, these "Notes " (begging pardon for my want of modesty)
possess it, though it may be their only merit. Whatever they contain has
actually happened, and those who have returned from Santiago will testify to
it. Not a single fact, no matter how insignificant, herein related, is doubtful
or hypothetical. Wherever I did not know the outcome of any event, or where
its objects or consequences have remained a mystery, I have openly acknowl-
edged it, without circumlocution, a» any one may see who reads these notes.
There is in them nothing of my own invention, and my imagination has had
nothing to do with them, unfortunately, for I do not possess the gift of inven-
tion, which I admire so much in others. My work has been confined to
gathering data and obtaining as much information as possible, my only care
having been to see that everything was correct, and I have made sureof this
by comparing the data collected with tha information obtained.

(7)

8 PREFACE.

Feeling sure that the events which have taken place from May 18 to July 17 —
hence the true situation in which were Santiago de Cnba and the forces defend-
ing it— can not be known in Spain in detail, but only in general, I am desirous
of making them known in their whole truth, so that the country, to whom I
think that we who were intrusted with defending its honor and interests at a
distance of fifteen hundred leagues, owe the strictest account, may be able,
with a complete knowledge of the facts, to call us to account, if it thinks that
we have incurred any responsibility.

Such has been my object, and I trust that my comrades of Santiago de Cuba,
both in the Army and in the Navy, vnll approve of it.

Santiago de Cuba, August lo, 1898.

IV.

THE SCENE OF EVENTS.

In order to be able to form at least an approximate idea of the
events which are taking place here, and of which no one knows as
jet when and how they will end, it is indispensable to know the
location of the places where they are occurring, and for that
reason I will describe them as briefly as possible, referring the
reader to the sketch at the end of this book and the explanations
concerning the different places.

Santiago de Cuba, the capital of the province of the same name,
occupying the eastern part of the island, contained at the begin-
ning of the present insurrection about 45,000 inhabitants; but the
population has been reduced to about three-fourths of that, owing
to emigrations and epidemics. The city is built on very hilly
ground, at the head of a bay which is almost entirely closed in
and very safe, so that, when seen from the city, it looks more like
a lake than an arm of the sea. The distance to the mouth of the
harbor in a straight line is about 4 miles.

This mouth, which is extremely narrow, is bounded on the east
l>ythe heights of the Morro and on the west by those of the Socapa,
lx)th of which are very steep toward the south, that is, where tliey
Iwrfler on the sea.

At Punta Morrillo, the western extremity of the Morro heights,
which latter rise about 65 meters above the level of the sea, is sit-
uated Morro Castle, which was at one time a very good fort, well
Imilt, but in these days of modern artillery it is not only useless,
but even dangerous on account of the target which it presents, and
this was the opinion of the junta of defense when they decided that
whatever artillery was to be installed there should be erected on
the plateau of the Morro and not inside of the castle. On this
plateau are also situated the houses of the governor, the adjutant
of the fort, the engineers and gunners, the lookout and the light-
house keepers, also the light-house itself, which is a white light,
fixed, flashing every two minutes, and visible IG miles. Since
May 18, in consequence of the events of that day, it has not ])een
lighte<l.

The heights of the Socapa, whose elevation is about the same as
that of the Morro heights, are bounded on the west, as already
stated, by the mouth of the harbor, and contain no fortification
nor defense of any kind.

(0)

10

Ships wanting to enter Santiago Harbor must follow the Morro
shore, which is bold and comparatively clear, while on the Socapa
shore is Diamante Bank, consisting of rocks, leaving a channel
whose depth varies between 6 and 11 meters. Between the place
where Diamante buoy is anchored (in 30 feet of water) and Estrella
Cove the channel is not over 50 fathoms wide. At the head of
this cove, which only small boats can enter, is the hut of the
English cable.

The course to be taken in orddr to enter the harbor is NE. 5° N.
(V.) (true), until coming close to Estrella battery, an old fort
which, like the Morro, was good in its time, but is now useless.
Prom this point to Punta Soldado, which is on the eastern shore of
the bay and which, with Punta Churruca, forms the entrance of
Nispero Bay, the course is north, leaving to starboard Santa Cata-
lina battery, which is abandoned and in ruins.

From Punta Soldado the course is NNW. until coming close to
Cay Smith, which is to be left to port ; from there the course must
be shaped so as to avoid the Punta Gorda Bank, whose beacon,
marking 18 feet, is to be left to starboard.

Cay Smith is a small island, or rather a large rock of small sur-
face and great elevation, on the top of which is a small stone
hermitage of modern construction; on its southern slope are 111
houses and cottages belonging to pilots, fishermen, and private citi-
zens, who have built them for the purpose of spending the hottest
season there. In the northern part there are no buildings what-
ever, the ground being inaccessible.

After passing Punta Gorda, the course is to be shaped for Punta
Jutias, leaving to port Colorado Shoals, containing a beacon, and
Cay Ratones. The latter is a small low island devoid of all vegeta-
tion. In the extreme north is a powder magazine, and in the south
the guardroom of the same.

From Punta Jutias, the course is NNE. until reaching the gen-
eral anchoring place, which is 8 meters deep (oozy bottom).

Santiago de Cuba has, besides many minor piers for boats and
small craft, the Royal Pier and the piers of Luz and San Josd,
all built of wood ; only ships of less than 14 feet draft can go
alongside of these. Between the city and Punta Jutias, at a place
called Lais Cruces, is the pier of the same name, built of iron with
stone abutments, belonging to the American company of the Ju-
ragua iron mines ; it has a watering place, the water coming from
Aguadores in pipes. Ships of large draft can go alongside of
this pier. A narrow-gauge railroad from the mines, passing o\'er
26 kilometres of ground, goes to the extreme end of the pier.

Santiago is an open city, with not a vestige of fortification in its
precinct (I am speaking of the beginning of the present war), and

11

only at Pnnta Blanca, situated just south of it, is a battery of the
same name, with a small powder magazine, intended only for
saluting pturposeBand to answer salutes of war ships casting anchor
in the harbor.

From the abore it will be seen that the mouth of Santiago Har-
bor is defended by nature in such a manner that nothing is easier
than to render il truly impregnable in a short time by installing
modern artillery in batteries erected where it would be most
necessary and convenient. The heights of the Morro and Socapa
have a full view of the sea, and being difficult of access by land,
they are easy to defend. Punta Qorda, owing to its admirable
location and being high above the level of the sea, has entire
control of the channel, and any ship trying to enter would neces-
sarily be exposed to its fire and present her bow and port for at
least twenty minutes. The very narrow entrance is well adapted
for laying lines of torpedoes which could be easily protected by
rapid-fire artillery erects on the western shore, preventing them
from being dragged or blown up. Moreover, no matter how large
a fleet might attempt to force the harbor, as but one vessel can
pass through the channel at a time, and that only with the great-
est care and precautions if it is over 80 meters long, nothing is
easier than to sink it ; and in that event, the channel would be
completely obstructed and the harbor closed, until the submerged
vessel is blown up.

It is evident, and almost superfluous for me to mention it, that
with the same ease that a fleet trying to force the harbor can be
prevented from entering, another fleet can be prevented from leav-
ing it. But since Spain, in spite of all that was being done in the
United States, never for a moment believed that war would come,
it has not occurred to her to fortify this harbor. There were no
g^ns; but on the other hand, plenty of good plans and designs
which the military authorities in Santiago have never been able to
have carried into effect, for the simple reason that the Government
never got around to ordering that it be done.

Thr^ miles west of the entrance of the Morro is the small har-
bor of Cabafias, which, while accessible only for small vessels, is
very safe and well suited for landing purposes. It has 6 ft^et of
water at the bar and 5 fathoms inside. The distance by land from
Cabafias to Cabafiitas on Santiago Bay is about a league.

Six miles farther west, or 9 miles from Santiago, is Punta
Cabrera, the headland extending farthest south and the last one
which can be seen. It is a high cone-shaped mountain. As the
coast is very accessible, vessels of great draft can approach it.
At the small cove of Quaicabon, east of said point, boats can land
and communicate with the shore, which, in fact, is being done at

12

this time by a steam yacht of the American fleet, which is proba-
bly receiving confidential information from the insurgents. Guai-
cabon is about 2 leagues from Santiago by land and the road is
good-.

Three miles east of the Morro is Aguadores Bay ; it is crossed
by a high bridge, over which passes the railroad of the Juragua
mines. Boats can enter the river which empties into this bay ; it
is an excellent place for landing.

A quainter of a mile farther east is the roadstead of Sardinero,
with a river emptying into it.

Three-fourths of a mile from there is Jutici, a small roadstead
with a watering place.

Ten miles farther on is Juragua Beach, with a river that boats
can enter.

Fifteen miles from there is Daiquiri Bay, with a river and water-
ing place. Boats can enter here. Daiquiri Bay has a very fine
stone and iron pier, also a small one for minor craft. Ashore, a
short distance from the pier, are the offices of the employees of the
mines and railroad for the transportation of the mineral from the
mines to the pier, about 6 miles long. Large vessels can go along-
side the iron pier.

Finally, 20 miles farther east is Punta Berracos, the last point
which can be distinguished from the Morro, and the one projecting
farthest south. Although it is possible to land here, with a great
deal of work, it is not advisable to do so, there being no watering
place and no road.

In all these places, east as well as west of Santiago, vessels can
not remain with strong south or southeast winds, but must neces-
sarily put to sea.

Aguadores and Santiago are connected by the Juragua railroad.
The road along the coast is bad ; it is a little over a league long.

From Sardinero to Santiago there are 2 leagues of good road.

The road leading from Juraguacito to Santiago is the Qu^simas
road, which is good, beginning at El Caney. It is 4 leagues long.

From Juragua to Santiago is the Sevilla road, which also leads
to El Caney. This road and the former meet at a place called Dos
Caminos. It is a good road, and about 4 leagues long. Moreover,
as has been stated, there is a narrow-gauge railroad from the mines,
which passes through Aguadores and terminates at Las Cruces Pier.

At Berracos there are no roads whatever, only paths, over which
it is not possible to transport artillery.

The railroad to San Luis, 32,460 meters long, starts from San-
tiago and passes through the following points: Santiago, Cua-
vitas (station), Boniato, San Vicente, Dos Bocas (station), Cristo,
Moron, Dos Caminos, and San Luis.

13

From Cristo a branch line of 10,300 meters goes to Soiigo. Traijis
ai"e now running as far as Socorro.

These are the different places which form the scene of the events
now claiming the attention of the island of Cuba, and probably
also of the Peninsula; and these events, whatever maybe their
outcome, will be of great importance and powerful influence on
the result of the war.

FOKCES OF THE JURISDICTION.

The present insurrection broke out on February 24, 1896, in the
eastern provinces, but it soon invaded the western provinces and
spread over the whole island from Cs^pe San Antonio to Cape Maysi.

In order to check it, or at least reduce it to narrower limits, Qen-
eral Weyler conceived and carried out the plan of moving his forces
from west to east, building trochas to prevent the insurgents from
again invading the pacified provinces, or to inclose them between
two lines of soldiers more or less difl&cult to force.

Consequently the greater part of the forces of the army of Cuba
occupied the provinces of Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, and
Las Villas, for the purpose of carrying on active operations
there, leaving a very small number at Camaguey, and still less
in the eastern provinces. These latter provinces, therefore, could
do nothing more than defend the country and the cities and
towns and prevent the enemy from entering them. Hence, when
the war with the United States broke out, the division of Santiago,
consisting of two brigades, had to cover the districts of Santiago,
Guant^namo, Baracoa, and Sagua; and it is only necessary to cast
a glance at the map in order to understand how difficult it would
be to control such an immense territory with such scant forces,
which had to garrison many cities, towns, forts, and redoubts,
cover four railway lines (from Santiago to Sabanillo and Maroto,
to Juragua, to Daiquiri, and from Caimanera to Quant^namo), act
as convoys, protect the mineral regions, and provide also for the
formation of more or less numerous flying columns to harass the
enemy incessantly. Fortunately this division was in command of
General Linares, whose energy and zeal can never be sufficiently
praised, and whose well-deserved promotion to lieutenant general
was learned here by cable about the middle of May.

As the events which I propose to relate are only those directly
concerning Santiago de Cuba and its jurisdiction, where they have
taken place and which I have had a chance to witness, they will be
the only ones that I shall refer to.

The first brigade of the division consisted of the following forces :

Chief of division, Lieut. Gen. Arsenio Linares Pombo ;

Chief of staff, Lieut. Col. Ventura Fontan ;

Military governor of Santiago and chief of the forces of that
division, General of Division Jos6 Toral ;

(14)

15

Chief of staff, Luis Irlds;

Chief of the San Luis brigade, General of Brigade Joaqufn Vara
del Key ;

Chief of staff, Captain Juan Bamos.

It will be seen from the above that the brigade was really divided
into two divisions, one under the orders of General Toral, and the
other under the orders of General Vara del Rey. The forces com-
posing both divisions were as follows :

Twelve companies of mobilized troops;

Two squads of the regiment of royal cavalry (less than 200 horse) ;

Two battalions of the regiment of Santiago infantry ;

One Ajsiatic battalion;

One provincial battalion of Puerto Rico, No. 1 ;

One battalion of San Fernando;

One battalion " Oonstitucion ; "

Also half a battery of artillery and a small force of the civil
guard and engineers.

To these forces must be added the battalion of Talavera, which
General Linares ordered from Baracoa as soon as the present war
was declared and in anticipation of coming events.

These forces form at most a total of 8,000 men.

General of Brigade Antero Rubfn was under orders of General
Linares.

Florencio Caula, colonel of the senior corps, was commander of
engineers of the city, and Lieut. Col. Luis Melgar commander of
artillery ; the latter turned his command over to Colonel Orddilez
on April 29 upon being appointed superintendent of the artillery
park.

Administrative chief. First-class Commissary Julio Cuevas.

Chief of the civil guard, Col. Francisco Oliveros.

Superintendent of the military hospital. Sub-inspector Pedro
Martin Garcia.

Governor of Moito Castle, Commander of Infantry Antonio Ros.

When the first insurrection broke out in the Island of Cuba in
1868, bodies of volunteers were formed which have rendered good
services as garrisons of the fortified places. At Santiago, accord-
ing to official statements, there were the following:

Hen.

First battalion . Col. Manuel Barmeco 030

Second battalion : Lieut. Col. Jo86 Marim6n 485

Firemen: Col. Emilio Agnerrizabal 324

Company of gnides: Capt. Federico Bosch 200

Company of veterans: Capt. Jos^ Prat 130

Squad of cavalry 100

Total 1,869

16

Santiago de Cuba is the capital of the maritime comandaiicia of
the same name, bounded on the south by Junco Creek and on the
north by Sagua de TAnamo, and divided into four districts : Man-
zanillo, Santiago de Cuba, Quantdnamo, and Baracoa. The com-
mander of this maritime comandancia was Capt. Pelayo Pede-
monte, of the navy.

The prelate of the archdiocese Ilmo was Francisco Saenz de
Urturi.

Governor of tlie province, Leonardo Ros.

President of tlie audencia territorial, Rafael Nacarino Brabo.

Mayor, Gabriel Ferrer.

The consular corps was represented by the following gentlemen :

Frederick W. Ramsden, England ;

German Michaelsen, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium,
Italy;

E. Hippean, France;

Pablo Bory, Mexico ;

Juan E. Rabelo, Santo Domingo ;

Temlstocles Rabelo, Paraguay ;

Juan Rey, Hayti.

The vice-consuls were :

Jacobo Bravo, United States of Colombia ;

Isidoro Agustini, Sweden and Norway ;

Leonardo Ros, Netherlands ;

Modesto Ros, Portugal ;

Eduardo Miranda, Venezuela ;

Robert Mason, China ;

Jos6 J. Hernandez, Argentine Republic.

The United States consul left on April 7 in an English steamer
bound for Jamaica, having turned over the archives of his consu-
late to the British consul.

VI.

WORKS OF DEFENSE.

The governments of Spain have thought more than once of
fortifying the coasts of the Island of Cuba, and for that purpose
committees have been appointed who have studied the matter and
submitted many good, even excellent, plans, which have been
approved, but never carried into effect.

There was at Santiago a junta of land and marine defenses of
the city, composed of the following persons :

President, the military governor of the city. General of Division
Jos^ Toral; voting members, the commander of marine, Capt.
Pelayo Pedemonte; the commander of engineers of the city,
Col. Florencio Caula; the commander of artillery of the city,
Lieut. Col. Luis Melgar; and the chief of submarine defenses.
First Lieut. Jos^ MuUer, of the navy.

The latter officer, whose regular office was that of second com-
mander of marine, was only temporarily chief of submarine
defenses, in the absence of torpedo officers, he not being one.

This junta held meetings whenever it was deemed necessary,
until April 8, when a cablegram from the captain general of the
island ordered that it become permanent, and that the commander
of marine give his opinion as to the suitability of laying torpedoes.
The junta, taking into account the grave situation, the imminence
of war, and the scarcity of artillery material and appliances and
resources of any kind, expressed the unanimous opinion that the
only defense that could be counted on for the harbor were the torpe-
does, for which the material was at hand, and consequently that
they should be given preference, and everything within human
power done to protect them and prevent their being dragged or
blown up; in a word, that the torpedoes should be placed as the
only veritable defense and everything else subordinated to them.

As early as the second day of the same month (April) the com-
mander of submarine defenses, in compliance with orders received,
had already commenced to charge the Latiner-Clark torpedoes,
transferring them to Cay Ratones, where the powder magazine
was located that contained the gun-cotton, also to place the buoys
for the first row of torpedoes, and to carry out other operations in
connection therewith.

(17)

10846 2

18

The junta of defense, in view of the poor condition of Morro
Castle and Estrella and Catalina batteries and of the informa-
tion which the American consul would probably give his Govern-
ment, decided to remove the torpedo-firing and converging stations
from said forts where they were and erect them at places on the
bay where they would be protected and sheltered from the hostile
fire, and this was done.

On April 14 the second commander of marine turned over the
submarine defenses to a torpedo officer, Lieut. Mauricio Arauco,
commander of the gunboat Alvarado, who continued the work of
laying the torpedoes ; the first row, consisting of seven, with their
firing stations at the Estrella and Socapa, was finished by April 21,
and the second row, consisting of six, with stations at the Socapa
and Cay Smith, on the 27th.

By orders of the commander general of marine (Havana), the
second commander of marine of the province, together with Col-
onel of Engineers Angel Rosell and Captain of Artillery Ballenilla,
left for Guant^namo on April 21, for the purpose of selecting the
most suitable site for planting Bustamente torpedoes in that harbor
so as to prevent ships from reaching Caimanera, returning to San-
tiago on the 25th after finishing the investigation. The torpedoes
were subsequently placed by First Lieut. Julifin Garcia Dur6n at
the site selected.

On the 23d, the gunboat Sandoval left for Guant^namo, where
her crew was to plant the Bustamente torpedoes. She has since
remained at that harbor.

Two days before, on the 21st, orders were received from Havana
to remove from the interior of the harbor all light buoys and bea-
cons, which orders were promptly complied with.

It was also agreed by the junta of defense to establish at Punta
Qorda a battery composed of two 15-cm. Mata howitzers and two
9-cm. Krupp guns, and the corps of engineers at once proceeded to
clear the plateau of the mountain, build the road, and do other
work preparatory to erecting such battery. By the 26th, the two
howitzers were ready to fire, and the two guns by the 27th, all of
them being breechloaders. This battery, which, as will be seen
later, had two 16-cm. Hontoria guns, is the best of all the batteries
erected, because it was done with less haste, and perhaps also be-
cause the ground was particularly well adapted. It was placed in
command of Captain of Artillery Seijas, who had previously had
command of the Morro battery.

On April 18 there arrived from Havana three 21-cm. muzzle-
loading howitzers, and a few days later, in the steamer Reina de
los AngeleSj three more from the same city.

19

A cablegram from Havana stated that, according to information
received, the steamer Margrave would try to cut the cable at San-
tiago, thereby cutting off our communications, and it was there-
fore ordered to erect on the esplanade of the Morro two old 16-cm.
guns, more for the purpose of making signals than to attack the
enemy. They were both taken up there ; one of them was mounted
on a wooden carriage and the other was not mounted.

On April 21, two short 8-cm. Plasencia guns (breech-loading)
were mounted at Estrella Cove.

At the Estrella battery there had been installed some time ago
an old 21-cm. rifled howitzer, and another partly installed. In
view of the unfavorable location of the battery, it was decided to
abandon both ; but after the 28th, the second was mounted, also
the two Plasencia guns that had previously been erected at Estrella
Cove, together with two short 12-cm. rifled bronze guns. Not a
single one of these pieces was fired. The battery was in command
of Lieutenant of Artillery Sanchez of the reserve forces ; he was
subsequently assigned to the artillery of the precinct.

By May 28, five 16-cm. rifled muzzle-loading bronze guns had
been mounted on the esplanade of the Morro.

On June 21, a 21-cm. muzzle-loading howitzer was erected at
the same place, and another on the 25th.

On the high battery of the Socapa were mounted : on June 13, a
21-em. muzzle-loading howitzer; another on the 16th; another on
the 17th.

Rfenmiu

Punta Gtorda battery, in command of Captain of Artillery Seijas :
Two 16-cm. Mata howitzers ;
Two 9-cm. breech-loading Krupp guns.
Estrella battery, in command of Lieutenant Sd.nchez :
Two 21-cm. old howitzers;
Two 8-cm. modem Plasencia guns ;
Two short 12-cm. rifled bronze guns (old).
None of these were fired.
Morro battery, first in command of Captain Seijas, later of Lieu-
tenant Ledn :

Five old 16-cm. guns;
Two old 21-cm. guns.
High battery of the Socapa :

Three old 21-cm. howitzers.
It wiU be seen that this whole artillery includes only six breech-
loading guns, four erected at Punta Gorda and two Plasencia guns
at Estrella, which latter two, owing to the location of said bat-
tery, could not be fired. All the others were old guns, and it is

20

well known that it takes a long time to load them and that their
fire is very uncertain.

The dates when these different guns were erected and ready to
fire should be kept in mind, so as to know which could answer hos-
tile attacks and which not on the different days when the enemy
bombarded the mouth of the harbor and the bay.

VII.

ARTILLERY SET UP.

It will be snflBcient to remember what has been said in the pre-
ceding chapter to understand that, in spite of the fact that Santiago
has a harbor which is so easy to defend and the possession of
which it was so imperative to maintain, in spite of its being the
capital of the eastern half of the island and at such a long dis-
tance from Havana, there were at Santiago at the time the present
war broke out not more than six modern breech-loading guns,
namely, two 15-cm. Mata howitzers, two 9-cm. Krupp guns, and
two 8-cm. Plasencia guns. That was all the artillery worthy of
the name, and even these guns, owing to their small calibers, were
useless, or almost so, against armorclads and cruisers.

The others, as has been seen, were old bronze and even iron
muzzle-loaders which could not fire more than one shot to every
twenty fired from one of the enemy's guns, and all they sent us
from Havana were six 21-cm. howitzers, likewise old muzzle-loaders,
this being all the material received here to oppose a powerful
modem fleet. These facts might appear exaggerated if there were
not others that appear still more so, but which are shown in official
statements and statistics of forces available, and these can not be
doubted. For the service of all the guns, including those set up
in the precinct, there were only 79 gunners; of course, it became
necessary to complete the indispensable number with soldiers of
the infantry.

To mount this artillery, which was defective if not entirely
useless, but which was nevertheless set up at the Morro, Punta
Gorda, and the Socapa, endless difficulties had to be overcome and
work done which only the intelligence, energy, and perseverance
of the chiefs and officers and the subordination and good will of
the soldiers could accomplish, when resources and aids of every
kind were absolutely lacking.

By simply looking at the esplanade of the Morro, one would
realize the work it must have required to take guns up there
weighing three or four thousand kilos, by a road which, I believe,
has not been repaired once since the castle was first built.

To install the guns at Punta Gorda everything had to be done
from building the pier, where the guns were landed, to clearing
the summit of the mountain, where they were set up, and opening
a zigzag road by which they were taken there.

(21)

22

To mount the howitzers at the Socapa was truly a piece of work
worthy of Romans, and of the six received only three could be
set up.

But where the corps of engineers never rested for a moment, and
accomplished the most difficult work with the smallest force, was
around the city in a line about 14 kilometers long.

Closer to the city three lines of defenses were built, with trenches,
breastworks, inclosures, wire fences, and whatever other obstacles
the configuration of the ground might suggest; the so-called forts,
already in existence, were improved and new ones built; in a word,
an open city, which had no fortifications of any kind to oppose to
the enemy, was, in the short space of a few days, placed in condi-
tion of resistance with chances of success.

From the moment that our fleet entered Santiago Harbor, it was
not difficult to surmise that it would become the enemy's objective,
upon which all his efforts would be concentrated, and it was for
that reason, always expecting the landing which was finally effected,
that the work above described was carried out, and the rest of the
artillery of the city, likewise old, mounted in the following posi-
tions :

June 12 — One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun, at Fort San Antonio ;
One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Santa Inds ;
Two short 8-cm. rifled bronze guns at Fort San
Antonio.
June 13 — One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun, and

One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at the entrance to
El Caney.
June 14 — One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun;

One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun, and
Two short 8-cm. rifled bronze guns at El Sueilo.
June 16 — One 16-cm. gun, and

Two short 8-cm. guns at Santa Ursula.
June 17 — One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun at Cafladas.
June 25 — One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Fort Homo ;
One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Fort Nuevo.
After the battle of July 1 the following were mounted :
At Santa Ursula — ^Two long 12-cm. rifled bronze guns.
At entrance of El Caney — Two guns of same type as above.
At Santa In^s — One long 8-cm. bronze gun (old). The breech
pieces of this latter gun were missing.

With General Escario's column two 8-cm. Plasencia guns arrived
from Manzanilo ; but, like all those mounted since July 1, they did not
get a chance of being fired, the battles having ceased by that time.

23

Hence the only modem artillery existing in the precinct of the
city, namely, one 9-cm. Hontoria, two 76-mm. Maxim, and two
8-cm. Plascencia guns, was not fired.

All the 8-cm. guns had been pronounced useless by the central
junta of Havana, and, far from being effective, they were even
dangerous.

The 12-cm. guns were mounted in carriages of other guns, and
were therefore useless in themselves, without being disabled by
the enemy.

vni.

THE CRUISER "REIN A MERCEDES."

It does not require a deep knowledge of artillery to understand
that the batteries erected at the Morro and Socapa, and even at
Punta Gorda, were powerless, or almost so, against armored and
protected ships. As to the Estrella battery, I even refrain from
mentioning it, because owing to its location it was not fired at all.
Of the only modern artillery, at Punta Gorda, the guns were of
small caliber, and the howitzers, owing to their indirect fire, are
very uncertain against ships which occupy comparatively very
little space. As to the guns of the Morro and Socapa, when I say
that they were old howitzers I think I have said enough. Having
had no other artillery, it may well be supposed that we, who wit-
nessed and sustained the blockade of Santiago, feel satisfaction
and pride in being able to say that we kept the American fleet,
notwithstanding its power and the number of its guns, for seventy
days, namely, from May 18 to July 17, in front of the mouth of
the harbor, on the sea, and at a respectable distance from our bat-
teries, which they were unable to silence, and not daring to force
the entrance.

It is only just to say, and 1 take pleasure in doing so, that this
result is due, in the first place, to the cruiser Reina Mercedes^
under the command of Captain Rafael Micdn, and in the second
place, to our fleet anchored in the bay, and which the enemy would
have had to fight after forcing the harbor, provided they had suc-
ceeded in doing so, but they do not appear to have thought of it.

Owing to the very bad condition of the boilers of the Reina
Mercedes, it was impossible for her to proceed to Havana, as most
of the vessels cruising in these waters did sooner or later, and it
was taken for granted that, in view of her condition, she would
play but a very secondary part during the events here; it did not
occur to anyone that the Mercedes might become, if not the salva-
tion, yet the providence, so to speak, of Santiago Harbor, and that
she was to be of such great assistance to the heroic defense made
by the batteries.

Her crew had been considerably reduced by detachments and
sickness, but it was well disciplined and enthusiastic, and com-
manded by chiefs and officers as intelligent as they were energetic
and indefatigable. The vessel cast anchor at the Socapa on March

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25

23 and proceeded to send down her yards and topmasts and pro-
tect her starboard side (the one she presented to the mouth of the
harbor) with her light cables, thereby protecting the torpedo maga-
zine as much as possible from the hostile fire.

On the 26th, in obedience to superior orders, she had to undo
everything that had been done and again anchor in the bay, return-
ing to the Socapa a few days later, when she went to work once
more sending down the masts, protecting her side, etc.

At the same time one of her steam launches, with a crew from the
Mercedes, rendered service at the comandancia de marina, where
she became indispensable, and the other steam launch and the
boats assisted in laying the torpedoes, towing launches, and did a
thousand other things, some of them not properly belonging to
vessels, but all equally indispensable.

On May 7 work was commenced on dismounting four of the
16-cm. Hontoria guns, under the direction of Boatswain Antonio
Rodriguez Dfaz, a derrick having been erected for that purpose,
which removed the guns with their mounts from the vessel. The
latter now had only the two bow guns left to defend the mouth of
the harbor and rows of torpedoes.

All of the four guns were taken up to the Socapa by fifty sailors
of the Mercedes and forty of Captain Mateu's guerrillas. One was
mounted and ready to fire by the evening of the 18th, the other by
the 28th, the engineers having previously finished the trenches and
cement foundations for setting them up.

The third gun was mounted at Punta Gorda by a crew from the
vessel by June 2, and by the 17th the fourth and last one had been
mounted. These two 16-cm. Hontoria guns, erected on the western
slope of Punta Gorda, were placed in charge of Ensign Vial, under
the command of Captain of Artillery Seijas.

The two Hontoria guns at the Socapa were placed in charge of
Ensigns Nardiz and Bruquetas respectively.

The erection of the last gun mounted at Punta Gorda was super-
intended by Boatswain Ricardo Rodriguez Paz, Boatswain Rod-
riguez who had superintended the others having been wounded.

These four guns were mounted for the purpose of directly attack-
ing the hostile fleet.

The crew of the Mercedes, besides defending the torpedo lines
and preventing the approach of small craft that might attempt to
disable them, also mounted at the lower battery of the Socapa,
west of the channel of the harbor, the following guns :

One 57-mm. Nordenf eldt gun ;

Four 37-mm. Hotchkiss revolving guns ;

One 25-mm. Nordenfeldt machine gun.

26

The latter belonged to the submarine defenses, the others to the
Mercedes. Lieutenant Camino was placed in command of this
battery.

It seems almost superfluous to state that all the artillery from
the Mercedes set up ashore was served by men and commanded by
officers from the crew of the vessel and that the same difficulties
were encountered in this work as in the land defenses, there being
the sama obstacles and the same lack of resources and appliances ;
moreover, two of the torpedo firing stations were manned by officers
from the Mercedes; they actually seemed to multiply themselves
to be able to render all these services. Words fail me to do justice
to the officers and men for the work accomplished, especially while
the guns were being mounted in the batteries.

Although it may be anticipating events, I can not help but say
that some ships, like some men, seem preordained to be martyrs.
When long afterwards the Mercedes returned to the bay, having
left the anchoring place at the Socapa on account of the many
casiialties which she had suffered passively^ if I may be permitted
the expression, the American ships, by a singular coincidence,
threw their projectiles at the very spot where she was at anchor,
as though an invisible hand had been guiding them.

Finally, when she had nothing left her but her hull to oflfer in
sacrifice, she went down in the channel of the harbor, in order to
oppose to the very last moment, and even after death, an enemy
whom she had so fiercely fought during her life-time. Peace to
her remains I

THE TWO FLEETS.

When the war between Spain and the United States became a
fact, it is hard to tell how much was said and written about the
Spanish fleet, or rather, fleets ; everybody knows of the thousands
of items which appeared in the newspapers concerning the pur-
chase of ships, to such an extent that, if all could have been believed,
our navy would have been vastly superior to that of the United
States, in number and quality. And this is so true that the least
optimistic, the most reasonable people, those whom we considered
best informed as belonging to the profession and who knew to a cer-
tain extent what we could expect, counted on not less than eight
battle ships leaving the Peninsula, to say nothing of the transports,
torpedo boats, destroyers, etc. How much we were mistaken!

On the 19th of May, at 5.50 o'clock a. m., the look-out signaled
five steamers to the south; shortly after it was signaled that the
five steamers were five warships, and a little later that they were
Spanish. So the much wished-f or fleet had arrived, which, accord-
ing to the newspapers, was under the command of Vice Admiral
Butler.

At 7.15, the Infanta Maria Teresa, hoisting the rear admiral's
flag, was sighted from the captaincy of the port ; a few minutes
later, she cast anchor in the bay, some distance from the royal pier,
her draught not permitting her to go nearer. Then the Vizcaya,
Oquendo^ and Cristdbal Coldn anchored one after the other, the last
named with the flag of the second-in-command (brigadier) ; then
the destroyer Plutdn entered, went out again without anchoring,
and returned an hour later with the Furor ^ of the same class, and
both anchored at a convenient place.

The day when the fleet entered Santiago harbor was one of those
beautiful mornings that are so frequent in tropical countries; not
the slightest breeze rippled the surface of the water, not the least
cloud was to be seen in the deep blue sky, and still, notwithstand-
ing all that the local papers have said, very few were the people
who came down to witness the arrival of the ships. With the ex-
ception of the ofiicial element and a small number of Peninsulars,
the arrival of our warships inspired no interest, nor even curiosity.

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28

And I say this and want it understood, because it is the best proof
of the sympathies which the country professes for us and of which
it gives us constantly unquestionable proofs whenever opportunity
ofiPers.

The fleet was under the command of the eminent Rear Admiral
Pascual Cervera, who, as already stated, had hoisted his flag on the
Infanta Maria Teresa^ Captain Joaquin Bustamente being chief
of the general staff. The second in command was Captain Jos^
de Paredes, who had hoisted his flag on the Cristdbal Coldn,

The Infanta Maria Teresa, built at the Nervidn shipyards, is a
ship of 103.63 metres length, 19.81 beam, and 7,000 tons displace-
ment, with a draught of 6.55 metres. Her engines develop 13,700
I. H. P., giving her a speed of 20.25 miles. Her armament con-
sists of two 28-cm. Hontoria guns (mounted in turrets, one for-
ward and one aft); ten 14-cm. Hontoria guns; eight 57-mm. Nor-
denf eldt rapid-fire guns ; eight 37-mm. Hotchkiss revolving guns,
and two 11-mm. machine guns. She was commanded by Captain
Victor Concas.

The Vizcayay commanded by Captain Antonio Eulate, and the
OquendOj commanded by Captain Juan B. Lagaza, are exactly
like the Maria Teresa and built at the same yards.

The Cristdbal Colon, under the command of Captain Emilio
Diaz Moreu, was acquired in Gtenoa from the firm of Ansaldo.
She is 100 metres long by 18.20 beam; her displacement is 6,840
tons and her draught 7.76 metres; her speed is 20 miles and her
engines develop 13,000 I. H. P. Her armament consists of two
25i-mm. Armstrong guns (in turrets); ten 132-mm. guns; six
120-mm. guns; ten 67-mm. Nordenf eldt guns ; ten 37-mm. and two
machine guns.

Important note: The last-named ship, her 254-mm. or large
calibre guns mounted in turrets not being ready, had to go with-
out them.

The destroyer Plutdn was commanded by Lieutenant Pedro Vaz-
quez, and the Furor, of the same class, by Lieutenant Diego
Carlier ; both of them were under the command of Captain Fer-
nando Villamil.

The arrival of these six ships produced real enthusiasm among
the better peninsular element in Santiago, especially as nobody
wanted to believe that they were the only ones that Spain was
going to send, since they were called the /'first division," and at
least two more divisions were expected. The only ones who had
no illusions, who knew what to expect, who were acquainted with
the true condition of affairs, were those who had arrived in the
ships. From the admiral down to the last midshipman, they

29

knew perfectly well that there were no more fleets, no more divis-
ions, no more vessels, and that those six ships (if the destroyers
may be counted as such) were all that could be counted on to
oppose the American fleet, which consists of the following ships,
not including those in construction, and taking into account only
armored and protected ships — ^that is, those of the first and second
classes :

loway 11,340 tons, steel, first-class battle ship, 18 guns.

Indiana^ 10,288 tons, steel, first-class battle ship, 16 guns.

Massachusetts^ 10,288 tons, steel, first-class battle ship, 16 guns.

Oreymiy 10,288 tons, steel, first-class battle ship, 16 guns.

Brooklyn^ 9,216 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 20 guns.

New Yorky 9,200 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 18 guns.

Ccivmbia, 7,375 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 11 guns.

Minneapolis^ 7,375 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 11
guns.

TeoMis^ 6,315 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 8 guns.

Puritan^ 6,060 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 10 guns.

Olympiay 5,870 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 14 guns.

Chicago^ 4,500 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 18
guns.

Baltimore, 4,413 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 10
guns.

Philadelphia, 4,324 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 12
guns.

Monterey, 4,084 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser (with
turrets), 4 guns.

Newark, 4,098 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 12 guns.

San Francisco, 4,098 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser,
12 guns.

Charleston, 3,730 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 8
guns.

Miantonomoh, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 4 guns.

Amphitrite, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 6 guns.

Monadnock, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 6 guns.

Terror, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 4 guns.

Cincinnati, 3,213 tons, iron, second-class protected cruiser, 11
guns.

Raleigh, 3,213 tons, iron, second-class protected cruiser, 11 guns.

Note : Before war was declared, they bought of Brazil the Ama^
zonas, a magnificent protected cruiser of more than 6,000 tons, with
perfect armament. She was one of the ships that blockaded this
port.

It is to be noted that in the first eleven ships enumerated, the
number of guns stated is only that of the large-calibre guns, that

\

30

is, from 16-cm. upward, without including rapid-fire, revolving,
machine guns, etc.

The first four, namely, the Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, and
Oregon, have four 32-cm. guns each, that is to say, larger guns
than the medium-calibre ones of the Maria Teresa, Oquendo, and
Viscaya, each of which had but two 28-cm. guns. The Cristobal
Coldn, as has already been stated, did not have her large guns
mounted.

Shortly after the fleet had anchored, the civil and military author-
ities went on board to pay their respects to Admiral Cervera.

It will be remembered that these ships had been assembled at
the Cape Verde Islands and that many notes were exchanged on
that subject between the Governments of Spain and the United
States, until finally the Spanish Government gave definite orders
for the ships to proceed to the Island of Cuba.

They arrived at Martinique, where they left the destroyer Terror,
commanded by Lieut. Francisco de la Rocha, for the reason that
the vessel had sustained injuries to her boiler and was no longer
able to follow the fleet. From Martinique, the ships proceeded to
Curagao, where only two ships could take a small quantity of coal,
as the laws of that Dutch colony did not allow any more to enter
the harbor. Finally, as stated above, the fleet reached this harbor,
without having met Admiral Sampson's fleet, whether accident-
ally, or whether Admiral Cervera went by way of Curagao on
purpose to mislead the American admiral, I do not know.

X.

PKO VISIONS OF THE CITY.

So far my task has been, if not easy, at least pleasant, for in
honor of the truth and deference to justice, I will say that all per-
sons who have so far figured, directly or indirectly, in the events
under discussion, deserve praise and congratulations. Unfortu-
nately, I can not say as much regarding the question of provisions,
which is of such great importance, and has had so much to do with
the capitulation of this city.

It is far from me to want to mention or censure any person or
persons in particular. I am citing facts which everyone knows,
and I believe it to be a duty which I must not shun to set forth
everything with perfect impartiality. I am making history, and
with that I have said everything.

The city of Santiago de Cuba has never been very well supplied
and provisions have never been abundant there.

It is only just to state that the whole military element of the
province and also the hospitals were nine or ten months in arrears
in the payment of consignments. They had been living on credit
for some time, and the firms furnishing the supplies, not being
able to order new ones and meet their obligations, had allowed
their stores to run very low. We were passing through one of
those crises which were so frequent in our last war, and which,
unfortunately, are being repeated in this, owing to the parsimony
of the Treasury.

But now, under the circumstances in which Santiago de Cuba
was, the problem assumed more serious shape, for living became
almost impossible. Everything was lacking: articles of food,
prospects, money; our credit and purchasing resources were ex-
hausted. And this was the case not only at the capital, but extended
te the whole division. What happened at Santiago, also happened
at Manzanillo, Holguin, Puerto Principe, Ciego de Avila, Mordn,
Splritus, and other places of the island, namely, the cities supplied
the people of the surrounding country and the latter had no pro-
visions or stores to furnish in return.

Moreover, the merchants of this city, little given to great enter-
prises and risky speculations, did not have on hand any more than

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32

what they felt sure they could sell in a short time. And, there-
fore, I repeat it, provisions, even those of first necessity, were cer-
tainly not abundant, and everybody knew that when the hostile
ships should arrive to blockade the city, as must happen sooner or
later, these would soon give out. A few families understood it
and laid in supplies in anticipation of what was to come, and they
certainly did not regret it, for their fears were realized, although,
be it said in honor of the truth, there was no motive or reason to
justify such a condition of affairs.

War was officially declared on April 21, and until the 18th of
May not a single hostile ship appeared in sight of the harbor.
There were in it five Spanish merchant vessels, which were pre-
vented from leaving by the breaking out of hostilities, the Mejico,
Mortera^ San Juan^ Reina de los Angeles, and Tomas Brooks.
Jamaica is only 80 miles from Santiago, and yet not a single sack
of flour entered the city since before the 21st of April, when a
small English sailing scliooner came from there with a cargo of
butter, potatoes, onions, and corn meal, which she sold for a good
price without landing it at the custom-house. The example was
not followed ; everybody saw the possibility of the conflict which
had to come without trying to prevent it.

Had it not been for the arrival of the German steamer Polaria,
which, fortunately, left at Santiago 1,700 sacks of rice intended
for Havana, there would have been an absolute lack of provisions,
as neither the merchants nor anyone else attempted to import them.

The last provisions entering the trading houses were brought by
the steamer Mortera on the 25th of April, consisting of 150 head
of cattle, 180,000 rations of flour, 149,000 of peas, 197,000 of rice,
79,000 of beans, and 96,000 of wine. Now, without including the
forces of Guant^namo, Baracoa, and Sagua de Tinamo, the needs
of the troops of Santiago de Cuba amounted to 360,000 rations a
month. Thus it will be seen that the provisions on hand in the
trading houses the last days of April were hardly sufficient for
half a month.

And this is not the worst ; but the merchants, far from contrib-
uting to the welfare of the army, which in reality was defending
their interests, hid whatever they could and raised the prices in a
manner which I do not wish to qualify, taking advantage of the
sad stress to which the blockade had reduced the city.

An example will show this better than anything I may say on
the subject. The man who had the contract of furnishing water
at the bay, relying on the letter of his contract, tried to charge the
ships of the fleet for the water which they were getting at Las
Cruces pier, this water being the property of the American com-
pany of the Juragua mines, for which the Spanish Government

33

could therefore not contract, and was conveyed on board by means
of the water pipes, which are there for that purpose, the pump
being kept going night and day by the soldiers of Colonel Borry's
column. Nearly all the ships took over 500 pipes of water each,
which, at 4 pesetas a pipe, amounts to several thousand dollars.
The contractor in question, whose name I do not wish to remem-
ber, is from the Peninsula, a captain of volunteers, and, as he says
himself, " a better Spaniard than Pelayo."

I do not know what news may have reached the Peninsula about
the conditions at Santiago de Cuba. It is possible that people believe '
there that only certain articles of food were lacking ; if that is the
case, they are greatly mistaken. People here have suffered from
actual hunger, and many persons have starved to death, although
the population had been greatly decreased, since whole families
had left prior to the 21st day of April. I, myself, saw a man who
had died of hunger in the entrance of the Brooks House opposite
the captaincy of the port — died because he had nothing to eat.

Horses, dogs, and other animals were dying from hunger in the
streets and public places and the worst thing was that their car-
casses were not removed. I also saw — this is significant on account
of the fatal consequences that might follow — I saw, I repeat, a dog •
throw himself upon a smaller one and kill and devour him. The
water from the aqueduct had been cut off, as will be seen, and
the city was exposed to the danger of the dogs going mad, and we
should have had that calamity to add to the many that were weigh-
ing upon us. But why go on? What I have said is more than
suflBcient to show the immense responsibility incurred by those who
might have supplied the city with provisions, and who neglected
and eluded so sacred a duty.

There were orders and decrees published regulating the price of
articles of first necessity, but the merchants paid no attention to
them, as though they did not concern them, and the raising of
prices was the more unjustifiable and inexcusable, as everything
that was in the city had been there prior to the declaration of war,
and had cost no more freight or duty than in normal times.

If there had been flour and bacon, the soldiers might not have
become weakened and sick, and yet they fought as the Spanish
soldier always has fought. What a contrast between him and the
merchant of this city ! But there are things which it is better not
to air and this is one of them.

1084.V— 3

COALING.

The fleet which left the Cape Verde Islands, which took no coal
at Martinique where it touched, and which at Curagao took on
only a few tons in two of the ships, arrived here, as was natural,
with the bunkers almost empty. Admiral Cervera prepared to
replenish them, and it may be easily imagined how imperative it
was to hasten an operation without which the ships were unable
to execute a single maneuver, even though their very salvation
might depend on it.

Unfortunately, the harbor of Santiago, where there is little
movement of shipping, has but very scant means and resources,
especially since the breaking out of the present insurrection.

There were only four steamers — the Alcyon^ Juragudy Esme-
falda, and Colon. The first two do not possess the necessary re-
quirements for towing launches ; the Esmeralda does very well
when the sea is calm and there is not much head wind ; the only
one that has all the necessary requirements is the Colon, hut the
Colon was having her boiler overhauled and it required a week to
finish the work, which was indispensable. Unfortunately, the
gunboat Alvarado, which might have rendered good services, was
in dock renewing her bottom planks, and the work was very slow.

The army, in its turn, also had a great deal of work on hand
which it could not possibly leave, such as taking supplies to the
Morro, water to Punta Gorda, and war material and ammunition
bo both of these places and to the Socapa, and the chiefs and offi-
cers were needed for directing all the work undertaken.

The only launches and lighters in the harbor were those of
Messrs. Ros, some of them useless, others in bad repair, and a few
only in condition to be used ; besides these there were those of the
Juragu^ Company, which were good but few in number, and, as
they belong to American subjects, it was not easy for the Govern-
ment to get them. With such small resources and with so much
that had to be done, it will be understood how difficult it was, not
to say impossible, to accomplish everything.

To give even an imperfect idea of the lack of appliances of every
description, I will mention that the contractor of water, which

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35

latter is very bad aud for which he charges exorbitant prices, had,
for the purpose of supplying the ships, only two small rudder
boats, each with two pipes (about four hogsheads), and there
were four ships requiring 1,600 pipes each, without counting the
destroyers.

Naturally all the demands, requests, and complaints, everything
the fleet needed, wanted or desired, went to the comandancia de
marina, the i)ersonnel of which consisted of the commander, the
second in command, the aide, the paymaster, three enlisted seamen
(cabos de matrlcula), one of whom had charge of the provision
stores, and two orderlies, and with this personnel everything had
to be done that was asked for and everything furnished that was
wanted.

The army wanted a tiig, the military government wanted a tug
and launches, and the fleet wanted launches and a tug, and all
wanted them badly, and all the services were important and urgent,
and at the captaincy of the port we constantly had to solve prob-
lems that had no solution, and furnish launches that did not exist
and tugs that were not to be found.

The coaling, which went on day and night, progressed very
slowly, in spite of everything; for at the two piers where the coal
was there was very little water, and at the end of each pier only
one lighter could be accommodated without danger of running
aground, in which case it would have been necessary to wait for
high water to float it again.

There is no end to the time and work which it took to put the
Cardiff coal of the navy d^pot on board the ships, and though
laborers were hired for the Cumberland coal of the Juragud, mines,
the ships, which never stopped coaling as long as as they stayed
at Santiago, never succeeded in filling their bunkers. One detail
will show the lack of means available at the port. Although every
store in the town was visited and any price offered for baskets, only
a very limited number could be found for carrying the coal ; it had
to be put in as best it could.

There is some work that can neither be understood nor appreci-
ated, that passes by unnoticed and of which people do not even
have an idea, because it does not constitute actions of war, more or
less brilliant, and which yet can not be kept up nor stood for any
length of time. We who belonged to the captaincy of the port
finally dined, breakfasted, and slept there — or rather, did not sleep
there, for there never was a night when it was not necessary to
transmit to the admiral two or three urgent papers, orders, or other
cablegrams, at all hours, and the telephone did not stop a minute
and did not give us any rest. Still it was not the work that made

36

the situation unbearable ; what soldier or sailor did not work des-
perately at Santiago de Cuba? No, the sad, the lamentable thing
was that, being so anxious to please all, we were unable to satisfy
anybody.

The coal belonging to the navy, consisting of 2,300 tons of Car-
diff, was taken on at the piers of Bella vista, situated in the western
part of the bay. Besides this, General Linares placed at Admiral
Cervera's disposal about 600 tons of Cumberland coal from the
Juragudr mines and 600 tons from the Sabanilla railway.

The water had to be gotten "by the boats of the fleet in bulk at
the piers of Las Cruces and at the faucet near the Royal Pier.
Some of the ships got their own water by going alongside the first-
named pier.

OPINIONS AS TO WHY THE FLEET DID NOT GO OUT.

In narrating the events of Santiago, it was not my intention to
make remarks of any kind on them, nor to permit myself com-
ments thereon, as I consider that I have neither the authority, nor
the ability (and this I do not say from false modesty), nor the
right to do so. My object has been to give a simple account of
what I witnessed, what I saw, and what I heard from trustworthy
sources, and of the authenticity of which I am certain, feeling
sure that in Spain, though the facts are known as a whole, they
are not known there in detail ; but in the presence of certain insin-
uations and certain doubts I can not remain silent and indifferent.

Great was the joy caused by the arrival of the fleet among the
peninsular element generally and some of the sons of Cuba who
truly love us. But after a few days, a number of intelligent and
prominent people, or at least recognized as such, showed great
impatience and surprise that the ships should remain in port, and
never got tired asking what the fleet was doing there and why it
did not go out.

It is easy to answer that question.

If Admiral Cervera can be accused of anything, it is an excess
of courage. One need only read his record of service to be con-
vinced of that, and the third day of July proved it only too well.
Admiral Cervera received many cablegrams and oflBcial letters ; no
one knew better than he did what was going on in Spain and in
Cuba, and what was being ordered and required of him, and that
Admii'al Cervera acted as he should have done admits of no dis-
cussion. My only object is to answer the question which so many
were asking in Santiago: "What was the fleet doing there?"
What was it doing ? Well, a great deal.

It is not always great battles or great fights that decide the out-
come of a campaign. Napoleon I, by an admirable maneuver,
closed in on the Austrian General Marck at Ulm, and the latter
had to surrender with his whole army without having fired a single
shot.

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88

When Admiral Villenenve, who unfortmiately commanded
the allied fleets of France and Spain, learned that Admiral Ros-
silly, appointed to relieve him, was at Madrid, he preferred to
fight with Nelson rather than present himself before Napoleon.
So he decided to leave Cadiz, and he called together the com-
manders of both 'fleets on the ship Bucentaure. The Spanish
objected, on the grounds that, in order to leave Cadiz, they needed
time and a favorable wind, that the ships were in need of repairs,
had to replenish their provisions and ammunition and complete
their crews, that the season was far advanced, and that, if the
English were compelled to blockade them in winter, it would be
equivalent for them to the loss of a naval battle; that was the
opinion of men like Gravina, Churruca, and Galiano.

They added that, moreover, the barometer was very low and
that a storm was imminent, whereupon Rear Admiral Mag(5n replied
"that what was low was the courage in some hearts." At this
insult, the Spanish, losing all prudence and calm, decided to go
out in search of the enemy to prove that they still retained their
courage. That was all that the French admiral wanted. The
combined fleets went out, and what happened at Cape Trafalgar
is well known.

Now, then, the question is answered already: the ships were
compelling the enemy to sustain with superior forces the blockade
of Santiago de Cuba, with all its difficulties and dangers. While
our ships were in port, safe from the ordinary dangers of the sea,
using hardly any coal, not exhausting their engines, and waiting
for a favorable opportunity to maneuver, when and as best they
could, the hostile fleet was obliged to cruise on the coast day and
night, using a great deal of coal, constantly doing sea service,
which is always laborious, especially in time of war, exhausting
their engines, and exposed to the danger of having to abandon the
blockade in case of a storm from the south or east, still more if
the season of cyclones should come.

It is certainly true that a victory can be achieved without the
necessity of giving battle, so much so that, if it had been
possible for us, besides the ships that were at Santiago, to have
two at Cienfuegos, for instance, and two more at Nuevitas, which
ports are well suited for placing lines of torpedoes, owing to their
narrow entrances, there is no doubt but that the Americans, who,
outside of the ships they had in the Philippines, had sent their
whole fleet to the island of Cuba, would have had to blockade
those three ports with forces superior to ours and to keep watch at
Key West if they did not want to expose themselves to a serious
disaster, or would have had to force one of the ports, thereby
exposing themselves to a hecatomb ; and we only need think of

89

the number of their ships to understand that they could not suc-
cessfully threaten so many points ; though they only had to deal
with Santiago and had almost all the ships of the fleet in front of
it, they would have found it necessary to desist from taking the
offensive.

The foregoing shows that ships do not necessarily have to give
battle in order to obtain results. Those in Santiago harbor suc-
ceeded for forty-six days in keeping before the mouth of the har-
bor a vastly superior fleet, which performed no special acts of
prowess except to throw a hail of projectiles which comparatively
did very little damage. One could not obtain better results with
less work ; and if provisions had not been wanting in Santiago,
Qod knows, if our fleet had remained there, to what extremes
impatience and despair might not have carried Admiral Sampson !

THE BLOCKADE.

As I liave already given a description, thougli very deficient, of
the sites and places that were the scene of these events (IV : Scene
of Events), and of the miserable resources we had for their defense,
it will be easy to understand them by remembering and fixing the
attention on what has been said.

I have already stated that on the 18th of May, the Saint Louis^
equipped for war, and a gunboat whose name could not be ascer-
tained, fired about 80 shots, which were answered by Punta Gorda,
the only battery that was then in condition to answer the attack.
If it had happened a few hours later, one of the 16-cm. Hontoria
guns of the Socapa could have been fired, but as stated, it was not
mounted until the night of the 18th. The hostile ships disappeared
to the east. The next day, the 19th, the Spanish fleet, coming from
Curasao, entered the harbor and commenced to coal on the 20th.

21st, — This day, a ship coming from the south came close to the
mouth of the harbor, then shaping her course westward. At 10.30
p. m. the Morro telephone gave notice that two ships had been fir-
ing on Punta Cabrera for 15 minutes, ten shots in all. Probably
they were firing at Colonel Aldea's forces, which covered that part
of the coast.

22(1. — At 7 a. m. the look-out signaled a steamer to the east and
another half an hour later. We learned from the Morro that one
of them appeared to be the same that had been sighted the day
before ; the other was a three-master. Both of them were thought
to be hostile vessels because they were going very slowly and
reconnoitering the coast. The new one had three smokestacks.

At 11.30 the vessels were south of the Morro (that is, in front of
it), proceeding very slowly westward, where they disappeared at
half -past four.

23d. — At 5.45 a vessel was signaled to the south and an hour

later two to the east. At 9 the Morro said that one of the three

vessels had three smokestacks, the same that had been sighted the

day before, and one was a battle ship, and that flag signals were

being made.

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41

At 11.30 a vessel was signaled to the west; at 12.30 the Moiro
said that the vessel just arrived had three masts and three smoke-
stacks.

At 4.10 we learned by telephone that one of the four vessels had
disappeared to the south and the others were coming closer to the
month of the harbor.

At 7 the three ships disappeared, one to the east and two to
the south.

2Jffth, — At 2 o'clock the lookout signaled two steamers to the
south. The sky was clouded and nothing could be distinguished
beyond a certain distance.

At 11.46 the destroyer Plutdn went out.

At 12.30 four hostile vessels were distinguished, though with
difficulty, owing to the cloudy weather, to the east of the mouth of
the harbor.

When seeing the Plutdn go out, one of them shaped her course
to the westward and passed close to the destroyer without being
able to attack her, then proceeded westward. The others started
in the same direction, also in pursuit of her, but without success,
as the Plutdn had naturally eluded meeting them.

The four vessels disappeared to the westward.

At 2 o'clock, the Spanish flagship {Infanta Maria Teresa) started
up and went alongside the Las Cruces Pier for water.

At 5.30 two vessels were signaled to the south; they disappeared
in that direction after dark.

25fh. — At 6 o'clock two steamers were signaled, one to the south
and one to the west.

At 7.30 the Cristdbal Coldn started up and shortly after cast
anchor again.

At the same hour, the Morro reported that one of the two ves-
sels signaled was apparently heading toward the harbor at full
speed, and the other seemed to be chasing her. Three-quarters of
an hour later it was reported that the vessel appeared to have been
captured at quite a distance from the mouth of Santiago harbor,
and that both were going south, the captured vessel ahead and the
other following.

The Infanta Maria Teresa sheered off from Las Cruces Pier at
1 o'clock p. m., and the Oquendo then went alongside, also to take
water ; the former anchored again in the bay.

At 2 o'clock the Vizcaya cast anchor south of Cay Ratones, near
Cajuma Bay. The Cristdbal Colon anchored south of Punta Gorda.

26th, — At 2 o'clock p. m. the Oquendo left Las Cruces Pier and
anchored again in the bay.

The position of the fleet was as follows : The Cristobal Coldn was
at anchor south of Punta Gorda, close to it, presenting her broad-
side to the mouth of the harbor, in line with the channel to which

42

she presented her guns, so as to be able to attack the enemy in case
he should try to force it.

The Vizcaya close to Cajumas Bay, facing the same as the Coldn
so as to unite their fire in case the enemy should succeed in passing
Punta Soldado.

The Maria Teresa and Oquendo south of Cay Batones, so as to
defend the channel of Punta Gorda as well as the general anchor-
ing place and the city. During the day three ships were sighted
to the south, and disappeared shortly after in the same direction.

27th, — At 6 the lookout signaled two vessels to the south.

At 11.30 it signaled five more ships. There were now seven in
sight.

At 12.15 General Linares went to the Morro in the steamboat of
the captaincy of the port.

At 12.30 four more ships were sighted; total, eleven ships.

Of the eleven ships in sight, four are battle ships.

At 2.30 p. m. another ship arrived.

At nightfall General Linares returned from the Morro. The
ships disappeared to the south.

28fh. — At 6.15 the lookout signaled a vessel within 5 miles of
the Morro, and at noon she disappeared to the south.

At 4.30 p. m. six large ships were signaled, disappearing to the
south at nightfall.

29th. — At daybreak the destroyers Plut&n and Furor went out
to reconnoiter, returning at 8.

During the day they anchored in the bay; at night they cast
anchor at the Socapa and at Nispero Bay in order to guard the en-
trance of the harbor.

General Linares went to the Morro in the tug Alcyon.

At 7, seven hostile ships were sighted reconnoitering the coast,
at a distance of about 8 miles; they withdrew to the south before
dark.

30th. — At 5.30 the hostile fleet was signaled approaching to within
9 miles of the harbor. It consisted of seven ships.

At noon three others arrived from the south and joined the former.

Slst. — ^At 5.45 the lookout signaled eleven ships to the south.

At 2 p. m. gun fire was heard. The lookout reported that the
coast was being fired on.

At 2.40 Punta Gorda battery opened fire, ceasing again shortly
after.

The ships of the Spanish fleet hoisted their battle flags and fired
up their boilers.

At 2.30 the firing was quite lively.

By 3 it became slower and ceased at 3.30.

43

The enemy had been firing on the Morro and Socapa batteries,
without any casualty in either.

The ships disappeared, as usual, to the south before dark.

Thus ends the events of the month of May, insignificant on the
whole and only a prologue to those that were to follow.

During the days of May 20th to 22d, the insurgent chief Calixto
Garcia, with a numerous contingent of troops and artillery, at-
tacked the village of Palma Soriano on the Cauto river. General
Vara de Rey, at the head of 1,000 men and two guns, repulsed the
hostile forces, routing them and killing a great many. On our
side we had 16 wounded. This operation of the soldier hero, sim-
ulating a surrounding movement by crossing the Cauto at three or
four fords, and pursuing the rebels 2 miles beyond Palma Soriano,
was due to the skillful distribution of the scant forces of the line
of observation. This line, as will be readily understood from the
chart at the end of the book, was weak, very weak, in almost its
whole extent. It was, indeed, work that deserves praise, to guard,
patrol, and sustain strategic points, cultivated land, coasts, roads,
and railroads, with such a small and weak contingent of troops.
And the forces that we were expecting from Havana, and the arrival
of which had been announced, did not appear.

As a collier was being expected, it was supposed that the vessel
captured on the 25th was the one. It is possible; but, on the other
hand, it may not have been. In any event, there was much sur-
prise expressed at Santiago that, since the hostile fleet was not in
sight, but only one or two vessels. Admiral Cervera had not pre-
vented the capture, or at least recovered the prize.

The reason why he did not is very simple. Our fleet had taken
on board all the Cardiff coal that was at the navy depot, without
succeeding, as has been seen, in filling its bunkers, and there
remained only the 1,100 tons of Cumberland coal of which Gen.
Linares could dispose ; this latter coal is inferior to the former, and
I believe it is hardly necessary for me to point out how important
it is that a fleet should have good fuel ; H may be its salvation at
a given moment ; consequently the fleet, which had the prospect of
having extremely difficult maneuvers of the highest importance to
execute, could not afford to waste even a single i)iece of coal to no
purpose.

The capture took place a long distance from the mouth of the
harbor; before a ship could weigh anchor, clear the channel, get
up full steam and traverse that distance, at least three hours must
elapse, and where would have been the captor and the prize by that
time? And even granting that the former could not bring the
latter in safety, would he allow it to fall into our hands ? Certainly
not. Two gunshots would have sunk her very quickly, especially

44

if, as was believed, she had a heavy cargo ; and the Coldn^ or any
other ship that had gone out on that errand, would have consumed,
probably to no purpose, a quantity of coal which it was impera-
tive to keep for much more important and less hazardous opera-
tions than pursuing merchant steamers equipped for war and tak-
ing or recapturing prizes. Moreover, from the 22d to the 28th, the
swell of the sea prevented the ships from going out ; the pilots of
the harbor were not willing to take them out, saying that in view
of the state of the sea, they might touch bottom, especially the
Cristdbal Coldn.

THE VOLUNTEERS.

Although the comparison may perhaps not be considered very
apt, I might say that the month of May was the paradise of the
blockade, while the month of June was its purgatory, and the
month of July its hell.

The appearance of the first hostile ships before the Morro of San-
tiago, as the natural result of the war decided upon by the Gov-
ernment of the United States and accepted by ours, and the noise
of the first gunshots caused both consternation and curiosity among
the inhabitants of the city ; but as man becomes accustomed to
everything, so the situation, which at that time was, if not dan-
gerous, yet certainly very unpleasant and disagreeable, was finally
looked upon with indifference.

The boats of the fleet were constantly going back and forth be-
tween the ships and the piers to supply the innumerable wants of
the former, and gave to the marina an aspect of animation which
it never wore in normal times. The Alameda, where the music of
the Santiago regiment played, as usual, on Sunday evenings, by
order of the the military authorities who were desirous of raising
the spirit of the inhabitants as much as possible, and the Plaza de
Armas, where the drums continued to beat the tattoo every Thurs-
day and Sunday, were always full of people, although so many had
left the city. People fond of giving sensational news, especially
those who took pleasure in inventing it, had a wide field and plenty
material to satisfy their desire ; and anyone having patience and
curiosity enough to collect the news floating through the city
might have written a very original and amusing book.

The children were playing war, pelting each other with stones
inside and around the city, divided into parties in command of a
Cervera of ten summers or a Sampson of twelve Aprils.

The different corps of volunteers were considerably increased by

the many men who came to swell their ranks, especially chiefs and

oflicers ; the city was full of sabers, machetes, stars, and galloons,

and I believe not even in Berlin, the capital of the most military

nation of Europe, are as many uniforms seen as we saw in this

city, usually so quiet. Even the clerks of the guardhouse and

employees of the civil guard armed themselves with carbines and

machetes.

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46

And while I am talking of the volunteers I will finish their his-
tory to the end, which is not without interest.

After sunset and during the first hours of the night the volun-
teers would gather at the Alameda, which they filled completely,
divided into more or less numerous platoons, which officers of the
regular army, or their own officers, undertook to drill, and at the
first gun or the first blast of the bugle, they reported promptly,
especially the chiefs and officers, at the posts which had been as-
signed to them beforehand.

Every night a guard of twenty-five men, commanded by an offi-
cer, occupied the large shed of the Alameda and placed its senti-
nels, and from that time until dawn the noise of musket- butts
striking on the wooden floor was constantly heard, and by many
people mistaken for gunshots, and the "Who goes there?" ad-
dressed to every moving object was an evident proof of the extreme
vigilance observed, and showed that it would not be easy to sur-
prise them.

The firemen were always on hand whenever they were needed at
the pier to take the wounded from the Morro and Socapa to the
hospital on their stretchers, and their energy, good will, and zeal
can not be sufficiently praised.

On the 1st, 2d, and 3d of July, as will be seen later, a large num-
ber of volunteers hurried to the trenches of the third line, where
they fought the enemy like brave men, and where some of them
were wounded.

Unfortunately, after that day, with a few honorable exceptions,
the spirit animating them underwent a complete change; their
enthusiasm became indifference, their valor prudence; they left
the trenches to which they never returned, and exchanged the uni-
form for civilian's clothes and the gun or machete for the measur-
ing-stick or weighing scales.

Why this change? There is an explanation for it. It is an
error to suppose that the soldier is braver than the volunteer;
there is no reason why he should be ; they are both Spanish. But
the soldier has military habits and discipline which the volunteer
lacks ; he has chiefs and officers whom he must needs respect and
obey, the volunteer has not ; and that is the whole explanation.

As long as the enemy was making attacks which it was neces-
sary to repel the volunteers fought with energy and enthusiasm;
but when the battle and excitement were over, when the period of
trenches arrived, with the hot sun in daytime and dampness at
night, with rains, sickness, privations, and want, in a word, the
hour of suffering in silence and with resignation, the hour of sub-
ordination, of sacrifice and duty, then, one after another, under

47

this pretext or that, they returned to the city, determined not to
go back.

The circle narrowed more and more, the probabilities of capitu-
lation and death increased as those of triumph and success dimin-
ished, and then it was that they remembered their families, their
own interests, and themselves, that they took off their uniforms,
which, in their opinion, might cause them trouble, and, not con-
sidering themselves safe in the city, they went to hide at Cinco
Reales, Las Cruces, and on board of merchant steamers, or any
other place where they thought themselves safe from projectiles,
and there were even those who emigrated to El Caney and Cuabitas,
occupied by the Americans and the insurgents respectively.

What I relate I do not know from hearsay; I saw it myself at
CSnco Reales, upon my return from the cruiser Reina Mercedes^
sunk in the entrance of the harbor, where I had gone by orders of
the commander of marine in order to report to him on the exact
position then occupied by the vessel. At Cinco Reales I found
many in hiding, in civilians' clothes, some with their families and
others alone.

But while men who had carried the gun did such things, others
who had girded the sword, with a show of doing great things, did
even worse.

WAITING

The events of the month of May, although they are not, or rather
do not appear to be, of great importance in themselves, because
there were no special movements on the part of the enemy and no
casualties of any kind on ours, are in reality of great importance,
and their consequences have had great influence and weight on the
result of the war, which has been decided, so to speak, in the waters
of Santiago de Cuba and in front of the trenches in this precinct.

If we take into consideration the position of Santiago de Cuba,
situated at the southern extremity of the island, and therefore
at a comparative distance from the United States and Key West,
the base of operations of the Yankees ; the topography of its harbor,
difficult in itself to force ; the absence of military importance of
the city, which is not a stronghold or even a military city, and the
scarcity of roads and railways so that it is almost cut off from com-
munication with any important or strategic i)oint, it is not too much
to assume that the Americans had no idea of making great demon-
strations or operations, but thought that it would be sufficient to
blockade it, and throw in a few projectiles as they had done at other
cities on the coast, and a proof of this is that, until the 18th of May,
that is, nearly a month after the declaration of war, not a single
hostile vessel was seen, and the two that appeared then were a
merchant vessel equipped for war and a small gunboat, which, after
reconnoitering, disappeared to the east.

But the arrival of the Spanish fleet, though composed of only

four battleships, but these the only ones of that class which we had

in the island, and therefore the only ones that could inspire any

fear, the absolute necessity of replenishing them with coal, which

took a number of days, because, in view of the scarcity of facilities

of any kind it could not be done in less time, compelled the enemy

to make the city, and especially the harbor where the fleet was at

anchor, their objective, although they had not taken much thought

of it at first ; to concentrate upon this objective all their forces on

sea and on land, and to take for the scene of the war one which

was least adapted for their plans and which they had least thought

of choosing.

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49

When did they learn that our ships had anchored in the harbor?
I do not know ; nor do I believe that anybody in Santiago knows
it. If the 8t Louis and the gunboat which has been mentioned
several times returned from Guantanamo on the 19th, where they
went presumably to continue the blockade when they left these
waters, there is no doubt but that they could see our ships and
some people think that they at once notified their admiral, but I
doubt it, because it was not until the 27th that ships appeared in
such numbers as would make it possible to check or defeat ours.

It might be said in answer to this that the hostile fleet may have
had a thousand reasons, which we could not know, for this delay
in assembling and appearing at the harbor. It is possible, but in
that case, if the enemy knew ever since the 19th, what had hap-
pened, why did they continue to appear in small numbers before
the mouth of the harbor, exposing themselves to serious trouble ?
I do not believe that the enemy received any information on the
subject, or at least complete evidence, until the 24th, when the
vessels which were cruising in Santiago waters, saw the Plutdn
come out and go back again, for they knew that she accompanied
the fleet and formed part of it. It was three days later, the 27th,
that eleven ships appeared, four of them, at least, battle ships.
This interval of time was necessary, of course, to advise the hostile
fleet, which was perhaps between Cape San Antonio and Havana,
or Cape San Antonio and Cienfuegos.

In any event, the operations of the month of May assumed great
importance, for the harbor remained closed, where since before the
declaration of war no provisions of any kind had entered, if we
except those which the small English schooner already mentioned
brought from Jamaica, and which are hardly worth taking into
consideration.

Another problem : Why did the hostile ships which remained
all day long in front of the mouth of the harbor disappear at dark
instead of continuing to watch it during the night? I do not
know that either. The whole coast is accessible and the ground
so high that it can be distinguished perfectly- even in stormy
weather, so that there was no danger in remaining there in calm
weather such as we have had all this year (for even in that Provi-
dence had favored them), and what I say is true, as shown by the
fact that afterwards they never left the mouth of the harbor for a
single moment, day or night, as will be seen.

Was it perhaps because they had become convinced of the diflB-
culty of forcing the harbor, especially with a fleet inside, and
wanted, by opening a passage, give the fleet a chance to come out
in order to take refuge in another harbor less difficult of access ?
But such tactics might have had fatal results, because if our ships

50

should reach Havana harbor, a few hours from Key West, under
the protection of its 300 guns, and united with the other warships
that were there, the situation would have become materially
changed, and the Americans might have had a chance to regret
such tactics. That they should have made such a mistake is not
to be thought of; besides, if that had been their intention, they
would not have maintained such vigilance during the day. Were
they simulating a retreat to return at night to the harbor, without
lights, so as not to be seen? That is not probable; in order to see
the mouth of the harbor they must have been seen themselves
from the heights of the Morro or Socapa, where the strictest watch
was also exercised. I suppose, for I can not think of anything
/ else, that, not having been able as yet to unite all their naval
forces, they did not want to run the risk of a battle at night with
a fleet that had destroyers, the number of which they probably did
not know, and did not learn until later, through the secret infor-
mation which they probably received from the insurgents.

But all this is only supposition and hypothesis, no doubt entirely
erroneous. The incontrovertible, undeniable fact is that, on the
27th, the enemy appeared with forces much superior to ours and
remained all day long opposite the Morro, retreating at night, or
simulating retreat. Thus ended the month of May.

THE MERRIMAC.

Jwae 1st, — At 6 o'clock the look-out signaled the hostile fleet in
sight, consisting of thirteen ships; five battle ships and eight
merchant and warships, among them one torpedo boat.

At 7 o'clock gunshots were heard.

At 12.30 the fleet started up, moving away from the harbor
from which it was about 6 miles distant; half Q,n hour later it
reversed its course and came again closer.

At night the Spanish fleet changed its anchoring place.

The Maria Teresa and Vizcaya anchored south of, and with
their broadsides toward Cay Ratones and were forming the first
line for the defense of the harbor. The Colon and Oquendo
anchored north of the same Cay and were forming the second line.

2nd. — At 5.30 nineteen ships appeared at the mouth of the
harbor, at a distance of about 5 miles.

At 7 the Morro reported that they were going to fire a few
shots to discharge some of the guns.

3rd. — At 3.30 gunshots were being heard toward the mouth of
the harbor and the firing became very lively.

At 4 o'clock it was learned at the comandancia de marina that
a merchant vessel had come very close to the mouth of the chan-
nel; that the batteries had fired at her and she had not answered;
and at that moment she was already inside; shortly after she
passed by the bow of the Reina Mercedes^ which, it will be
remembered, was moored between the Socapa and Cay Smith,
with her bow towards the channel which she was defending with
her two 16-cm. Hontoria guns and Whitehead torpedoes.

By 4.20 the firing, which had been very violent, ceased.

At 4.30 it was learned that the hostile ship had gone down in
the mouth of the channel, close to Punta Soldado, but without
obstructing it.

At 5.30, it now being daylight, very slow firing was again heard
and ceased at 6.

At 5.30 the commandant of marine went to the mouth of the
harbor in the steam launch.

52

When lie returned, we learned that one of the merchant vessels
forming part of the American fleet, called the Merrimac^ with two
masts and one smokestack, larger than the MejicOy had forced the
entrance at 6.30; that she had been sunk in the channel close to
Punta Soldado, by the guns of the Mercedes and the rapid-fire
guns of the battery below the Socapa, and was lying in the direc-
tion of the Socapa, without obstructing the entrance or preventing
our ships from going out, and that one lieutenant and seven sailors
forming her crew had been captured and were on board the Mer-
cedes.

Besides the firing on the vessel from the guns, the PlutSn
launched two torpedoes and the Mercedes two more. Two sub-
marine mines were discharged from the first line and one from the
second.

During the events related above. General Linares was at the
Morro, where he had repaired by land on receipt of the first news.
At daybreak, General Toral, military governor of Santiago, came
to assist the navy with a force of regulars and volunteers.

At 7 a company went to reenf orce the forces at the Socapa and
the Morro.

At 7.30 the forces that had come to assist the navy withdrew.

At 11 p. m. firing was heard at a great distance in a south-
easterly direction; it ceased at 12.15. The fire was extremely slow.

As may have been noticed, on June 1 the enemy appeared before
the Morro with thirteen ships, five of them battle ships and eight
merchant and war vessels; that is to say, with forces superior to
ours, in number as well as caliber of armament, and also from the
fact that they were better protected than ours, as may be seen
from the report of the United States Navy, and as unfortunately
we found out ourselves later. From that time on the hostile
ships, which were afterwards increased in number, established day
and night a constant watch, without withdrawing at nightfall, as
they used to do. Probably they suspected — for they never lacked
advices and secret information — that our fleet, for want of pro-
visions, would before very long be compelled to go out, and that
is what they were waiting for.

On the 2d, nineteen ships were present.

At daybreak of the 3d, the Merrimac forced the entrance of the
harbor, at 3.30, with the result above set forth.

In spite of the time that has elapsed, we, at Santiago, have not
succeeded in ascertaining definitely — though it is probably known
in Spain from American newspapers that are in the habit of pub-
lishing everything — ^what was the real object that the Merrimac
had in view.

53

Slie had guns and did not fire; she had torpedoes, though imper-
fect and primitive, if I may be permitted the expression, or rudi-
mental, which she did not use ; if she was trying to explode our
mines, she did not accomplish her design; and, finally, she had
2,000 tons of coal on board. The lieutenant who commanded her
refused to state the object of his maneuver, saying only that it was
made by order of Admiral Sampson ; later, he said to Mr. Rams-
den, British consul, that if the vessel were examined, it would bfi
found that she carried torpedoes, as indeed was the case. There-
fore, it may be reasonably supposed that the object was to sink the
vessel across the channel, so as to obstruct it and prevent our ships
from going out; and having made sure of that, to use part of their
ships in other operations ; and if the vessel did not come to lie
across the channel and did not obstruct it, it was because she lost
control of her movements, her rudder having been disabled by
some projectile, so that she went down where it suited her least.

There is another fact in this connection which may and should
arrest the attention of experts in that subject : The Plutdn launched
two torpedoes, the Mercedes two more, all of them Whitehead ; two
mines were discharged from the first line and one from the second ;
and yet the vessel was not blown up and passed both lines in safety,
which shows that the effect of torpedoes is moral rather than
material, and that it is not easy to discharge them at the right
moment. To do so requires a degree of experience, a range of sight,
and a presence of mind not easily found united in a single man.
The occurrence to which I have reference demonstrates this very
clearly.

During the day the officer and seven men of the Merrimac^ who
had first been taken on board the Mercedes^ were temporarily
transferred to the Morro.

From 11 to 12.30 in the night, the hostile ships were firing,
though slowly, outside of the harbor and towards the southeast.
The object of this has never been ascertained.

I have several times spoken with General Eos, governor of the
Morro, and he has always repeated these and similar words:
'*From the beginning of the hostilities to the end I have remained
in the castle, from where, as you know, everything can be seen
and observed. Sooner or later I have always learned the object of
everything the enemy has done and the reason for it ; but the firing
of that night, though I saw and heard it myself, I have never
understood. I believe they were firing on some ship they saw, or
thought they saw ; but it may be that they were firing on the land ;
but I believe in that case the object and result of the firing would
have become known sooner or later."

54

That same day Captain (General) Parades, second in command
of the fleet, disembarked from the Cristobal Coldn and embarked
temporarily on the Mercedes, where he remained until the 21st,
taking command of all the defenses at the month of the harbor.

XVII.
THE BLOCKADE CONTINUES.

Jwne 4th. — There were to be seen at the mouth of the harbor
seventeen ships: Six battle ships, five war ships, and six merchant
vessels.

At 11.30 a. m., the second commander of the local naval forces
(being the writer of this book), as judge, accompanied by the aid
of the captaincy of the port, Mr. Leguina, as secretary, and the
Government interpreter, Mr. Isidoro Agostini, went to the Morro
in the steam launch of the captaincy of the port, for the purpose
of taking the depositions of the lieutenant and seven men who had
been taken prisoners.

The former, Mr. Hobson, 27 years old, bom in the State of Ala-
bama, is a lieutenant in the corps of naval constructors, who, in
the United States, study in the naval college, and those first pro-
moted are assigned to that corps ; I state this so that it may not
seem strange that he commanded the Merrimac, for, as they are
officers of the Navy, they can build and command ships.

Upon learning the object of the visit, the prisoner, from whose
room a great extent of the sea and part of the blockading fleet
could be seen, asked why the British Consul, who was in charge
of the United States Consulate, was not present when his deposi-
tion was to be taken, and he wanted to know whether I belonged
to the army or the navy ; what might be the consequences of his
statements; by whose authority he was being examined; and he
stated that, since he had been taken prisoner by Admiral Cervera
himself in his own boat (as was true), it was his understanding
that he could and should answer only Admiral Cervera. or some
one delegated by him. And although all this was said in the very
best form and with a thousand protestations of his respect and
deference for me, it did not prevent our positions from being
reversed, and far from my asking the prisoner questions, it was
he, on the contrary, who asked them of me. I told him so, asking
him through the interpreter to state categorically whether he was
disposed to answer. He replied he was ready to answer the ques-
tions which he thought he ought to answer, but not those which

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56

he deemed untimely. Therefore, and in order not to lose time, I
at once asked him one question which I knew beforehand he would
refuse to answer, namely, by whose order and for what purpose
he entered the harbor; he replied: "By order of Admiral Samp-
son; the second part I can not answer." I then deemed my mis-
sion at an end and had the fact set down.

A few days later, this officer was transferred to quarters on the
Reina Mercedes that had been prepared for him, and the seven
men to others on the vessel, where they remained until they were
released.

As I left the Morro and stood on the esplanade in front of it, I
had an opportunity for the first time to admire the spectacle that
presented itself to my eyes; I say "admire," for the picture was
truly worthy of admiration.

The evening was most beautiful ; the sea was as smooth as a
lake, there was hardly any wind and the sky was perfectly clear.

At a distance of about five miles, seventeen ships could be seen :
eleven war ships, among them seven battle ships and one torpedo
boat, and the other six merchant vessels, the nearest one about six
miles from the harbor, formed a large arc, one extremity of which
was at Aguadores and the other at Punta Cabrera. The largest
and most powerful ships were in the center. Among them were
the Iowa, Indiana, Brooklyn, and New York; the latter two may
be easily recognized by their three smokestacks. The fifth was
presumably the Morssachusetts; and finally the Texas and Ama-
zonas. The New York and Brooklyn taking advantage of the
state of the sea, had a merchant steamer alongside and were coal-
ing. All of them had their engines stopped and their bows in dif-
ferent directions according to the current. From time to time, one
of them would move a short distance forward and then return again
to her place. Among the merchant vessels were specially notice-
able the Saint Louis (the first vessel that had been seen at Santiago),
a huge transatlantic steamer of over 10,000 tons, which looked larger
than any of the other ships, including the armorclads, and a steam
yacht of great speed, very small, on the contrary, and which looked
like a ship's boat. This is the yacht that was in constant com-
munication with Punta Cabrera. There also was a torpedo boat
or destroyer. A few days later, I saw the same spectacle from the
high battery of the Socapa, and I shall never forget it.

Before I continue, I will state that on May 26, the cable had been
cut at Cape Cruz, so that communication with Manzanillo was
interrupted until June 17, when the connection was reestablished.

5fh, — The American fleet could be seen at the mouth of the har-
bor, being the same ships we had seen the night before.

57

Qeneral Linares returned from the Morro at 8 o'clock p. m. and
ordered the launches and a tug to be gotten ready to take 160 men
to the mouth of the harbor.

At 10.30, a chief, two officers, and 120 soldiers embarked and
went out in a launch towed by the Coldn, assisted by the Alcyon;
the tugs returned at 1 o'clock at night.

At 2 o'clock in the morning, through the fault of a collier coaling
near the hut of the English cable at Las Cruces, said hut was
burned ; it was an accident, but none the less deplorable.

THE BOMBAKDMENT INCREASES.

June 6th. — Eighteen ships were visible at the mouth of the har-
bor. At 7.30 the lookout reported that the ships were starting up
and approaching.

At 8.30 ten ships — the lowa^ Indiana^ Massachusetts^ Brooklyn^
New York^ Texas^ Amazonas^ Minneapolis^ and two other war-
ships— forming two divisions, opened fire, the first division, on
the Morro and Aguadores, the second on the Socapa; one ship was
detached from the latter division to bombard Mazamorra and
adjoining points on the coast, where the column of Colonel Aldea
(Asiatic battalion) had detachments and was operating.

When the American fleet opened fire, it was so intense and the
"shots followed each other in such quick succession that it might
have seemed like a fusillade if the mighty thunder of guns can be
compared with the crackling of small arms.

By 9 o'clock it Ibecame somewhat slower, shortly after reaching
again the same intensity, then decreasing once more at 10.15, and
again becoming terribly intense at 10.30.

At 11.2 it ceased.

Punta Gorda battery fired only 7 shots.

At 12.15 intense firing was heard again in the distance to the
east; it ceased at 1.45.

At 2 p. m. there arrived at the royal pier a boat from the Reina
Mercedes^ towed by her steam launch, with Lieutenant Ozamiz,
bringing three seriously wounded sailors, who were taken to the
military hospital. This officer reported the death of Commander
Emilio de Acosta y Eyermann, second in command of the cruiser,
and of five sailors ; also, that Ensign Molins, one boatswain, and
several other sailors had been wounded ; their names could not be
ascertained owing to the condition of the ship, nor could even the
exact number of wounded be stated, as it had been necessary to
extinguish two fires on board.

At 2.45 a private boat arrived at the pier, carrying a sergeant
and a wounded soldier from the Mazamorra detachment. . They
were also taken to the military hospital.

There were no more remarkable events during the night.

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59

Ten warships, eight of them battle ships, divided into two divi-
sions, opened fire shortly after 8 a. m., on the batteries at the
mouth, and by elevation on the bay. During the first moments,
the firing was so intense that it resembled one prolonged thunder.
In fact, I had no idea that any firing could be as terrific as that of
those ten ships. Much has been said of the bombardments of
Sebastopol and Alexandria, but I do not believe that they could
have been as terrible as the bombardment we suffered that Cth day
of June — a day which the inhabitants of Santiago will never for-
get. I might write pages about it, and even then would probably
not give the faintest idea of what it really was.

The hostile ships (see list of ships and armaments) had at least
120 large guns, that is to say, of 14, 20 and 32-cm. calibers, and
about 80 small-caliber guns, that is to say, of 57 and 42-mm., or a
total of 192 guns, for they fired with guns of all sizes ; and as I
am far from wanting to exaggerate and since the guns of the two
sides of a ship can not be fired at the same time (those mounted
in turrets forward and aft can), I will say that 91 guns were
firing upon four 16-cm. muzzle-loading guns attheMorro and two
16-cm. breech-loading Hontoria guns of the Socapa battery.

I do not count the guns of Punta Gorda battery, which fired
only seven shots ; for the Americans, in spite of their enormous

superiority, still had the prudence of avoiding it and not

engaging it because it was not in line. Before the eloquence of
numbers, anything else that I might say becomes unnecessary.

How did it happen that the Morro was not razed to the ground
and that its guns and those of the Socapa were not dismounted ?
How did it happen that those who served these guns were not
buried under the ruins ? I do not know ; that is all I can say ; and
those who were in those forts may bo sure that, since they were
not killed that day, they will die of old age.

Captain Concas, who is very clever at computations of a certain
nature, counted at different times the number of shots fired in a
minute, and his deduction is that about 8,000 projectiles were
fired; though this figure may appear exaggerated at first sight, it
is not so in reality; the firing lasted 175 minutes, which would
give an average of 45 shots per minute. I believe, if anything,
the computation falls below the truth.

I have always believed that the hostile fleet, which, by means of
the yacht referred to, communicated with the insurgents on the
coast by way of Punta Cabrera, knew everything that was going
on in Santiago as well as in the harbor and the position of our
ships. But if I had had any doubts on that subject, they would
have been dispelled that 6th day of June when I saw the aim of

60

their projectiles. Most of them dropped in the bay in the direc-
tion of the Maria Teresa and Vizcaya, which were covering the
first line, and it was a miracle that both of them were not seriously
damaged ; for the large-caliber shells fell all around them ; there
were moments when it seemed as though some had hit them, especi-
ally the Vizcaya,

They were also perfectly acquainted with the position of the
Mercedes J which is proved by the fact that the ships to the east,
being the division which bombarded the Morro, were firing their
projectiles right at the cruiser, and though protected by the hill of
the Socapa, she received in her hull and rigging 35 shells, causing
two fires, one of them quite extensive, being in the paint locker
forward.

Commander Emilio Acosta y Eyermann was directing the extin-
guishing of the fire in the forecastle, when a large shell cut oflE his
right leg at the hip and also his right hand, mutilating him horribly.
But he lived for half an hour after that and kept on looking after
the fire, as I was told by Mr. Ozamiz, who was close to him in
those critical moments. I do not like to think of it ; he had been
a fellow-student of mine at college and our old friendship had
always remained the same. As there was no safe place in the
ship, his body was placed on a cot and taken to the Socapa coast;
five soldiers who had been killed the same day were also carried
there, and all of them were covered with the flag which they had
been defending and for which they had died. May he rest in peace,
this first chief of the navy killed in this war.

The large projectiles shot through the space across the bay,
causing a tremendous noise which only those who heard it can
understand; some fell on the opposite coast (to the westward),
raising, as they exploded, clouds of dust and smoke; others could
not be seen falling, which proves that they must have dropped in
the hills at a great distance. This explains that they did not only
reach the city, but went thousands of meters beyond.

Toward evening, the ships also fired twice on Daiquiri, probably
at the forts and the detachments in the mineral region and at Fir-
meza, but without any effect worth mentioning. The high bat-
tery of the Socapa (two 16-cm. Hontoria guns) fired 47 shots; that
was all they could fire, because during the bombardment the ships
were hidden most of the time through the smoke.

The inhabitants of Cay Smith had to take refuge in the northern
part, which is very abrupt, and many were in the water up to the
waist ; if they had not gone there, most of them would have been
killed, for nearly all the dwellings which were located in the south-
em part suffered from the effects of the shells. The following day
the Cay was aba»ndoned and the inhabitants transferred to the city.

61

Lieutenant Julian Garcia Durin was appointed second in com-
mand of the cruiser Reina Mercedes; he had arrived a short time
before in command of the merchant steamer MejicOy with torpedo
supplies, which he landed at the port of Guantanamo.

Later, after the Mercedes sank, this same officer was placed in
comniand of the naval forces that occupied the Socapa; and later,
of the whole navy encampment, until they were embarked and
taken back to Spain.

XTX,

THE FIRING CONTINUES.

June 7th. — ^At daybreak nineteen ships in front of the mouth.

At 9.15 the body of Commander Emilio Acosta was brought on
shore.

At 9.30 the funeral procession started, headed by Admiral Cer-
vera and Generals Toral and Rubin, and including, in spite of the
rain, the civil and military authorities of the city, delegations from
all the different divisicms, and a great many private citizens. On
both sides of the body walked the battalion of volunteers and the
company of guides, the only forces that were in the city, with the
music of the Santiago regiment.

At 6.30 p. m. the ships increased the distance that sei>arated
them from the coast.

The French cable had been cut, and we were not in communica-
tion with Guantanamo.

Sth, — Nineteen ships were in sight at daybreak, about G miles from
the mouth.

During the night the fleet had constantly thrown its search-
lights on the coast.

9th. — At daybreak eighteen ships, at a distance of about 7 miles.

The steamer Tottios Brooks delivered 25 planks at the mouth of
the harbor, which were attached to a steel cable stretched from Cay
Smith to Punta Soldado, the object of the planks being to keep it
at the surface of the Water ; the cable was laid to prevent the pas-
sage of any torpedoes which the enemy might attempt to send into
the harbor with the entering tide.

10th, — At daybreak the eighteen ships of the preceding day were
to be seen about 10 miles distant. At 7 o'clock another one, a mer-
chant vessel, arrived from the south.

The PliUon and Furor went alongside the steamer MejicOj one
at each side, to rest from the service of the night.

At 11 the lookout made a signal, taking it down shortly after,
that fire was being opened. Nothing was heard in the city.

The Morro said that the enemy had fired upon Punta Berracos,
but had stopped very soon.

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63

During the night the American fleet continued to examine the
coast by means of the searchlights.

11th, — Seventeen ships, some 6 miles distant, others 10.

121%, — :The same seventeen ships, from 5 to 6 miles distant from
the Morro.

ISfh. — Fifteen ships, 6 miles from the harbor.

IJiih. — ^At 5.15 the enemy opened fire on the mouth of the harbor;
it ceased at 6.50.

The projectiles fell toward Cajuma Bay, close to the Vizcaya.

Only one ship kept up the fire on the Morro and Socapa, both
batteries answering it.

At the latt-er battery Ensign Bruquetas and two sailors were
slightly wounded.

At 10 General Linares went to the Socapa and the Morro, re«
turning at 12.30.

The enemy continued the fire during the night, aiming his pro-
jectiles upon the coast, especially above the mouth of the harbor.

15th, — At daybreak seventeen hostile ships in sight, among them
the Vesvmus^ this being her first appearance before the harbor.

The Vesuvius is a vessel of 900 tons displacement and of peculiar
construction, being very long, narrow, and low. She is the only
one of her class in the world, and throws, by means of guns or
pneumatic tubes, dynamite bombs or projectiles a distance of
about 2 miles ; they are probably provided with a screw ; nobody
knows them exactly. I do not believe this vessel, though it may
cause serious destruction, would be able to sustain a fight with
another, even though smaller, for the reason that the range of her
projectiles is very short and she has no protection.

From the 7th to the 15th the hostile fleet hardly threatened the
batteries which defended the harbor, nor the coast either, contenting
themselves with watching it incessantly day and night.

In the city nothing appeared to have changed, and yet the situ-
ation was very far from being what it was a month ago.

In the stores many articles were wanting, and those that could
be had brought fabulous prices. Unfortunately, one of the first
articles that gave out was flour, and no bread could be baked.
Hardtack (galleta) was used instead, but only a few people could
pay for it ; there was no milk to be had, indispensable for the sick
and for babies. The soldiers commenced to eat bread made of rice
and rice boiled in water, which weakened them very much; and
though they were not suffering actual hunger, everybody knew
that calamity was not far off and was inevitable, for no provisions
could be expected, either by land or sea.

Fortunately, the sailors of the ships and defenses, thanks to the
foresight of the general commandant of the naval station, were

64

still receiving full rations and had them for some time to come,
thanks also to the interest taken in this matter by the Comman-
dant of Marine.

The music continued to play at the Alameda and in the market
place, but the people, who had nothing to eat, had no desire to go
walking, and the market place and Alameda were deserted.

Horses and dogs were dying before our eyes. Carriages stopped
going about for want of horses, which the scavenger carried off at
night, and gradually the city acquired that stamp of sadness and
absence of life which is seen in places into which cholera and
plagues carry sorrow and death. The situation became more
serious every day,, and the discouragement was general, for every-
one knew that if the blockade should continue, the ruin of the city
was imminent.

I must state that while the ships of the hostile fleet were firing
on Punta Cabrera and Mazamorra on the 7th, 9th, and days fol-
lowing, insurgent bands, commanded by their principal chiefs,
sustained a continued musket fire on land. In these attacks they
were repulsed with great losses.

THE LANDING EXPEDITION APPEARS.

Jwne 16th. — Eighteen ships in sight.

At 5.45 the hostile fleet opened fire.

At 6.15 Punta Qorda commenced firing, but stopped shortly after.

The greater part of the projectiles dropped close to the Spanish
fleet.

At 6.30 the fire became more intense.

At 6.35 smoke was seen for a few minutes issuing from the In-
fanta Maria Teresa. It was learned afterwards that a fragment
of shell had caused a slight injury in the starboard gallery.

At 6.40 Punta Gorda again opened fire; ten shots.

At 7 the firing ceased.

At 7.15 the Furor and Plvidn, which had their steam up during
the firing, went alongside the steamer Mejico.

It was reported from the Morro that the ships which had been
firing were eight in number ; that the fire had been directed against
the castle and the Socapa, both of them answering; that at the
Morro battery a gunner had been killed and an oflBicer and five
soldiers (all belonging to the artillery) wounded ; that at the Socapa
two sailors had been killed and four sailors and Ensign Bruquetas
wounded, the latter for the second time ; and that one of the Hon-
toria guns had been put out of action by debris obstructing it, but
that the enemy had not succeeded in dismounting a single gun.

At 11.45 the four sailors who had been wounded at the Socapa
arrived in a boat at the royal pier and were taken to the military
hospital, one of them, who was seriously wounded, on a stretcher
from the firemen's headquarters, the other three in carriages.

At 12 a second lieutenant and a gunner arrived from the Morro
and were also taken to the hospital.

During the night the ships continued to illuminate the coast with
their search lights.

The debris was removed from the Hontoria gun, which was
again made ready for firing.

17th. — At 5.30 steady gun fire commenced in the distance to the
west. It was learned that one ship was firing on Punta Cabrera.
A few minutes later another opened fire on the Socapa.

Thirteen ships in sight.

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10646-^6

66

The ship firing on Punta Cabrera was also firing on Mazamorra.

At 7.30 the firing ceased.

There was nothing further of importance during the day and the
following night.

18th. — Fourteen ships in sight at daybreak. The Iowa left and
the Massachusetts^ which had been absent for several days, took
her place.

At 7.46 p. m. gun fire was heard.

It was learned that it was from the Socapa firing at a ship which
had passed within a short distance and had answered. About 20
shots were exchanged.

19th. — Fifteen vessels in sight.

At 7 two battle ships arrived from the south; total, 17.

At 2.30 p. m. General Linares went to the mouth of the harbor,
returning at 7 p.m.

During the night the ships were again running their search lights
along the coast and the entrance of the harbor.

20th. — At daybreak there were 21 vessels in sight, 7 of them
battle ships.

The Oquendo changed her anchoring place and went farther to
the north.

At 12 the Morro reported that 39 hostile vessels had arrived ;
shortly after 3 more came, so that, with the 21 that were already
opposite the Morro, there was a total of 63.

At 12.05 a loud detonation was heard and a great deal of smoke
was seen at the piers of Luz and San Josd ; it came from the schooner
TrafalgaTy where a shell had exploded while being fired, killing a
sailor of the steamer San Juan and wounding three of the Morteray
one of whom died a few minutes later. The schooner had to be run
ashore to prevent her going down.

Orders were received for the formation of the fourth army
corps, in command of General Linares, composed of the division
of Santiago, which was already under his command, and the
division of Manzanillo.

Another cable was stretched between the Socapa and Cay Smith,
like the one stretched between Cay Smith and Punta Soldado, and
twelve Bustamente torpedoes were planted, half of them between
Cay Smith and the Merrimac^ and the other six between the latter
and Punta Soldado.

21st — It was learned that the 42 vessels that had arrived the
previous day had proceeded in an easterly direction during the
night, leaving only the former 21, most of them war ships.

At 2.30 p. m. the Morro stated that the 42 vessels were again
returning from the south.

67

The cruiser Reina Mercedes left her anchoring place at the
Socapa and cast anchor in the bay, west of the captaincy of the
port.

On the 16th the American fleet had again opened fire on the
batteries at the mouth of the harbor, and although it could not be
compared with that of the 6th, either in intensity or duration, yet
it had caused us two deaths at the Socapa, and two oflBcers and
several sailors and soldiers had been wounded there and at the
Morro. A 32-cm. shell, which exploded at the former of said
batteries, raised such a quantity of earth that it partly buried one
of the Hontoria guns, making it useless for the time being, and
came near burying also the men serving it. During the night the
earth covering the gun was removed, so that it was again ready
for service.

The names of the Morro and Socapa have been repeated many
times, and it has been shown that these two poor batteries were the
main objective of the hostile fleet and had to withstand the fire of
over 90 guns, most of them of large caliber, which they always
answered ; yet, I can not help but speak once more of the heroism,
truly worthy of admiration, displayed by those who served them,
constantly exposing their lives and having to watch after fighting,
without a moment's rest or sleep ; for the enemy was always on
the lookout for the least remission in watchfulness in order to sur-
prise them and attempt a coup de main on the harbor.

Each one of them, and the governor of the castle first of all,
earned the gratitude of the country every day for two months.
Their self-denial and valor kept a powerful fleet in check for sev-
enty days. The resistance which the Morro and the Socapa offered
under the prevailing circumstances is a true feat of heroism.

On the 17th the ships reconnoitered along Punta Cabrera and
Mazamorra, firing on the detachments of the Asiatic column.

On the 20th, the day when the 42 vessels of the convoy appeared
with the landing expedition, a shell exploded in the hold of the
schooner Trafalgar^ causing several deaths and injuring the hull
of the schooner, which had to be run ashore in order to prevent
her from sinking.

I shall not speak at length of a matter which is of no importance,
but will mention it briefly, because it gives an idea of the craze
reigning at Santiago, to which the frequent bombardments, which
must have cost at least a million dollars, gave rise.

Whether by reason of the type of their fuzes, or because many
of the shells did not have the requisite powder charge (I have dis-
charged a 57-mm. shell myself, which had only one-eighth of it),
certain it is that many did not explode and remained intact as
though they had not been discharged ; as they were being thrown

68

in such large numbers, many people wanted to keep one as a curi-
osity or as a souvenir of an event which does not happen often in
a lifetime. Some wanted them of small, others of large caliber;
others wanted to make a collection of all sizes. I have a friend
who called on me one evening to show me a 20-cm. shell which had
been discharged and had not suffered the l^st deformation. The
fad had cost him 20 pesos, and he was as happy over it as a child
over a new toy. But I was thoughtless enough to tell him that
there were 32-cm. ones, and he was inconsolable. It will be under-
stood from the above that the fad was being paid for dearly ; and
as capital is always made out of everything, many people made a
business of gathering up and discharging projectiles and selling
them. That was the cause of the unfortunate occurrence on board
the Trafalgar \ a shell had been discharged without the necessary
care, and what happened was but the natural consequence.

Another monomania of this period : As the Americans kept up
the bombardments all through the month of June, so that there
hardly was a day when gunshots were not heard at a greater or less
distance, people were hearing them all the time ; the falling of a
chair, the closing of a door or window, the noise of carriage wheels
in the distance, the crying of a child — everything was taken for
gunshots, and gunshots was all that was being talked about.
When they finally ceased, Santiago had become so identified -with
them that people almost missed them and were surprised to hear
them no longer.

LINE OF OBSERVATION.

We have now reached a period when the events acquire the
greatest interest and assume exceptional importance. So far it
was only the fleet that had been antagonizing us ; and numerous
and powerful though it was, it had threatened only one point,
which experience showed us it did not dare attack or force. Hence-
forth we shall find ourselves menaced also on land by an army
equipped with numerous modern artillery, which, supported by
the ships that had control of the sea and could therefore, without
tronhle, communicate with their depots and base of operations,
and further supported by the insurgents who had control of the
field, was constantly receiving reenforcements of men and material
and had at its disposal everything which we, unfortunately, were
lacking.

From this time on the events are precipitated, so to speak, and
lead with dizzy rapidity to a denouement which it is not difficult
to foresee. In view of the exceptional location of the island of
Cuba, we can not hope for help either from within or without ; we
can not hope for provisions nor ammunition, and without these the
soldier can not be fed and can not fight — a sad and desperate
situation for men who ask for nothing else and whom fate seems
to pursue.

When speaking of military operations and movements of troops,
it is not always possible to give a full account of them as they
happen ; there is danger that some of the occurrences, the situation
of the forces, and the points they defend or attack, may not be
known. In order to obviate this, and to give the reader a better
understanding of the events that took place later, I will give an
outline, though perhaps incomplete, of the distribution which
General Linares made of the forces he had at his disposal.

It has already been stated that on the 20th the Fourth Army
Corps was organized, consisting of the Santiago division and the
Manzanillo division. General Linares was made commander in
chief, and Lieutenant Colonel Ventura Fontd»n, who had been chief
of staff of the latter division, retained the same position relative to
the corps.

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70

General Toral, though in command of the division of Santiago,
remained at the head of the military government of the city, with
the same chief of staff. It may, therefore, be said that nothing
was changed.

From telegrams received, the enemy's plans could be, if not accu-
rately known, at least surmised, and as it was supposed that they
might effect a landing at a point on the coast more or less close to
the city, General Linares ordered the concentration of his forces so
that they might be assigned to convenient positions. First of all,
orders were sent from Havana to Manzanillo, by telegraph, for
General Escario to proceed with all the forces available, and with
the least possible delay, to Santiago de Cuba. Said general left
Manzanillo on the 22d with 3,300 infantry, 250 cavalry, two Plas-
encia guns and 60 transport mules. The infantry was composed
of the battalions of Alcantara, Andalusia, Puerto Rico chasseurs
and two battalions of the Isabel la Catdlica regiment. These 3,300
men who, from the time they left Manzanillo, had encounters every
day with the insurgents, who killed and wounded 97 of them, could
not arrive here, in spite of forced marches, until the evening of
July 3 ; this should not be lost sight of.

At another place I have spoken of the scarcity of provisions in
the city. The authorities, in order not to diminish the chances of
assistance which they might obtain from the region under cultiva-
tion, for the men as well as the horses and mules, combined the
operations and position of the troops with the object of attempting
to preserve that region and looking out for the enemy in all di-
rections.

With this object in view, a line of observation was established,
as follows : To the north, from Palma Soriano through San Luis,
El Oristo, and Socorro ; to the west, from Punta Cabrera through
Monta Real and El Cobre, on the roads which lead to the city on
that side, and to the east, from Daiquiri through Vinent and Fir-
meza to the harbor of Escandell.

On the 22d the first companies of the Spanish fleet disembarked,
with a force of about 130 men each, under orders of the third com-
manders of the ships respectively; two companies were stationed
at San Miguel de Paradas, to guard the coast west of the bay and
assist the Socapa or the city ; the third company at the Socapa, to
reenforce that point, and the fourth and last company at Las Cruces,
to assist the Morro, Aguadores, or the city.

At night of the same day, the second companies disembarked,
including men from the Mercedes and the destroyers, a total of 450,
who, under command of Capt. Joaquin Bustamente, went the fol-
lowing day to occupy the line from Dos Caminos del Cobre to the
Plaza de Toros ; that is, south and southwest of the precinct.

71

The only forces in the Santiago district prior to the declaration
of the present war were nine companies of mobilized troops and
two of the Santiago Regiment, to garrison the city and the forts of
the precinct, besides a small nnmber of the Civil Qnard and a few
artillerymen, and as much cavalry as was indispensable for convoy
and other services properly belonging to the cavalry.

When war was declared, six more companies of the Santiago
regiment came for the purpose of commencing the fortification works
of the precinct of the city, under the directions of the chiefs and
officers of the corps of engineers; another company was occupying
the i)osition of Ermitaflo (east of the city) and another was at
Socorro.

I believe I have already stated that by orders of General Linares
the Talavera battalion had come from Baracoa and was stationed,
with three companies of mobilized troops, along the coast to watch
the same, occupying Daiquiri, Siboriey, the railroads, and the forts.

The Asiatic battalion, in command of Colonel Aldea, took up its
position of observation west of Santiago: Four companies, with
the colonel at Punta Cabrera, covering the coast road ; another,
with one mobilized company, occupying Mazamorra, both to be
ready to reenf orce the former four or the forces at the Socapa, if
necessary, and to prevent in due time a landing at Cabaflas;
another occupied the camp at Monte Real, and finally another,
with one mobilized company, garrisoned El Cobre. With these
forces all the roads leading to Santiago from the west had to be
covered.

Gradually, as information was being received concerning the
enemy's plans, the available forces of the San Luis brigade, in
command of General Vara del Rey, were concentrated in the
district.

First, four companies of the Provincial Battalion of Puerto Rico
(No. 1) arrived, one company remaining at El Cristo and one at
Songo, both of them occupying also the forts on the railroad of
both towns. Later came three companies of the San Fernando
battalion, one remaining at El Cristo and two at Palma Soriano.
Finally, General Vara del Rey, with three companies of the twenty-
ninth regiment (Constitucion), one company of guerrillas on foot,
and two Plasencia guns, occupied El Caney, where there were only
40 men of the Santiago regiment and 50 of the mobilized troops,
leaving three companies of the twenty-ninth regiment at the towns
of San Luis, Dos Caminos, and Mordn. Two squads of cavalry
were distributed in said three towns.

It is only necessary to cast a glance at the chart, without much
study, to understand that the line whicli our troops occupied was
too extensive to be solidly covered and effectively defended by such
small forces.

72

Why did General Linares not limit it and occupy positions closer
to the precinct and more susceptible of efiFective defense? For a
reason which outweighs all others. He could not do so without
condemning its defenders from the outset to an inevitable disaster.

I will repeat once more — for to this must be attributed the
reverses we suffered — that there was nothing left in Santiago
except rice, and only 500,000 extra cartridges outside of the regu-
lar supply of the soldiers, namely, 160 each; for although there
were many more included in the surrender of the Park, they are
of the Remington, Argentine Mauser, and other types, and of cali-
bers differing from those of the Spanish Mauser, which is the
weapon carried by almost all of our forces. Of course, 150 car-
tridges are used up very rapidly. It was the scarcity of provis-
ions, confined almost entirely to rice, which, more than anything
else, compelled General Linares to defend the line which, begin-
ning at Ermitafio and passing through El Caney, San Miguel de
Lajas, Quintero Hill and the hills of La Caridad and Veguita,
would protect the railway to Sabauilla and Mordn and the aque-
duct. If the troops could have maintained this line, they would not
have suffered for lack of water, as they did in some positions, nor
would the food, as long as we remained in possession of the culti-
vated region, have been reduced to rice bread and rice boiled in
water, which the soldiers could not stand and which made them
unfit for the active operations necessary in war.

The Morro and the Socapa had to be not only occupied, but well
protected ; they were the key to the harbor. If the enemy had
taken possession of them, it would have been easy to remove the
torpedoes and force the bay, and then the city and its defenders
would necessarily have had to surrender.

It was equally necessary to occupy Daiquiri, Siboney, and Agua-
dores, so as not to allow the enemy to make a landing at any of
them with impunity (as they did after all, supported by the war
ships, at the first-named place) and gain possession of the railroad.
For the same reasons also, it was necessary to cover the landing
places of Cabafias and Guaicabdn (near Punta Cabrera), as also
the west coast of the bay, and preserve the railroads leading to
the city.

All this proves that it was not only desirable, but absolutely
necessary to defend said line. To give it up would have meant to
be resigned from the outset to perish from hunger, and perhaps
from thirst, which is worse.

If El Caney and the San Juan position had not been taken we
should not have lost our communications with the cultivated
region, nor would the aqueduct have been cut, and it is easy
enough to understand how much these two things had to do with

73

later events, and how different the situation would have been with-
out them. Unfortunately the small number of our forces made
it impossible to save these positions.

The ships would no doubt have reduced the city to ashes and
ruin, but there would have been water and more provisions, and
the army would have been able to maintain itself and fight, at
least until the last cartridge was gone.

Unfortunately the insurgents, firing from ambush, as usual,
on Gteneral (then Colonel) Escario's column, succeeded in delaying
its march long enough so that it could not arrive before the 1st of
July. Fate is not always just.

EVENTS OF JUNE 22d TO 27th.

The reader being acquainted with the number of our troops, the
positions they occupied and the sites they covered and their object,
it will not be difficult to understand and appreciate the operations
carried on and the events taking place here.

On the evening of the 21st it was learned, as has been stated,
that the enemy was effecting a landing at Punta Berracos.

June 22d, — At 6.30, the usual ships were opposite the mouth of
the harbor; in Aguadores Bay there were two yachts and one
monitor; at Punta Berracos, the 42 vessels of the convoy, among
them the Saint LouiSy with the Indiana. A steamer, with tugs,
could also be seen, We therefore knew that the landing was being
effected. We also saw the house on fire that the English had on
San Juan river.

At 8 the enemy opened fire and Punta Gorda answered.

At the same time, one ship fired upon Aguadores.

The Brooklyn, Iowa, and Texas were firing on the Morro and
Socapa, and the batteries were answering.

At noon the firing ceased in the mouth of the harbor.

Punta Gorda only fired five shots.

The firing continued on the coast toward the east.

During the day the first companies of the Spanish fleet (4 com-
panies, about 620 men) disembarked. At midnight the second
companies (about 450 men) disembarked. It has already been
stated what part of the ground they were to cover.

At 11 o'clock p. m. two shots were heard and a loud detonation,
followed by a noise resembling that of a screw revolving in the
air. Shortly after, another similar detonation was heard.

i^Sd. — Opposite the Morro entrance, and at a distance of about 6
miles from it, 8 battle ships, 2 destroyers, the VesuvitLS, and 8
merchant vessels. The rest, as many as 63, continued the landing
on the coast, protected by some of the war ships.

At 2.30 a yacht, with a white flag, left the fleet and approached
the Morro. The tug Colon went out to speak with her. At this
time there were 24 ships opposite the harbor.

During the night the enemy examined the coast again by means
of search lights.

24th. — Eight battle ships, 2 destroyers, the VesuviiLS (which, at
11 o'clock on the previous night, had thrown two dynamite bombs

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75

on the i)ort, fortunately without doing any harm) and 12 merchant
vessels, are guarding the mouth of the harbor, stretched out from
Aguadores to Punta Cabrera. The others, as many as 63, among
them six war ships protecting them, continued the landing at
Daiquiri.

The yacht that came up yesterday with a flag of truce was sent
by Admiral Sampson, who inquired whether the lieutenant who
had been made prisoner was being kept in the Morro. Mr. Concas,
who was delegated to parley, answered evasively, as was natural,
that the prisoner was in a safe place.

At 11.55 the Brooklyn opened a slow fire on Daiquiri and adjoin-
ing points on the coast.

At 1.30 the firing ceased.

At 1.55 it was again heard in the same direction, ceasing at 2.30.

At night the hostile fleet used the projectors again.

2oth. — At 4 a. m. 14 shots were heard in the direction of Daiquiri.
It was presumed that they were firing on General Rubin's column.

At daybreak there were at the mouth of the harbor 8 battle ships
and 12 merchant vessels.

From 12.30 to 2 o'clock the hostile fleet kept up a slow fire on
the coast from Aguadores to Daiquiri.

It was noticed that the vessels landing troops or material were
going back and forth, so we felt sure that new reenforcements
were constantly arriving from the United States.

26th. — At daybreak the New York^ Brooklyn, Indiana, Oregon,
Massachusetts, Texas, Vesuvius, 1 monitor, and 6 merchant ves-
sels were in front of the harbor. To the east, in the direction of
Berracos, 1 1 steamers could be seen, and 8 at Daiquiri, inside of the
roadstead.

The Veswvius had discharged two bombs the preceding night,
.one completely destroying the house of the lighthouse keeper, the
other seriously damaging the fortress, wounding three sailors of
the Mercedes and a soldier of the garrison.

27th, — The same ships blockading the harbor as the preceding
day.

During the night the Vesuvius threw 3 dynamite bombs, doing
no damage, as they fell in the water, although inside of the harbor.

The search lights were going again during the night.

On the evening of the 21st the enemy had commenced to effect
the disembarkation of the landing expedition (which according to
New York newspapers consisted of 50,000 men), and in order to do"
so in perfect security, even though they had in all 63 vessels, count-
ing both merchant and war ships, they landed them at Punta Berra-
cos, 20 miles from Santiago, in spite of there being no water aud

76

no roads, because our troops, few in number, could not cover sucli
an extensive region.

To assist the landing, the ships were firing on the whole coast
from Berracos, east of Santiago, to Punta Cabrera, 27 miles west.
How could we cover so many threatened points and occupy so
extensive a territory ? Impossible, even if we had had much supe-
rior forces than we did.

The battle ships, always in imposing numbers, remained in front
of the harbor so as to keep our fleet in. The war ships were pro-
tecting the landing, and as they controlled the sea it was impossi-
ble for soldiers with small arms to prevent it.

How many men did the Americans disembark ?

As Santiago was cut oflf from the reM of the world, or almost so,
it was not easy to ascertain the exact number, nor was it neces-
sary. The vessels of the convoy, as soon as they had landed men
and material, returned to the United States and came back with
fresh contingents. But it may be safely stated that the first
expedition consisted of at least 15,000 men, with more or less war
material.

I base this estimate on the fact that forty-three vessels arrived,
including six war ships apparently convoying them, and although
the latter can, and generally do transport troops, I do not count
them, nor do I count five small tugs; hence there remain thirty-
two of all sizes, and modern steamers can surely carry on an aver-
age not less than 1,000 men each, especially in view of the short
distance from Key West to Santiago and the fine weather prevail-
ing. But taking into consideration the circumstance that they'
had to carry war material as well, I will reduce the figure to one-
half, namely, 500 men to each steamer, and there would still be
16,000. There can be no dou^bt, as everybody will admit, that, if
I err in my calculation, my figures are below rather than above •
the actual number. Moreover, as I have said, this matter is not
of great importance, for new contingents kept constantly arriving,
and the Americans also knew that the insurgents, who were await-
ing their arrival, would swell their forces.

Every night, with great regularity (between 11 and 2), the
Vesuvius threw her three dynamite bombs on the batteries at the
mouth of the harbor, with the greatest humanity possible, for it
will be remembered that such was the pretext of this war. For
that purpose she would come close to the coast, accompanied by
another ship, usually a battle ship — for the mission of the Vesu-
vius is only the offensive, she has no defensive qualities — and as
soon as she was within convenient distance she would discharge
three tubes at regular intervals. If the projectiles dropped close
to a battery its ruin was certain, for one must see the effects of

77

one of these projectiles to understand them. Fortunately, they
do not appear to be very sure, either in range or in aim.

On the sea, matters continued in the same condition. Let us now
see the operations carried out on land by the Army forces during
this period, the latter events taking place at diametrically opposed
points.

On the 22d Daiquiri and Siboney were bombarded by the ships.
At the same time the enemy appeared at the former place. As the
force guarding it could not cope with the ships, it retreated by way
of Vinnent to Firmeza, gathering up all the detachments from the
forts.

Greneral Rubin, with three companies of the provisional battalion
of Puerto Rico, three of San Fernando, and two artillery guns
(Plasencia), proceeded to Siboney. There he received orders to
proceed with his column and with the whole force in the mineral
region to the heights of Sevilla before daybreak, where they were
to take position in three echelons, the foremost one under Com-
mander Alcafliz, formed of the three companies of Puerto Rico and
one mobilized company.

On the 23d this echelon alone checked the enemy's advance in
the morning, and again in the evening, the echelon having been
reenf orced by one company from San Fernando, half engineers, and
two guns. When the battle was over the forces withdrew to their
former positions, the echelon remaining on the same site.

At daybreak on the 24th the echelon was reenf orced by two com-
panies from Talavero, and not only resisted a strong attack of the
enemy, but also forced the latter to retreat.

In spite of this advantage they received orders to withdraw be-
cause the enemy was approaching the Morro by rail, and as there
were not forces enough to oppose him, it would have been sur-
rounded. In compliance with the order received the column with-
drew to the city.

The official report of this battle is as follows :

"General RuMn's column, under orders of the commander in
chief of the Fourth Army Corps, was attacked yesterday at noon
and in the evening.

"This morning considerable forces with artillery guns made a
resolute attack and were repulsed, losing many men.

"On our side we had in the two days seven dead, Jos^ Lancds,
captain of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico, and Zendn
Borregdn, second lieutenant of the same battalion, seriously
wounded ; Francisco las Tortas, first lieutenant of the regiment of
Royal Artillery, slightly wounded; two privates seriously wounded,
two slightly wounded. Various contusions."

78

Later on it was learned that the forces which attacked General
Rubin's column, or rather the echelon of the same, under Com-
mander AlcafLiz, were as follows :

The seventh, twelfth, and seventeenth regiments of United States
infantry, the second Massachusetts, the seventy-first New York,
and 16 dismounted squadrons.

On the 26th the following was published :

"General order of the Fourth Army Corps, dated June 26, at
Santiago de Cuba :

"Soldiers: We left the mineral region because I did not wish to
sacrifice your lives in vain in unequal battle, with musket fire,
against the pompous superiority of the enemy, who was fighting
us under cover of his armored ships, armed with the most modern
and powerful guns.

"The enemy, rid of our presence at the points referred to, has
already landed his troops and proposes to take the city of Santiago.

" The encounter is at hand and it will take place under equal
conditions.

" Your military virtues and your valor are the best guarantee of
success.

"Let us defend the right, ignored and trampled upon by the
Americans, who have united themselves with the Cuban rebels.

"The nation and the army look to us.

"More than a thousand sailors, disembarked from the fleet, will
assist us. Volunteers and firemen will take part in the task of
repulsing and defeating the enemies of Spain.

"The other division of this army corps is hastening toward us
to reenforce us.

"I make no recommendations, because I feel sure that all will vie
in the defense of their posts with firmness and resolve; but I will
say that those assigned to any position, be it in the precincts of
the city or at the foremost points, must stand firm at any cost,
without vacillating, without thinking of retreating, but only of
saving the honor of our arms.

"I shall comply with my duties, and, in conclusion, I say with

all. Long live Spain I

"Linages.

"The foregoing was published to-day, by order of His Excellency,

for the information of all.

"Ventura FontAn,

^^ Lieutenant Colonel^ chief of staff .^^

In order to convey a better understanding of the foregoing oper-
ations of General Rubin's column, I will give below a copy of the
instructions and orders which said general received from General

79

Linares, all of wMch were drawn np in camp and written with

lead pencil.

They are as follows :

**Pozo, Jwne2S, 1898.

"Civilians have handed to me the paper which yon wrote to me,
and we have heard firing since a quarter to five, and afterwards
gnn fire.

" I have impressed upon Colonel Borry to guard well the path
or road to the Eedonda, where he is encamped, so that the troops
of the line, if they should find Sardinero occupied, can take that
road to the Bedonda.

"I have sent to Santiago for all the transport mules and ten
carts, which will be at your camp by 7.30 or 8 o'clock. You will
have the sick ready, and also the ammunition, so that they may
at once be taken to Santiago, with the same convoy that will go
with the mules.

"Make arrangements to have the first mess of the morning taken

there and then you will receive further orders.

"Linares.
"To General Antbro RubIn."

(Seal: "Army of Operations of Santiago — dth Army Corps —
General StaflE.")

"After eating the first mess you will march with the whole
column to Santiago, effecting a retreat from that point by eche-
lons as carefully and slowly as may be necessary, so as to be in
good condition to repulse any attack of the enemy.

"The Talavero Battalion will go to Sueflo and will there meet
the chief of the town, who will indicate to it the points to be
occupied.

"The Puerto Rico Battalion, with the two mobilized companies
from the mineral region, will proceed to Cafiadas and will there
receive orders concerning the points it is to occupy, and the San
Fernando Battalion is to proceed to Central Ben^fico, and will also
receive instructions. The section of artillery will go to the quar-
ters at Dolores. The section of engineers will proceed to Cruces,
taking quarters in the offices of the mineral company.

"Linares.
"Pozo, Jwne 2^, 1898.

"Note: The captain of engineers is to return to Santiago with
the convoy of sick and to report to Colonel Caula.

"To General Antero del Rubin."

80

(Seal : * ' Army of Operations of Santiago — 4th Army Corps —
General Staff.")

"You have already received orders to retreat, which is to be
done when the convoy of sick has started under the protection of
two mobilized companies and one Talavero company.

" The whole train will retreat first, and upon arriving at San-
tiago, they will go to the i)oints design^ated, and with the three
echelons of Puerto Rico, San Fernando, and Talavero, you will
make the retreat, alternating by echelons in such manner that
when the forward echelon leaves* a position the other two will be
in i)osition, until arriving at Santiago. There I shall await you.

^^ Linares.
"To General RubIn."

EOT) OF THE MONTH OF JUNE.

Jwne 28th. — The Morro said that the MdssachusettSy which had
been gone, had returned ; that the Iowa had left instead, and that
at 7 a. m. a merchant vessel was embarking the sick of the fleet,
estimated at about 50, judging from what could be made out with
the help of glasses ; that to the east, at a distance, the ships were
firing slowly.

During the night they continued to watch with search lights.

29th. — ^The Imva returned.

In the evening, firing on Daiquiri was heard.

30th. — The same ships are blockading the harbor.

The Morro said that at 3 p. m. a steamer was sighted to the
south; that, when she saw the American fleet, she shaped her
course eastward at full speed ; that a yacht and a battleship went
out to chase her; that the latter returned with the steamer which,
with the American flag hoisted, joined the convoy at Daiquiri.

At 8 p. m. a few musket shots were heard in the direction of
Campo de Marte (east of the city).

Later the sound came from the Plaza de Toros (northeast).

At 9 firing was again heard at the cemetery (to the north).

Nothing further occurred.

The last three days of the month of June are devoid of interest
and we enjoyed unusual quiet. So much had the people of San-
tiago become accustomed to the sound of gunshots that they almost
missed them.

But how true it is that when a calm comes after a storm, it is
often only the precursor of another storm. The enemy was prepar-
ing to begin the month of July in a manner that Santiago de Cuba
will remember many a day.

The hostile fleet continued to antagonize the coast as usual.
But without neglecting their main objective and their constant
care, that of watching our fleet, which, being short of pro^asions,
would sooner or later be compelled to take some decisive action,
they were gathering at the entrance of the harbor a large number
of their most powerful ships, and the army, no doubt intrenching
itself at Daiquiri, so as to have another shelter besides that of the

1084B 6 (81)

82 -

ships, and a safe base of operations, was preparing to attack the
city, supported by the insurgents who had joined them in large
numbers under their leaders Calixto Garcia, Demetrio Castillo,
Cebrecos, and others less known.

This is proved by the musket fire which was heard a short dis-
tance from the city, to the northeast, on the night of the 30th.

Prom the news we had received from the Morro it might have
been inferred that about 3 o'clock in the afternoon of that same
day, the hostile fleet had captured a merchant vessel, which, after
the American flag had been hoisted upon her, joined the convoy ;
but this is not probable. Aside from the fact that the flag of a ship
is not changed as easily as that, the truth would have become
known sooner or later. It is more probable that it was a vessel that
was not expected and they went out to reconnoitre. That is my
opinion about this incident, which, in reality, is not of much
importance.

A few words more about the Vesv/vius that gave us so much
trouble for a few nights — that time, it seems, suiting her best to
carry out her exploits. This ship is the only one of her class; her
projectiles and the apparatus throwing them are not known, and
she has made her d^but here. One of the projectiles which fell on the
northern slope of the Socapa, tore up trees right and left for a dis-
tance of about 20 metres. From a certain distance, as I could see
the day I went to the Mercedes^ it looked as though a road had
been opened across the mountain.

Another, which fell a short distance from the one just referred
to, made an excavation, not very deep, but very wide; I was told
that it would hold twenty horses. This would seem to indicate that
the screw with which they are provided keeps on revolving even on
solid groimd.*'

Still another dropped in the water, but close to one of the destroy-
ers, which was violently shaken, as also the Mercedes^ anchored at
a short distance. I heard this from the commander of the former
and the officers of the latter.

The forces of the army which, as has been stated, abandoned the
mineral region, not being able to maintain it, concentrated in the
city, preserving, as was indispensable, the line from Aguadores to
Cruces, after destroying the bridge at the former point. The line
(4 kilometers) was covered by six companies of the Santiago regi-
ment and two of mobilized troops, a total contingent of about 800
men.

* The reference to the " screw " in this pari^graph probably refers to the vanes
or feathers on the rear end of these shells. They are for the purpose of giving
the shell rotation in its flight, and being fixed to the shell tney have no inde-
pendent motion.— O. N. L

83

The advance post of Caney (a league and a half — about 6 miles —
from the city), in command of General Vara del Rey, was defended
by three companies of the battalion **0onstituci6n" (the 29th),
one company of guerrillas on foot, in all 430 men, 40 soldiers of
the Santiago regiment and 50 of the mobilized troops, being a total
of 520 men.

The line of the precinct (9 kilometers), extending from Dos
Caminos del Cobre, west of the city, to the fort of Punta Blanca,
to the east, on the seashore, was defended by the following forces :

Corps of sailors from the fleet (four second companies) 458

Fonr comx)anies of the Provisional Battalion of Puerto Rico 450

Talavera Battalion, No. 4 (Peninsular) - 850

Four companies of the San Fernando Battalion, No. 11.. 440

Total, army 2,198

Three companies of mobilized troops 330

Volunteers - - 440

Total 2,968

Also a small number of gunners, for there was not a suflBcient
number to serve the guns installed, the number and place of which
has been mentioned. It may therefore be said that there were, in
round numbers, 3,000 men.

This was the fighting force. Within the city was the cavalry
force (for which the ground, being hilly and cut up by trenches,
was not adapted), and a small force of the civil guard assigned to
duty in the city, and the firemen with their engines in readiness.

This line is divided into sections in command of colonels.

Of the 3,000 men defending it, two companies, one of the Pro-
visional Battalion of Puerto Rico and the other of the Talavera
Battalion, defended the advance position at San Juan, one being
assigned to the right, the other to the left side of the road.

Finally, at the Socapa, that is, at points in an opposite direction
from that line, there were 400 men, 450 at the Morro, and 120 at
Punta Gorda. It must be remembered that these three positions
overlook the entrance of the harbor, and are its key, and must for
that reason be maintained at any cost ; and these forces were in-
dispensable there, as the enemy might attack them, as indeed he
did attack them the next day.

The same day, the 30th, the following telegram, addressed to
the aid of marine (ayudante de marina) of that district, was re-
ceived at the comandancia de marina from Manzanillo :

" Commander Marine, Santiago:

"Last evening, for about an hour, we sustained in the waters of
this harbor a battle against three hostile vessels of medium ton-
nage, which passed, at a distance of about a mile from the head of
the piers, in a northeasterly direction, under low steam.

84

" The following took part : Gunboats Gvuntdnamo^ Estrellay and
Delgado-ParejOy under my command, and a group of vessels that
were disabled, consisting of the pontoon Maria and gunboats Cuba
Espanola and Guardian. With the former three we arrived in
time at the other group, as the enemy passed by, who, finding him-
self attacked, stopped his progress only a short time on account of
an injury which our vessels had inflicted on the second of theirs,
which made it necessary for the third one to tow her to windward,
and then, with slow speed, though keeping up a steady fire during
the retreat, they doubled the headland northeast of the Manza-
nillo Cays, heading north, and soon disappeared from sight. The
city cooperated efficiently with the few guns it has. We had two
dead, two slightly wounded, and one bruised, on the DeLgado-
Parejo; two slightly wounded and two contusions on the other
ships ; in the city, a few wounded ; injuries to all the ships, but

not material.

"Barred A."

XXIV.

BATTLES OF EL CANEY AND SAN JUAN.

July 1st. — At 7 gun and musket fire were being heard in the
direction of the Plaza de Marte (east of the city).

According to the Morro the Minneapolis arrived to reenforce
the hostile fleet.

At the commandancia de marina we could hear a slow gun and
steady musket fire in the direction of Campo de Marte.

The enemy had a captive balloon, from which he observed our
positions ; from the Reina Mercedes headquarters (converted into
a hospital) it could be plainly seen. It was in the direction of
Sevilla.

Tbe American fleet is firing from Aguadores, the greater part
of the projectiles passing over the city. Others fall inside, some
exploding and some not. Many have already fallen in the houses,
among others* a 20-cm. shell, which fell in the house of the chief
pilot of the port, but did not explode. The ships firing, from
Aguadores are the New York and the Oregon.

The streets of the city are almost deserted; only soldiers and
volunteers are seen as they go to their posts. As usual, many
projectiles are falling in tiie bay near our fleet.

The firing from the ships ceased at 11.

At 2 intense musket-fire was heard in the direction of El Caney ;
at 2 :30 also gun-fire.

By 3 o'clock the musket-fire became steadier; constant volleys
were being heard ; at 4 it became less intense.

At 10 p. m. General Cervera left his ship, returning at 12.

On July 1st, at 6 a. m., the nucleus of the hostile army under
command of General Shafter, and which must have consisted of
at least 15,000 men, with many modem guns, without including
the insurgent parties, attacked the lines of the precinct east and
east-northeast of the city, that is El Caney, defended by General
Vara del Key with 620 men and two Plasencia guns, and the position
of San Juan, occupied by two companies comprising 250 soldiers.

The attack which the Americans made with 12,000 men, as stated
by themselves, was commanded by General Wheeler, second in
command of the army.

(86)

86

A brigade of 3,500 men, also under the orders of said General
Wheeler, and supported by another, directed its efforts upon El
Caney, while Colonel Chaffee with 2,000 men attacked the hill and
fort of San Juan.

The Americans, it must be acknowledged, fought that day with
truly admirable courage and spirit. The houses of El Caney,
which General Vara with his 520 men converted into as many
fortresses, threw forth a hail of projectiles upon the enemy, while
one company after another, without any protection, rushed with
veritable fury upon the city. The first company having been deci-
mated, another appeared, then a third, and still another, and those
soldiers resembled moving statues (if I may be permitted that
expression for want of a better) rather than men ; but they met
heroes, and although the houses had been riddled with bullets
by the artillery and musketry, and although the streets were
obstructed with dead and wounded. El Caney had been converted
into a veritable volcano, vomiting forth lava and making it impos-
sible to go near it.

Both sides being short of forces and out of breath, almost with-
out having stirred from their relative positions, the battle ceased
for some time, and General Vara del Rey took advantage of this
circumstance to have his soldiers re-form the lines and again get
ready for the battle.

General Linares, who was repulsing the attacks at the position
of San Juan, upon learning the result of these assaults, warmly
congratulated the handful of lions in these words: "When the
American army attacked El Caney they had not counted on a
general of Vara del Rey's stamp and on troops as fiery and inured
to warfare as those he had under his command."

The fight commenced once more and the enemy attacked again
and again, being always repulsed, but as we had no reserve forces,
and the Americans, on the contrary, had a great many, the battle
was no longer possible under these circumstances. The General
was wounded almost simultaneously in both legs by two musket
balls, and as he was being carried away on a stretcher, the bullets
falling around him like hail, he was killed by a third one, at the
same moment as two of the men who were carrying him. The
greater part of the commanders and officers (among them two rela-
tives of the General) were dead or wounded, as also the majority
of the soldiers. Finally, at 7 p. m., the commander being dead
and those 520 men having been reduced to less than 100 and most
of these slightly wounded and bruised, that handful of heroes, for
want of forces and a commander, retreated from the site, which
for ten hours they had been defending without being able to get
any reenforcements, for there were none to be had, and the enemy

87

occupied the position on which he, in his turn, had made such a
bold attack.

Of the 620 defenders of El Caney only 80 returned, most of them
crippled and bruised. The Americans acknowledged that they
had 900 casualties.

As has been stated, 2,000 men under the command of Colonel
Chaffee, well protected, attacked in the morning the position of
San Juan with the same spirit and enthusiasm with which Wheel-
er's men made the attack on El Caney.

Our headquarters were situated in an excellent position, at the
crossing of the roads to El Caney and Pozo. General Linares had
no available reserves; he therefore formed the echelon close to the
positions of San Juan where he could observe the movements of
the enemy and assist personally at points where his presence might
be necessary.

With him was General Ordofiez with two rapid-fire guns.

In the foremost echelon at San Juan was Colonel Jos6 Baquero^
of the Simancas regiment of infantry, who had come from Guan*
t^namo with a message, and could not return on account of th^
blockade. This echelon was two companies strong, and before the
Americans opened fire, it was reenf orced by another company. It
is here that Colonel Ordoiiez was, with the rapid-fire division ; the
position being defended by 300 infantry and two guns.

The echelon nearest San Juan consisted of three companies of
Talavero, one company with General Linares to the right of the
Pozo road, forming an angle, in order to prevent a surrounding
movement on the part of the enemy from the right of San Juan;
another at the angle of the two roads referred to, and a third at
Veguita toward El Caney, crossing their fire with that of the forces
at Sueiio.

In view of the small numbers of our forces and the ever increas-
ing numbers of those of the Americans and their war material, we
reenforced our positions by some trenches, under shelter of which
we might be able to prolong the fight for a longer time.

The cavalry formed the third line at the fort of Canosa, pro-
tected by a small hill.

After the cannonade of the morning, in which our guns with
accurate aim succeeded in causing the enemy many casualties and
silencing the fire of one of his batteries erected at Pozo, and when
the Americans had brought together considerable forces of infantry,
they attacked about noon with cannon, machine-gun, and musket
fire.

The situation of the line commanded by Baquero was critical.
Colonel Ordofiez and the commander of the Puerto Rico battalion,
Mr. Lamadrid, had been wounded. One-half of the officers had

88

also fallen under the action of the lead that was pouring down
upon the line. The enemy was advancing in large and compact
masses, firmly resolved to take the positions, but Baquero, the
brave soldier, who had distinguished himself so highly in the cam-
paign, was there, keeping up by his example the spirit of the
troops, almost annihilated by hunger and fatigue, and decimated
by the clouds of bullets and grapeshot.

At this critical moment the cavalry was ordered to advance rap-
idly in order to protect the retreat of Colonel Baquero's forces and
save the artillery if possible.. Lieutenant Colonel Sierra hastened
to carry out the order, as Commander Arraiz had done before him
at San Juan.

The line which General Linares commanded personally now
formed the vanguard. With his assistance the General's aids and
his chief of staff had to organize the remnants of the first line.

It was necessary to maintain that position at any cost, for its
loss would give the enemy free entrance into the city. The brave
men of the first line were retreating. Colonel Baquero had dis-
appeared, killed, no doubt, when he led that retreat under the hail
of grapeshot and lead. The enemy was advancing in compact
masses, and rushing upon what was now the first line. Fortunately
the fire of our infantry, accurately aimed, compelled the Ameri-
cans to recede, and they retreated behind the positions of San
Juan. At that moment General Linares and the brave com-
mander of infantry, Arraiz, fell wounded ; the latter officer, who
had already shed his blood at Cacarajfcara, was one of the most
beautiful examples of the army.

While these cruel battles of El Caney and San Juan were carried
on the enemy sent forces against our whole line, for the purpose, no
doubt, of harassing us and making the attack more general.

The San Juan forces tried once more to recover themselves.
Others came to their assistance, among them the company of
marines which had been stationed at the Plaza de Toros with Cap-
tain Bustamente; but the enemy was already strongly occupying
the position, our forces were scant, and success was impossible.
Our artillery was steadily firing at many points of the line, load-
ing the guns (old ones, as has been stated) without any protection,
but the fire was extremely slow and therefore of little efficacy.

At 3.30 p. m. I went toward the Campo de Marte, impatient to
learn what had happened. At the Plaza de Dolores I met General
Linares. His arm, which had been seriously wounded in the first
trenches, as stated, had been dressed at the military hospital and
he was now being taken to his house on a stretcher, escorted by a
few horsemen.

89

When I arrived at the end of Enramadas street and was only a
few feet from a trench of the third line, covered by a section of
volunteers, I saw a part of the battlefield. The mnsket fire was
very slow, and although Santa Ursula fort, situated to the right
and somewhat in the rear of the trenches referred to, was firing
as rapidly as its muzzle-loading guns permitted, it will be easily
imderstood that there was no new attack that day.

I then went to the headquarters of the cavalry, at the entrance
of El Caney road, where a section of the cavalrymen were ready to
hasten wherever they might be ordered.

It may be said that the battle was at an end and many com-
manders and officers were arriving, all tired out and almost dying
from thirst. Among others, I saw Commander Irlds, of the
general staff, who had had either one or two horses killed under
him, and there I learned that the number of commanders and offi-
cers wounded had been comparatively very large. Mr. Molina,
lientenant colonel of the civil guard, arrived and said that Com-
mander Bustamente of the navy had been seriously wounded and
was being carried on a stretcher. My consternation may be
imagined. I hurried out to meet him and found him a few min-
utes later. In spite of the heat, he had been wearing his blue-
cloth suit in the fight, by which he could be easily distinguished
from all others. He was covered with blood, pale and disfigured,
his eyes closed, and without his saber and revolver. I learned
that before he was wounded his horse was killed under him and
his hat shot through. I accompanied him to the military hos-
pital. In spite of his insignias of a commander, nobody paid
much attention to him. This can be readily understood, for that
day, in a short time, over 300 wounded had been received, and
they were still coming. It was difficult to find beds and the
attendant personnel, although increasing, was not sufficient to
look after all.

I succeeded in finding Antonio Caflaz, the surgeon of marine,
whom I know, and in whom I have unlimited confidence, and
thanks to him, the wounded man was placed on a bed and his
clothes taken off. They had to be cut with scissors. The wound
was in the right side of the abdomen ; his legs were covered with
blood. The position of the bullet, the aspect of the wounded man,
and above all the look with which Dr. Cafiaz answered mine, left
me no doubt. I knew that he had only a few moments to live and
I left the hospital deeply affected.

I will add that, as the hospital was situated in the sector
attacked by the enemy and near the trenches, being outside the
city, musket balls were falling in great quantities in the court
and on the roof; later on, shells were flying over it in all
directions.

90

As has been seen, two battle ships from Agaadores were throw-
ing projectiles upon the city and the bay, causing victims among
the inhabitants and damages to the buildings. As I went to the
captaincy of the port in the morning when the firing commenced,
I saw at the ambulance improvised at the Bottino pharmacy, a
woman who was having her head dressed, which had been struck
by a fragment of shell. The wound, although not deep, was wide,
and looked as though made with a razor.

At nightfall the firing ceased along the whole line.

Such were the battles of that day, so serious by reason of the
blood that had been shed, as well as by their results.

With the loss of El Caney, we lost the line which it had been
so imperative for us to keep, and also the aqueduct and the region
under cultivation — ^that is, provisions and water. We had to con-
fine ourselves to the defense of the precinct, knowing full well
that, though the sad end might be held off for a day or two longer,
there was no possibility of avoiding it.

Our casualties were as follows :

Killed : Brigadier General Joaquin Vara del Rey, 3 commanders,
12 oflScers, and 78 men.

Missing: Colonel of Infantry Jos^ Baquero, 4 officers, and 116
men. The colonel was probably killed, but this could not be
verified.

Prisoners : Two oflficers.

Wounded : Lieutenant General Arsenio Linares Pombo, 6 com-
manders, 30 officers, and 339 men.

(Among the wounded officers was Colonel of Engineers Caula
and Colonel of Artillery OrdofLez.)

TOTAL CASUALTIES.

Generals 2

Commanders - 10

Officers 48

Men 688

Total 598

Almost one-fifth of the combatants covering the whole line, and
the whole line was not even attacked, but only a sector of it; con-
sequently not all of them fought.

The casualties of the enemy, as acknowledged by themselves,
were:

In the attack on El Caney 900

In the attack on San Jnan 483

At other points of attack 828

Total 1,760*

* This is the figure of the original Spanish but is probably intended for 1,600.—
O. N. I.

91

In these cruel battles the army inspired the enemy with respect
and true admiration, perhaps because he had supposed that they
fought in the same manner as the insurgents. The foregoing is
my firm conviction, because I have seen and observed the events
which I narrate and have dwelt much upon them.

On the 1st day of July the Americans fought, as I have stated,
without protection and with truly admirable courage, but they
did not fight again as they did that day. They entrenched them-
selves and set up their artillery as fast as they received it, and did
not again come out from behind their fortifications. Did they
think on that first day that all they had to do was to attack our
soldiers en masse to put them to flight? God knows.

It was difficult to convince them that only 520 men had been
defending El Caney for ten hours. When doubt was no longer
possible their admiration had no limits. When they entered San-
tiago de Cuba-, the American soldiers and ours looked upon each
other without any prejudice or jealousy, perhaps because they
knew that both had fought like brave men, and whenever the
Americans saw one of our men of the twenty-ninth (the number
of the battalion ''Constituci<5n," which had defended the city,
and has been referred to so many times) they would call him,
look at him, and treat him with great admiration, wondering
perhaps, how so simple a soldier could do such great things.

The men of the twenty-ninth, known to have done something
worth doing, were loved and feasted by everyone and spent whole
hours with the Americans, who did not understand them, but
applauded everything they said, on the assumption, perhaps, that
he who is brave must also be bright.

Incidents like these I saw, not once, but a hundred times, and
they have made me believe and say what I have stated. I may be
mistaken, but I do not believe it, because I have also noticed that
the Yankees treat the insurgents, although they are their allies,
very diflferently. Besides, I am only citing facts, and anyone can
construe them to his own satisfaction.

From the foregoing, it is reasonable to believe that when 520 men
maintained themselves at El Caney for ten hours, and 250 at San
Juan for four hours, if Escario could have been there that day, so
that there had been 3,000 men more in our lines, neither El Caney
nor San Juan would have been lost, though attacked by almost the
whole hostile army.

General Linares surrendered the command to General Toral.

In the battle of July 1, General Rubin, who commanded the
forces of San Juan and Portillo del Caney, had his horse killed
under him at the latter place at 5 o'clock p. m.

XXV.

ACTIONS OF THE 2d AND 3d.

July 2d. — At 5 o'clock gun and musket fire commenced, well
sustained in the direction of the land.

At 6 the hostile fleet opened fire on the Morro and the Socapa.
The greater part of the projectiles fell in the bay and on our fleet.

The firing ceased at 8.30.

Punta Gorda, which also opened fire, discharged 8 shots.

The musket fire was intense.

At 8.15 Punta Gorda again opened fire. At the same time the
Pluton started up toward the mouth of the harbor. The musket
fire ceased.

At 9.30 the military governor said by telephone: "I ask your
excellency to send a boat, so that by going as close to the coast as
possible, the enemy may be checked at San Antonio and Plaza de
Toros." At this time the enemy opened musket fire in the same
direction. It ceased shortly after.

The companies of the fleet embarked again. A pilot was sent
to each one of the ships.

The body of sailors that disembarked was protected in a line of
trenches by Colonel Aldea's column (Asiatic battalion), which
withdrew from the coast to the city.

At 8 o'clock four wounded from the Socapa were brought to
the pier. A shell which exploded on one of the guns killed three
men and wounded six, completely disabling the mount of the
Hontoria gun, which could no longer be used. Among the
wounded was Ensign Fernandez Pifia, who was in command of the
battery.

At 1.30 a slow gun fire was heard in the distance.

The French consul, on horseback, with a flag of his nation on a
very long pole, left for Cuabitas, followed by many people.

During the firing several projectiles of all calibers fell on the
city.

At 3.16 musket and gun fire was being heard in the direction of
Campo de Marte. The line of fire was very extensive and the
musket fire intense.

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93

At 4 o'clock the musket fire ceased, only the gun fire being
heard now.

At 4.40 musket fire was again opened; volleys could be heard at
intervals.

At 6 the firing ceased.

At 7 musket fire broke out again; ceasing at 7.30.

At 8.30 two blazes could be seen at the top of Monte Real to the
west.

At 9.46 the enemy opened a violent musket and gun fire from
the Plaza de Toros to the Campo de Marte (from east to east-north-
east). To the left (Plaza de Toros) frequent volleys could be
heard.

At 10.30 the musket and gun fire ceased.

The night was extremely dark. From 10 to 11.30 the ships of
our fleet spoke by means of the ardois (light signals).

The enemy, during the night of the battle of Caney, and after
burying the dead, not without paying due honors to General Vara
del Rey, commenced work on the trenches, which they never left
again, continued to surround our lines with the new reenforce-
ments constantly arriving, and installed modern artillery and ma-
chine guns on the heights. The insurgents were covering Cuabitas
and adjoining points, although in second line. We were decidedly
surrounded and all our communications by land cut oflf, as they
had been by sea for over a month and a half. Each hour that
elapsed the enemy fortified the circle that inclosed us.

During the night the enemy kept up most incessantly a violent
musket and terrific gun fire which we hardly answered, so as not
to waste the little ammunition that we had left, which was, no
doubt, what the enemy intended.

The Asiatic column (Colonel Aldea) arrived from the coast and
occupied in line the post vacated by the companies of the fleet, sit-
uated on the road to Caney (in the entrance).

In the meantime the fleet was once more bombarding the Morro
and the Socapa, where, after killing several men, they finally suc-
ceeded in dismounting one of the two Hontoria guns, which they
had been constantly antagonizing since the 18th of May. At the
same time they were bombarding the city from Aguadores, wound-
ing several persons and ruining several houses.

The cruiser Reina Mercedes changed her anchoring place and
remained at the head of the bay as much as possible, awaiting
orders to open fire on Quintero Hill to check the enemy if he should
appear there.

The French consul was the first to leave the city, which was
abandoned by almost the whole population a few days later.

94

A little before 10 a. m. the enemy, who no doubt intended to
surprise us, furiously attacked our lines, and was repulsed with
great loss.

The events of the second of July may be summed up as follows :

Lively bombardment by sea and land, killing several men and
disabling one of the only two guns with which we could attack the
enemy trom the mouth of the harbor ; bombarding with impunity
the defenseless city ; a battle from trenches, the fire of which we
hardly answered, and finally a night surprise that resulted in
failure.

The companies of the fleet embarked rapidly in spite of the pre-
vailing conditions. A pilot was sent to each one of the ships, which
latter took in their boats and steam launches and loosened the spring
on their cables, and the gunboat Alvarado, which had come out of
the slip and was afloat, raised at night the six Bustamente torpe-
does that were obstructing the channel to the west. Everything
indicated, without leaving room for doubt, that the fleet was about
to go out; but when and how?

It occurred to me (and nobody could have dissuaded me from it)
that a fleet from the Peninsula was on its way to Santiago ; that it
would pass in sight of the semaphore of Puerto Rico ; that conse-
quently Admiral Cervera would know, given the distance and the
speed of the former and allowing for the diflference in time, when
it would reach Santiago; and when fire was opened on the enemy
it would leave the mouth free, he would go out and the two fleets
combined would defeat the enemy. I remembered everything I
had read in newspapers about the purchase of ships, and the date
when those building had been launched. Everything became clear
to me. We had ships and they were coming. No doubt they were
quite near, or perhaps only a few miles distant, but where had the
ships come from? I do not know — from heaven, from earth, from
the air, from nothing at all — I do not know. But everything ap-
peared possible to me, except that our fleet should go out alone to
fight the ships that were assembled at the Morro.

The aid of marine, Mr. Dario Leguinia, even more optimistic
than I (and that is saying a great deal), could not rest a minute.
I shall never forget how during that night of the 2d we were sitting
on the doorsteps of the captaincy of the port, making calculations
as to the number of ships that might arrive and the probabilities
of success that we could count on. Our ships communicating by
means of the ardois were another proof of this. The event
announced was near, and we were to see great things happening.
At times we even thought we heard firing out there on the sea at
a great distance and in a southeasterly direction. How much
desire and imagination can do !

95

At 1 o'clock at night there was nothing special to be seen, and
so, feeling sure that important events were to take place the fol-
lowing day, I retired, not without repeatedly impressing upon the
seaman (cabo de matricula) to notify me at once at the first move-
ment of the fleet, or the first gun shot. It would not have been
necessary. My impatience and anxiety would have taken care of
that mnch. better than the cabo.

The next day it was learned that the blazes we had seen on the
Monte Real were from the burning of the forts and the heliograph,
which the detachment there had abandoned to hasten to Santiago,
in order not to be cut off and surrounded. During the march,
which w^as full of hardships, it became necessary to kill a horse
for food.

XXVL

SORTIE OF THE FLEET

If I were to live a thousand years and a thousand centuries, never
should I forget that 3d day of July, 1898, nor do I believe that Spain
will ever forget it. The day dawned beautifully. One of those
summer days when not the slightest breath of air stirs the leaves
of the trees, when not the smallest cloud is visible in the skies;
when not the slightest vapor fills the atmosphere, which was won-
derfully transparent, so that the horizon could be observed at a
great distance.

Nothing special was to be noticed among the ships of our fleet;
motionless on the quiet waters of the bay, that reflected their hulls,
though inverted, with wonderful accuracy, they looked as though
they ought not to leave an anchoring place where they could
remain in such perfect safety.

It was 8.30. Feeling sure that the ships would not go out, and
taking advantage of the chance of getting a horse, for the distance
was great, I went to the military hospital to see Mr. Joaquin Bus-
tamente, whom I found a different man, as the saying is. His
voice was strong, his eyes bright, and his cheeks flushed. He
moved with ease and did not appear to experience any difficulty in
doing so. I was agreeably surprised.

Why does one remember things that are really not of great im-
portance? Is it perhaps because they are connected with others
that are ? I cannot explain it. I only know that I remember,
word for word, the conversation that took place between us. It
was as follows :

*'Is the fleet not going out?" he asked, without giving me a
chance to say anything.

"Not just now, I believe, though it is ready to go out. Is it
known when the other fleet will arrive?" I said.

"What other fleet?"

"The one that is supposed to come from Spain; they probably
! know at about what time it may be expected at the mouth of the

i harbor."

"Don't be simple." (I don't remember whether he called me
simple, or innocent, or a fool.) "There is no other fleet; the ships

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97

are going out and that is all there is to it. I have a letter from
Don Pascual (Admiral Cervera) in which he tells me so."

I remained thunderstruck. I could doubt no longer. I know
Admiral Cervera sufficiently well, as does everybody else, to know
that he does not say, and still less write, what he does not intend
to do.

" Do you think he will go out to-day ? " I said.

" I thought he was going even now."

I could not answer. A gunshot which, judging from the direc-
tion, could only be from one of the two fleets, left me motionless.

Two or three minutes later a terrific cannonade commenced,
such as I have never heard, nor will probably ever hear again, a
cannonade more intense than that of June 6, a thing which I be-
lieved impossible, shaking the building, thundering through the
air. I could not think coherently. I kept looking at Mr. Busta-
mente like an imbecile, and he looked at me and didn't say a word.
I felt something that commenced at my feet and went up to my
head, and my hair must have stood on end. Then suddenly, with-
out taking leave, I went out, got on my horse and rode down the
hill at breakneck speed, and I hardly understand how it was that
I did not break my neck. I arrived at the captaincy of the port,
where I found them all, from the commander of marine to the last
clerk, with emotion painted on every face, and all looking in the
direction of the mouth of the harbor, the mountains of which, that
had been such a protection to us, and which now prevented us
from seeing what was going on outside, we should have liked to
grind to powder.

The noise caused by the gunshots which the mountains and
valleys echoed was truly infernal and comparable to nothing.
An idea may be gained of what it was when it is remembered
that over 250 guns, most of them of large caliber and all breech-
loading, were firing incessantly. The earth trembled, and very
soon Punta Gk>rda, the Morro and the Socapa took part in the
frightful concert, adding the. thunder of their guns to the noise
of those of the two fleets.

But the firing continued and that is what puzzled me. I
thought, taking into account the number and class of hostile ships
and of our own, that the catastrophe of the latter must necessarily
take place in the very channel of the harbor, which is such a
difficult one, even for ships of less length and draft than those
which formed our fleet, under normal conditions ; how much more,
then, when sustaining a battle. A deviation, a change of course
ahead of time, an injury to the rudder or the engine, even though
slight and momentary, the least carelessness, in a word, might
run a ship aground, and such a disaster would cause also the

98

destruction of the other ships that were coming after and which
would have collided with the first ; the hostile ships might sink
the first right there and then ; for the same reasons, the disaster of
the others becomes inevitable.

To my mind, the going out from Santiago harbor under the cir-
cumstances Admiral Cer vera did, and as confirmed by the command-
ers of the ships of the fleet, constitutes the greatest act of valor
imaginable, for it meant to go out to certain death, not only with
fearlessness, but with a clear head, for a man must be completely
master of himself in order to command a ship without becoming
excited nor losing his head. One may form an idea of it from the
horror which I experienced, who was not in any of the ships, but
I knew perfectly well the dangers of the enterprise, which, in my
opinion, was impossible.

The day, as I said, was most beautiful and the calm perfect.
Therefore, the smoke, far from vanishing, rose up in a straight line.
When the first moments of excitement were over and we had some-
what cooled down, we could see perfectly that the smoke from the
firing formed four groups more or less distant from each other,
but what group did our fleet form ? If the one farthest to the
west, then no doubt it was not surrounded and had the open sea
before it, and this was a great advantage. If, on the contrary, it
formed the second or third, then it was between two fires.

Later on it was noticed that the firing was at a greater distance
and decreased in intensity, and that the columns of smoke were
moving farther to the west. Had they succeeded in escaping and
outwitting the hostile fleet ? For the present one thing was cer-
tain : Our ships had not gone down in the entrance of the harbor,
nor even close to it, and that was of great importance, for the great-
est danger was in the channel. Imagine our joy when the Morro
advised us by telephone that our fleet was fighting in wing forma-
tion and that the enemy did not have the range. Evidently the age
of miracles is not over. I will not try to describe what we felt that
day — we, at Santiago, who have the honor of belonging to the
navy.

I still had the horse at my disposal, and as I remembered the
anxiety in which I had left Mr. Bustamente and his delicate state
of health, I hastened to bring him the news, which I thought
would do him a great deal of good. When I arrived, he knew it
already, as everyone else did in Santiago. He had been all over
the city. I found him radiant with satisfaction.

I may safely say that the 3d of July was a day of true rejoicing,
for, as will be seen later when I relate the events of that day, it
was believed that our ships had accomplished their object,
although at the cost of the destroyers, the loss of which wat,

99

already known. And although we felt very sad over the victims
there must have been, the result, on the whole, was so brilliant
that it surpassed all reasonable expectations.

How great were my consternation and sorrow when, at 6 o'clock
in the evening, I saw the pilot Miguel L6pez arrive, his appearance
changed and his clothing and shoes wet from the drizzling rain,
with the news that he had at his house at Cinco Reales five ship-
wrecked from the Maria Teresa and Oquendo^ worn out and weak ;
that both ships, on fire, had run aground on the coast close to each
other west of Punta Cabrera and about 8 miles from the harbor of
Santiago, and that a great many more, some wounded and all tired,
were on the road.

The Teresa and Oquendo lost, besides the Plutdn and Fv/ror!
What a horrible contrast and what a sad awakening! In the
morning I had believed the ships safe and was already thinking of
a telegram from Havana announcing their arrival at that port.
At night the news of the catastrophe, the full extent of which I
did not know even then !

But as my comments and lamentations do not explain what had
happened, I will give the news as it was received in the course of
the day at the captaincy of the port. It will explain why, for
eight hours, we believed at Santiago de Cuba that the Spanish fleet
was in safety.

XXVIL

NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

July 3d. — The hostile fleet in sight, about 5 miles distant.

At 9.45 the Spanish fleet went out. Shortly after, a violent
bombardment was heard.

At 10.40 the Morro said: " The Spanish fleet is fighting in wing
formation at Punta Cabrera; the enemy does not have the range
and it seems as though they would succeed in escaping. The
American fleet is composed of the Brooklyn^ Indiana^ lowa^ Texas,
MaasachibseUSy Oregon, and one yacht. The ships from Aguadores
have come to assist in the battle."

At 11.15 no more firing was heard.

At 12.30 the Morro said: '*When the fleet went out it did so
slowly. After the four large ships had gone out the destroyers
went, and all of the American ships fell upon them. Our fleet
opposed the attack and the destroyers hurried to join them, but
near Punta Cabrera one of them took fire and ran ashore. The
otlier continued to fire and when she saw herself lost she lowered
two boats filled with men ; one reached the coast, the other was
captured. On leaving the destroyer they set it afire and she ran
aground burning."

So they are both lost. When our fleet passed Punta Cabrera one
of the ships, apparently the Teresa, went close to the shore and a
great deal of smoke was seen. The Iowa and New York were pur-
suing her and the others followed them. By this time the hostile
ships from Aguadores were already taking part in the fight.

At 2 an English warship was signaled to the south.

At 3 the Morro said that the ships which pursued our fleet were
24 in all; 15 warships, armored and unarmored; the others mer-
chant vessels equipped for war.

At 6.30 the pilot, Miguel Ldpez, said that at his house at Cinco
Reales, he had five shipwrecked from the Teresa and Oquendo, and
they said there must be others at Cabanitas.

The tug Esmeralda, with the second commander of Marine and
Ensign Nardiz, with the pilot, Lopez, and ten armed sailors, went
out to gather them up. Forces of the army also went out in the

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101

steamer Col6n to protect those who might be returning by roads
and paths along the coast.

At nightfall Colonel Escario's column arrived from Manzanillo.

My friend, Mr. Robert Mason, Chinese consul, who is interested
in naval matters, and has a good understanding of everything
concerning them, witnessed the battle from the Vigia del Medio,
which is the highest mountain in the bay and overlooks a great
part of it. But we must take into account that, as it is quite dis-
tant from the coast, the ships that pass close to it can not be seen.
As soon as he arrived he told me what had happened as he had
seen it, and I put it down as he dictated it to me. The following
is what I heard from his own lips, word for word, without chang-
ing anything in this interesting account :

"The Teresa went out first, then the Vizcaya and Colon; after
a somewhat longer interval, the Oquendo^ then the destroyers.
The Admiral passed the Morro at 9.45. A little to windward of
the Morro (west) was the Brooklyn. Opposite the Morro another
ship, apparently the Massachusetts, and I could distinguish no other
war ships from the Vigia. When the Admiral passed the Morro
the hostile ships and the Morro and Socapa opened a violent fire
simultaneously ; the hostile ships that could not be seen and that
were at Aguadores also opened fire at the same time. After pass-
ing the Morro, the Admiral went west and was lost from sight on
account of the Socapa. The Vizcaya followed, and then the other
two. In the meantime the destroyers remained in the bay. The
Spanish ships were now visible again, the Vizcaya in the lead, the
Cclonj Oquendo, and Maria Teresa in line ahead at a certain dis-
tance from the American fleet. The Spanish fleet was firing slowly,
the American ships lively, so that I did not lose sight again of the
Spanish ships, but often of the American ships on account of
the smoke. In the meantime the American war ships and two
yachts were gathered opposite the Socapa, and when the destroyers
came out it seemed impossible that they should be able to escape.
The fire was horrible from the large guns, as well as from the
rapid-fire guns. Nevertheless, the destroyers were lost from sight,
but they appeared again, firing from their stern guns. As long as
the ships could be distinguished it could not be estimated whether
they had received injuries of any kind. When they disappeared
from sight, at 10.30, we could see no injuries in the masts or smoke-
stacks, or anything special. At this time we saw all the American
ships firing in a westerly direction, and at that hour the Netv York,
which had not yet entered the fight, passed the bay headed west-
ward. When I left the battle I had not seen any ship run aground
nor on fire, either Spanish or American."

102

Before I continue, in order to give a "better understanding, I will
recall the fact that the coast between Santiago and Punta Cabrera,
a stretch of about 6 miles, forms a kind of bay on which are situ-
ated Cabafias and Guaicabdn ; that Punta Cabrera projects south
and is very high land, consequently the ships which are west of it
and close to the coast can not be seen. It is absolutely necessary
to remember this in order to understand why it was that the final
result of the battle was not seen.

At 9.30 the Spanish fleet started up; first the Maria Teresa^
Admiral Cerv6ra's flagship, the Vizcaya^ then the Cristobal ColdUy
and Oquendo. Behind these the Plutdn and Furor. This was the
order of sortie as I learned from the pilots, Ldpez and N6fiez.

The Brooklyn^ lowa^ Indiana, Texas, Massachusetts, Oregon,
and one yacht were waiting at the mouth of the harbor. The
others arrived soon from Aguadores, where they had been, with
their engines going and under steam. One of the last ones to
arrive was the New York, which, the same as the Brooklyn, has a
20-mile speed.

The Spanish ships, which necessarily had to go out in line-ahead,
received, as each went out, the fire of all the American ships,
which they could not answer until they had passed the bank of
Diamante, because they could not present the broadside, conse-
quently their guns, to the enemy. Therefore, as long as they
were inside of the harbor, they all sustained a terrible fire.

Nevertheless they came out without serious injuries and reached
the open sea.

The Vizcaya, which was the fastest ship, but had not had her
bottom cleaned, was making only 13 miles, and the other ships had
to regulate their speed by hers in order to preserve the line.

I suppose from what happened and taking into account the order
of the sortie that Admiral Cervera intended to protect the retreat
of the Vizcaya^ accompanied by the Colon (which did not have her
turret guns mounted), with the Oquendo and Maria Teresa, and
then have the latter, by putting on forced draft, rejoin the former,
but both were set on fire by the stern, which they presented to the
hostile fire, and they were soon converted into one immense blaze
and went aground on the coast, the Teresa about 7 miles from San-
tiago harbor, west of Punta Cabrera, then close to her the Oquendo.
These events I learned at nightfall from the shipwrecked who had
arrived. The fate of the Vizcaya and Cristobal Colon I will antici-
pate, in order to complete the account of what happened to the
whole fleet as it was told me by an oflicer of the Austrian cruiser
Maria Teresa (same name as ours) the next day.

When the Oquendo and Teresa had been lost, two or three
American ships remained there to consummate the surrender and

103

gather up the shipwrecked and wounded and take the others pris-
oners. The other ships continued to pursue the Vizcaya and the
CciUin. The first of the two also took fire at the stern and stranded
at a distance of about 20 miles (toward Aserradero) ; the second
did not take fire. Probably her engine was damaged and she ran
up on the coast about 60 miles distant (oflE Turquino).

Such was the hecatomb (for there is no other name for it) of
our ill-fated fleet, and I do not believe that history records
another like it. Not a single ship was saved from the catastrophe.
The commanders and officers of all the ships knew well what was
going to happen, when, calm and serene in spite of everything and
ready to do their duty fully, they took leave of each other and of
their comrades who remained on shore, as they did not belong to
the fleet.

A person who has witnessed and seen with his own eyes an
event like the one which I have in vain tried to describe, must
necessarily be of interest, even though of Uttle prominence and
education. For that reason I have had the pilots Miguel Ldpez
and Apolonio NuSez, who took out the Teresa and Oquendo
respectively, repeat to me a hundred times what they had seen. I
shall not copy everything they said ; that would be too much of a
task, but only what relates to the battle and which gives an idea
of that veritable hell, for that is what the mouth of Santiago
harbor was for fifteen minutes.

Miguel L<5pez, who is cool-headed and daring on land as well as
on the sea, said to me about as follows :

" I was in the forward tower by the side of Admiral Oervera,
who was as calm as though he had been at anchor in his own cabin,
and was observing the channel and the hostile ships and only said
these words :

" 'Pilot, when can we shift the helm?' He had reference to
turning to starboard, which could only be done after we had passed
Diamante Bank. After a few seconds he said :

** * Pilot, advise me when we can shift the helm.'

" *I will advise you. Admiral,' I answered.

** A few moments later I said : * Admiral, the helm may be shifted
now.'

** In a moment the Admiral, without shouting, without becom-
ing excited, as calm as usual, said: 'To starboard,' and the next
minute, ' Fire ! ' At the same moment, simultaneously, the two guns
of the turret and those of the port battery fired on a ship which
seemed to me to be the Indiana. I thought the ship was sinking.
I can not tell you, Don Jos6, all that passed. By this time there
were already many dead and wounded in the battery, because they
had been firing on us for some time, and I believe that in spite of

104

the water that was in the ship she was already on fire then. The
Admiral said to me :

" 'Gk)od-by, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let them pay
yon, because you have earned it well.' And he continued to give
orders. "

These were, more or less, the words that Miguel Ldpez spoke to
me, and which he repeats to anyone who wishes to hear them.

Apolonio Nuflez, who took out the Oquendo^ is very diflFerent
from L<5pez, not daring, but rather easily frightened. These were
his impressions :

** When we arrived at Santa Catalina battery, they were already
firing. There was a hail of bullets on board which can not be com-
pared to anything. I was in the tower looking after the course of
the ship. The commander, who is very kind, and who knew me
because I had taken the ship in on the 19th, said to me :

"*Tou can go, pilot; we can get along now, and later on i)er-
haps you will not be able to go.' I thanked him and should have
gone gladly enough, I can tell you, but I was afraid they might
shift the helm before they passed Diamante, and you can imagine,
Don Jos6, what would have happened. I remained on board, and
when we had passed the bank I said to him : * Commander, you can
shift the helm.'

*' 'Go, pilot, go,' he said, and then he commanded to put to star-
board and shouted, ' Fire ! ' The noise caused by the big forward
gun and the shaking of the ship made more impression on me than
the fire of the Yankees. I thought the Oquendo had been cut in
two. I do not even want to remember it. I was lowered in a boat
and then I thought I was a dead man. The bullets were falling all
around me. Finally I reached Estrella Cove, where Miguel Ldpez
had already arrived. I did not even dare look at the battle, which
was now outside of the harbor."

These two accounts,* which perhaps, do not inspire the interest
which no doubt they possess, because I have not been able to
remember the exact words of the men, although in substance they
are the same, may give an idea of that never-to-be-forgotten sortie
which had such fatal consequences.

I supposed that the American fleet would await the Spanish
fleet at the mouth of the harbor and absolutely prevent it from
going out, under penalty of having the ships attacked. But that
requires a great deal of courage and presence of mind. Neverthe-
less, it would have been the safest means for accomplishing it.
By not doing so they exposed themselves to being outwitted and
this is proved by the fact that our ships succeeded in getting out
of the harbor and as far as Punta Cabrera (about 6 miles), so that

105

they really accomplished the most difficult part, and there is no
donbt that if they had not been set on fire and if they had had a
speed of even 18 miles they would have run the blockade.

It will also have been noticed that the three ships built in Spain
all had the same fate; they were burned. The one built in Italy,
although not having the turret guns, and which had suffered from
the hostile fire much longer, because she ''died" later than the
others, was not burned ; she had a different fate, but not that. I
believe I am not bold in affirming that if the four ships had been
protected like the Coldn^ they would have outwitted the enemy's
pursuit. In that event they might have reached Havana, for as
the whole, or nearly the whole, American fleet was in front of
Santiago, they would have met no one to prevent them and the
situation would have been very different.

A few of the shipwrecked arrived in the tug Coldn and were
embarked by our commander of marine in the cruiser Reina Mer-
cedes.

The tug Esmeralda^ with Ensign Nardiz, ten armed sailors,
and the pilot Ldpez, went to Cabafiitas Cove to gather up ship-
wrecked ; but, although they made a careful search, they found
none.

At night Colonel Escario's column, whose forces have already
been mentioned, arrived from Manzanillo. The next day General
BSscario told me that when he heard the fire of the battle in the
morning, he proceeded with a small vanguard to the heights of
the harbor of Bayamo, and that the detachment there told him the
same thing, viz, that they saw our ships run the blockade and dis-
appear past Punta Cabrera.

To my mind there is nothing so interesting and eloquent as the
account of a naval battle by persons who have taken part in it.
Lieutenants Bustamente and Caballero, second in command of the
destroyers Furor and PliUdn, respectively, who escaped by a mira-
cle from the horrible hecatomb, in which the greater part of their
crews perished, told me two days after the catastrophe, still sick
and tired, of the battle which their ships sustained. Their accounts
follow :

Mr. Caballero: "The last ships were already outside of the
harbor when the destroyers, which had stopped between the Socapa
and Cay Smith for the purpose of getting up steam, proceeded and
passed through the channel as far as Punta Morrillo, where the
Furor ^ which was in the lead, put to port as though trying to go
east, but when she discovered the Qloucester and other ships which
were near Aguadores, she put to starboard, following the lead of
our fleet, which was already at some distance, opening fire on the
Qloucester which we (the two destroyers) had left astern. And

104

the water that was in the ship she was already ou fire then. The
Admiral said to me :

" 'Gk)od-by, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let them pay
you, because you have earned it well.' And he continued to give
orders."

These were, more or less, the words that Miguel Ltfpez spoke to
me, and which he repeats to anyone who wishes to hear them.

Apolonio Nuiiez, who took out the Oqitendo^ is very different
from L<5pez, not daring, but rather easily frightened. These were
his impressions :

** When we arrived at Santa Catalina battery, they were already
firing. There was a hail of bullets on board which can not be com-
pared to anything. I was in the tower looking after the course of
the ship. The commander, who is very kind, and who knew me
because I had taken the ship in on the 19th, said to me :

"*You can go, pilot; we can get along now, and later on per-
haps you will not be able to go.' I thanked him and should have
gone gladly enough, I can tell you, but I was afraid they might
shift the helm before they passed Diamante, and you can imagine,
Don Jose, what would have happened. I remained on board, and
when we had passed the bank I said to him : ' Commander, you can
shift the helm.'

** *Go, pilot, go,' he said, and then he commanded to put to star-
board and shouted, * Fire ! ' The noise caused by the big forward
gun and the shaking of the ship made more impression on me than
the fire of the Yankees. I thought the Oquendo had been cut in
two. I do not even want to remember it. I was lowered in a boat
and then I thought I was a dead man. The bullets were falling all
around me. Finally I reached Estrella Cove, where Miguel L6pez
had already arrived. I did not even dare look at the battle, which
was now outside of the harbor."

These two accounts, which perhaps, do not inspire the interest
which no doubt they possess, because I have not been able to
remember the exact words of the men, although in substance they
are the same, may give an idea of that never-to-be-forgotten sortie
which had such fatal consequences.

I supposed that the American fleet would await the Spanish
fleet at the mouth of the harbor and absolutely prevent it from
going out, under penalty of having the ships attacked. But that
requires a great deal of courage and presence of mind. Neverthe-
less, it would have been the safest means for accomplishing it.
By not doing so they exposed themselves to being outwitted and
this is proved by the fact that our ships succeeded in getting out
of the harbor and as far as Punta Cabrera (about 6 miles), so that

105

they really accomplished the most difBcnlt part, and there is no
doubt that if they had not been set on fire and if they had had a
speed of even 18 miles they would have run the blockade.

It will also have been noticed that the three ships built in Spain
all had the same fate; they were burned. The one built in Italy,
although not having the turret guns, and which had suffered from
the hostile fire much longer, because she ''died" later than the
others, was not burned ; she had a different fate, but not that. I
believe I am not bold in affirming that if the four ships had been
protected like the Coldn^ they would have outwitted the enemy's
pursuit. In that event they might have reached Havana, for as
the whole, or nearly the whole, American fleet was in front of
Santiago, they would have met no one to prevent them and the
situation would have been very different.

A few of the shipwrecked arrived in the tug Col6n and were
embarked by our commander of marine in the cruiser Reina Mer-
cedes.

The tag Esmeralda, with Ensign Nardiz, ten armed sailors,
and the pilot Ldpez, went to Cabafiitas Cove to gather up ship-
wrecked ; but, although they made a careful search, they found
none.

At night Colonel Escario's column, whose forces have already
been mentioned, arrived from Manzanillo. The next day General
Escario told me that when he heard the fire of the battle in the
morning, he proceeded with a small vanguard to the heights of
the harbor of Bayamo, and that the detachment there told him the
same thing, viz, that they saw our ships run the blockade and dis-
appear past Punta Cabrera.

To my mind there is nothing so interesting and eloquent as the
account of a naval battle by persons who have taken part in it.
Lieutenants Bustamente and Caballero, second in command of the
destroyers Fwror and Plutdn, respectively, who escaped by a mira-
cle from the horrible hecatomb, in which the greater part of their
crews perished, told me two days after the catastrophe, still sick
and tired, of the battle which their ships sustained. Their accounts
follow :

Mr. Caballbbo: "The last ships were already outside of the
harbor when the destroyers, which had stopped between the Socapa
and Cay Smith for the purpose of getting up steam, proceeded and
passed through the channel as far as Punta Morrillo, where the
Furor, which was in the lead, put to port as though trying to go
east, but when she discovered the Gloucester and other ships which
were near Aguadores, she put to starboard, following the lead of
our fleet, which was already at some distance, opening fire on the
ffUmcester which we (the two destroyers) had left astern. And

104

the water that was in the ship she was already on fire then. The
Admiral said to me :

" 'Good-by, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let them -p&j
you, because you have earned it well/ And he continued to give
orders. "

These were, more or less, the words that Miguel Ldpez spoke to
me, and which he repeats to anyone who wishes to hear them.

Apolonio Nuiiez, who took out the Oquendo^ is very diflPerent
from L<5pez, not daring, but rather easily frightened. These were
his impressions:

"When we arrived at Santa Catalina battery, they were already
firing. There was a hail of bullets on board which can not be com-
pared to anything. I was in the tower looking after the course of
the ship. The commander, who is very kind, and who knew me
because I had ta>ken the ship in on the 19th, said to me :

***You can go, pilot; we can get along now, and later on per-
haps you will not be able to go.' I thanked him and should have
gone gladly enough, I can tell you, but I was afraid they might
shift the helm before they passed Diamante, and you can imagine,
Don Jos6, what would have happened. I remained on board, and
when we had passed the bank I said to him : ' Commander, you can
shift the helm.'

'* * Go, pilot, go,' he said, and then he commanded to put to star-
board and shouted, * Fire ! ' The noise caused by the big forward
gun and the shaking of the ship made more impression on me than
the fire of the Yankees. I thought the Oquendo had been cut in
two. I do not even want to remember it. I was lowered in a boat
and then I thought I was a dead man. The bullets were falling all
around me. Finally I reached Estrella Cove, where Miguel Ldpez
had already arrived. I did not even dare look at the battle, which
was now outside of the harbor."

These two accounts,' which perhaps, do not inspire the interest
which no doubt they possess, because I have not been able to
remember the exact words of the men, although in substance they
are the same, may give an idea of that never-to-be-forgotten sortie
which had such fatal consequences.

I supposed that the American fleet would await the Spanish
fleet at the mouth of the harbor and absolutely prevent it from
going out, imder penalty of having the ships attacked. But that
requires a great deal of courage and presence of mind. Neverthe-
less, it would have been the safest means for accomplishing it.
By not doing so they exposed themselves to being outwitted and
this is proved by the fact that our ships succeeded in getting out
of the harbor and as far as Punta Cabrera (about 6 miles), so that

105

they really accomplislied the most difficult part, and there is no
doubt that if they had not been set on lire and if they had had a
speed of even 18 miles they would have run the blockade.

It will also have been noticed that the three ships built in Spain
all bad the same fate; they were burned. The one built in Italy,
although not having the turret guns, and which had suffered from
the hostile fire much longer, because she **died" later than the
others, was not burned ; she had a different fate, but not that. I
believe I am not bold in affirming that if the four ships had been
protected like the Coldn^ they would have outwitted the enemy's
pursuit. In that event they might have reached Havana, for as
the whole, or nearly the whole, American fleet was in front of
Santiago, they would have met no one to prevent them and the
situation would have been very different.

A few of the shipwrecked arrived in the tug Coldn and were
embarked by our commander of marine in the cruiser Reina Mer-
cedes.

The tug Esmeralda^ with Ensign Nardiz, ten armed sailors,
and the pilot Ldpez, went to Cabafiitas Cove to gather up ship-
wrecked ; but, although they m£kde a careful search, they found
none.

At night Colonel Escario's column, whose forces have already
been mentioned, arrived from Manzanillo. The next day General
Escario told me that when he heard the fire of the battle in the
morning, he proceeded with a small vanguard to the heights of
the hajrbor of Bayamo, and that the detachment there told him the
same thing, viz, that they saw our ships run the blockade and dis-
appear past Punta Cabrera.

To my mind there is nothing so interesting and eloquent as the
account of a naval battle by persons who have taken part in it.
Lieutenants Bustamente and Caballero, second in command of the
destroyers Fwror and Plutdn^ respectively, who escaped by a mira-
cle from the horrible hecatomb, in which the greater part of their
crews perished, told me two days after the catastrophe, still sick
and tired, of the battle which their ships sustained. Their accounts
follow :

Mr. Caballebo: '*The last ships were already outside of the
harbor when the destroyers, which had stopped between the Socapa
and Cay Smith for the purpose of getting up steam, proceeded and
passed through the channel as far as Punta Morrillo, where the
Furor ^ which was in the lead, put to port as though trying to go
east, but when she discovered the Gloucester and other ships which
were near Aguadores, she put to starboard, following the lead of
our fleet, which was already at some distance, opening fire on the
OUmcester which we (the two destroyers) had left astern. And

104

the water that was in the ship she was already ou fire then. The
Admiral said to me :

" 'Gk)od-by, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let them pay
you, because you have earned it well.' And he continued to give
orders. "

These were, more or less, the words that Miguel L<5pez spoke to
me, and which he repeats to anyone who wishes to hear them.

Apolonio Nufiez, who took out the Oquendo^ is very different
from L<Spez, not daring, but rather easily frightened. These were
his impressions :

** When we arrived at Santa Catalina battery, they were already
firing. There was a hail of bullets on board which can not be com-
pared to anything. I was in the tower looking after the course of
the ship. The commander, who is very kind, and who knew me
because I had taken the ship in on the 19th, said to me :

"*You can go, pilot; we can get along now, and later on i)er-
haps you will not be able to go.' I thanked him and should have
gone gladly enough, I can tell you, but I was afraid they might
shift the helm before they passed Diamante, and you can imagine,
Don Jose, what would have happened. I remained on board, and
when we had passed the bank I said to him : * Commander, you can
shift the helm.'

'* *Go, pilot, go,' he said, and then he commanded to put to star-
board and shouted, ' Fire ! ' The noise caused by the big forward
gun and the shaking of the ship made more impression on me than
the fire of the Yankees. I thought the Oquendo had been cut in
two. I do not even want to remember it. I was lowered in a boat
and then I thought I was a dead man. The bullets were falling all
around me. Finally I reached Estrella Cove, where Miguel Ldpez
had already arrived. I did not even dare look at the battle, which
was now outside of the harbor."

These two accounts,* which perhaps, do not inspire the interest
which no doubt they possess, because I have not been able to
remember the exact words of the men, although in substance they
are the same, may give an idea of that never-to-be-forgotten sortie
which had such fatal consequences.

I supposed that the American fleet would await the Spanish
fleet at the mouth of the harbor and absolutely prevent it from
going out, under penalty of having the ships attacked. But that
requires a great deal of courage and presence of mind. Neverthe-
less, it would have been the safest means for accomplishing it.
By not doing so they exposed themselves to being outwitted and
this is proved by the fact that our ships succeeded in getting out
of the harbor and as far as Punta Cabrera (about 6 miles), so that

105

they really accomplished the most difficult part, and there is no
doubt that if they had not been set on fire and if they had had a
speed of even 18 miles they would have ran the blockade.

It will also have been noticed that the three ships built in Spain
all had the same fate; they were burned. The one built in Italy,
although not having the turret guns, and which had suffered from
the hofitile fire much longer, because she *'died" later than the
others, was not burned ; she had a different fate, but not that. I
believe I am not bold in affirming that if the four ships had been
protected like the Coldn, they would have outwitted the enemy's
pursuit. In that event they might have reached Havana, for as
the whole, or nearly the whole, American fleet was in front of
Santiago, they would have met no one to prevent them and the
situation would have been very different.

A few of the shipwrecked arrived in the tug Coldn and were
embarked by our commander of marine in the cruiser Reina Mer-
cedes.

The tug Esmeralda^ with Ensign Nardiz, ten armed sailors,
and the pilot Ldpez, went to Cabafiitas Cove to gather up ship-
wrecked ; but, although they made a careful search, they found
none.

At night Colonel Escario's column, whose forces have already
been mentioned, arrived from Manzanillo. The next day General
Escario told me that when he heard the fire of the battle in the
morning, he proceeded with a small vanguard to the heights of
the harbor of Bayamo, and that the detachment there told him the
same thing, viz, that they saw our ships run the blockade and dis-
appear past Punta Cabrera.

To my mind there is nothing so interesting and eloquent as the
account of a naval battle by persons who have taken part in it.
Lieutenants Bustamente and Caballero, second in command of the
destroyers Fv/ror and PlutoUy respectively, who escaped by a mira-
cle from the horrible hecatomb, in which the greater part of their
crews perished, told me two days after the catastrophe, still sick
and tired, of the battle which their ships sustained. Their accounts
follow :

Mr. Caballero: '*The last ships were already outside of the
harbor when the destroyers, which had stopped between the Socapa
and Cay Smith for the purpose of getting up steam, proceeded and
passed through the channel as far as Punta Morrillo, where the
Furor y which was in the lead, put to port as though trying to go
east, but when she discovered the Oloucester and other ships which
were near Aguadores, she put to starboard, following the lead of
our fleet, which was already at some distance, opening fire on the
Gloucester which we (the two destroyers) had left astern. And

106

the Indiana, Oregon, Iowa, and Texa^, which we had passed in
the order named on the port hand, continued to fire very rapidly,
which made it extremely difficult for us to serve the guns. After
we had passed Cabafias we commenced to gain on the Furor, and
when we came up with her and were about 50 meters to starboard,
she listed rapidly on that side, her rudder having been disabled,
and passed astern of us at a distance of 1 meter, and sank by the
stem, standing up almost vertically, and was buried in the sea a
moment later, before reaching Punta Cabrera.

"As we (the PltUdn) were making a great deal of water we con-
tinued close to the shore to reach Punta Cabrera, and when we
were close to the headland which it forms, we received a 32-centi-
meter projectile which exploded the forward group of boilers,
blowing up the whole deck and cutting oflf communication between
the two ends. She then veered to starboard and struck on the
headland, tearing off a great part of the bow. The shock threw
her back some distance, then she struck again. I jumped into the
water and reached the shore.

'*! climbed up on the headland of Punta Cabrera and lay there
for about fifteen minutes, during which the fire continued. When
it was at an end I went into the mountains and gathered up such
personnel of the ship as I met — about 20 or 25 — and with them I
went around a small hill for the purpose of hiding from the coast
and took the road to Santiago de Cuba, avoiding the roads and
seeking the densest thickets and woods. The pilot, on pretext that
the road which I was following was not a good one, left us and did
not again put in an appearance. We continued walking in an
easterly direction — some clothed, others naked, and the rest half
clothed — for two hours, resting now and then, and trying to keep
close to the coast. When we reached the beach we met Lieutenant
Bustamente with a group of shipwrecked from the Furor (his ship)
and some from the Maria Teresa. We saw a yacht with the
English flag close to the coast maneuvering back of Punta Cabrera,
as though trying to gather up the shipwrecked there. We made sig-
nals to her with a shirt, and seeing that she paid no attention to us
we walked on, avoiding the formation of large groups and hiding
ourselves as much as possible.

"About 3.30 we reached the harbor of Cabafias, which we had to
cross swimming, and on the opposite shore, about 9 o'clock at
night, we reached the trenches of the Socapa, where at last we
could rest for the night, with the assistance of some guerrillas,
who supplied us with what they could."

Mr. Bustamente : *' When we (the Furor) reached the mouth of
the harbor and saw the Spanish fleet, we thought that by shaping
our course westward we could seek the protection of the Spanish

107

fleet, which was already at some distance, and we manetiyered
accordingly. One of the projectiles struck one of the hatches of
the boiler ventilators, thereby reducing the pressure and conse-
quently the speed of the ship. By this time the projectiles were
falling on board in large numbers. One of the shells struck Boat-
swain Dueflas, cutting him in two; one part fell between the tiller-
ropes, interrupting them momentarily, and it was necessary to
take it out in pieces. Another projectile destroyed the engine
and the servo-motor, so that the ship could neither proceed nor
maneuver. Another had struck the after shell room, exploding
and destroying it.

Our torpedoes had their war-heads on and were ready to be used,
but we did not launch them because we were never at a convenient
distance from the enemy. Under these circumstances the com-
mander of the destroyers, Captain Fernando Villaamil, gave
orders to abandon the ship, and I with part of the crew jumped
into the water, about 3 miles from the coast. In the water, one of
the men near me, I believe the first boatswain, was struck by a
bullet in the head and was buried in the water forever. The ship
in the mean time, after a horrible series of explosions, went down.
When we reached the land we went in an easterly direction
towards Santiago. Shortly after we met Lieutenant Caballero and
with him and his men we reached Santiago, and following the
same road and the same fortunes ; as they are identical, I will not
here relate them."

To what has been said it is useless to add another word.

CAUSES OP THE LOSS OF THE NAVAL BATTLE

OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

Words fail me to describe the painful impression produced upon
me by the disaster of the four cruisers and two destroyers under
Admiral Oervera's command, and by what I may call the hecatomb
of their crews, which was not complete for the only reason that the
battle had taken place so near the shore, where the ships, all on
fire, could run aground, rather than surrender to the enemy. In
less than two hours the ships were destroyed, and yet, this is not
strange. I am surprised, on the contrary, that they were not sunk
in the channel.

The loss of the fleet had been foretold by all its commanders,
with whom I have talked more than once, and was prophesied, so
to speak, as soon as the order was received at the Cape Verde
Islands to start for Cuba, and the admiral who was in command
advised the Government to that effect several times ; these official
communications are still in existence. But it seems that public
opinion in the island of Cuba, especially at Havana, required the
presence of the fleet in those waters, and between that and the very
sensible and logical reasons advanced by the admiral, the Govern-
ment decided in favor of the former, and the fleet departed, shaping
its course to the west. From that moment the loss of the fleet
became inevitable, and it was only a question of time, as will be
easily understood from what follows.

The fleet left the Cape Verde Islands with no more coal than was
in the bunkers, the greater part of which must necessarily be used
up during the voyage across the Atlantic Ocean. The three de-
stroyers, FlutdUy Furor, and Terror accompanied it and had io be
convoyed and supplied with coal, which involved difficulties and
delays.

At Martinique (where the Terror was left, being no longer able
to follow the fleet) the ships could not coal ; and at Curagao, in
spite of the government's promise that they were to find a ship
there with fuel, which did not put in an appearance, only two of
the ships could get aBmall number of tons.

(108)

109

The order to proceed to the island of Cuba was there ; what could
they do under such circumstances? The only natural and logical
thing : go to the harbor that was nearest and for that reason ofiEered
the least dangers, go to Santiago de Cuba, which Admiral Cervera
believed well defended, as the harbor is suited for that purpose,
and supplied with provisions. How great was his surprise when
he found that only two guns worthy of the name defended its en-
trance, and that provisions were lacking in the city, as well as
ammunition and everything else.

I have already stated, and will here repeat it, that during those
days of May, before the hostile fleet appeared with forces superior
to ours (that is, from the 20th to the 27th) the ships could not go
out, not only because they did not have coal enough, but also be-
cause there was considerable swell in the sea, which prevented them
from going out, as was stated by all the pilots of the locality, who
said that the ships were almost sure to touch bottom, especially
the CdtdUy which drew more water than the others.

We must take into account, for it means everything for a fleet,
that they had not cleaned their bottoms for a long time and their
speed was therefore far from what it should have been ; the Vizcaya^
above all, was not able to make 13 miles, and later, after being in
Santiago harbor for 46 days, her speed was reduced to even less.

But even if there had been no swell in the sea to the south and
the ships could have gone out, where would they have gone ? To
Havana by the shortest route ? They would have met Sampson's
fleet, as Admiral Cervera knew only too well, and that was just
what he wished to avoid. Perhaps he might have succeeded by
taking a course which he would have been least expected to take,
through Providence Channel, for instance ; and this did occur to
Admiral Cervera, but it was impossible, for the simple reason that
he did not have fuel enough for so many days of navigation.

Moreover, when the fleet reached Santiago harbor, everybody
there, as well as in the Peninsula, believed it safe and congratu-
lated its commander on his success and his clever maneuver; and
when I say '* everybody " I do not mean the common people only,
but the official element. Could there be a better proof that Ad-
miral Cervera complied with the wishes of the Government?

The fleet received definite order from the Captain General of the
Island of Cuba to leave the harbor of Santiago, which he reiterated,
in spite of Admiral Cervera's remonstrances. After that, what
was to be done? Only one thing: go out, as indeed they did,
resigned, but calm and serene, those heroes ; for all those who went
out with the fleet to certain death, as every one knew, deserve that
name. And I say that they went out calm and serene, and shall
say it a thousand times, for only thus can ships be maneuvered in

110

so narrow and dangerous a channel, without any of them running
aground, which can happen so easily even under ordinary circum-
stances, when it is not necessary to oppose the fire of a hostile
fleet, and with ships of less draught and length. The sortie from
that harbor, under the circumstances under which those ships
effected it, I do not hesitate in calling the greatest act of valor,
fearlessness, skill, intelligence and practical experience in seaman-
ship that can be conceived. This was stated repeatedly and with
great admiration by the commanders and oflftcers of the English
corvette Alert and the Austrian cruiser Maria Teresa^ who, it may
be said, witnessed the battle.

The number of ships that were awaiting ours at the mouth of
the harbor, and with which the latter had to fight, as well as their
nature and the kind of armament they mounted, was given in one
of the first chapters, from statistics of the American Navy. This
alone is more than sufficient to demonstrate that, in view of the
inferiority of ours in quantity and quality, it was impossible to
sustain the battle.

But there is more, much more, to be added in order to explain
what happened in the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba, the greater
part of which is not known by the people in Spain.

I have already stated that the Colony the only really protected
ship of the four that composed the fleet, did not have her turret
guns. Of the 14-cm. guns of the Teresa^ Oquendo^ and Vizcaya,
which are the ones that do most of the firing in a battle, six had
been declared useless ; and while the Teresa could change hers, the
Oquendo and Vizcaya could not do so, and had to fight, the former
with one, the latter with two useless guns, as I have stated.

Moreover, the supply of ammunition for all of the ships was
inadequate, and the Teresa had 70 useless charges. The greater
part of the primers were no good, and consequently the guns did
not go oflF. The breech-plugs were imperfect, so that after the
second or third shot they no longer closed. The firing-pins blew
out, and from many of the survivors of the Oquendo and Teresa
I have learned that a number of the men serving the guns were
wounded by their own pieces. Therefore, if the whole thing were
not so sad and serious, it might be said that the guns of our ships
were like the *' carbine of Ambrosius," which went oflf at the
breech; that is, that far from injuring the enemy, they were a
danger to those who had charge of firing them.

The majority of the cartridge cases did not have the required
diameter, and on the Maria Teresa it happened that seven had to
be discarded before one good one could be found. Under these
conditions, it will be readily understood that the armament, which
was intended to be converted into rapid-fire artillery, was instead

Ill

converted into artillery — I do not know what to call it, but it was
certainly entirely useless.

After what has been stated, can the result of the battle of San-
tiago be wondered at? Certainly not. The only thing that may
appear strange is that, under such conditions, a fleet should have
been sent to the scene of war.

It was under these circumstances that the sortie was made from
the difficult harbor of Santiago by those commanders and officers
who, convinced that they would all perish, contented themselves
with saying farewell to the comrades who remained on shore and
whom they never expected to see again.

We Spanish are very proud of the disaster of Trafalgar on
account of the heroism which our navy showed on that occasion,
when they placed honor above everything else, though our ships
were buried in the sea. The battle of Santiago de Cuba is much
more glorious even than that of 1805. In this latter battle, thirty-
two allied ships of 64, 80, and 120 guns fought with twenty-eight
English ships, also of 120, 80, and 64 guns; the forces, therefore,
were almost equal; and if the battle was lost, while it might very
well have been won, it was because our fleet was commanded by
Villeneuve, and the hostile fleet by Nelson. In the battle of San-
tiago, six ships (if the Pluton and Furor may be called such), had
to fight against twenty-four* that were better protected and armed.
After these figures, anything else that might be added would
appear to be useless.

I have never been able to understand the reason why there
was sent to the Island of Cuba a fleet that was in no manner
able to cope with that of the United States and which therefore
could in no wise prevent the ships of the latter from blockading
our ports and controlling the sea ; but since it was sent, without its
arrival being able to prevent the loss of the island, which was lost,
as experience has shown, from the very moment when war was
accepted, owing to the conditions prevailing there, then it should
have been prevented from being destroyed, as it was, without
resulting in any advantage whatever.

The only way of gaining any advantage would have been, in my
opinion, taking advantage of the fact that all the hostile ships were

* The writer makes a strange error in the number of the American ships en-
gaged in this fight. He has evidently counted all those enumerated in Chapter
IX. Those ships, however, were scattered among the fleets at Manila, Havana,
Key West, and Santiago. Those actually engaged were as follows : Brooklyn (flag),
Oregon, Indiana, Iowa, Texas, and yachts Oloucester and Vixen. The flagship
New York, with the torpedo boat Ericsson, took pwrt toward the latter end of
the enp^ement, the battle being practically fought by the six ships first named.
Gonntmg only numbers of ships, therefore, the Americans had five fighting
shipB against the Spanish four, with two armed yachts against the two Spanish
torpedo-boat destroyers.— O. N. I.

112

in Cuba, to send a few ships of great speed, more or less well
armed, to the commercial ports of the United States and bombard
them, even though not very effectively. It is probable that public
opinion, especially of those who did not participate in the war, would
have exacted the return of the ships, and then the Spanish fleet
could have left Santiago in perfect safety, and a catastrophe would
have been avoided which has brought us no advantage. At the
same time, the ports of the island, freed from the blockade, could
have supplied themselves yrith provisions ; and although the final
result would probably have been the same, it would not have been
so immediate.

But all this is nothing more than hypothesis and supposition,
and not timely ; besides, it was not my object in writing this book.
I have told how Admiral Cervera's fleet started from the Cape
Verde Islands, how it arrived at Santiago, and how it went out to
fight with Admiral Sampson's fleet, convinced that the greater
part of the people living in Spain are ignorant of what I have set
forth, and also convinced that, when the facts are known, the
results will be judged differently.

SINKING OF THE MERCEDES.

Jviy 4th. — Opposite the month of the harbor, the New York^
Braoklynj Indiana^ Masscichusetta^ Minneapolis^ Vesv/vius^ one
yacht, and seventeen merchant vessels.

At 7 an English corvette arrived and asked for a pilot.

At 9 the Austrian cmiser Mafia Teresa arrived.

The boats of both ships entered the harbor.

At 4 they departed with subjects of their respective nations.

At 8 p. m. the cruiser Reina Mercedes started up.

At 11. 30* wo gunshots were heard in the entrance at the foot of
the Morro; afterwards many more.

At 12.45 the fire ceased. It was answered by the Socapa.

There was hardly a day when the hostile fleet and the Morro
and Socapa did not exchange shots, or when some information was
not received of injuries to one or more of the hostile ships, even of
their having been burned and sunk, but as this has never been
proved I have said nothing on the subject, being resolved to say
nothing except what has been positively proved and what everybody
knew who remained at Santiago during the time when the events
that are the object of these notes occurred. It is natural that the
ships which sustained the fire so many times (the opposite would
be imiprobable) should have suffered some damages and casualties,
although they were stationed at a considerable distance, but there
ia no doubt that they were not serious ; if so, they would have been
clearly seen.

On the day of the battle of the two fleets I was assured by sailors
from the Socapa and by those shipwrecked that they had seen such
and such a ship sunk, or such other one on fire, and such and such
a tug had taken off some other ship. It seemed probable, but noth-
ing of the kind happened. The next day the ships that had fought
with ours were all at Daiquiri, at Aguadores, or opposite the mouth
of the harbor ; that is the reason why I have never spoken of the
damages done to the blockading ships.

The English corvette Alert and the Austrian cruiser Maria
Teresa could, of course, not enter the harbor, because we had

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114

planted Bustamente torpedoes (althougli only a part of them) and
stretched wires across. The tug Coldn went out with a flag of
truce to notify them to that effect, and they sent' in their boats,
towed by steam launches.

From the Austrian officers it was learned at the commandancia
de marina what had happened to the Vizcaya and Oqriendo in the
battle of the preceding day, for they had arrived just in time to
hear the gunshots and to see tiie ships stranded and lost on the
coast. All agreed, of course, that our fleet had fought admirably,
and, above all, that the sortie of the ships from the harbor under
the circumstances under which they executed it, showed a courage,
skill, and practical seamanship truly admirable. It is always a
comfort to see that justice is being done, and that comfort I had at
that time.

As the interior of the harbor did no longer have the safeguard
of the fleet, as the Bustamente torpedoes (six of them) had been
taken up so that the fleet could go out and had not yet been
replaced, and as, finally, the first line of mines no longer existed,
the commander of marine decided — General Toral also being of
his opinion — ^to sink the Mercedes (the only ship that was suitable
for that purpose) in the narrow part of the channel; consequently,
the commander of the cruiser received orders to do so. Hurriedly,
for time was pressing, the wounded and sick from the lost fleet
were transferred to the steamer Mejico, which had been converted
into a hospital and hoisted the flag of the Red Cross. Important
papers that had been saved, memoranda, portable arms, beds, and
the most necessary things, were taken off the Mercedes^ and at 8
p. m., with her commander. Ensign Nardiz, a few engineers, the
necessary sailors, and Pilots Apolonio Nuflez and Miguel Ldpez,
started toward the entrance, with her bow anchor and stern spring
on the cable ready.

At 11.30, as soon as the enemy, who was watching with search
lights, sighted her, he opened a continuous fire on the ship. In
spite of this the ship was sunk at the intended place, a very diffi-
cult operation under any circumstances and especially under fire,
as will be readily understood. Unfortunately the ship did not
come to lie across the channel, because it seems a projectile cut
the spring on the cable; the sacrifice was useless and the harbor
was not obstructed. Yet it was not entirely useless, since the
enemy could not take possession of her, as she is all riddled by
bullets which she received that night, and I do not believe she can
ever again be used.

And since so much has been said of this ship, I will give an
account of all the victims of her crew, some on board, some at the
Socapa, Punta Gorda, and the Morro, from the beginning to the
end of the war.

116

Commander Emilio Acosta, second in command, was killed.
(Here follow the names of the killed and wounded. The list
includes 5 dead, 11 seriously wounded — two of them fatally — 16
slightly wounded.)

The enemy cut oflP the aqueduct so that there was no water left
in the city, except in the wells and cisterns.

The shipwrecked, who have arrived from the fleet, are Lieuten-
ants Bustamente and Caballero, second in command of the destroy-
ers, respectively; Midshipman Navia; several engineers and about
150 sailors.

Many were murdered by the insurgents with guns and machetes.
I say murdered, because I believe there is no other name for kill-
ing with guns and machetes men who were not only disarmed, but
almost naked, sick, and many of them wounded. I realize the seri-
ousness of such an accusation, but it is the statement of all who
have succeeded in escaping.

ESCARIO'S COLUMN.

As the column whioh the commander in chief had ordered by
telegraph from Manzanillo took such an active part in the military
events from the time of its arrival at Santiago on July 3, it seems
proper that I should give an account of its difficult and laborious
march, covering a distance of 52 leagues over territory which had
been abandoned two months ago and was in the hands of the enemy
and where no help or support could be looked for anywhere.

In order to give an idea of this march, which reflects great honor
on the general at the head of the column, the ,chief s and officers
accompanying it, and the patient soldiers, I will state that of the
52 leagues the only distance where the column could march two
abreast was from Almirante to Santa Rita; all the rest of the dis-
tance they had to march single file, opening the road with machetes
as they went along, as everything was overgrown with manigua.
In order that the reader may better understand this march, I will
copy the diary of operations of the column.

This diary is as follows :

FROM MANZANILLO TO SANTIAGO DE CUBA BY LAND.

[Diary of the operations of campaign of the forces of the Manzanillo division

from June 22 to July 8, 18d8.]

"from MANZANILLO TO BAYAMO.

**In compliance with orders from the lieutenant general, com-
mander in chief of the fourth army corps, in his cablegram of the
20th instant, ordering that the forces of the Manzanillo division
should proceed to Santiago de Cuba, Colonel Federico Escario,
for the time being commanding general of said division, having
made the necessary preparations for such a long journey, properly
equipped the troops and rationed them for six days, commenced the
march on the 22d at the head of a column composed of the first
and second battalions of the Isabel la Catdlica regiment of infan-
try. No. 75 ; the first battalion of the Andalusia regiment, No. 52 ;
the Alcantara Peninsular battalion, No. 3 ; the battalion of Puerto
Rico chasseurs. No. 19; the second section of the first battery of
the fifth mountain regiment; part of the eighth company of the
first regiment of sappers; mounted guerillas from Calicito, Bay-
amo, and Manzanillo ; five medical officers and thirty men of the

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117

medical department destined for the Santiago hospitals, and the
tenth company of the transportation column in charge of 13,0C)0
rations of hardtack (gaUeta)^ and 15,000 extra rations loaded on 148
mules, and 50 private beasts of burden properly loaded.

"This column, comprising a total of 3,752 men, left Manzanillo
at 5 o'clock p. m., and at nightfall reached Palmas Altas, where
its commander gave orders to encamp for the night, which, how-
ever, did not afford the soldiers the rest that it was intended it
should, owing to a steady downpour, so that only a few could lie
down.

"The 23d dawned more brightly than the preceding day; the
camp was struck, the column reorganized, and the difficult march
continued at 5.30; high weeds had to be cut down to open a road
on the left bank of the Yara River, which route the commander
chose in order to obviate passing through towns which might be
occupied by the enemy, thereby complying with the order to
avoid encounters, contained in the cablegram of the 20th, above
referred to.

"The column passed through the Don Pedro plain and arrived
at dark at the ford of the Yara River, near the town of the same
name. Orders were given to encamp here. The column had
been harassed all day, especially while preparing to occupy the
camp, when the enemy opened a steady, lively fire, which lasted
ten minutes, killing one of our men and wounding three. The fire
was answered by the vanguard of the column. The usual recon-
noissance having been made by the mounted force, which reported
that the enemy had withdrawn, the column encamped and the
night was spent without further events and under more favorable
conditions than the previous night, for a clear sky and a dense
grove allowed our soldiers comparative rest until daybreak of the
24th, when the column, rising at the sound of the reveille, and
after drinking coffee, was again formed and organized by 6
o'clock, when it continued its march through Arroyo Pavon, Ana
Ldpez, and Sabana la Loma, sustaining slight skirmishes, in which
the column had one man killed and one wounded. The column
encamped on the banks of the Canabacoa River.

"On the 25th, at the usual hour, the camp of the preceding day
was struck and the column reorganized while heavy showers were
falling; the march was continued through Las Peladas, Palmarito,
and across the Buey and Yao rivers. The camp was pitched at
Babatuaba. The same as yesterday, the column was harassed all
day, always repulsing and dispersing the enemy. One man was
killed during the skirmishes.

"The night passed quietly, and at 6.30 a. m. of the 26th the
march was recommenced. The day was eventful and of excellent

118

moral and material results for the Spanish cause, as will be seen
from the feet that our forces entered the city of Bayamo after a
long march and pursued and scattered hostile detachments through
the heights of San Francisco, Peralejo, across the Mabay River,
and at Almirante, where the camp was pitched, not without some
resistance from the enemy, who was severely punished by the
accurate fire of the column, without causing us the least damage.

"The diary of those days would not be complete without an
account of the entrance into Bayamo above referred to. This
maneuver was undertaken, contrary to the orders to avoid encoun-
ters contained in said cablegram of the 20th from the commander in
chief of the fourth army corps, for the reason that the commander
of the column thought it would be discouraging to the soldiers to be
so near said city without entering it, and that their spirits would
rise, on the other hand, if they were allowed to do so and show the
enemy and the ungrateful people of Bayamo that there were still
Spaniards left in Cuba, and to disperse the enemy, for which pur-
poses there was strength and time enough left that day. The com-
mander therefore decided to explain these reasons to the commander
in chief and ordered that Colonel Manual Ruiz, second commander
of the column, should occupy the city with the cavalry and 600
infantry, the latter to be divided into two columns and the cavalry
to form the third. Interpreting faithfully the wishes and orders
of Colonel Egcario, Colonel Ruiz left the camp at Almirante at 3
o'clock p. m., after the troops had taken their first mess, and
divided his forces into the three groups mentioned, himself taking
command of one of the groups of infantry, placing the other in
charge of Lieutenant Colonel Baldomero Barbdn, first commander
of the Alcantara battalion, and the mounted force in charge of
Luis Torrecilla, commander of the first battalion of the Isabel la
Catdlica regiment. These three columns of attack, advancing
steadily on three diflEerent points, succeeded in approaching the
city without disturbance or interruption. Evidiently the enemy
was desirous of saving his fire, for alarm signals were heard and
groups were seen running from one place to another of the pre-
cinct, leaving no doubt that the enemy was near.

"The columns in the meantime continued to advance rapidly
and in silence, deployed in perfect order of battle, and thus they
arrived at the banks of the Bayamo River, where hostile forces
tried to check them by a steady musket fire from the city. But
this attempt became futile when the signal of attack was given, at
the sound of which our soldiers, arms in hand and without firing
a single shot, crossed the river at a run ; with only one casualty
and without further resistance, they triumphantly entered the
stronghold of the enemies of Spain. In disorderly and precipitate

119

flight that savage tribe retreated. Our forces went to occupy the
^^orts and principal avenues, and in separate groups they recon-
noitered the whole city, gathering up at the military command-
ancia of the insurgents several packages of their records and cor-
respondence, and the station and part of the telegraph line which
the rebels had established with Jiguanf and Santa Rita were
wrecked.

"No information concerning the enemy could be obtained from
the people of Bayamo, who, as usual, kept silent; a few only opened
their doors from sheer curiosity, plainly showing in their faces the
disgust they felt at the presence of Spanish soldiers on that soil
where it had been believed that they would never again set foot.

* ' Our forces then returned to the camp at Almirante. The result
of that day's work was not known at first, but it was afterwards
learned that the enemy had 19 casualties, 10 killed and 9 wounded.
The night at Almirante passed without further incidents, and thus
ended the first part of what may well be called the glorious march
from Manzanillo to Santiago.

*'from bayamo to baibb.

"At daybreak of the 27th the camp at Almirante was strucK
and the column continued its march across the plain of Guan&bano,
through Chapala and across the Oautillo River, destroying on their
way the enemy's telegraph line from Bayamo to Santa Rita, where
the camp was pitched for the night, which was spent without any
further incidents.

"At 6 a. m. of the 28th the march was resumed, the column pro-
ceeding to Baire via Cruz Alta, Jiguanf River, Upper Jiguanf,
Piedro de Oro, Qranizo, Cruz del Yarey, and Salada. The enemy,
in greater number than on preceding days and in control of the
heights which overlook the ford of the Jiguanf River, tried to pre-
vent our forces from crossing; but their intention was foiled by
timely flank attacks ordered by the commander of the column,
protected by accurate artillery fire. After the river had been
forded, the march was continued without interruption to Cruz del
Yarey, where the rebels appeared again, oflfering less resistance,
and we defeated them once more. They seemed inclined, however,
to continue to impede the march, which was apparent upon the
arrival of our column at the ruins of what was formerly the town
of Baire ; they were waiting there, and as soon as they espied the
column they opened a galling musket fire, which was silenced by
the rapid advance of our vanguard, who compelled them to retreat
in shameful and precipitate flight. In this encounter Colonel
Manual Ruiz, second commander of the column, was wounded and
his horse killed under him; four soldiers were killed and five
wounded. The column encamped and spent the night at Baire.

120

"The high weeds which during almost all those days completely
covered the soldiers and hampered their progress, causing at the
same time a suffocating heat, which made it almost impossible to
breathe, and cutting off the road, which had to be opened by dint
of hard work, rendering the march extremely laborious and often
making it necessary to proceed in single file ; the frequent rains,
which not only soaked the clothing, but also the ground, making
it slippery and difficult to walk on for such large numbers; the
sickness caused by the inclement weather and the hard work of
these operations; the ever-increasing convoy of stretchers; the
consideration that one-half of the journey had been accomplished,
and the further very important consideration that the column had
arrived at a place where it would be easy to throw the enemy off
the track, as they would not know what direction our forces might
take, there being three roads leading from here to Santiago; all
these were reasons which the commander of the column took into
consideration when he decided to suspend the march and rest dur-
ing the day of the 29th. It was so ordered owing to fatigue ; but
the enemy kept harassing us and we had three more wounded.

"la mantonia.

"At daybreak of the 30th the camp at Baire was struck and the
column proceeded to Palma Soriano, where the wounded and dead
were left, and continued its march via Ratonera, Doncella Creek,
and the Contramaestre River to La Mantonia, where the camp was
pitched and the night spent.

"Before the column was deployed on the road to Ratonera, the
enemy from intrenched positions opened fire, which was answered
and silenced by the first forces leaving the camp. The commander
of the column foresaw that such attack would be repeated, and in
order to obviate casualties, thus further complying with the order
of the aforesaid cablegram from the commander in chief of the
fourth army corps, he changed the route, and our forces, thus
eluding the ambuscades, arrived at the slopes of Doncella Creek,
the ford of which was reached by a narrow pass and difficult
ravine. The rebels occupied positions here ; our vanguard brought
them out without answering their fire. When the column had
been reconcentrated after fording the Doncella, they prepared to
ford the Contramaestre River, where the enemy was awaiting us,
which fact they had announced themselves by written challenges
and threats which they had left along the road. Lieutenant
Colonel Baldomero Barbdn, of the Alcantara battalion, who since
Colonel Ruiz was wounded had been in command of one-half of
the vanguard brigade, deployed his forces in perfect order of bat-
tle and advanced resolutely. Commanding positions overlooked

121

the clear and unobstructed road which the column had to follow
after coming out of the mountains through the narrow valley of
the Contramaestre, and moreover they had to scale the steep and
tortuous ascent of the opposite bank. Without other shelter than
the high weeds which, as usual, impeded the march, without other
trenches than their own hearts, these brave soldiers, with their
commander at their head, advanced calmly and in perfect order,
accepting the challenge which had been addressed to them. The
enemy had told the truth ; there they were in large numbers occu-
pying those favorable positions which would have been impregna-
ble if they had been held by any one who knew how to defend
them; but not expecting that we would accept the challenge, they
allowed themselves to be surprised by a lively musket fire and effec-
tive artillery discharges, which demoralized and dispersed them, and
the rapid advance of our forces rushing upon them arms in hand
did not give them a chance to rally. The enemy, being unable to
do much firing, retreated with little resistance and having suffered
a number of casualties, leaving the field and their positions to
those who, understanding the sacred duty imposed by honor, had
known how to pick up the glove that had been thrown to them,
and regardless of danger and without measuring their strength
had marched on imflinchingly in search of the death with which
they had been threatened. Having crossed the Contramaestre
and passed through extensive pastures, the column arrived at a
farm (finca) known as La Mantonia, where a number of huts of
all sizes and many recent tracks indicated the proximity of a large
hostile force. And indeed, soon after the first forces of the van-
guard had entered that large encampment, the enemy tried to
check our advance by a galling fire from the slope of a mountain
where they were intrenched, controlling a line of 1,200 meters,
through which it was necessary for us to pass unprotected, as the
high weeds made any deployment of the column and advance of
cavalry impossible. By order of Lieutenant Colonel Barb(5n, the
two companies of the vanguard of the Alcantara battalion, in
command of Francisco Gonzales, who rendered himself an exact
account of the hostile position, advanced steadily and without
answering the fire, following the only passable trail, and engaged
the hostile position on the left flank, compelling the enemy by
repeated discharges crossed with the few that the column was able
to fire, to abandon the trenches, leaving us a great deal of ammu-
nition, mostly of the Remington type.

"In the fierce battles of that day Captain Jenaro Ramiro, of the
Alcantara battalion, and 9 privates were wounded and 5 killed.

122

"aguacatb.

** At daybreak of July 1 the column resumed the march and
reached the ford of the Guarinao River, after passing through Las
Lajas, where the enemy held advantageous positions from which
our vanguard routed them without much resistance. After cross-
ing the Guarinao, small detachments sent out surprised two ambus-
cades; the column sustained insignificant skirmishes with outposts
and small reconnoitering parties, which indicated that large hostile
forces were not far off. Subsequent events showed that this theory
was correct. When the column arrived at a rugged place dom-
inated by steep heights forming an amphitheatre, they discovered
in its center a camp of recent construction, suflBciently large to
accommodate 2*000 men. A rapid glance convinced us that the
site was specially adapted for an ambuscade. Colonel Escario,
realizing this and taking precautions accordingly, gave orders for
the column to proceed in its advance and for the artillery to take
X)ositions. The enemy did not wait to be surprised, but opened
fire at once from Aguacate hill, the station of our heliograph, and
adjoining hills to the right and left in an extensive intrenched
line. Our soldiers maneuvered as though on drill, and advancing
steadily, two-thirds of the column entered the battle, and that hail
of lead which strewed death in its path was not sujficient to make
them retreat or even check them. Calmly, with fearless heroism,
they advanced, protected by the frequent and sure fire of the artil-
lery, and skillfully guided by their chiefs, and with the cry "Long
live Spain !" and charging with bayonets, they simultaneously took
those heights which were so difficult and dangerous to scale, beat-
ing the enemy into precipitate retreat, so that they could not gather
up their dead and wounded. Seventeen dead were left on the field,
also ammunition of various modern types. There were moments
during that battle when the tenacity of the enemy and the order
with which they fought gave the impression that they might belong
to our own column. This report spread rapidly and reached
Colonel Escario's ears, who, fearing that this might really be the
case, gave orders to suspend the fire, and tried to make himself
known by bugle signals. But this precaution was useless, and the
commander becoming convinced that he was fighting rebel forces,
ordered the attack to be renewed and the hostile positions to be
taken. To do the enemy justice it must be stated that they
defended these well-chosen positions with persistency and in good
order, and that they rose to unusual heights that day, making this
the fiercest battle which we sustained on the march from Manzanillo
to Santiago and one of the most remarkable ones of the present
campaign. Our casualties consisted of 7 dead and 1 lieutenant and
42 privates wounded. Large pools of blood on the battlefield

123

showed the severe chastisement which the enemy had suffered at
our hands. When the column had been reorganized, the march
was continued to Arroyo Blanco, where the night was spent.

cc

FROM ARROYO BLANCO TO SANTIAGO.

"From Arroyo Blanco, where the column had camped during
the night, it proceeded to Palma Soriano, fighting the enemy all
along the road, on both sides of which the latter occupied good
positions and endeavored to detain the column at any price.
Engaging the enemy in front and on the flank, a passage was
forced and the column reached Palma Soriano at 3 o'clock p. m.
The battle of that day caused us 4 dead and 6 wounded.

"From Palma Soriano the commander of the column, by helio-
gram sent to San Luis, announced his arrival to the commander
in chief of the fourth army corps at Santiago, and in reply he was
notified that large United States forces had landed and were sur-
rounding a part of the city, and that it was, therefore, of urgent
necessity to reenf orce the place, the defenders of which were few,
and to force the march as much as possible. Desirous of comply-
ing with this order. Colonel Escario, who realized that the soldiers
must be prepared to accomplish the rest of the journey with the
greatest possible speed, had the following order of the column,
dated at Palma Soriano, July 2, 1898, read to the companies :

" * Soldiers: We left Manzanillo because the enemy was threat-
ening Santiago de Cuba. We must hasten to the assistance of our
comrades; our honor, which is the honor of our fathers, calls us
there.

" * I, who am proud of having been able to be with you in these
days when our country requires of us twofold energy and courage,
address these few words to you in order to tell you that I am
highly pleased with your behavior and to point out to you the
necessity of making a supreme effort to save the honor of our
beloved country^, as we have done so far.

** *Then say with me, *Long live Spain!' and let us go in search
of those who are desirous of finding out what each one of you is
worth. The victory is ours.

' * ' Your Colonel, Escario. '

"After a plentiful and nourishing meal the troops were ordered
to rest. At 2 o'clock in the night the reveille was sounded, and
the column, organizing immediately, resumed its march, which the
soldiers tried to hasten as much as possible, with no other stimulus
than that imposed by duty, of which they were constantly reminded
by the cannonades that could be heard in the distance in the direc-
tion of Santiago. With slight skirmishes, and without eating nor

124

resting, these brave soldiers reached the pass of Bayamo, where
they had the first view of the city of Santiago. Here it was learned
that on the same day our fleet, forcing the entrance of the channel,
which was blockaded by the American ships, had gone out in
search of death, which is the fate reserved for heroes.

'' It was now between 10 and 11 o'clock in the morning of the 3d,
and when Colonel Escario noted the intense cannonade in the
direction of the city, he organized a flying column which was to
march as fast as possible, leaving the rest of the column with the
train, in command of Colonel Ruiz Rafioy, to follow at once.

"The flying column was formed of the first battalion of the
Isabel la Cat<51ica regiment, in command of Commander Torrecilla,
with 30 of the strongest men of each company, the whole cavalry,
and the two artillery pieces. The command of this column was
placed in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Baldomero Barbdn of the
Alcantara battalion.

"This column advanced toward Puerto Bayamo, from which
point Colonel Escario proceeded to the city with a section of cav-
alry, arriving there at 3 o'clock p. m. The rest of the flying col-
umn reached Santiago between 4 and 4.30, and the nucleus of the
Qolumn with the train between 9 and 10 o'clock p. m.

"Those worthy chiefs, ofl&cers, and long-suflfering soldiers, that
handful of brave men, constantly defeating the enemy who per-
sistently tried to check them, rising superior to the inclement
weather, to sickness and fatigue, had arrived at the post of honor
after a supreme effort and after victoriously crossing the Alps of
Cuba. It is not to be wondered at that, when they came in sight
of the city, they took oflE their hats, and with tears in their eyes
opened their lips in a unanimous shout of ' Long live Spain ! ' which
rose spontaneously from those noble hearts.

"The casualties during the whole march were 1 colonel, 2 officers,
and 68 privates wounded and 27 killed. Twenty-eight thousand
six hundred and seventy Mauser cartridges had been used and 38
rounds of artillery fired.

"At 10 o'clock the last rear guard entered the city of Santiago
de Cuba, and the battalions at once repaired to the different trenches
assigned to them by the chief of staff, and from that time on they
formed part of the forces defending the city.

"Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 1898:'

The column went to occupy the following positions :
Canosa : Lieutenant Colonel Baldomero Barbdn at the most ad-
vanced point ; the Alcantara battalion which relieved the Asiatic
battalion.

Match factory: The Isabel la Catdlica regiment, under Com-
mander Luis Torrecilla.

125

Campo de Marte: The other battalion, under Commander Eu-
genio Briceiio.

Dos Caminos del Cobre : The Puerto Rico chasseurs, under Lieu-
tenant Colonel Arana.

Plaza de Toros: The Andalusia battalion, under Commander
Julian Llorens.

9th. — ^The Alcfintara battalion was relieved from the difficult
position it occupied by six companies of the Isabel la Cat<51ica regi-
ment, one of the Asiatic regiment, one company of guerrillas, all
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Barbdn. On the morn-
ing of the 10th this line was reenforced by two companies of the
Alcantara battalion.

10th. — The Puerto Rico chasseurs receded to the city.

XXXT.

IN THE CITY AND IN THE BAY.

July 5th, — The usual ships blockading the harbor.

The greater part of the population has left the city, fleeing from
the bombardment.

The merchant steamers are firing up.

The Morro says that there are 28 merchant and war vessels in
sight. The Oregon and Brooklyn are missing.

In the city the streets are deserted and nearly all the houses
locked up.

6th, — The two 9-cm. Krupp guns at Punta Gorda were taken
down to be installed in the precinct of the city.

A German war ship was signaled to the south.

Mr. Mason, with a flag of truce, went out in the tug Coldn to
communicate with her. When he arrived at the mouth of the
harbor the ship had already left.

At 5 General Toral was advised by General Shafter that the
suspension of hostilities was at an end.

Lieutenant Hobson, of the Merrimdc, and the seven men were
exchanged.

In the American fleet there are 1,100 Spanish prisoners, among
them over 300 wounded.

7th, — It was learned that the prisoners of our fleet are being sent
to the United States.

The two 42-centimeter guns of the Mejico were disembarked for
the purpose of being erected in the precinct of the city. Forty
Mauser guns were also taken oflE the ship. They could not be
set up.

8th, — The hostile fleet continues the blockade.

Orders were given by the commandancia de marina to the cap-
tains of the merchant steamers to sink their ships.

A private house was prepared to receive the sick and wounded
of the fleet. The convalescents were sent to the quarters of the
firemen.

9th, — ^The hostile fleet in sight as usual.

Order of General Toral to have the merchant vessels refill their
bunkers at the piers of Las Cruoes and the Railway.

(126)

127

The wonnded and sick of the fleet were transferred from the
Mexico to the house fitted out for a hospital by the Navy.

On the 4th General Shafter notified the consuls that the city
would be bombarded, so that all those might leave who did not
form part of the garrison. At their request for more time in order
to take away their families, the term was prolonged twenty-four
hours.

The panic became general, and at daybreak of the 5th the pop-
ulation almost en masse left in the direction of Caney, so as to
avoid a bombardment which all supposed would be horrible and
not leave one stone upon the other.

The steamers, full of people, were ready to proceed to Las
Cruces, Cinco Beales, and all the coves on the eastern coast of the
bay, where they thought they would be better protected and safer.

All along the coast regular camps were established within the
shelter of the mountains. It may be safely said that there were
not 5,000 inhabitants left in the city. All the windows and doors
were closed, and Santiago presented the same aspect that Pompeii
and Herculaneum must have offered. Not a single store was
open, not even the drug stores. The desertion and solitude were
complete.

A few horses were running through the city, pulling up the
grass growing along the sidewalks. Many dogs are staying at the
entrances of the houses, which their masters have abandoned,
without having anything to eat, nor anything to drink, which is
worse. At night they bark incessantly, which makes the scene
still more impressive. I have several times gone from the cap-
taincy of the port to the military hospital, that is, across the city
from one end to the other, without seeing a single door open or
meeting a single person in the streets or public places, except a
guerrilla or one or two couples of the civil guard. The solitude
and the silence were absolute.

At night the city was truly impressive. The streets, the lamps
not being lit, were as dark as wolves' dens, and it was not possible
to cross them without being in constant danger of stumbling. A
few guerrillas, taking advantage of the circumstances, were break-
ing into abandoned stores and houses, which they ransacked ; for
instance, the house of my friend. Commander Ros, governor of
the Morro, situated in San Tadeo street, which I saw with my
own eyes. They left nothing whole, and him only with the cloth-
ing he wore and 20 pesos which he had with him. The criminals,
who were caught in the act, were four guerrillas. I speak with a
perfect knowledge of what happened, and, as will be seen, I cite
examples of well-known persons.

128

There is no excuse for such actions, and I shall not try to exten-
uate them ; but it is also just to say, in honor of the truth, that the
soldiers, who had hardly anything to eat and little water to drink,
and who spent day and night in the trenches, were not to be found
in the city, and when on rare occasions one would go there to see
whether he could not get a glass of water or buy a box of sardines
or a piece of hardtack, which the merchants were hiding, the latter
asked him six times what it was worth, and fleeced him (I find no
other word for it) without shame or compassion.

I must also add that such abuses, which were repressed as soon
as they were commenced — thanks to the civil guard and patrols,
who walked through the city day and night — were not committed
by the troops, except in isolated cases, as in that of Mr. Ros.
They were committed by citizens, although they were imputed to
those who knew how to enter the houses without forcing the prin-
cipal door. I might cite a thousand examples which would con-
vince the most incredulous and which I omit for the sake of brev-
ity. Thanks to the energy displayed by General Toral, the street
lamps were finally lighted, so that it became possible to venture
into the streets at night. As a proof of the proportions which
this plundering reached, I will copy a decree which the General
found it necessary to promulgate. The decree was as follows :

"I, Jose Toral y Velazquez, General of Division, Commander
General of the Division of Santiago de Cuba, and Military Gov-
ernor of the City and Province,

" In view of the frequent robberies which are being committed
in this city, by reason of the peculiar circumstances in which it
finds itself, in order to repress them, and by virtue of the author-
ity vested in me under Article 670 of the Campaign Begulations,
issue the following :

'^DECREE.

"Article 1. All soldiers who, in disobedience of this decree, shall
destroy or set on fire buildings or property, or commit any acts
of violence on persons, shall be punished by confinement in the
penitentiary for life, after previous degradation, in conformity
with Article 239 of the Code of Military Justice.

*' The penalty of death shall be imposed upon the instigators, or
persons employing soldiers for this purpose.

" Criminals caught in the act of committing these offenses shall
be summarily judged in conformity with Article 649 of the Code
of Military Justice.

* 'Article 2. Civilians who shall commit the same offenses shall
be adjudged in conformity with the Civil Code in force in this
island, and the law shall be applied in its whole rigor by the
respective Council of War.

129

''Article 3. Anyone surprised in the act, who shall not give
himself up at the first intimation, shall be fired upon.

"Jose Toral.
"Santiago de Cuba, JiUy 16, 1898."

As it is my object to relate everything that happened at Santiago
de Cuba, without omitting even the most insignificent events, so
that an exact idea may be formed of everything, I must also state
that, as I was told by Mr. Romero, captain of the civil guard, who
was wounded at Caney on the evening of the 1st, where he had
arrived in the morning to take charge of the military commandancia
of that place, and taken prisoner by the Americans, he was nursed,
attended, and treated with all the attention due to his rank and
condition, as also others who were in the same case. This proves
that only the Government of the United States and the jingoes are
the authors of the unjust war that is being carried on, but not the
people in general, and still less the Army, which, as its own officers
and soldiers have assured me, is desirous of having it terminated
as soon as possible.

10845 9

BATTLES AND BOMBARDMENTS OF THE 10th AND 11th.

July 10th, — The usual ships opposite the harbor. The general
staff of the fourth army corps has asked for a statement as to the
personnel and armament of the navy, which was forwarded to him.

General Shaf ter gave notice that hostilities had again broken out
since 4 in the afternoon.

At 3 the hamlet of Dos Caminos was burned.

At 6 a gunshot was heard which had been fired by the fleet ; im-
mediately after a sustained musket fire, which became very intense.

The artillery on land is firing, ours is answering.

At 5.15 the fleet opened fire on the coast.

At 6.30 the firing ceased by sea and by land.

The enemy has abandoned two trenches.

llth, — The fleet is guarding the harbor and Aguadores.

At 6 a slow musket fire commenced on land ; a few volleys are
heard.

At 8.30 tWo ships opened fire on the city from Aguadores. A
few projectiles fall at the head of the bay, where the Alvarado is
at anchor.

During yesterday 4G wounded were received at the military hos-
pital. There were seven dead.

At 2 p. m. the bombardment ceased.

At 2.30 firing ceased in the precinct.

At 5 the enemy hoisted a flag of truce on the Fort San Juan.

At night many fires were seen on the heights near the cemetery
and at the head of the bay (to the northwest).

The gunboat Alvarado asked for permission to fire; it was
denied on account of the truce.

On the 10th the enemy, already in the trenches and being in
possession of all the adjoining heights where he has installed
numerous modern guns, opened a lively musket and gun fire, at 5
p. m., upon a great extent of our line. The artillery answered
firmly, but there was hardly any musket fire, because orders had
been given and complied with to economize ammunition at any
cost.

(130)

131

Two hours previously, our advance forces had withdrawn to the
city, abandoning the foremost position at Dos Caminos del Cobre,
first setting it on fire.

The fleet at the same time opened fire on Aguadores and sur-
rounding points on the coast, and on our lines. The battle was
limited to firing from the trenches. Nevertheless, as the enemy
was very numerous and his lines only a few meters from ours, we
had 7 dead and 47 wounded. During the engagement tht/ Ameri-
cans abandoned two trenches which they could not he. t.. because
they were flanked by ours.

At 8.30 the following day the fleet bombarded the city from
Aguadores, having given notice to that effect as early as the 4th.
As I said, the ships of the fleet, taking turns two by two, fired
rather slowly, and only until 2.30 p. m., but notwithstanding, there
were 59 houses that suffered considerable damage. One shell went
through a foundation in San Basilio street, where it dropped and ex-
ploded, and a shell cut an iron column of a provision store in two,
penetrating into a house in Marina street, after piercing the wall.
Another shell penetrated at No. 9 Santa Lucia High street, destroy-
ing the hall and one room. In the provision store of Messrs. Brauet,
in Fundicion street, two 20-meter shells (nearly all were of this cali-
ber, or of 16 centimeters) fell; one only exploded, causing great
havoc. The most remarkable case of all was Mr. Marcand's house,
in Santo Tomas Place. A single shell ruined it completely. It is
hard to understand how a single projectile can do what that one
did.

Between the garden of the Alameda and the railway station,
being a distance of about 800 meters, 23 projectiles fell. Many of
them did not explode. One of them went through a tree, as though
it had been a gimlet. At the ice factory two fell, and three at the
railway station. A great many fell near the piers, and still more
near the place where the gunboat Alvarado was at anchor.

As the city was almost abandoned, there was no loss of life.

In the meantime the enemy continued to antagonize our lines
in order to compel the soldiers to consume the scant ammunition
that remained, but orders had been given not to answer the fire,
and so there was hardly any musket fire. Gun fire only answered
very slowly, as is necessary with antiquated guns. The enemy, on
the other hand, was constantly receiving modern guns and setting
them up rapidly. We were within a circle of fire, and although
that phrase has been somewhat abused, I find no other that better
describes the situation.

At 5 p. m. the enemy hoisted a white flag on Fort San Juan
and a spokesman was received.

132

Thougli this may not bo the right moment, I want to make an
observation. It has been asked many times why Admiral Cer-
vera's fleet, whose object was to run the blockade and elude the
hostile fleet, did not go out at night.

Of course, the Admiral did not tell me his reasons, but it is easy
to understand them.

The hostile fleet was constantly watching the entrance of the
harbor with its search lights, making it as light as though it were
day. There the ships would probably have been seen just the same.
On the other hand, the sortie, which even in daytime is extremely
diflScult, would have been short of impossible at night, when
blinded by the search lights, and would necessarily have resulted
in a catastrophe. The sortie at night was impracticable. It was
absolutely necessary to effect it in daytime ; at least, if the enemy
saw us, we also saw him, and the chances for not running aground
in the. channel were much better. From the foregoing I believe
that anyone, even though not acquainted with naval matters, will
understand why Admiral Cervera did not go out at night.

As a proof of this, I will say that on the night when the cruiser
Reina Mercedes was sunk the hostile ships fired upon her with the
same accuracy as though it had been daytime.

For a better understanding of the events and engagements of the
10th and 11th of July, I will copy below the oflBcial report of Lieu-
tenant Colonel Barbrfn and that of Lieutenant of Artillery Moreno
to General Escario, as also a statement of the shots which our guns
fired during those days. One need only glance at the statement
referred to to see at once that on the first day 167 shots could be
fired, and the next day, being the 11th, only 35, because the enemy
had dismounted and disabled some of our guns. A simple calcu-
lation is suSicient to understand that the following day not a sin-
gle gun could probably have been fired. Before such proofs, com-
ments are unnecessary.

'* Having been placed in charge of the forces on the right hand
of the plantation called El SueQo, on the heights and in the
glens which border on the avenues of Caney and Canosa, and the
roads of Pozo and San Juan, composed of six companies of the
Isabel la Catdlica Regiment, two of the Alcantara Battalion, one
of the Asiatic Battalion, and one of guerrillas as stretchermen, I
have the honor to report to you that at 4.30 a. m. yesterday the
enemy opened machine-gun and musket fire on our positions, with-
out daring to make any forward movement; such prudence being
founded, no doubt, on the respect inspired by our sepulchral silence
before the thunderous noise of their many guns, for only 10 marks-
men, in convenient positions, had orders to fire on a trench which
they attacked on the flank and dislodged at the end of 15 minutes.
At nightfall, 7.30 !>. m., the enemy ceased firing.

133

** To-day, at 6.30 a. m., the enemy again opened fire, while our
side did not waste a single cartridge, the enemy continuing with
the same activity as yesterday, without coming out of his trenches,
until 4.30 p. m., when he ceased firing and asked for suspension.

"The ca>sualties on our side were, on the 10th, 6 dead and 29
wounded, and to-day, one dead, 6 wounded, and one bruised ; total
casualties during the two days, 42.

"You will see from the above that I have exactly complied with
your orders not to fire until the enemy should come out of his
trenches to attack.

"I only need add that all the forces without exception did their
duty as brave men, full of enthusiasm, and I had to recommend
repeatedly that they should conceal in order to avoid needless
casualties, which seemed diflBcult, and there is nothing strange
about it, as our men, for the first time in three years of campaign,
were enclosed in trenches and on the defensive.

(Here follow special recommendations for bravery of three
officers, being 1 commander and 2 lieutenants.)

(Signed) "Baldomero Barb(5n."

" Santiago de Cuba, August 11, 1898,"

Copy of the report made by the first lieutenant in charge of the
artillery of the sector :

"Artillery, City of Santiago de Cuba,
Sector from the Portillo del Caney to San Antonio.
"Honored Sir: Fire was opened by the enemy yesterday at 4.45
p. m., and the batteries of this sector made it their business to
silence it, or at least diminish it as much as possible, given the
limited effectiveness of the guns which formed them — most of them
muzzle-loading — ^and the reduced caliber of the only four which
are of modem types, and can therefore keep up an accurate and
rapid fire. The enemy's batteries, as has been observed on pre-
vious days by means of glasses, and as we have experienced practi-
cally to-day, are quite numerous, very well installed without leav-
ing any space uncovered, and occupy positions overlooking ours,
and are for that latter reason well adapted to train successfully,
and to be of great moral effect on our troops, who are harassed
almost vertically by the grapeshot (shrapnel ?) inside the trenches.
The guns of these batteries are of small and medium caliber, as
may be seen from the size of their projectiles, and the shape of
the latter shows that they are breech-loading guns, and for that
reason alone, of the greatest advantage over ours. A few fire
dynamite projectiles, but it was noticed that they are of little
accuracy, although very effective when they explode. At the
same moment when the musket and machine-gun fire was opened,

134

which was hardly answered from the city, gun fire also commenced,
and as the effect of the shells began to be felt at the first shots, it
became necessary for us to do what we could to decrease the can-
nonade. Firing was commenced on the whole sector at the same
time and with such rapidity as each gun permitted, except the
Plasencia guns, for if we had continued to fire them with the same
rapidity as the gunners, anxious to injure the enemy, had com-
menced, we would have consumed the whole of the ammunition in
two hours. All the shots were made under the action of a constant
musket and machine-gun fire, aimed particularly at the batteries,
for the apparent purpose of not allowing us to come out of the
trenches to load and train our guns. In view of the sustained
artillery fire from the city the enemy moderated his somewhat,
especially in the sector between Nispero and San Antonio, and
by 6 p. m. the only guns that were doing any firing worthy
of mention were those installed opposite the Portillo del Caney.
This circumstance was very favorable for us. The ostentatious
artillery fire which we did during the first moments checked the
enemy's rapid fire along the greater part of the line, and if this
had not been the case we should have been compelled to keep silent
before his batteries, for of the 12 guns of different calibers of the
batteries of Nispero, Suefio, Santo In6s, and San Antonio, we had
left at the hour mentioned only three 8-cm. and two 16-cm. guns;
the others had been put out. of action, the carriages of most of
them having been disabled. The batteries of Portillo del Caney
continued to answer the fire, which was aimed at them partic-
ularly without a moment's cessation, and in one of them I was
an eye witness of an incident worthy of mention. A training
gunner of one of the 8-cm. Plasencia guns,, whose captain
had been previously wounded, was shot through one arm, and he
continued to train, for fear that there would be no one to relieve
him, until, a relief having been effected, he was obliged to go to
the nearest hospital. At the same moment an artillerist came out
with a mule and ran in the direction of the headquarters at Con-
cha, passing through the musket and machine-gun fire, shouting,
' Long live Spain ! ' through the streets. He was on his way to get
another supply of common shells for the gun, its supply having
been consumed during the first shots. These incidents, and similar
ones which no doubt occurred all along the line and in the trenches,
show, honored General, that while the enemy had succeeded, owing
to the superior position of his batteries, in acquiring greater accu-
racy of fire, he had not been able to quell . the courage of our sol-
diers, always cool-headed before the greatest danger, even to the
very last moment.

135

**At 7 p. m. the firing ceased, leaving us in bad condition for
to-day, because, as I have already stated, only two 16-cm. and three
8-cm. guns, and two 8-cm. Plasencia, and two rapid-fire Krupp
guns, are all that are available for the defense, and the majority
of the mounts for the old ones are somewhat defective. » ♦ *

"At 5.30 a. m. to-day fire was opened by a few mijsket shots,
and a few minutes after the artillerv battle commenced. The bat-
teries with which the enemy fired yesterday are not the only ones
he has ; he also has large-caliber guns, or perhaps howitzers, which,
being installed at a considerable distance from the city and covered
by the hills, keep up a constant fire upon us, which we are not able
to answer. Yesterday we could distinguish the flashing from the
batteries erected between the Portillo del Caney and San Antonio,
and^ to-day we can see only three opposite the said Portillo ; the
others were firing completely under cover, and we were not even
able to disturb the composure with which they were trained. It
is known that we did them some damage yesterday, and that is
perhaps the reason why they have taken this position to-day. Only
two shots were fired in the morning at Santa In^s and two more
at San Antonio. And the rest of the day we have been able to fire
only from the 8-cm. Plasencia battery and the 7.5 rapid-fire Krupp
battery, erected at the Portillo del Caney and Palomar, respect-
ively, which had opposite them three 9-cm. batteries of the enemy
at a distance of 1,100 meters from the former and 1,600 meters
from the latter. From the first moment it could be seen that the
enemy's objective was to bombard the city, and his fire was aimed
entirely at that target. Yesterday they took the exact distance
from their batteries to the principal points of the city, and to-day,
making use of yesterday's notes, they put the shells just where
they wanted, and the trajectories of those from the same battery
were almost identical. I repeat that there were only three in sight,
and upon these three we opened fire at G a. m. with the rapid-fire
guns. When the first shot was discharged the enemy partly
changed his objective, and soon the battery mentioned and one of
the hidden ones aimed their fire at Palomar, but were not able to
hit the rapid-fire guns until 10 a. m., because these guns, being of
reduced dimensions, in sunken battery, and with hardly any smoke
from the discharge, were hardly visible to the enemy. For four
hours we fired without knowing where we were, but very slowly,
because the number of ordinary shells and grapeshot for the guns
referred to is already very small. After these first four hours were
over, the enemy answered each shot with 8 or 10 of his, which, with
almost mathematical precision, were aimed at the battery. About
the same thing, but on a greater scale owing to the proximity of the
opposing batteries and tlie good target formed by the smoke which

136

developed at each shot, happened at the Plasencia guns. Since 8
o'clock in the morning, when the fire was opened, until 3 in the after-
noon, the places where the guns were erected were veritable centers
of impact, since we had only two batteries and the enemy a great
many. And when a shot was fired, all concentrated their fire on
the one that had discharged. In order to fire at all, it was neces-
sary to make the enemy believe, by using artificial means, that the
gun had been put out of action. When this did not succeed, the
gun fire aimed at the battery was incessant, and made it impossible
for us to load and train. As I have stated, at 3 p. m. the firing
ceased, and yesterday as well as to-day I noticed the greatest order
among the officers and men in charge of the different batteries.
At the Plasencia guns, the second gunner, Antonio Escriba Escriba,
belonging to the 2d section of the 1st battery of the 5th Mountain
Regiment, was wounded. The total number of shots fired yester-
day and to-day is as follows: 16, with the rapid-fire guns; 33, with
the 8-cm. Plasencia guns; 29, with the 8-cm. guns; 63, with the
8-cm. short breech-loaders; 10, with the 16-cm. and 10 with the
12-cm. bronze guns.

May God guard your excellency for many years.

Juan Moreno,

First lieutenant^
Commander of artillery of the sector.

"Santiago de Cuba, July 11, 1898:'

The guns which the Americans had in the batteries of the circle,
were all of modern type, with calibers of 8, 9, 7, and 7.5 cm. They
fired mostly grapeshot (shrapnel ?) with 10 per cent ordinary shells.
They also made use of dynamite shells, but the number of these
projectiles did not exceed 5 per cent of the total number thrown
upon the city.

The batteries that were most persistent in firing on the 10th
were those erected in the vicinity of the Caney road, and they fired
only about 150 shots, with an average rapidity of 14 or 16 shots
per hour and battery. The others, which ceased firing an hour
earlier, discharged about 100 shots.

On the 11th the gun fire was more sustained, but slower. All
the batteries fired about alike and discharged in all about 700 shots.

137

BATTERIES OF THE PRECINCT OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

Batten eK and giiuR.

Fuerte Nnevo :

One 12-cm. mnzzle-loading bronze gun -

Cafiadas:

One 16-cni. muzzle-loading bronze gun

Santa Ursula :

Battery No. 1 : Two S-cin. muzzle-loading bronze guns _

Battery No. 2: Two 8-cm. long muzzle- loading bronze guns..

Battery No. 3: Two 9- cm. long muzzle-loading bronze guns..
Portillo Caney :

Battery No. 1 : Two 8-cm. short breech-loading bronze guns
(Plasencia system) ___

Battery No. 2: Two 8-cm. long muzzle-loading bronze guns.
Nispero:

Battery No. 1: One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun -.

Battery No. 2: One 12-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun

Battery No. 8: Two 8-cm. short breech-loading bronze guns.
Sueno:

Battery No. 1 : One 16-cm. muzzle -loading bronze gun

Battery No. 2: One 12-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun

Battery No. 3 : Two 8-cm. short breech-loaders

Santa In^s:

Battery No. 1 : One 16-cm. muzzle -loading bronze gun

Battery No. 2 : One 12-cm. muzzle -loading bronze gun

Battery No. 3 : Two 8-cm. short breech-loading guns

San Antonio :

One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun

Palomar:

Two 7.5-cm. short breech -loading rapid-fire Kmpi) guns

No. of shots.

1

2

10

8

16

25
24

1

2

30

3

2

25

2

4
10

6

10

1
16

During the firing on the 10th, the following guns were put out
of action : The gun of the battery of Fuerte Nuevo; one of each of
the Santa Ursula batteries ; the two of battery No. 2 of the Portillo
del Caney ; those of the Nispero batteries Nos. 2 and 3 ; those of
batteries Nos. 1 and 2 and one of battery No. 3 of Sueiio ; and that
of Battery No. 2 and one of Battery No. 3 of Santa Ines.

To sum up, there were disabled: four 12-cm., one IG-cm., eight
8-cra. guns, old systems, and one 9-cm. breechloader.

The 9-cm. gun was disabled by the enemy, as also one of the
12-cm. guns of Sueiio, the cause being that the 12-cm. guns were
mounted on ''skeleton" carriages that did not belong to them, and
broke at the first or second shot, and that the 8-cm. old guns,
although mounted in their own carriages, these being of wood and
in bad repair, they had tlie same fat(3 as soon as a few shots were
fired. The IG-cm. gun was disabled by the cartridge sticking in
the chamber.

XXXIII.

SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES.

July 12th. — ^The hostile fleet is still in sight.

The archbishop, escorted by a detachment of the mounted civil
guard, left the city, returning soon after.

General Linares has forwarded to the commander in chief and
to the minister of war the following cablegram, which I copy
literally :

"official cablegram, JULY 12.

**To the commander in chief and the minister of war:

"Though confined to my bed by great weakness and sharp pains,
I am so much worried over the situation of these long-suflfering
troops that I deem it my duty to address your excellency and the
minister of war for the purpose of setting forth the true state of
affairs.

" Hostile positions very close to precinct of city, favored by
nature of ground; ours spread out over 14 kilometers; troops
attenuated; large number sick; not sent to hospitals because
necessary to retain them in trenches. Horses and mules without
food and shelter ; rain has been pouring into the trenches inces-
santly for twenty hours. Soldiers without permanent shelter; rice
the only food ; can not change or wash clothes. Many casualties ;
chiefs and officers killed ; forces without proper command in crit-
ical moments. Under these circumstances, impossible to open
passage, because one-third of the men of our contingent would be
unable to go out; enemy would reduce forces still further; result
would be great disaster without accomplishing the salvation of
eleven much-thinned battalions, as desired by your excellency.
In order to go out under protection of Holgxiin division, it would
be necessary for the latter to break through the hostile line, and
then with combined forces to break through another part of the
same line. This would mean an eight days' journey for Holguin
division, bringing with them a number of rations which they are
unable to transport. The situation is fatal ; surrender inevitable ;
we are only prolonging the agony ; the sacrifice is useless ; the
enemy knows it, fully realizing our situation. Their circle being
well established, they will exhaust our forces without exposing
theirs as they did yesterday, bombarding on land by elevation
without our being able to see their batteries, and from the sea by

(138)

139

the fleet, which has full advices, and is bombarding the city in
sections with mathematical accuracy.

"Santiago de Cuba is not Gerona, a city inclosed by walls, on
the soil of the mother country, defended inch by inch by her own
sons, by old men, women, and children without distinction, who
encouraged and assisted the combatants and exposed their lives,
impelled by the sacred idea of independence, while awaiting aid
which they received. Here solitude, the total emigration of the
population, insular as well as peninsular, including public officials,
with a few exceptions. Only the clergy remains, and they intend
to leave to-day headed by their prelate.

"These defenders are not just beginning a campaign, full of
enthusiasm and energy ; they have been fighting for three years
with the climate, privations, and fatigue; and now that the most
critical time has arrived their courage and physical strength are
exhausted, and there are no means for building them up again.
The ideal is lacking ; they are defending the property of people who
have abandoned it in their very presence, and of their own foes,
the allies of the American forces.

" There is a limit to the honor of arms, and I appeal to the judg-
ment of the Government and the whole nation; for these long-
suflfering troops have saved that honor many times since the 18th
day of May, when they sustained the first bombardment.

" If it should be necessary to consummate the sacrifice for reasons
which I ignore, or if there is need of some one to assume the re-
sponsibility of the denouement anticipated and announced by me
in several cablegrams, I offer myself loyally on the altar of my
country for the one purpose or the other, and I will take it upon
myself to perform the act of signing the surrender, for my humble
reputation is worth very little when it comes to a question of

national interests.

"Linares."

ISth. — The ships are still blockading the harbor.

By order of the commander of marine, I went to the cruiser Reina
Mercedes in order to ascertain her exact position.

In crossing the channel we saw two hostile ships, but at a great
distance.

The cruiser which I visited is aground on the Morro shore. The
port side is completely under water, the starboard side above water ;
here the effects of the hostile shells may be observed. She lies in
the line of the channel, and therefore does not interfere with the
entering or going out of ships. I do not believe that the enemy
will be able to use her; besides the injuries caused by the shells,
the sea has commenced to destroy the bottom.

140

Upon returning I saw and spoke to many volunteer officers who
have taken refuge there, dressed in civilians' clothes.

The conferences with the enemy have come to nothing, and it was
decided that the suspension of hostilities and the armistice should
cease and the bombardment be continued.

The sailors from the fleet, 98 in number, who were at the fire-
men's headquarters, have gone, under the command of Ensign
GWmez, to protect the match factory near tlie gasometer.

There was a suspension of hostilities during the days of the 12th
and 13th, and conferences were held with the enemy, which evi-
dently have come to nothing, and from General Linares's eloquent
cablegram, setting forth so graphically and accurately the true
state of affairs in this unfortified city and the situation of its
defenders, it may be inferred that the capitulation was objected
to, although it was absolutely necessary and further resistance
impossible.

IJ^th, — The chief pilot of this harbor, Apolonio Niiiiez, was taken
prisoner by the insurgents at Rentd, situated west of the bay. The
commander of marine at once notified General Toral, and as the
suspension of hostilities had been extended, the latter, in his turn,
advised General Shafter, commander in chief of the American
forces operating at Santiago.

15th, — Pilot Niiflez was delivered up and escorted to the city by
American soldiers.

At night the chiefs of the army assembled in the apartments
occupied by the staff of the division, and as a result of the meeting
the following memorandum was drawn up :

"On the 15th day of July, 1898, in the city of Santiago de Cuba,
the following-named persons assembled, i)revious notice having
been given of such meeting: General of Division Jost? Tonal y
Velazquez, for the time being commander in chief of tlie fourth
army corps, as president; General of Brigade Federico Escario;
Colonel Francisco Oliveros Jim(5nez, of the civil guard; the follow-
ing lieutenant colonels of the different battalions: Jose Cotrina
Gelabert, of the Asiatic battalion; Juan Punet, of the battalion
* Constitucion ;' Pedro Rodriguez, of tlie Talavera battalion ; Ven-
tura Fontd-n, of the staff; Baldomero Barbdn, of the Alcc4ntara
battalion; Segundo P(?rez, of the San Fernando battalion; Jos(5
Escudero, of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico No. 1 ; Luis
Melgar, of the artillery; and Ram(5n Arana, of the Puerto Rico
chasseurs ; Julio Cuevas, commissary of war ; Pedro Martin, sub-
inspector of the medical department of the army, and Juan Diaz
Muelas, captain of engineers, all as voting members, and the last
named as secretary.

141

"The president stated that although he did not consider Santiago
de Cuba a stronghold of war, and though he was in direct commu-
nication with the commander in chief, from whom he received pre-
cise instructions, so that it was not necessary to proceed to the
convocation of the council of defense referred to in Article 683 of
the Regulation of Campaign, he desired nevertheless to learn the
opinion of said council, constituted in accordance with the provi-
sions of the regulation referred to, and of the lieutenant colonels
of the battalions, as to whether, in view of the condition of the
forces defending the city, it would be advisable to prolong the
defense, or, on the contrary, to capitulate on the most favorable
terms obtainable.

**The junta, considering that Santiago has no other works of
defense of a permanent nature than a castle without artillery at the
mouth of the harbor and a few forts in the precinct, none of them
substantial, so that its only real defense consists in the trenches
which have been dug in suitable positions in the circuit of the city,
and other earthworks in said circuit and in more advanced posi-
tions, all effected hurriedly and with scant resources ;

'* Considering further that for the defense of this line of trenches,
about 14 kilometers long, not continuous, there are available only
about 7,000 infantry and 1,000 guerrillas, all of whom have been
doing constant service in the trenches, with hardly any troops to
support them and without any reserves of any kind, the rest of the
forces (the total forces consisting of about 11,500 men), belonging
to other arms and garrisoning the Morro and the batteries of So-
capa and Punta Gorda, or being assigned to other services, such as
supplying all the posts with water, patrolling the city, etc., which
services would have been rendered by the inhabitants if the city
had remained loyal, but which must now be performed by the
army, the inhabitants having abandoned the city ;

*' Considering further that, in view of the great extent of the
line referred to, the position of the forces on the same, the difficulty
of communication and the proximity of the hostile positions to
ours, it is difficult for the troops stationed at one part of the line
to render prompt assistance to those stationed at another part
which might be more seriously threatened ;

"Considering further that at the present time the only available
artillery of the precinct consists of four 16-cm. rifled bronze guns,
one 12-cm., one 9-cm. bronze gun, two long 8-cm. rifled bronze
guns, four short ones of the same caliber, two 8-cm. Plasencia and
two 75-mm. Krupp guns; that the 12 and 16-cm. guns, according
to reliable information, are about to give out and will admit of
only a few more shots, and that the 75-mm. Krupp guns have
hardly any ammunition, and that the above is all the artillery we
have to oppose to the enemy's numerous modern guns;

142

"Considering further that the million Spanish Mauser cartridges,
being the total available, counting" those at the artillery park and
the spare cartridges of the troops, will be used up in two or three
attacks made by the enemy ; that the Argentine Mauser cartridges
can hardly be used, and the Remington only by the irregular forces ;

"Considering further that, owing to the failure of the commer-
cial element to lay in supplies prior to the blockade which had
long been foreseen, there is a great scarcity of meat and of all
other articles of food for the troops, it being necessary to reserve
for the military hospital the few heads of cattle now on hand, so
that the only available food for the soldiers consists of rice, salt,
oil, coflEee, sugar, and whisky, and this only for about ten days
longer;

"Considering further that, if the food of the 1,700 sick at the
hospital is inadequate, the food furnished the soldiers is still more
so, and yet they have to spend night and day in the trenches, after
three years of campaign, the last three months without meat except
on rare days, and for some time past reduced to the rations above
enumerated ;

"Considering further that with such inadequate rations the sol-
diers, whose physical strength is already considerably shaken, far
from being able to repair their strength, must necessarily become
weaker every minute, especially since, in spite of their poor nour-
ishment, the greatest fatigues are required of them ;

"Considering further that there is an ever-growing contingent
of soldiers among the trdbps who, though not in hospitals, are sick
and who are enabled to remain at their posts only by their superior
courage, which circumstances, however, can not fail to weaken the
resistance of the only line of defense we have ;

"Considering further that, since the cutting of the aqueduct,
great diflBculties are experienced by the small forces available for
furnishing water to the majority of the forces in the trenches of
the precinct, especially those near th§ coast, which difficulties
must naturally increase when the city is bombarded by sea and
by land, so that there is well-founded fear that the soldiers who
are unable to leave the trenches may find themselves without the
water of which they are so much in need ;

" Qonsidering further that, in view of the location of the hostile
positions, mostly in the immediate vicinity of ours, completely sur-
rounding the city and in control of all the avenues, there is no
possibility of abandoning the city without a fierce battle under the
most unfavorable circumstances for us, owing to the impoverished
condition of the soldiers and the fact tliat it would be necessary to
effect the concentration of the forces in sight of the enemy;

143

** Considering further the great superiority of the enemy who,
besides a contingent of men said to exceed 40,000, possesses 70 pieces
of modern artillery and a powerful fleet;

" Considering further that no supplies can reach the city except
by sea, and that there is no prospect of receiving any as long as a
powerful hostile fleet completely closes the entrance of the harbor ;

'* Considering further that, under these circumstances, to con-
tinue so unequal a fight would lead to nothing except the sacrifice
of a large number of lives ;

"And considering, finally, that the honor of our arms has been
completely vindicated by these troops who have fought so nobly
and whose behavior has been lauded by our own and other na-
tions, and that by an immediate capitulation terms could be
obtained which it would not be possible to obtain after hostilities
have again broken out:

" The junta is of unanimous opinion that the necessity for Capitu-
lation has arrived. In witness thereof they sign these proceedings. "

(Signatures of members.)

CAPITULATION.

July 16th. — The people have returned from Caney.
Negotiations for the capitulation having been opened, we think
it proper to give the following important document :

"Neutral Camp near Santiago de Cuba,

Under the Flag of Truce, July Uth, 1898,

"Recognizing the nobleness, valor, and bravery of Generals
Linares and Toral and of the Spanish troops who took part in the
actions that have recently occurred in the vicinity of Santiago de
Cuba, as shown in said battles, we, the undersigned, officers of the
United States Army, who had the honor of taking part in the
actions referred to, and who now constitute a committee, duly
authorized, treating with a similar committee of officers of the
Spanish Army for the capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, unani-
mously join in asking the proper authorities that these brave and
gallant soldiers may be granted the privilege of returning to their
country carrying the arms which they have so nobly defended.

(Signed) "Joseph Wheeler,

Major General U, S. V.

"W. H. Lawton,

Major General U. S, V.

*'J. D. MiLEY,

First Lieutenant^ Second Artillery^ Aide,^^

Under a giant cotton tree the following capitulation was signed:

*'lst. The hostilities between the Spanish and American forces
shall cease absolutely and finally.

'*2d. The capitulation shall include all the forces and war
material in said territory (territory of the division of Santiago).

"3d. The United States agree to transport all the Spanish forces
in said territory to the Kingdom of Spain with the least delay pos-
sible, the troops to be embarked, as early as can be done, at the
nearest ports they occupy.

(144)

145

'*4tli. The officers of the Spanish army shall be permitted to
carry their arms with them, and officers as well as men shall retain
their private property.

"5th. The Spanish authorities agree to raise, or assist the Amer-
ican Navy in raising, all the mines and other obstructions to navi-
gation now existing in the bay of Santiago de Cuba and its entrance.

"6th. The commander of the Spanish forces shall deliver, with-
out delay, to the commander of the American forces, a complete
inventory of the arms and munitions of war in the district above
referred to, as also a statement of the number of troops in the same.

* * 7th. The commander of the Spanish forces, upon leaving said dis-
trict, shall be authorized to take with him all the military archives
and documents belonging to the Spanish array now in said district.

"8th. All that portion of the Spanish forces known as volun-
teers, mobilized troops, and guerrillas who may desire to remain in
the Island of Cuba shall be allowed to do so, on condition that they
will deliver up their arms and give their word of honor not again
to take up arms against the United States during the continuation
of the present war with Spain.

"9th. The Spanish forces shall leave Santiago de Cuba with
honors of war, afterwards depositing their arms at a place mutu-
ally agreed upon, to await the disposition which the Government
of the United States shall make of them, it being understood that
the United States Commissioners shall recommend that the Spanish
soldiers be permitted to return to Spain with the arms which they
have so gallantly defended.

" 10th. The clauses of the foregoing document shall go into effect
immediately after having been signed.

" Entered into this 16th day of July, 1898, by the undersigned com-
missioners, acting under instructions of their respective command-
ers in chief, and with the approval of their respective governments.

"Joseph Wheeler, "Federico Esc arid.

Major General U, 8, V. Brigadier General.

"W. H. Lawton, "Ventura Font an.

Major General U, S. V. Lieutenant Colonel,

"J. D. MiLEY, General Staff.

First Lieutenant,

Second Artillery,

"Robert Mason,

Jjiterpreter,^^

The reason why the archbishop went out of the city on the 12th
was to ask General Shafter to permit him and thirty priests to
leave Santiago. The American general refused to grant this request
as long as the negotiations were pending.

10946—10

THE EMIGRATION TO EL CANEY.

I will here speak of a matter which, though not directly related
to the military operations, nor the movements of troops, nor the
attack or defense of positions, is yet so graphic and typical and so
remarkable and far-reaching in the consequences which it entailed
and still entails, that to omit it would be to omit one of the most
important episodes of this eventful period, an episode that has been
much commented upon and discussed. I have reference to what
may well be called the emigration to El Caney.

At daybreak of July 5, a compact crowd, composed for the greater
part of old men, women, and children, though strong, robust men —
some of them volunteers, now in civilian's clothes — were not want-
ing, started from the city toward El Caney, about a league and a
half distant, where they were going on foot, there being no car-
riages, nor wagons, nor vehicles of any kind, nor even horses,
which the enemy, moreover, would not have allowed to j)ass. All
these people we^e crossing the ditches and trenches by which the
whole road was cut and obstructed, all anxious to escape from the
dangers of a bombardment of which notice had been given to the
consuls.

Many of those who emigrated were people of wealth, women not
accustomed to such fatigues and hardships, which fear and terror
alone enabled them to bear.

Being convinced, though I do not know why they should have
been, that their absence would not be for more than sixty or seventy
hours at most, the majority of them had nothing with them but
the clothes on their backs and a little underclothing, and no pro-
visions except what they could carry themselves.

I have been told, not by one person alone, but by many who
were there and with whom I have talked, that there were no less
than eighty people in any one house, and in some of them as many
as two hundred. As in the cemetery, each person had no more
space than he or she occupied ; and thus they were housed together,
men and women, children and old people, white persons and black

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147

I

The provisions which were calculated for three days at most were
naturally soon exhausted, and this is probably the only instance in
the nineteenth century when mouey was looked upon with disdain
and when gold was of no value. Trading was going on, it is true,
but it was exchanging rice for coffee, hardtack for beans, or sugar
for codfish.

The bodies of those who had been killed on the 1st of July had
only partly been buried, and the houses in that portion of the
town which had been shelled were riddled with bullets and there-
I fore leaking everywhere. Carcasses of horses and other animals,

even corpses of persons, were thrown into the river, and people
washed their dirty clothes and bathed in the water, which was all
there was to drink. Most of the people lived on mangoes and
mamoncillos, and it is no wonder that malaria, fevers, and dysen-
tery broke out and assumed alarming proportions.

The houses had no sanitary provisions of any kind, and as the
doors were kept closed in order to prevent new invasions, the
atmosphere was terrible. The children, sick from lack of nourish-
ment or from taking food which they could not digest, were cry-
ing day and night, and quiet or rest became impossible.

The faces of those who died were covered with a sheet or hand-
kerchief, and the living remained by the side of the dead bodies,
knowing that, if they should leave their places, others would
come to occupy them.

Why go on ? I might write a hundred chapters and still not
give an idea of the suffering during those days; suffice it to say
that El Caney, which was a town of 200 houses, was invaded by
20,000 people, who had counted on being there two days and
who remained eleven, namely, until the 16th.

Those eleven days at El Caney have caused more victims in
Santiago than the three years of war ; for the epidemic that broke
out still continues. When the inhabitants of the city numbered
45,000 there were, on an average, not over five deaths a day ; and
now, that the number of inhabitants is reduced to 30,000, there
are not less than fifty a day. The house that does not contain one
or more sick is an exception, and people who are well and hearty
one day are buried a day or two later. The physicians can not
attend all the sick, and the dead are carried to the cemeteries by
members of their own families. The city wears that stamp of
sadness and absence of life whicli is the mark of great calamities,
and we hear nothing but wailing and sobbing.

A bombardment, of course, inspires women with the greatest
horror, and yet, they preferred its dangers and consequences to
the sadness and miseries of El Caney and asked, as the greatest

148

of blessings, to be allowed to return to Santiago, and to that end
they signed a petition drawn np by the British consul, Mr. Fred-
erick Ramsden, a literal translation of which follows :

"We, the undersigned women, in the name and at the request
of all the women and children who are staying in this town with-
out food or shelter, set forth to your excellency as follows:

"At 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the 3d instant, the consuls of
Santiago de Cuba were notified that your excellency intended to
bombard the city the following day at 10 o'clock in the morning,
unless the Spanish anny should surrender by that time, and that
your excellency had ordered that the women and children should
leave the city prior to that hour.

"The same evening, at the request of the consular committee,
your excellency consented to defer the bombardment until noon
of the 5th, and it was agreed upon that the noncombatants should
proceed to El Caney, Cuabitas, and other places on the line of
railway.

"In conformity therewith, the civil governor of Santiago de
Cuba issued a decree permitting all noncombatants to leave the
following morning, between the hours of 5 and 9, on foot, and
without vehicles or beasts of burden. Consequently, old and
young, rich and poor, sick and invalid, went out in confusion,
without extra clothing and with only the food they could carry
themselves, fleeing from certain death, and firmly convinced that
the city would be bombarded that same day, and that in two days
they would be able to return to what might be left of their homes.
Far from this being the case ; it is now ten days since they came
here; many are without a roof over their heads and the others
housed together like hogs, without even having room enough to
lie down on the floor, which is all the bed they have ; the scant
supply of food is exhausted and no more can be had at any price.
The praiseworthy efforts of the army and of the Society of the Red
Cross are inadequate to better the situation ; they are perishing
themselves of hunger; the old and the sick are dying for want of
care and medicines and as a result of so much suffering. And
still the city has not yet been taken or bombarded, except a partial
bombardment last Sunday and Monday, by which no result appears
to have been attained, nor does there seem to be any probability
of a change in the horrible situation for the near future.

"They now invoke that same humanity which has been the
motive of this war, to ask that something be done as soon as possi-
ble to put an end to this terrible state of affairs, or that arrange-
ments be made with the Spanish authorities permitting us to return

149

to the city, where we whould rather die from the shells or be buried
under the ruins of our homes than perish slowly from hunger and
disease, and the privations we are suflfering.

(Here follow signatures.)
"Caney, Jvly U, 1898.

"To His Excellejicy General Shafter,

Commander-in' Chief of the United States Army^

. This document, remarkable under all aspects, describes the situa-

\ tion better than anything that I might say.

XXXVI.

SURRENDER OF THE CITY.

Jvly 17th. — In xjonformity with the terms of the capitulation,
the surrender of the city to the American army took place to-day.

At 9 a. m. the Spanish flag was hoisted on Punta Blanca Fort
and saluted by 21 guns; shortly after it was lowered.

At 9.30 Generals Toral and Shafter, commanders in chief of the
Spanish and American forces, respectively, the latter accompanied
by his staif and many of the commanders and oflBcers of the Ameri-
can fleet, witnessed the marching by, under arms, of a company
of the former, representing all the Spanish forces, as it was difficult
to assemble them. The American forces presented arms and beat
a march.

The heights of Conosa were the theater of this sad scene. The
morning was very beautiful, and the clearness of the sky formed
a singular contrast with the gloom that enwrapped the spirit of
. our troops.

When the march was ended, the American forces remained at
their posts, while ours left the trenches and proceeded to the city
for the purpose of depositing their arms.

The forces of the Socapa and Punta Gorda were taken by sea, in
the steamer Reina de Los Angeles, to Las Cruces pier, and from
there they marched to the Artillery Park, where they delivered
arms and ammunition. Without them, they proceeded to the
camp outside of the city, where all the forces were to assemble
until the arrival of the vessels which, as agreed upon, were to con-
vey them to Spanish soil. The other troops did the same thing,
after depositing their arms at the points designated beforehand.

The troops having evacuated the city, 1,000 men of the United
States Army entered it, hoisting the flag of that nation at the Pal-
ace and Morro Castle. It is the only flag that has been raised in
the city. No insurgent forces, nor individuals belonging to the
same, have entered the city with arms. The situation remained
the same till the day wher the army embarked for Spain.

As the operations at the Park lasted several hours, it was curious
to see the avidity with which the Americans were looking for num-
bers worn by the 29th battalion (Constitucion), sabres, buttons, and

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151

decorations of our officers and soldiers. It was noticed with what
satisfaction they kept whatever articles and arms they could
gather. Some of them put on the crosses, covered with dirt and
blood, that had adorned the breasts of the Spanish. There were
so many incidents on the same order that it would really be tedious
to enumerate them. They showed the high conception which the
American forces had of the valor of our army.

One incident, in conclusion, relative to this matter: When a
Yankee officer of artillery and another of engineers took possession
of the Morro, they inquired about the defenses and artillery of the
fort. "There they are," said the governor, pointing to the land
batteries and old guns. The American officers did not believe
him; personally they went all over the place in search of guns
and more important works of fortification. And when they had
convinced themselves that they had been told the truth, they
exclaimed: "That fleet" (pointing to Admiral Sampson's) "has
no excuse for not having gained possession of the harbor and
defeated the city and its defenses in so many days."*

The Commander in Chief of the American Army is General
Miles. (Here follow the names of the diflFerent commanders in
chief of the United States Army and Navy.)

At 10 a. m., an officer of the American Army, delegated for that
purpose, took possession of the comandancia de marina and cap-
taincy of the port, which were surrendered to him, after we had
gathered up such documents and communications as should be
preserved, and destroyed the others, or made them useless.

The forces are still depositing arms and ammunition, preserving
excellent order, which has not been disturbed for a moment. Then
they march to the camp outside the city. The arms were all
deposited at the park, and not surrendered to the enemy. In order
to form an idea, though only approximately, of the number of the
forces defending the city, I give below a statement which gives
the number at the hospitals, several having been fitted up.

On the 17 th of July there were —

In the military hospital 800 sick and wounded.

At the Concha headquarters 500 sick and wounded.

At the Mercedes hospital _ 500 sick and wounded.

At Barracones - _. 300 sick and wounded.

Total - _>_2, 100 sick and wounded.

•On July 2, Admiral Sampson wrote General Shafter : "It was my hope that
an attack on your part of these shore batteries from the rear would leave us at
liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes. " — O. N. I.

152

Note 2 : At the hospital, only the seriously wounded and sick
were admitted ; those who could stand on their feet were refused
and sent back to the trenches. If this had not been the case, there
would not have been beds enough in which to put them nor phy-
sicians to attend them. Therefore, the number of sick was in
reality much greater than shown by the statement furnished by
the hospital.

The soldiers had but little to eat, and that little was bad, and not
enough water. The latter was scarce, and means were lacking for
transporting it to all the points on the extensive line they covered
and which it was indispensable to maintain.

The horses of the cavalry, as well as the animals of the artillery
and military administration, had had no corn to eat for a long time,
and the hay, their only food, was very difficult to get and caused
sickness, which was worse.

In conclusion, I will give a statement of the stock on hand which
the artillery park turned over to the American officer commis-
sioned to receive it :

ARTTLLERY PARK OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

Statement of stock on hand, in arms and ammunition, of which tJie officer of
the American Army, commissioned to receive it, takes charge.

Kind.

Mauser guns, Spanish model, 7-mm. , No. 1898

Mauser guns, Argentine model, 7.65-mm., No. 1891 -.. |

Mauser guns, Turkish model, 765-mm., No. 1892 )

Remington guns, ll-mmi. No. 71 - )

Remington guns, 11-mm., No. 7189 _. )

Mauser carbines, Spanish model

Mauser carbines, Argentine model

Remington carbines

Revolvers

Sabers-

Machetes

Number of
uins.

Round« of
amniuiiitioii.

7,902

1,500,000

872

' 1,471,000

6. 118 1

833]

345,000
1,335,000

84
330 '

1,200

84

267

692

Santiago de Cuba, July — , 1898.

Ldis Meixjar,
Lieut. Col., Commander of Artillery.

Found correct by the officer commissioned. Errors and omissions excepted.

A. D. BORUP,
Lieut. Col, U. S. V., Chief Ord. Officer.

It will be seen that nearly the whole armament with which the
Spanish army was equipped consisted of Mauser guns, Spanish
model (the Remington was that of the volunteers and a few
mobilized companies); hence the ammunition for those was all
that could be used and should be counted ; the rest was useless.

153

Therefore, the number of cartridges on hand and surrendered was
1,500,000, and the number of guns 7,902. Hence there were 191
cartridges for each soldier. Every army man will know the time
it takes to use them up.

Here end the events and military operations that took place at San-
tiago de Cuba, and which are the subject of these notes. I should
therefore stop here, but I do not wish to do so without venturing
a few ideas suggested to me by certain scenes of which I was an
unwilling witness (for I have naturally avoided sights in which
there could be nothing pleasant), and without making a compari-
son between two sieges, upon one of which judgment has already
been passed and which has become a matter of history known to
every one, and upon the other of which judgment can not yet be
passed because we are not as yet in possession of the necessary data
and information which would make a just and impartial sentence
possible.

I give below the oflBcial statement of all the casualties sustained
by the forces of Santiago de Cuba in the different bombardments
and battles from the 18th of May to the date of the signing of the
capitulation. Those caused by sickness are not included.

CASUALTIES IN THE BOMBARDMENTS AND ATTACKS ON THE CITY OP SANTIAGO,

KiL

Officers. P

•

s

T
1

Wouj

iVDRD.

i

o

•

a
25

Prison ERB and
Missing.

Datx.

48

i

a
o

5

1
o

a
»
C5

t

*

S

s

o
I

1

i

&

1

Jane 6 — Horro

4

1

Estrella

Cay Smith

2

8

11

10

6

10

6

3

6
5

24
1
8

31
3:i9

45

10

550

Socapa - -

!

1

Maasamumi _

- —

I

CniiBor Reina Mercedes-.

1

6

1

1
1
1

1

June 14 — Socapa

June 16 — Motto

1
2

' Socapa ,

1

Jane 21 — Motto

June 22— Socaiia

(

1
1

AfiTuadores

Daiquiri

1
9

1

June 23 and 24 — Sevilla

'

3
2

_

Jane 26— AfTuadorefl —

Jane 26— Motto

'

July 2 — Motto

1

78

G

1

1

:jo

2

I

1

July 1,2, 3 — Caney and Santiago.
July 10 — Santiago

I

:j

12

1

^

0

I

1

6 IKi

July 11 — Santiago

1

Total

1

4

12

107

1

9

49

1

G

116

154

RECAPITULATION.

Generals.

1
1

Com-
manders.

Offlcen.

Men.

Killed

4
9
1

12

49

6

107

Wounded - „

556

Priffonon find miming ___ . ^ .— - . , ., ,, ... _

116

Genenl total

2

U

67

779

XXX vn.

TRADERS, NOT THE SPANISH PEOPLE.

I was sent to the Island of Cuba for the first time in 1868 and
have remained there, if not constantly, yet quite long enough to
understand, even though I am but a poor observer, that one of the
most important causes which have led to the deep aversion which
the sons of Cuba generally show for the mother country is the con-
duct of a certain number of people who come from the Peninsula
with no other object in view than to accumulate a fortune in more
or less of a hurry, the majority of them having no education or
knowledge of any kind.

In order to better attain their desires and ambitions, they inces-
santly boast of everything Spanish, whereby they must necessarily
come into conflict with the Cubans, whose feelings and dignity they
hurt and offend. When they have acquired money, they aspire to
lucrative and important offices, which they obtain because they are
Spanish, to the prejudice of others, who by their intelligence and
ability are better fitted to hold them ; and the aversion is intensi-
fied into hatred, which, always latent, though concealed, was only
waiting for an opportunity to break out openly. This opportunity
presented itself for the first time in 1868, and the battle cry of Yara
became the signal of vengeance and extermination, to which these
Peninsulars responded by organizing the corps of volunteers.

To deny that they have since rendered important and constant
services to the cause of Spain, would be both unjust and useless ;
but it must also be acknowledged that they have committed many
serious errors, often becoming overbearing and having compelled
more than one captain general to resign his command — a fatal
example which hurt us in our country and impaired our reputation
in other countries.

The first Cuban insurrection and all those which we have had to
fight since have acquired that stamp of cruelty and extermination
which is a characteristic of savage people, but not of civilized
nations, and the war has given an opportunity to satisfy vengeances,
which have given rise to reprisals and furnished the Government
of the United States with a pretext — both unjust and hypocritical,
as I know only two well, but still a pretext — for deciding on armed
intervention, in the name of humanity, or which is the same, on
war, which could not help but be its natural outcome.

(155)

156

If all those errors and offenses which have been attributed to
Spain and the country had really been committed by them, such
intervention would have been justified and even worthy of com-
mendation. But events have shown very plainly that to them
(the Peninsulars referred to) the nation was but a pretext and that
the object was quite a different one, namely, the attainment of
their aspirations and the realization of their desires. And this is
further evidenced by the fact, previously mentioned, that, taking
advantage of the scarcity of provisions, the natural consequence
of the blockade, they hid such provisions as they had on hand or
asked exorbitant prices for them, without any reason to justify
such proceeding, after taking good care to place their funds
abroad, in anticipation of what might happen. I need hardly
state again that those who were so enthusiastic and loyal in
normal times were the first to strip off the uniform and hide
where they believed themselves safest. Finally, when they
became convinced that the sun in whose light they had been
living, and in whose rays they had thrived, was yielding his place
to another sun, larger in size, but not in luster, they sought its
protection and benefits, without remembering any longer the one
which their eyes had seen when they opened them for the first
time. "The King is dead — long live the King!"

They advertised their merchandise in "The Times," of Santiago
de Cuba, a newspaper of recent publication, printed in Spanish
for the information of the Cubans, the hatred of whom does not
prevent their fleecing them, and in English for the purpose of
doing the same thing with their new masters, whom they did not
hesitate in recognizing. And so great is their love and affection
for Spain, of which they were so proud, that where they ask one
dollar of American silver they require two in Spanish coin of
the same metal. They consider the latter worth one-half of the
former. Perhaps this may seem exaggerated, the same as many
other truths contained in my "Notes;" but a letter signed by a
Peninsular, published in number 7 of said "Times," of Santiago
de Cuba, of August 8, will convince the most incredulous. The
following is a literal copy of the letter :

"emigration at present is folly.

"Your southern race has many vices, but it also possesses great
virtues. Its weak point is that it is extremely impressionable.
Any orator speaking to you carries you completely away, and with
childlike weakness you accept everything just as it is painted and
described to you.

" During the six months last past the Spanish race at Santiago
de Cuba has lived in this fictitious atmosphere ; I say * fictitious '

157

because the bitter reality has not realized our patriotic and enthusi-
astic aspirations.

"How many useless sacrifices! How many illusions destroyed!
But that should not discourage us, because history, when dealing
with the events and the suffering of this poor people, will take
good care to transmit them to posterity with impartial rudeness.

''At present, as long as we are acquainted only with the occur-
rences that have taken place in this province alone and know abso-
lutely nothing of what is going on in the rest of the world, includ-
ing our mother country, why do we not wait until the black clouds
hanging over us have passed away and until the horizon has cleared
up so that we may be able to judge of our true situation and decide
what is to be done? Be calm, very calm, peninsular residents of
this city ; let us condemn right here the voluntary desertion which
prejudices your sacred interests, and whose current you have fol-
lowed without considering whether it would lead to your happi-
ness or to your ruin. However much you may think about the
extremes which I have just pointed out to you, it will still be little
enough.

"Let us suppose for a moment that the dismemberment of our
poor Spain becomes a fact, a thing which we do not know. What
painful scenes are you going to witness ? What business will you
resort to to recover from the ruin of your interests? Unfortu-
nately none, for your long absence will keep you in ignorance of
everything, and the radical change of climate, when winter is
almost at hand, will affect your health and that of your families.

"If you remain here, in this locality which is occupied by sol-
diers of a strong nation, until we shall learn definitely what has
happened, you will lose nothing either in your business or your
independence.

"The noble and farsighted chiefs who are at present ruling the
destinies of this country have shown you plainly that all they wish
is that peace and order may reign in all the branches of our public
administration ;

"That they have called upon you as well as the industrious
Cubans to cooperate in the work of progress and social recon-
struction ;

"That they have neglected nothing in order that the inhabitants
may have cheap and wholesome food ;

"That they have established banks for the development of our
agriculture and commerce.

"They have also shown us, and have so far proved it, that they
have not come here in the interest of any faction or political party,
but are desirous only of promoting the progress of this island and
the well-being of its inhabitants.

158

"Since the situation which I have ju«t described to you is the
undeniable truth, why should you want to join this insensate and
shortsighted emigration which can cause you nothing but expense?

*'Do you not understand that by remaining here where you are
well known by the people and the local trade, you have an ample
field for rebuilding your deteriorated business and provide for
your families and secure for them a bright future ?

** Whatever maybe the final fate which Providence reserves for
this country, whether we remain Spanish or pass over to foreigners,
our hard-working and honorable race will always remain deserv-
ing. There are instances in the Spanish- American Republics of
fellow-countrymen of ours who are holding the most prominent
places in those nations and who have been honored by their gov-
ernments.

'* If all that I have set forth is tangible truth, why should you

abandon the field, why flee from this beautiful country where you

have spent the years of your youth, raised families and acquired a

good standing? If you consider my disinterested advice you can

not help but become convinced that, as matters now stand, your

voluntary emigration is an absurdity.

"A Peninsular."

I have copied the letter literally, and it must be admitted that it
is remarkable in every respect for diction, aspiration, and intention.
I believe this example is quite sufficient, so I will refrain from cit-
ing others.

Those who to-day call and sign themselves Peninsulars, who have
always called themselves Spaniards, what will they call themselves
to-morrow ?

XXXVIII.

GERONA AND SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

When sieges are spoken of in Spain, tliose of Numancia and
Sagunto, Saragossa, and Gerona are always mentioned specially
as instances worthy of imitation.

As twenty centuries have elapsed since the first two took place
and I do not know what happened there, and am not sufficiently
acquainted with the facts to venture on a comparison, I will leave
them entirely out of the question ; for since the customs and usages
of warfare, as well as international law, and the rights of the peo-
ple were, and could not help but be, very different from those of
our days, there is nothing remarkable^ in the fact that, as capitu-
lations were not respected, people should have preferred to die like
lions rather than be butchered like sheep.

Therefore I shall refer only to the siege of Gerona (no doubt
quite as glorious as that of Saragosa) of which all Spaniards, my-
self included, are justly proud ; and judging from General Linares's
telegram, somebody had evidently had that siege in mind as a
pattern or model to be followed here at Santiago de Cuba.

Everybody is acquainted with the circumstances of the siege of
Gerona, but probably no one in the Peninsula with those of the
siege of Santiago. All that I am going to say concerning it is pure
truth, as can be testified by the 30,000 inhabitants of the city and
the 40,000 Americans and 8,000 or 10,000 insurgents who laid siege
to it.

It is true that Gerona in 1809 was far from being a Metz or a
Sebastopol ; but after all, it was a city surrounded by walls, with
forts and redoubts on the outside communicating with the main
precinct by open roads. For that reason the city could not be en-
tered by surprise, but had to be regularly besieged, which made it
necessary to construct parallel lines, set up batteries, cut off com-
munications with the outside to prevent assistance from reaching
the city, open a breach, or determine upon the assault, all of which
costs time and lives.

Great was the anger caused in Spain by the invasion of Napoleon
the First, and especially by the means which he employed to effect
it. The Spanish believed their religion and independence threat-
ened, and like one man they rose up in arms with an enthusiasm
and energy not often paralleled in history,

(159)

160

Thus it was that the garrison of Qeroiia, which at the beginning
of tlie siege consisted of about 6,000 men, enthusiastic as well as
being Spanish, was not the only garrison that did the fighting.
For all its inhabitants fought as well ; the young and the strong with
arms, the old and the weak by carrying cartridges and ammuni-
tion, the women by gathering up and caring for the sick and
wounded, the clergy by absolving the dying, burying the dead, and
stimulating the zeal of all. There everybody fought, everybody
toiled, all were heroes, because it was their own property they were
defending, their own hearths, their families, the soil where their
forefathers were buried, their religion, their independence — in a
word, their native country, and that is saying everything. They
well earned their country's gratitude, from Mariano Alvarez de
Castro to the last woman, the last child.

The troops which surrounded the city under Verdier and the
Saint-Cyr troops protecting them and occupying the roads which
lead to the city did not exceed in all 30,000, and although their
artillery was more numerous and better manned, Gerona had artil-
lery of the same caliber and the same range ; that is to say — ^and
this should be well borne in mind — that the Spanish projectiles
carried as far as the French projectiles.

The firearms of that time are well known ; the small arms were
loaded in eleven movements, and I do not know how many it took
to load the guns ; the effect of the bombshells was moral rather
than material, for it will be remembered that, in order to avoid
them as much as possible, men were stationed in church steeples
and other high places where they indicated the direction of such
bombshells by prearranged signals. Besides it was easy to elude
them in caves and cellars. If the powder gave out, the supply
could always be renewed by burning a few doors and windows to
obtain charcoal and mix it with a little saltpeter that could be
found in any damp place, and a little sulphur. Any blacksmith
could make cannon balls, and so on. Such were the firearms at the
beginning of this century and their effects were accordingly.

Moreover, Gerona was aware that all Sx)ain looked upon her
with admiration and compassion; that each month, each week,
each day that the resistance was prolonged and the French were
kept outside the walls of the city, armies were being organized,
regiments improvised, and armed bodies raised, and that there
was but one idea and one desire in Catalonia, namely, that of
helping Gerona, as, indeed, it had been lielped once by getting in
a convoy with provisions and over 3,000 men, and a second was
ready. The city also knew that all assistance which it could get
did really help to prolong the resistance, and the garrison was
well aware that, if it should go out en masse and break through the

161

hostile circle at any time, they would be safe and free, on their
own soil, where they would have found all the resources and
supplies they could wish for.

When they were not fighting, and did not have to be at the
breach to repulse the columns of attack, or at the walls to force
back an assault, they stationed their sentinels, guards, and patrols
to keep watch, while the others could go where they were under
' shelter from the sun, the rain, and the dampness; in a word, they
[ could take turns about in the service, and although they did not
have much to eat, they could at least rest when the enemy per-
mitted. Finally, Gerona preserved the remembrance and the
pride of two former sieges which those same French forces had
been obliged to give up, and there was well-founded hope of simi-
lar success if they received reenforcements, which was not at all
improbable.

At the end of a six months' siege Gerona had to capitulate owing
to starvation, but capitulate after all ; and that capitulation, far
from causing us to blush or be ashamed, is one of the most brilliant
pages in our history, of which we are justly proud.

Those were the conditions of Gerona during that famous siege ;
now let us see the conditions of Santiago de Cuba.

Santiago de Cuba, as has been seen, is an open city, without forts,
redoubts, or walls— in a word, without defenses of any kind. At
the time the present conflict was declared the precinct of the city
was surrounded by a wire inclosure which had been deemed suffi-
cient, and indeed had proved so, to check the insurgents; but any-
one not acquainted with Santiago and the kind of warfare we had
been sustaining, would have laughed at it, and with good reason.

Then the war with the United States broke out. I will not again
mention the work effected for the protection of the precinct by the
corps of engineers, without resources and appliances and with a
scant personnel, which, though both enthusiastic and intelligent,
had to confine itself to constructing trenches and protecting by
. earthworks the forts surrounding the precinct (if the name of forts

I [ can be given to a few blockhouses, built with a view to resisting

musket fire, but surely not gun fire), erecting palisades and obstruc-
tions of every nature, for which purpose all the sinuosities and
windings of the ground were utilized with remarkable skill. But
all these works were only works of campaign, and left the soldiers
exposed to the rays of the July sun of the Island of Cuba, to almost
daily torrents of rain, and at night to heavy dew ; anyone acquainted
with the island would know that, if these conditions had continued
for a month, not a single soldier could have remained in the
trenches.

10845 11

162

Here at Santiago, as well as in the rest of the island, the soldiers,
poorly clothed and still more poorly fed, had been sustaining for
three years a fierce and thankless war, fighting with the enemy,
the climate, with sun and dampness, with sickness, with the roads
(or rather for want of them), with rains and drouth, with the
mountains and plains— in a word, with everything, for here in
Cuba everything is hostile to the army. Besides, there was more
than eight months' pay due the soldiers, and I believe is still due
them.

Before the destruction of our fleet, and still more so after it, the
enemy had complete control of the sea, and from Daiquiri, where
the landing was made, to Punta Cabrera, the American fleet, con-
sisting of over seventy vessels, including both war and merchant
vessels (many of the latter armed with guns), did not permit us to
even think of receiving reenforcements or help of any kind, unless
it were from the interior of the island.

After the arrival of General Escario, who might perhaps have
checked the progress of the enemy for a little while longer if he
had reached here prior to July 1, though he could not have changed
the final result, provisions and ammunition, already scarce, became
still more so, because there were twice the number of mouths to be
fed and twice the number of muskets to be supplied.

Eight or nine thousand men, many suffering with fever and all
of them tired and exhausted, who had been day and night in the
trenches, which they could not leave for the simple reason that
they were far from the city, with water reaching up to their waists
whenever it rained, who for only food had rice bread and rice
boiled in water, and for only artillery a few muzzle-loading guns,
had to resist 40,000 Americans and 8,000 or 10,000 insurgents, with
machine guns, also intrenched, and 68 breech-loading guns in
advantageous positions and well manned.

The inhabitants, far from helping the soldiers or encouri^ging
them, had left the city as soon as notice of an intended bombard-
ment had been given, and the few who remained closed their doors
and windows, even at the 'drug stotes. The merchants, far from
furnishing provisions to the army, or even to the hospitals, which
stood so much in need of them, hid them carefully and ofBcial
searches had to be made, the result of which was as I have stated
above.

The situation of Santiago de Cuba from a military standpoint is
probably unique in history.

Without any prospect of receiving help by sea, which was in
control of a powerful fleet, the city was surrounded on land by an
army five times as large as ours in number, with excellent artillery,
which was increased every day and was constantly receiving pro-
visions and war supplies.

I

163

Our foveas, being without these latter, have no longer even the
pleasure or comfort of fighting, for the enemy knows their situa-
tion bettor than they do themselves; knows that they have no food
left but pjce, and but very little ammunition, which they dare not
use up for fear of becoming entirely disarmed and placing them-
selves completely at the mercy of the victor; knows that they can
not expose themselves to another fight like that of July 1, which
they remember with fear and terror ; that they will be compelled
/ to capitulate, and that it is only a question of days. Knowing all

. this, the hostile forces intrench themselves, train their artillery on

the city, and also prepare to bombard it with their ships, which,
from Aguadores, more than 4 miles from here, will soon reduce it to
ashes and ruin, hurling upon it a hail of 16, 20, and 32 cm. shells,
the effects of which will be seen only too well, even though we may
not be able to see where the projectUes come from that are causing
I the ruin.

The eneu^y, as has been stated, had cut the aqueduct, thus depriv-
ing the city of water. There were a few wells and a number of
cisterns, it ii true, but the transportation of the water to the Socapa,
' Punta Gorda) and especially l^e blockhouses on the line from Las
Cruces to 4>guadores (4 kilometers), was not only extremely labori-
ous and diJScult, but quite inadequate.
( But what makes this siege an exceptional one more than any-

thing else U the fact that the reenf orcements which could only
{ have come by land would have had the opposite effect of what
) they were intended to have, as I will demonstrate.
I Where oould such reenf orcements come from ? From Holguin,

i Manzanillo, Guant^namo, or Havana. Holguin could have fur-
I nished five or six thousand men under Colonel Luque, but with
only rations enough for the march, for there were no more at
t Holguin, xxQT means for transporting them. From Manzanillo all
I those who could come had already arrived in command of General
Escario. From Guant&namo none could come for lack of provi-
sions. That left only those from Havana.

But I will go even further : I will suppose that all the reenf orce-
ments, including those from Havana under General Pando or any
other general, had arrived, and that there had been forces enough at
Santiago to rout the enemy, which is the most that could be con-
ceded. What wouM have happened then ? The enemy would have
receded as far as the coast in less than an hour and their armor-
clads and other war ships would have checked the progress of our
army and would have made its victory and efforts useless, leaving
it in worse condition than before the arrival of such reenforce-

• 4

ments, since there would be many more men to feed ; and every-
body knows that the fields of Santiago have produced nothing
during these last three years of warfare.

164

Some may say that there was one last recourse left : to force a
passage through the hostile lines and march to Holguin. That is
more easily said than done.

One can not break through lines and walk over armies equipped
with modern muskets and guns. Metz and Sedan have proved
that, and it must be admitted that the French did fierce fighting at
these places. We had to reconcentrate at a given point all our
forces, scattered along an extensive line, and how could that be
done without the enemy, whose lines were only a few meters from
ours, seeing it all ?

But I will concede even more : I will concede that it had been
possible to accomplish the reconcentration ; that the cavalry had
been able to make a successful charge, which I do not believe
would have been possible, for the horses were starving; I will
grant, for the sake of argument, that the mules, which were in
the same condition as the horses, had been able to transport the
spare ammunition, provided there was any left, and the supplies
of rice required for the march. Let us suppose that, after leaving
two or three thousand dead and wounded on the field, the others
had opened a road to Holguin ; how could soldiers who were weak
and sick accomplish the forced march which would have been
absolutely necessary in order to escape the enemy's pursuit? It
was an impossibility. The insurgents would have harassed us on
the march, fighting for every inch of the ground, and would have
wounded a more or less considerable number of our men, thereby
delaying a march which it was so imperative to hasten, and the
Americans, who would no doubt have followed our tracks, would
thereby have gained time to overtake us with overwhelming num-
bers, and we should have been compelled to surrender to them at
their pleasure for want of ammunition, or to perish to the last
man, and such a sacrifice would have profited Spain no more than
had the sacrifice of the fleet, and would have deprived the nation
of 8,000 soldiers who by three years of fighting had become inured
to war.

If the hostile fleet had bombarded the city, as it doubtless would
have done, it would have reduced it to ruins and ashes in a short
space of time, and while, from a military standpoint, such a con-
sideration should not influence a general and impel him to capitu-
late on that account alone, in this case the ruin of the city meant
also that of its defenders ; for if it was difficult to supply enough
water in normal times it would have become altogether impossible
under such circumstances ; the soldiers, exposed to the sun all day,
would have been without anything to drink, which is .worse even
than being without anything to eat.

/

165

Finally, what and whom were we defending in Santiago ? The
Cubans, after three years of fighting, preferred to become Yan-
kees rather than remain Spaniards, and the Peninsulars, far from
assisting the soldiers who were defending them, took advantage
of the situation to raise in the most outrageous manner the price
of all articles, even those of first necessity, or hide them, giving
the impression that they had been confiscated, and when the time
of daliger arrived they left the city, taking off the uniform of
volunteers, in which they had always taken good care to shine at
reviews and in processions, and went to hide at El Caney, in
merchant steamers, and at Cinco Beales.

Such were the situation and circumstances which, at Santiago,
led to the signing of the capitulation, by virtue of which we Span-
iards, who happen to be here, are to return to Spain.

I do not wish to make comparisons, nor express my opinion on
events in which I have taken a more or less direct and active part,
as such opinion might appear impassioned or dictated by interest
or egotism. I have stated what happened at Gerona and what
happened here, like Bertrand du Guesclin, without omitting or
adding anything. Now, let the country, knowing the circum-
stances, judge us. With a calm mind and a clear conscience I
await its sentence.

•J

V

\L . O • — OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCK.

War Notes No. IL
INFORMATION FROM ABROAI>

Q

COMMENTS

OF

REAR-ADMIRAL. PLUDDEMANN,

GMGRlMJ^l^^- NAJV\r^

ON THE

MAIN FEATURES OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of Naval Intelligknck.

OKCEIMBER, 1898.

WASHINGTON :

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.

1898.

Ym.uc'^

\

'..0/

JAN 23 1899']

u>on

From the
U. S. Government.

INTRODUCTORY.

This able analysis of the main features of the Spanish- American
war by M. Pltiddemann, Rear- Admiral, German navy, presents in a
comprehensive form many of the technical deductions of the late war.
He comments on the high quality and endurance of our navy ordnance
and on the defective results from the navy fuse now in use.

As regards the question of the importance of the Navy controlling
the transport service, his reference to the landing of the army at
Daiquiri is instructive. Referring to the want of control and dis-
cipline on board the merchant steamers chartered as transports for
service under the Quartermaster's Department of the Army — that
control and discipline at sea which foreign military authorities have
long since by experience recognized can onlj'^ be obtained through the
navy — ^he states:

Under these circumstances it is not strange that the landing of the provisions,
guns, and ammunition, and the entire equipment, all of which were so much
needed in this locality, which offered no resources, was effected with such slow-
ness that the troops were reduced from the outset to the meager rations which
each man carried with him.

Richardson Clover,

Chief Intelligence Officer.
December 21, 1898.

3

MAIN FEATURES OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

By M. Pluddemann, Rear-Admiral. German Navy.
[Translated from the Marine-Rundschati, November, 1898.]

While the events of the war just ended show nothing which might
lead to a radical revolution of present ideas as to rational Avarfare
and the use of modern war material, and while no essentially new
appliances have been made use of which might cause us to anticipate
a change in the floating material or the weapons of the sea powers,
still the war has enriched former experiences. But, on the other hand,
it might lead to erroneous conclusions, as many good devices did not
have a chance to be tested, the weakness of the adversary making
them 8ui)erfluousj and others not good did not have bad results,
because they were counterbalanced by the defects and nustakes on
the part of the enemy or by other favorable circumstances.

The following is a discussion of the points which are of special
interest to the naval officer:

I. BATTLES OF THE FLEET.

Aside from the moral qualities of the personnel, which constitute
the prerequisite of success, tliere are ftve main factors on which the
result of a battle depends — the construction and equipment of the
8hii)s, the artillery, the torpedo, the ram, and speed.

The torpedo and the ram have not been used in the late war, for the
reason that the liostile ships have never come close enougli to each
other. It is claimed, it is true, that two Spanish 1ori)edo boats
attempted an attack at Cavite on May 1. lUit thc^se two vessels were
so entirely covered by the rapid-fire artillery of the OJuwpia^ even at
a distance of 2,()()0 meters, that they could only save their crews by
running ashore as fast as possible. It is doubtful whetlierthey were
really torpedo boats. If so, the attack could only have been made
owing to entire inexperience with torpedo-boat attacks and complete
ignorance of modern rapid-fire guns.

The other two factors, artillery and speed, have proved to be of
much more essential and indeed of a very powerful eiYect. The
8Ui)eriority of the American artillery as to number, caliber, and kind
of guns is well knowji. Tlie general opinion is also that tlie shooting
of the Americans was very good, while that of tlie Si)anish was miser-

5

able. This was the more essential for the Americans at Cavite, owing
to the fact that a large number of their shells did not explode. If
nevertheless they achieved such a complete success and caused such
destructive fires, it was because of the comparatively large number
of hits; there were still quite a considerable number of shells that
did explode. Even as early as"at the bombardment of San Juan it was
discovered that many of the shells did not explode ; but this fact was
most noticeable at the naval battle of Cavite. It is true that at the
end of the battle all the Spanish vessels were under water to the upper
deck, so that the really mortal injuries could not be verified ; the parts
above water showed a number of hits, and there is no reason for the
assumi:)tion that the ratio of exploded shells to that of unexploded
ones was essentially different in the lower parts.

The Reina Crist ina showed ten shots that had gone entirely through
the vessel; the after smokestack ha<l lieen torn down by the falling
of the mainmast; no explosive effect could be noticed. However, the
w^hole ship had been burned out, which made accurate observation
difficult.

The Ciwtilla showed considerable explosive effects. The smoke-
stacks and metal bulkheads of the upper deck were pierced in differ-
ent i)laces by fragments and splinters. The conning bridge and super-
structure deck were completely destroyed and torn dowai.

On the Don Antonio de Ullon the masts were pierced in several
places; a 5.7-centimeter shot had gone clear through a 12-centimet.er
gun shield ; the chart house and the starboard side aft showed two
hits each, in which there had been failure to explode.

The Don Juan de Austria was burned out; effects of firing could
not be observed.

On the Marquis del Duerothe tube of the 12-centimeter starboard
gun was bent upward ; the cause of this could not- be ascertained.
Two shots had pierced the ship's side. The upper edge of the smoke-
stack had been indented by a projectile. No splinter effects were
noticeable.

On the General Lezo the demolition of the smokestack was appar-
ently due to an explosion.

The IsJa de Cuba showed no injuries.

On the Isia de Luzon the 12-ceutimeter forward gun, with its whole
pivot and shield, had fallen over backward in firing. Two shots
(presumably 4-centinieter) had gone through the bow; one of the
masts had been gi-azed by a small-caliber shot. The engine telegraph
and sui)erstructures had been demolished; the helm upturned by
splinters.

On the Argos nothing could be observed.

The Vektsco had the foremast pierced and slightly burned, the
mainmast torn down, and the anchor stock shot off.

When the American fleet advanced for the attack it was fired upon
by a battery at Manila. The Ohjmpia answered with two shots; both

shells were afterwards found unexploded near Luneta. The govern-
or's house at Cavite also showed a shot without explosive effect.

In this respect better results appear to have been achieved at San-
tiago. This may be gathered from the details known, although the
rei)orts refer only in a few instances to the explosive effects attained;
but even here a number of cases of nonexplosion have been noticed
on the Spanish ships, as well as the fortifications.

The following table gives some data concerning the hits in the naval
battle of Santiago :

AMERICAN GUNS.

American designation. |

, l-pounder. 6-pounder. 4-inch. 5-inch. 8-inch. 12-inch. 13-inch.

Caliber, in centimeters

Number of gnns on board .

3.7
22

5.7

84

HITS.

10
6

12.7
\2

20
32

30 '
6

33

8

Total.

170

Siaria Teresa 1

Almirante Oqnendo

Vizcaya -^ ,

Cristobal Colon

Total 1

17

46

11

5

1
0
4

79

11

4 3 2 : 28

3 7 02

6 46 66

2 7

Ts^ 55 2 163

This is not quite 1 hit per gun, or, leaving out the 1-pounders,
which have only a short range of fire, 9 hits to 8 guns.

The Iowa is the only ship that has 10-centimeter guns, the Brooklyn
the only one having 12.7-centimeter guns. These data can not lay
claim to absolute accuracy, owing to the extent of the destruction.
The calibers of the hits also admit of some margin.

Special mention should be made of the following points : The fallen
foremast of the Maria Teresa showed 2 hits; 10 hits from 3 ships
went into the smokestacks.

On the Abnirante. Oquendo a 20-centimeter shell went through the
forward turret roof, exploding, and killing the whole crew in the
turret. If the turret had had no roof the shell would have passed
over it.

The superstructures on the deck of the Vizcaya had been almost
completely destroyed by the end of the battle. Whether the torpedo
which lay ready for firing in a bow launching tube was detonated by
a hostile projectile could not be definitely established. It has also
been said that the forward ammunition magazine had exploded.

A 20-centimeter shell hit the protectii^e shield of the second 14-
centimeter gun of the Maria Teresa^ exploded in the rear of it, and
killed and mutilated everyone in the vicinitj-, as did also another
shell of the same kind which struck the battery deck aft. Still farther
aft two 30-centimeter shells struck so close together that their shot
holes were merged into one. Explosive fragments from them had
torn a hole 4 feet square in the ship on the opposite side (starboard).

8

The Cristobal CoJon^ although having received but seven shots, gave
up the game, seeing that there was no possibility of escape, as even
the Oregon and Texas had caught up with her after a three hours'
chase.

In no case has an armor belt been pierced. The greatest destruc-
tion comparatively was wrought by the 5.7-centimeter projectiles,
while the efficacy of the 3.7-centimeter projectiles was very small,
their range not exceeding 2,000 meters. They are therefore to be
done away with, perhaps a little overhastily, since they were con-
structed primarily as against torpedo boats and for use at compara-
tively short distances.

In connection with the hits, a few figures as to the consumption of
ammunition may be of interest, while the total consumption of am-
munition is not yet known. Smith, a seaman on board the loira, fired
135 aimed shots from a lO-centimeter rapid-fire gun in fifty minutes.
During the same i^eriod of time two 5.7-centimeter guns of the same
ship fired 440 shots. The Oregon used in all 1,775 shells, but 1,070 of
this number were used for the twenty 5.7-centimeter guns alone (or
perhaps only for the ten of one side of the ship), wliile the four 30-cen-
timeter guns 'fired 31 shots.

The American material has demonstrated not only its efficacy but
also its durability, as only four guns were in need of repairs at the
end of the war, in all of which projectiles had burst in the bore.
This fact, taken in <»onne(^tion with other frequent failures of fuses,
shows that the construction of the fuse in America is still far from
perfect.

It is well known that the extensive fii*es on board the Spanish shii>s
were due princix)ally to tlie fact tluit th(» Spanish liad not sufficiently
considered modern experiences and principles by removing every-
thing combustible from the ships. One circumstance should be
menlJoned in this connection which has perhaps not been fully appre-
ciated, luimely, the danger of woodc^n de(*ks with pitch in the seams.
The danger of these decks was still further increascMl in the Spanish
ships by the circumstance that tlie planks wer(» not even resting on
an iron deck. An iron lining excluding the air and being a con-
ductor of heat naturally decreases the danger of a fire spreading,
though it does not obviate it, as the splinters of exx)loding projectiles
pierce the deck, thereby causing drafts of air from below. On the
Maria. Teresa, Ahniranfe Oqueinlo, and J^izraga the upper decks
and all the woodwork were completely burned, other decks partially.

The Americans had avoided all combustible material in the con-
struction and equij)ment of their shii)s; and moreover, special orders
were given at the beginning of the war that all the ships should be
examined and everything combustible that might have been left or
accumulated on board through carelessness should be removed.
Besides, tlie Spanish appear to have relied entirely on their steam

9

pumps and water mains for extinguishing fires. When these had been
destroyed or injured by hostile projectiles, they had no other means
to fall back on. Even the most primitive means for fighting fires, such
as fire buckets and tubs filled with water, are indispensable in connec-
tion with our modern fire-extinguishing equipment which is very
effective indeed, but also very complicated.

The thick powder smoke sometimes suffocated the Americans and
almost blinded them. They sought to remedy this by tying wet clotlis
over their heads with small holes cut into them for the eyes. Smoke-
less powder would probably have had still more troublesome effects.

The range-finders, to which the good firing results of the Americans
were often attributed in the beginning, were not of much use. Owing
to their delicate construction, their usefulness was soon imi)aired.
The distances were then estimated from the height of the masts of the
hostile ships.

While the Spanish were inferior in every other respect, they might
have averted the whole sad catastrophe of Santiago by i)reservingand
taking advantage of their greater speed, which they had shown, at
least, at the trial trips of their ships. In this respect the Americans
were at a great disadvantage from the outset.

The speed of the two armored cruisers, Xetr York and Brooklyji, was
superior by 1 knot to that of the Spanish cruisers, but these w(»re
the only ones; the speed of all the other vessels was inferior by from
2k to 0 miles. The American ships, aside from previous services
required of them — the Orrcjon, for instance, had not reached Key
West on her return from San Francisco until 3Iay :?0 — had been block-
ading Santiago for five weeks. Their boilers were in constant use and
could not be properly cleane<l; the bottoms of the ships were badly
fouled. It is claimed that in order to nuike 11 knots an hour the
ships had to xise as much coal as they i*(M[uired to mak(» 1») knots, when
in good condition, and even then they couhl not attain their original
speed. The Spanish, on the other hand, had a good opportunity dur-
ing their six-weeks' stay in Santiago harbor to put their l)oilers and
engines in first-class condition and to clean the bottoms of the ships.

Here, again, the moral qualities of the persoiuu^ are of the greatest
importance. Teclmical x>erf(H'ti()n is but an auxiliary in warfare — a 0
which acquires value only by the figure placed before it, nanu'ly, the
nu»ntal qualities of the warrior. It is doubtful, howt^ver, whether the
Sj)anish ships ever actiuilly possi^ssed the speed ofiicially claimed for
them. At trial trips it is easy enough to use means by which the
efficiency attained appears greater on paper than it is in reality, es])e-
eially if the personnel accepting the ship is not of the highest moral
and technical standing. In any event, the Spanish engine pers(mnel
was not equal to its task.

It did not need this war to establish the value of an efficient engine
personnel for success in war; but the immensity of the catastrophes

10

must make it plain even to the most superficial mind that it would
be very wrong to deny the importance of the services of the men
who give life and motion to the ship by the most arduous kind of
work simply because they do not handle shell and lanyard, but coal
shovel and fire hook. The very best of human material, strong in
body and mind, is the only kind suitable for this work, and a navy
should spare neither trouble nor expense to secure it.

On the subject of the efficiency of monitors opinions in United
States naval circles were much divided at the beginning of the war.
The North Americans are the only ones who still continue to build this
type of ship. Little has been heard of their services during the war.
Two of them went from San Francisco to the Philippines, the greater
part of the way in tow of their colliers. The Monterey^ accompanied
by the collier Brutus, left San Diego, Cal., on June 11 and arrived
at Manila on August 4. The distance is 7,600 miles, 3,725 miles of
which she was towed. Twice she had to touch at anchoring places,
namelv, at Hawaii and Guam. She was towed from the 8th to the
23d of June, 712 miles; from the 5th to the 22d of July, 2,541 miles,
and from the 25th to the 28th of July, 472 miles; average speed
while in tow, 0.7G knots. The weather was fine during the whole
time, with the exception of a slight storm on July 31. The voyage
took in all two months less seven davs. The Monadnock took
exactly the same length of time, having left San Francisco on June
23 and arrived at Manila on August IG.

These voyages are quite remarkable as far as sea efficiency is con-
cerned, but wlien it comes to war efficiencv thev had better not be
relied upon. The confidence in the efficiency of the monitor for war
purposes has been considerably shaken. Captain Mahan, who used
to argue in favor of a defensive navy composed of monitors, has
recently expressed the opinion that the inefficiency of the monitors
had now been proved ; that they had been a constant impediment to
the fleet owing to their lack of speed, limited coal capacity, and
unstable platforms, which completely excluded effective firing in a
bombardment. For harbor defenses also he prefers land fortifica-
tions to monitors.

II. BOMBARDMENTS.

What might be the results of a serious battle between armor clads
and coast forts the war. has not demonstrated. The Americans in
these instances have never gone close enough to make it possible to
note decisive results on either side of the belligerents. They should
not be blamed for this. If they could obtain their object without
taking greater risks, it would have been a mistake to take such risks,
and they certainly did attain their object. The great injuries, how^-
ever, which the Americans claimed to have inflicted at different times
have subsequently proved to be exaggerations and delusions. Even
at target practice we believe only reluctantly the statements of "too

11

short" or "too far" made by an observ^er favorablj'^ stationed. The
claims that the forts had been silenced, which would presuppose that
the guns had been dismounted, were also founded on delusion.

There is no doubt that the Americans had better guns than the
Spanish in their land batteries and could fire at distances which the
Spanish guns could not reach. When this was i^ecognized ashore and
the firing stopped, the ships thought they had silenced the batteries.
It has therefore been demonstrated that the ships were unable to
seriously injure the land fortifications at great distances. After all
the bombardments of Santiago thei*e was but one gun dismounted in
each of the batteries at the Morro and the Socapa. It has not been
demonstrated whether with equal armaments and skill in firing on the
part of the Spanish the ships would not have seriously suffered. Still
less has it been demonstrated what the relative situation of the bel-
ligei^ent parties would have been if shorter distances had been chosen.

The employment of torpedo boats for bombardments, as at Car-
denas, must be designated as entirely unsuitable. Torpedo boats are
expensive and delicate vessels, equipped for launching torpedoes and
for great speed. Their guns are intended to be used onl}" in extreme
cases. When the torpedo weapons can not be used their other princi-
pal quality, speed, in connection with the circumstance that they
draw little water, may be utilized for the transmission of orders and
information ; but bombardments, even in narrow and shallow waters,
had better be left to the most primitive gunboats, etc. ; they can do
better work and are less expensive, but can never take the x)Iace of a
disabled torpedo boat.

The so-called djiiamite cruiser, Vesuvius, was a failure. Her pro-
jectiles can be fired only at medium and short distances, and can not
be aimed. The terrible effects claimed for hits can not be considered
as counterbalancing this. It is true that an accidental hit may cause
great havoc, but in this age of accurate firearms we should no longer
reckon with such uncertain factors. The Americans have utilized
the vessel accordingly. They used to send her at night against the
coast defenses, counting on accidental hits, while the vessel, pro-
tected by the darkness, did not betray her i^resence by any flash at
the discharge nor by smoke or detonation. Nothing has been heard
of any particular result. No attempt was made to carry out the idea,
so much talked of at first, of destroying the mine obstructions by
svstematic bombardments of the harbor entrance. In order to do
this it would have been necessary for the vessel to approach the shore
in daytime, when she would have been exi)osed to the very dangerous
fire of the coast forts, and a sj stematic bombardment could hardly
be spoken of in view of the uncertainty of fire.

The Americans consider this vessel a failure, as also the ram Katahr
din, which, aside from four rapid-fire guns, has no other weapons but
her ram.

12

III. COAST DEFENSE.

Some obstructions by means of vessels and mines were laid out by
both belligerents, but have not come into play. The Spanish had
attempted to close the entrance of San Juan Harbor in Porto Rico
and that of the Pasig River at Manila by sunken vessels. In the lat-
ter case it was the opinion of German officers that it did not consti-
tute a military obstruction, although it interfered considerably with
the movements of shipping.

The two mines which wei-e blown up in front of the Olympia at the
beginning of the battle of (,^avite were not intended as a regular
obstruction of the channel, but represented only a small mine field
for vessels that might accidentally pass over them. They were fired
prematurely.

In the entrance of Guahtanamo Bay the Americans found quite a
number of mines. These might have caused considerable damage if
they had operated, for the Americans entered the bay without any
precautionary measures, and the screws of the MarhJehead tore two
of t<he mines loose from their anchorages so that they rose to the. sur-
face of the water. Then the whole bav was svstematicallv searched
for mines. This was done on June 21 by the boats of the MarhJehead
and Newark. Four steam launches, under the fire of Spanish infantry
hiding on the shore, fished up thirteen mines on the first day with
light chains they were towing. The ships, of course, fired on the
hostile position, which was soon abandoned. During the next few
davs thirt v-five more mines were found and tak(m ashore. These
proved to be charged with 120 iK)unds of gun cotton each. Many of
them showed evidences of having been in contact with ships' bottoms
or screws, but the firing mechanism was not capal)le of operating.
The fuses showed such grave defects that it was quite evident that the
work of constructing them had not been done under the supervision
of a superior.

The mines raised in Santiago Harbor after the surrender of the
place proved on the whole to be in better condition. Still, the outer
row containing contact min(\s was of doubtful value. One mine was
found, for instance, in which lialf of the gun cotton had l>een burned,
leaving no doubt that it had been in contact with some object — prob-
ably the Merriniac — and that the fuse had acted, but that the gun-
cotton charge had become spoiled.

The second row of mines (electric) was in pretty good condition and
miglit easily have destroyed one or more sliii)s if an attempt had been
made to force the entrance. These latter mines contained a charge
of 200 pounds of gun cotton each. All tlie mines in Guantanamo as
well as Santiago Bay were thickly overgrown Avitli barnacles and
seaweeds.

As a curiosity, it maybe mentioned that lightning struck an Amer-
ican mine in the lower Mississippi and exploded it, and that several

13

mines in the Potomac were exploded by lightning at a few seconds'
interval without causing any disturbance in the rest of the mine sys-
tem. They blew up exactly as it was intended that they should be
blown up in war.

IV. BLOCKADES AND CRUISER WARFARE.

Both of these were applied by the belligerents in the mildest pos-
sible form. Spain can hardly be considered in this connection. She
could do no blockading, and it is somewhat doubtful whether it was
quite voluntarily that she abstained from capturing hostile merchant-
men. The Americans were enabled to maintain quite an effective
blockade on the coasts, which they designated as blockaded, by means
of the large number of yachts and other steamers which they had
incorporated into their Navy as auxiliary vessels, while their large
shii)s were giving their attention to the hostile naval forces.

It can hardly be said that the Americans carried on systematically
any destructive warfare as against Spanish merchantmen. Those
they did capture almost ran into their hands, so to speak. This was
especially the case at the beginning of the war, mostlj' with vessels
which, owing to the usual Spanish cai^elessness, had received no warn-
ing of the fact that hostilities were about to break out. This was
even the case with the Spanisli gunboat Callao in the Philippines.
Still a few prizes maj' he mentioned which were captured while mak-
ing a direct attempt to run the blockade, also a few cases where ves-
sels were chased till they ran ashore, while a few fast Spanish vessels
succeeded in running the blockade. But neither the successful nor
the unsuccessful attempts at running the blockade were of much
importance.

A number of neutral vessels were also captured, but nearly all of
them were released again, for the American (Tovernment, in adju-
dicating their cases, showed a liberality which was (luite unheard of
in former naval wars and which probably had a x)olitical background.
About thirty vessels in all were considered good prizes.

As the United States as well as Spain have refrained from priva-
teering, although they were the very countries whi(^h reserved that
right at the time of the Paris declaration, it may be assumed that
privateering is definitely at an end.

During the blockade of Santiago the harbor entrance was at night
kept constantly under the light of the i)rojector of some ship desig-
nated for the dutv and boats were stationed at intervals between the
other vessels and the shore, so that any attempt of the Spanish ships
to go out might at once be perceived. It has been commented upon
that the ship so illuminating the harbor entrance was hardly ever
fired upon by the fortification works. It would seem as tliough tele-
graphically connected observation stations at the Morro and Socapa
could have ascertained the exact distfince of the troublesome watcher
and made her work, if not entirely impossible, yet extremely difficult
by firing upon her.

14

V. LANDINGS.

The landing of the Americans at Daiquiri is the largest landing
effected since that of the western powers at Balaklava in the Crimean
war. Yet the total forces landed did not exceed 15,000 men, embarked
in fifty-three steamers. It took a long time before the troops were
ready to start, for everything required for an army and a landing had
first to be procured. When the expedition finally did start it was
found that a great deal had been overlooked or was incomplete, or
had been lost in the chaos, or could not be secured. For instance, no
cavalry horses — except for one troop — could be taken along because
there had not been time to fit out the vessels for the reception of
horses. The voyage and the landing were effected in the most beauti-
ful weather; the Americans had good luck, as they always did. The
forces were landed unmolested.

The disembarkation was effected almost entirely at a small landing
bridge where but two boats could go alongside at a time. Attempts
to have boats run ashore on the small sandy beach, at one end of
which was the bridge, had to be abandoned after the loss of several
boats, which were wrecked in the surf on the projecting rocks and
stones. The report that the United States war ships had first fired on
the open strip of land back of the landing place and routed the
Spanish should not be taken literally. No such open strip of land
exists there. The rocks reach close to the sea, offering hundreds of
sheltered places from which the bridge might have been fired upon.
Authorities in military matters state that 300 men, though they might
not have been able to prevent the landing entirely, could have caused
great losses. But on this occasion, as on so many others, the Spanish
showed that they had no appreciation of military situations, and as
soon as the bombardment commenced they retreated. They need not
have paid much attention to the Cubans. The Spanish ought to have
known that now that the Americans had arrived the Cubans would
avoid danger even more than before.

With the landing of the army all operations on the part of the
Americans ceased for a while. In spite of the most exhaustive use
of all the boats and auxiliaries of the warships, including the armor-
clad s guarding the entrance to Santiago Harbor, it took several da.ys
before the field guns and luggage could be brought ashore, to say
nothing of the siege guns. It was found that there ought to have
been many more lighters, especially such as are equipped with lifting
apparatus. There was onlj'^ one of these — a second one had disap-
peared during the voyage. There were no devices for landing horses
and mules which were intended for drawing the guns. The animals
were hoisted overboard, and it was taken for granted that they would
swim ashore. But in a number of instances this did not happen.
Many of the frightened and bewildered animals swam out to sea and

15

were drowned. As all the boats were being used in the landing and
were crowding each other for hours at the landing place, there was
none available to go after the mules and lead them in the right direc-
tion. The few men in charge of landing the animals had all they
could do to get those that swam ashore out of the surf and in safety.
About 50 animals perished.

There was lack of management generally. No one in authority had
been appointed commander of the landing place. The commander
in chief, General Shafter, did not trouble himself about the landing.
Admiral Sampson had only made arrangements as far as the war ships
and their boats were concerned. The only landing bridge was but
partly covered with loose boards. No material nor tools were at hand
to build other bridges, and little attention was given to the one bridge
in existence, as is evidenced by the fact that three weeks later the
loose boards were still loose.

The conditions at Siboney, where part of the troops and supplies
were landed a little later, were quite similar, except that there was
no bridge at all. But in calm weather a few boats could be run
ashore side by side. No bridge was built here for the landing of the
voluminous luggage.

The relations between the military authorities and the officers of
the transport steamers had not been regulated. The latter had only
their own advantage and that of the ships' owners in view, and did
not pay the least attention to the wishes and plans of the officers of
the troops. The greater i)art of the time they kept at a distance of
from 3 to 20 miles from the shore, to make sure not to go too near or
to get into collision with other vessels, and if at times they did assist
in unloading their cargoes, they would return to the sea as fast as
possible as soon as fire was opened ashore, often taking with them
the most indispensable articles of the army equipment. An Ameri-
can reporter even calls them insolent, un-American, mutinous cow-
ards. The army authorities were unprepared and powerless before
such conduct on the part of the officers of the transports. Under these
circumstances it is not strange that the landing of the provisions,
guns, and ammunition, and the entire equipment, all of which were
so much needed in this locality, which offered no resources, was
effected with such slowness that the troops were reduced from the
outset to the meager rations which each man carried with him, and
w^here these had been thrown away, as had been done in many
instances in order to lighten the weight, the soldiers suffered hunger.

VI. COALING.

The late war will give a new impulse to the important question of
supplying coal. Ships and fleets carrying on war in a region where
they do not have available bases of supplies and coal depots in their
immediate vicinity, or whenever they are not certain that there may

16

not be occasion for their having to leave such region temporarily,
should have their own colliers along. The colliers should have the
same speed as the squadron. The ships should not be compelled to
relv on rendezvous or the uncertaintv of colliers sent after them. But
not only should care be taken to have a sufficient supply of coal, l>ut
also to provide appliances for taking coal on board under all circum-
stances in the shortest possible time. The lack of such aj)pliances has
contributed not a little to the disasters of the Spanish. The coaling
of Admiral Camara's ships at Port Said was nothing but a comedy.
Admiral Cervera intended to coal rapidly at Santiago and proceed.
But the ai>pliances for that purpose proved so defective that the
United States fleet had shut him up in the harlK)r before he could
finish coaling, which operation took several days. At present not
many ships are being built with that end in view, nor are they being:
equipxjed with appliances for coaling in the shortest possible time.
This will be absolutely necessary in future, so that the ships may l>e
enabled to take on coal or other fuel either from a wharf or from a
lighter or collier at sea.

VII. AUXILIARY WAR SHIPS.

What can be done with money and a practical mind in the matter
of securing naval war material the Americans have done since the
war cloud first appeared on the horizon. It is true that the purchase
of foreign w^ar ships before the beginning of the war proved almost a
failure. The United States bought the following Brazilian war ships:
The protected cruiser Ajffazona^^ of 3,4:50 tons, afterwards called the
New Orleans; the protected cruiser Abnirante AhreUy same size,
afterwards called the Albatujy and the cruiser Nictheroij^ of 7,080 tons,
afterwards called the Buffalo, which, aside from her good rapid-fire
armament, had a 38-centimeter dynamite gun; from other sources,
the cruiser Diogenes, of 1,800 tons, renamed the Topeka, and a tor-
pedo boat purchased in Germany, called the Soniers. The only ones
of these that were assigned to the active fleet were the Topeka and
the Xetr Orleans. The AUxtnt/ and the torpedo boat Somers, which
were still in England after the breaking out of the war, were not
allowed to leave there on account of England's neutrality. The
Buffalo did not leave the navy-yar<l during the war. The United
States had better luck with the merchant steamers they purchased
and converted into auxiliary cruis(*rs and gunboats.

They bought (JO yachts and other steamers as auxiliary gunboats
and scouts, 4 large fast ocean steanuM's as auxiliary cruisers, 11 tugs,
subsequently armed. The following were chartered : Four large ocean
steamers as auxiliarv cruisers. Placed in commission: Fourteen
revenue cutters as auxiliary gunboats and scouts. In all, 03 steam-
ers for warlike actions, more or less armed and fitted out for that
l)urpose.

There were also purchased as adjuncts of the fleet 20 transport

17

vessels, 9 colliers, 1 repair ship, 2 water-distilling ships, 2 ice-mami-
facturing ships, 3 hospital ships; in all, 37. This does not include
tlie temporarily chartered steamers for the larger troop transports.

The large auxiliary cruisers were also occasionally utilized for the
rapid transportation of troops. The auxiliary gunboats were indis-
pensable for the blockade of the extensive stretch of the coast. The
names of several of these, even of tugs, have been specially mentioned
in several of the battles. A few of the auxiliary vessels, as, for
instance, the SL Louis and the Zafiro, were equipped with special
devices for dragging for cables, which they have used with good
success.

As for the adjuncts of the fleet, the distilling ships were intended
especially to furnish fresh water to the blockading auxiliary vessels
and the transports of the landing army. As most of these vessels had
inadequate distilling apparatus, some of them none at all, this was
necessary, so that they might not be compelled to leave the blockade
for the purpose of renewing their water supply. The repair ship
Vulcan was also equipped with a powerful distilling apparatus.

The ice-manufacturing ships supplied the vessels not equipped with
ice machines, also the hospitals of the invading army of Cuba. The
object of the other adjuncts of the fleet is self-evident.

The repair ship Vidcan has proved extremely useful, even indis-
pensable for the blockading fleet at Santiago. She supplied 31 vessels
with extra engine parts, material, and tools. Twenty-six vessels were
repaired, and a number of repairs were also made on guns and their
equipments. The Vulcan also rendered important services in connec-
tion with the raising of the Maria Teresa and is now doing the greater
part of the work in temporarily repairing said ship for the purpose of
transferring her to one of the United States nav^'-yards.

How important it is to own transports specially fitted out for the
transportation of troops and war material has been demonstrated in
this war, though principally by the lack of vessels equipped for such
service. Of the transports purchased during the war, the Navy
Department intends to retain 16, which are to be refitted for service
as regular marine transports, namely, the Panama^ Port Victor^ Rita,
Mohawk, Mobile, Ma^ssachvseffs, Manitoba, Minnewaska, Mississippi,
Michigan, Roumania, Obdain, Berlin, Chester, and Britannia,
employed on the Atlantic Ocean, and one on the Pacific coast. Dur-
ing the war they were used not only for the transportation of troops,
but also for supplying provisions and material.

It would have been very desirable to have had even more of these.
The blockading fleet, for instance, complained of the very defective
mail service, as also of the fact that, although it was comparatively
but a short distance to the United States ports, so few fresh provi-
sions were received, which circumstance impaired the health of the
troops.

10846— No. 2 2

18

Vessels built for special purposes are in times of peace, at ma-
neuvers, stepchildren of the Navy; they are considered expensive
and troublesome adjuncts which have to be taken into consideration
in maneuvers and impede their rapid execution ; and yet how useful
they are and how much relief they are able to furnish in actual war!
Whenever mobilizations show that there is not a suflScient number of
suitable merchant steamers which would be unquestionably at the
disposal of the Navy at the beginning of a war, provision should be
made to have vessels set apart which can be easily equipped for such
purposes, and, if necessary, to own and keep in constant readiness a
number of such special vessels even in time of peace.

• "- ■ - OKFrCE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.
War Notbs No. III.
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD.

SKPJTCTTEft

FKOM THE

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

COMMANDER J .

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

WASHINGTON:

GOVERKMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1899.

I

t

INTRODUCTORY.

During the recent war the German protected cruiser Geier, Com-
mander Jacobsen, was stationed in the -West Indies, in the vicinity of
Cuba, and was permitted to pass in and out of the blockaded ports.
There has lately api)eared in the Marine-Rundschau, of Berlin, an
official publication, a series of '* Sketches from the Spanish- American

War, by Commander J " Their translation complete is

given in this number of the War Notes.

Richardson Clover,
Commander, U. S, N., Chief Intelligence Officer,

Navy Department, January 16, 1899,

Approved :

A. S. Crowninshteld,

Chief of Bureau of Na rigation.

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

By Commander J

[Translated from the MaTine-RandBCbau, October, November, and December, 1898.]

The following considerations constitute the opinions of the author
as acquired by him on the scene of war. He wishes to call special
attention to the fact that until authentic data ai*e available as to the
sti-ength of the two opponents in the diffei-ent battles, the tactical
situations and intentions, and the losses in personnel and material,
the reports can be but incomplete. Nevertheless it will be desirable,
even without awaiting ofi&cial statements, which may not be published
for yeai"s by the two belligerent parties, to sift the confused mass of
material which has come to us through the newspapers and to try
and describe the most important operations, at least approximately,
as they have taken place. To that end I have partly made use of
i^eports of Germans who were eye witnesses of the events. It is
hardly necessary to emphasize the fact that the author has observed
the strictest impartiality in his estimates of the situation. He has
the same high regard for Spanish and Americans.

I. THE CAUSE OF THE WAR.

1. Much has been said and written about the cause of the war;
but, even at the risk of offering nothing new, I believe I ought not
to avoid entering into this question, in order to make the sketch com-
plete.

As early as 181H) Mahan's sharp eye discerned what course the poli-
tics of his country ought to follow, and in vigorous language he
pointed out that coui-se to his nation, from a military standpoint, in
his essay entitled "The United States looking Outward," and in 181)3
in *'The Isthmus and Sea Power. " But not only strategic interests,
commercial interests also, play a powerful part in this historical
drama. Almost nine-tenths of all the sugar from Cuba is already
going to the American market. If America succeeds in getting
(^uba into her hands, either by autonomy or by annexation, it will
insure an immense advantage to the American market and drive all
other kinds of sugar (Germany is interested to the extent of many
milli(m marks) entirely out of America. Moreover, only a small part
of Cuba is as yet being cultivated, and there are good prosjjects for
harvesting from this beautiful country immense wealth in sugar and
tobacco. I'^pon calm consideration it is therefore not astonishing

6 SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

that the Government of the United States, pressed by the wishes of
the people and by speculators having only their own interests in
view, should finally have yielded and resolved to lay aside the
peaceable attributes of commerce and industry and take the sword
in hand. It should further be mentioned that the Maine affair
threw the last spark into the powder barrel, and that the conduct of
American officials at Havana toward the Spanish officials subse-
quently added further fuel to the flame.

The United States of America has done what other nations in
its place might perhaps have accomplished long ago. Accoi*ding
to the old adage that a war arises out of the needs of nations, the
Union has taken advantage of the opportunity to secure for herself
the first place in the West Indies.

2. Very different from the United States, the power of the Spanish
Empire, which at one time ruled the world, has beeij gradually" under-
mined. The flourishing colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines,
etc., have suffered severely during the last few years from fanatic
conflicts between the inhabitants and Government troops as a I'esult
of the injudicious policy followed in the government and treatment of
the former. Owing to the corruptibilit}' of the officials, fostered by
the merchants, the actual revenues from the colonies never reached
the hands of the Spanish Government. The principle of the Spanish
to compensate themselves first of all out of the rich profits of the
country has brought about the catastrophe. It w^as precipitated by
the fact that repeated changes in the highest positions were approved
by the Government at Madrid, which necessitated not only a change
in the majority of the lower officials, but entailed an entirelj' new
system of oppression and systematic robbing of the inhabitants.
When the Government at last realized the true state of affairs it
was already too late. Blanco, the last Captain-General and governor
of Cuba, as well as Martinez Campos, are well known as men of
unimpeachable character. But although General IManco had an
intimate knowledge of Cuban conditions and enjoyed great popularity,
he did not succeed in stopping the rolling ball. Steadily it was
approaching the abyss, and even the autonomy proclaimed by the
Government could not save it from the catastrophe. That catastroi)he
w^as the war with the United States. The Spanish, it is true, consider
it an entirely unwarranted interference with rights that have been
theirs for centuries and an act of violence on the part of a neighbor-
ing nation. But that is a characteristic of the Spanish nature and
will serve to explain subsequent situations during the war. Even up
to the very last day Spain thought it utterly impossible that war could
break out with the Ignited Stales. This is proved by the conditions
in Cuba immediately after the sending of th(» ultimatum by the
United States and the rejection of the same by the Spanish Govern-
ment.

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 7

If the Spanish had not been so blinded, and had had eyes for what
Tvas going on in theii' immediate vicinity and in the countiy of their
powerful neighbors during the last few years, they could not have
hesit«,ted to set aside their pride, and even to give up their right to
the colonies. The United States would have paid Spain a handsome
sum for the Atlantic colonies. The Spanish army, w^hich had been
fighting for years with great valor and under endless privations,
would have honorably returned home, the Spanish merchants would
have continued their business under safe protection, and the pur-
chase price would have helped the mother country in her financial
troubles. That would have been practical. But fate and the obsti-
nacy, or rather the pride, of the Spanish willed differently. The
ball keeps on rolling, and nothing will stop it until the Spanish power
is deprived of its colonies and, utterly broken, without any prospect
for the future, retires to its exhausted mother country. But that will
not prevent the people from proudly raising their heads and exclaim-
ing: "We have defended our honor and hav^e fought trusting in our
just cause. Ours is the glory ! "

3. Thus the struggle for existence is ever the same, even as between
modern nations. And each country which, by reason of its commerce
and industry, is entitled to a voice in the politics of the world, should
learn a serious lesson from this struggle between capital and anti-
quated heroism. Germany, above all, should never forget that
nothing but a naval force will keep her safe from adversaries — ^a
naval force strong enough to guarantee, or at least not to preclude,
success under all possible circumstances.

II. THE BELLIGERENT PARTIES.

4. I will not go into particulars as to the fonnation and strength
of the belligerent parties, as this work is not intended to discuss the
course of the whole war, but merely to select a few important and
interesting events. Besides, the reader will have an opportunity of
gaining information on these points by many other discussions on the
subject. There has lately appeared in the Marine-Rundsehau a
review on the events of the Spanish- American war, giving the
strength of both parties, together with a discussion by Rear- Admiral
Pltiddeman, which is especially well adapted for that purpose. I
shall take tlie liberty, however, of inserting a few remarks as to my
personal observations while on the scene of war.

5. As the United States of North America does not constitute a
military nation and has troubled itself very little about the organ-
ization of militia and volunteers, it would not be proper to make
the same requirements of American soldiers that we are in the
habit of making of our soldiers in Europe. Preparatory training-
need not l)e looked for, except in the cas(» of regular troojjs, and even

8 SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

there such training in time of peace is very defective. The com-
panies of militia and voliinteera are drilled for a short time; officers
and men become acquainted with each other, and as soon as an officer
is able to lead his company or division and the men have learned to
handle their guns, which is at most four weeks, the troops are
considered ready for war.

This system naturally pi'ecludes the exercising together of large
bodies consisting of several regiments. First of all, trained officers
are lacking for that purpose, and besides, it is not deemed necessary.
These troops do not fight, like European armies, in close ranks, but
rather on the order of guerrilla warfare. It will l)e readily under-
stood that under such circumstances there can be no question of
great discipline under fii*e or in camp on the part of the men, nor of
high tactical conceptions and cori'esponding leadership on the part of
the officere. It is very praiseworthy, therefore, that witli such primi-
tive means such great results were attained as evidenced, for instance,
by the capitulation of Santiago. As for the individual qualities of
the American soldier, he is brave, too impetuous perhaps, and as
long as there is fighting to be done and the hardships ai*e not too
great he is easily guided. A few volunteer regiments fought with
considerable valor. But not in that respect alone have they shown
military efficiency, but also in the manner in which they have
endured fatigues in the extremely unfavorable climate. I am prob-
ably not mistaken in the assumption that the good results attained by
some of the volunteer ivgiments are partly due to the circumstance
that outdoor sport is carried on with gi'eat zeal in the United States.
Polo, foot])all, athletic exercises in running, walking, and jumping,
tennis, bicycling, rowing, etc., are excellent preparations for military
service, l)ecause they harden the Ixxly and strengthen self-confidence.
And if the volunteers further know how to handle their guns and ai'e
good marksmen, which is also included among the sports, they have
very nearly all the qualities which the Americans i"e<iuire of their
soldiers.

0. The ITnited States Navy has Ixi^en diligently at work ever since
the war of the rebellion, 18()1 to 1865, and has put to profit the lessons
derived therefrom. That the American naval officei-s are intelligent
and energetic as well as brave and self-possessed leaders, and the
American sailors cool-headed and good marksmen, was demonstrated
by manj' examples during the above-mentioned war. Th(^ naval bat-
tle between the Kearsanje and Alahania, such deeds as Farragut's at
Mobile, will never Ik^ forgotten and go to prove that the fii*st founda-
tion for a warlike and efficient navy — an able personnel inured to the
sea — was in existence. Nor does the Union need fear a comparison
with other nations h>s far as materiel is concerned. Sinc<^ the year
18SS it has teen the endeavor of the Xavy Department to take the
construction of ships, armor plate, and onlnance into its own liands,

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 9

SO as to I'ender itself entirely independent of other countries in that
respect. The increase of the fleet has kept pace with such efforts.
The battle ships Iowa, Imlmna, Oregon, and Texas possess all the
i-eqiiirements of modern ships. Their heavy artillery is unusally
strong, and the medium and light artillery consists of rapid-fire guns
ill larger numbera. The new armored cruisers New Forfc and Brook-
lyn are fast and powerful ships, entirely on a level with the same class
of cruisei-s in England and France. It can not be denied that a certain
>veHkness regarding the personnel lies in the fact that so many different
nationalities are repi'esented on board ; but I believe this circumstance
is not of very great weight. Europeans are too much inclined to see
eveiything only with their own eyes and judge matters according to
their own usages. On boaixi of a ship, where very strict laws prevail,
especially in time of war, it can not be difficult, even among mixed
nationalities, to maintain the necessary discipline as long as the
officers have a correct understanding of how to handle the crews,
and that faculty the American naval officers do possess, as has already
been stated. Moreover, the reports of the Naval War College at
Newport show that it is the endeavor of the Navy Department to
have the officers gain also the necessary knowledge of tactical and
strategic questions. During the last few years fleet maneuvers have
taken place, the training of the crews has been carried on in a sys-
t-ematic manner, and, finally, target practice has been given the
importance which is al>solutely necessary for the attainment of the
final end, namely, the annihilation of the enemy in war.' I do not
want to be misunderatood and do not mean to give the impression
that the American Navy is above all censure and should be taken as
a model in every respect. Not at all. Many weaknesses have come
to light everywhere. I will only call to mind the taking off of the
armor plat/cs of the Iowa, several faulty gun constructions, which
are withheld for publication. And the boilei^s were probably not free
from objections either. But in what navy are such defects not found?
It is therefore deserving of sincere praise that the Navy, immediately
aft^r the breaking out of hostilities, was ready for service with all
the ships in commission and has continued such service successfully
for several months. Furthermore, the vessels of the merchant marine
which were required for the blockade were fitted out and armed with
rapid-fire guns in a very short space of time. This latter circum-
stance especially might well serve as an example to several other
navies.

7. As compared with the ITnited States, Spain has a large regular
army. But when we rememl)er that so many colonies have to be
defended and that the struggles with the insurgents, which have been
going on for years, and the hardships connected therewith, have
claimed many victims, the importance of this army shrinks consider-
ably. It should further be remembered that the troops in Cuba and

10 SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

Puerto Rico ai-e distributed along the coasts for protection and that
communications between them and concentration of these troops by
railway are possible only in few" places. Hence it can hardly be said
that the Spanish troops are superior to the American fighting forces
as far as strength is concerned. As to their militarj^ qualities, the
Spanish soldiere are highly thought of everywhere. They are veiy
brave, of great power of endurance, always sober, and exti-emely frugal.
The oflScei's present a good militar}' appearance, but their education
is said to be superficial. Their patriotism and readiness to sacrifice
themselves can not be questioned. Moi-eover, officei'S and men have
become inured to warfare through their fights with the insurgents and
are acquainted with the difficult topography of the country. Outside
of the regular anny volunteer regiments have been organized every-
where. To see those people of all conditions and ages devote them-
selves indefatigably to the duties of their new calling, after their
regular day's work is done, can not fail to arouse a feeling of admira-
tion. But, on the other hand, it is questionable whether the volun-
teers, when it comes to actual fighting, will pn)ve efficient. In the
first place, their equipments are very defective, and, besides, their
training is not sufficient to fit them for war. It ma}" be stated as a
general thing — and this applies to the regular troops as well — that the
training is not adapted to war purposes. I witnessed, for instance, a
drill of coast artillery where the movements of loading and firing were
practiced. Projectiles, cartridges, etc., were lacking at the drill. The
guns were not aimed, there was no sighting. That was one day before
an actual bombardment occurred at that i)lace. It is verj' evident
that such gun crews can not dq ver}' efficient work. In only a few of
the coast towns did target practice take place, and then only to a
very limited extent. The reason was, as I was told, that ammunition
was scarce, as the service ammunition had to be reserv^ed for the
enemy. That may be true, but this should have been thought of in
time of peace, and this most important preparation for war should not
have been deferred to the last minute or omitted altogether.

8. The Spanish navy has never recovered siiice the beginning of
the century, when it was completely annihilated. To illustrate, I will
quote IS^elson's words after a visit to Cadiz in 1703: "The Dons may
know how to build beautiful ships, but tliey do not know how to pro-
cure men. At Cadiz they have in commission four battle ships of the
first rank, very beautiful ships, but miserably manned. I am quite
certain if the crews of our six boats, who are picked men, had boarded
one of these ships, they could liave taken it." Mahan, in his work
on The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1783 to 1812, Chapter
II, has cited a number of other proofs to show the lack of seamanship
on the part of the Spanish. The above-mentioned Avords of Nelson's
are still true. A few handsome ships like the A hni ran fe Oquendo,
Vizcaya, and I}tfnnia Maria Teresa have been incorporated into the

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 11

Spanish navy, but next to nothing has been done for the* trainin^i: of
the pei'sonnel. Maneuvers of several fleets together were unknown,
and the individual training of of&cers and men was limited to what is
absolutely necessary. Especially as relates to target practice much
has been left undone. The same thing applies to the torpedo-boat
destroyers which the Spanish have secured during the last few years.
The vessels were very beautiful, but no thought was taken of tlie
manner in which they should be handled by their commanders, nor
the training in tactics and torpedo launching. As to the condition
of the ships generally, I will state, among other things, that the
boilei's of three cruisei-s of the same class, the Reina Mercedes,
Alfonso Xlly and Reina Crisfinaj were in such bad condition as to
completely disable the vessels, so that they could be utilized only for
harbor defense. There are several other points which also show care-
lessness in the training of the personnel as well as equipment of the
ships, and to which I will again refer in the course of this work.

ni. BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN DE PUERTO RICO.

9. It was on M^y 9, 1898, that I had an opportunity for the first
time of visiting the scene of war; that was at San Juan de Puei'to
Rico. The first thing that caught my eye was a proclamation bj^
the Governor-General Macias. As this proclamation shows the
enthusiasm and patriotism of which the Spaniard is capable to such
a high degi-ee, I give below a translation of the same :

San Juan, Ajml SS, 1898.
Inhabitants of Puerto Rico:

The day of trial, the hour of great decisions and great deeds of heroism has
arrived. The RepabUc of the United States, trusting in her powerful resources and
relying on the impunity with which she has so far been able to foster the insurrec-
tion of the Cubans, has resolved in her Congress upon armed intervention in the
island of Cuba. The Republic has opened hostilities and has trampled under foot
the rights of Spain and the moral sentiment of the whole civilized world. This is a
declaration of war, and in the same manner that the hostile squadrons have com-
menced their actions against the island of Cuba they will also direct them against
Puerto Kico; but here they will surely beshatti-red against the loyalty and valor of
the inhabitants, who would a thousand times rather die than surrender to the
asiirpers.

Do not think that the mother country has abandoned us. With enthusiasm she is
following our movements and will come to our rescue. The squadrons are ready for
the fight. All the troops have been armed, and the same waters over which Colum-
bus sailed with his famous ships will witness our victories. Providence will not
permit that in these countries which were discovered by the Spanish nation the
echo of our language should ever cease to be heard, nor that our flag should disap •
pear from before the eye.

Inhabitants of Puerto Rico, the time for heroic deeds has come. Fight and stand
firm in the consciousness of your right and of justice. On to the war!

Long live Puerto Rico, always Spanish! Long live Spain !

Macias.

It seems to me that more beautiful and more eloquent words could
haixlly be found to speak to the hearts of the people. And unless

12 SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMEKICAN WAK.

the actions and deeds of the leadei*s fall far sliort of their woixls, the
American invasion may l)e pi-epared to meet with strong resistance.

10. The city of San Juan is located on an island, and presents from
the sea a very pretty pictui^e with her ancient castle of Morro on one
side and San Cristobal Castle on the other. The forts are powei-f iil
masonrj'^ structuivs. Between them rise many stately buildings,
mostly barracks, hospitals, etc. The Spanish flag is waving from all
the buildings, and lends a picturesque charm to the whole scene in the
wonderfully bright light, with chains of mountains as a background.

Besides the old forts there are a number of new fortifications, east
of Cristobal Castle as well as in the entrance of the harbor itself. The
latter, which is difficult to pass even in time of peace, is closed by
mines. After passing through the harbor entrance one enters a large
basin close Ix^hind the city, adapted to receive a large number of
ships. There is also a second bay with sufficiently deep water. With
the necessary funds the harbor might l)e greatly improved by divdg-
ing, esi^cially by the removal of at least a part of the shoals at Punta
Larga. There are (^uite a number of piera offering good facilities for
loading and unloading ships.

11. In consequence of the breaking out of the war with the United
States commerce was, of course, at a standstill. Yet as the harl>or
had not been declared blockaded there were a few German and Eng-
lish steamers that were unloading their cargoes. A Spanish steamer
also had been brouglit in from St. Thomas by the auxiliary cruiser
Alfonso XIII. The onlj^ vessel that l)ehaved in a suspicious manner,
having apparently passed around the whole island several times and
repeatedly appeared in front of San Juan, was a large ocean steamer
with three smokepipes. The general opinion was that it was a United
States auxiliary cruiser. The Spanish gunboats tried several times to
go close up to this vessel but did not succeed, owing to her superior
speed. Nothing els(* in the city reminded one of war. Eveiy one
was pui*suing his accustomed occupations as far as this was possible
luider the circumstances. Almost every evening after the close of
business at 5 o'clock the volunteer companies marched through the
streets to the place where they were drilled. Theiv was not much
done in that line, however, at least nothing of great importance, such
as target practice, instruction in topography, or field scM'vice. Usuall^^
the troops were required to take their positions in the line of defense,
and soon after they would march off again. On the whole, the vol-
unteei-s made a good api)earance and seemed to devote themselves
with great zeal to their tasks. The large numb(»r of young men among
the volunteei's was striking. On one occasion the (4overnor-General
nuide a general inspection of the whole fortification, and at that time
exercises took place with several batteries. But the exercises were
carried out in a careless manner and without system. Target prac-
tice with guns, which would have been necessary above all in order
to place the fortification in condition for war and to drill the iK^i'son-

Ul

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANI8H-AMERICAX WAK. 13

nel, was held neither in peace nor after the breaking out of tlie war.
In the evening the whole population would usually I'epair to the
plaza; several times during the week there was music there. The
theater also remained open and enjoyed pretty good audiences.

12. This peaceful situation was suddenlj^ changed when, on Maj" 12,
1898, a part of the fle^t commanded by Admiral Sampson appeared at
5 o'clock in the morning in front of San Juan, and without any further
notification opened the bombardment. The Spanish complained bit-
terly of this surprise, which did not give them a chance to remove the
sick and the women and children to places of safety, and did not give
foreign representatives and warships time to leave the city or the
harbor. ''There ai*e no international agreements, it is true, as to
previous notice of a bombardment," says the Puerto Rico Gazette, "but
in pra<?tice the^ custom prevails among all civilized nations to give
notice of the bombardment of a city or fortification. For no Christian
soldier, no civilized nation, will want to take the terrible responsibility
of butchering defenseless women and children. The soldier fights
against those who carry weapons, but not against the weak and the
sick." Tlie Spanish are not entirely wrong in this. A real surprise
could have been of advantage to Admiral Sampson only in case it had
been his intention to force the harbor. If it was simply a question of
reconnoissance, he might have granted a delay of two or three hours
without in any manner prejudicing the result of the bombardment.
As it was, the inhabitants were rudely awakened from their sleep.
The troops and volunteers at once hurried to their posts; but old men,
women, and children sought their safety in the fields and roads outside
of the city. A veritable emigi'ation of fleeing people was moving
along the road to Cangrejos, but all were quiet and oi*derly. Mean-
while the American projectiles were steadily falling upon the city and
its vicinity; some passed over the city and fell into the bay.

13. The American squadron was composed of nine larger ships and
two torpedo-boat destroyers. Fire was opened immediately after 5
o'clock and continued until about 8.30. P^our of the American ships
were about two cable lengths (370 meters) north of the island of
Cabras (see accompanying chart), and at equal distances from each
other they were describing (»i7'cles. In order to safely avoid the shal-
low places near the island, which they .passed at a short distance, a
boat had been anchored in the center of the circle. They came to
within 1,500 meters of the Morro, and as each ship passed the cas-
tle she fii'ed a broadside. Five of the American ships were fighting
farther north with Cristobal Castle and the eastern batteries of Morro
Castle. These ships often changed their positions. Two more ships
could l3e discerned northeast of Santiago. Several of the American
ships succeeded in passing so close to the fortifications that the near-
est batteries could not fire upon them. The distance was probably
800 or 900 metei-s. The Spanish infantry took advantage of the
opportunity to join in the l)attle with musket fire. This musket fire.

14 SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

in connection with the fire of a battery at a greater distance, caused
the American ships to withdraw. It is said that the Americans fired
in all from 800 to 1,000 shots from their hea\nr and medium caliber
guns.

14. The Spanish fortification artillery is said to have behaved well;
but the batteries wei-e unable to answer the lively fire of the American
ships in the same manner. This was due to the fact, aside from the
defective service of the guns, that many of them could not i*each the
American ships at all. On the Spanish side about 400 projectiles
were fired in all. It is stated that the Spanish shots hit in several
instances; but they can have done no great damage on board of the
American ships, which has been confirmed by United States official
statements. The guns in the fortifications are all of medium caliber,
and their piercing power is not such that a single hit could be
expected to cause serious injury to a modern ship. The losses on
the American side were one dead and seven wounded. The number
of American projectiles fired is out of proportion to the material
damage caused by them. A large number of shells are said not to
have exploded. Of courae the fortification works were injured to some
extent, but not one of the guns was put out of action. A few of the
buildings visible at a great distance, like the barracks, the jail, the
Hotel Inglaterra, and a few private residences, suffered from the
bombardment. A large number of projectiles fell into the harbor.
Some of them ev^en reached the little town of CataSo, on the other side
of the harbor. The French cruiser Amiral Rigmdt de Genouilly^
which was lying in tlie harbor at the time, as also three small Spanish
gunboats, received a shot in the rigging and smokepipe. The
Spanish casualties wei-e 20 dead (among them several civilians) and
20 wounded.

15. If we inquire into the advantages which Admiral Sampson
expected from a bombardment of San Juan, w^e are probably not mis-
taken in the assumption that it was merely a question of reconnois-
sance. The batteries were to be brought out; Admiral Sampson
wanted to ascertain their strength and efficiency and be guided
thereby in determining the forces it would require for a serious bom-
bardment of San Juan and the taking of the city by sea. It does
not api)ear to have been the object of the American ships to system-
atically bombard the city and silence the batteries. Probably the
forts served as a general target, and the number of shots that w^ent
beyond speak in favor of the assumption that it was also intended to
reach the Spanish war ships which were supposed to be in the harbor.
There will be other opportunities to treat of bombardments by Amer-
ican ships. I will therefore i-ef rain from further i^emarks at this time,
and only state it as my opinion that a I'econnoissance of the place —
and there can be no question of anything else, since the American
fleet withdrew— could have been made with a much smaller expendi-
ture of ammunition.

Il

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 15

IV. EVENTS AT AND NEAR SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

I wUl not attempt to give a connected account of all the happen-
ings at and near Santiago and to set forth the reasons which inev-
itably led to the surrender of that place, but will confine myself to
the relation of some circumstances which ai'e not generally known,
and which have come under inv own observation.

1. There is a gi'eat deal of uncertainty as to the reasons why the
garrisons of Guantanamo, Baracoa, etc., were included in the capitu-
lation of Santiago. The following note of the Spanish chief of the
general staff will serve to explain this matter. lie says, among
other things:

The garrison of Guantanamo, consisting of 7,000 men, had been on lialf rations
since June 15 and since Jnly 1 they had received no rations at all, and had been
living on <;reon corn and horse meat. The garrisons of Baracoa, Sagua de Tanamo,
as well as of the smaller places of Palma Soriano, San Luis, Dos Caminos, Mordn,
Cristo, and Sougo would have been cut otf and unable to retreat, and would there-
fore have been left to the mercy of the enemy, for the nearest place on which they
could have fallen back was at least a seven days* march distant. That is the reason
why these garrisons were included in the capitulation, and that of Guantanamo was
included on account of the absolute lack of provisions. Hence about 10,000 men
capitulated without having been at the front at all, simply owing to the peculiar
circumstances.

2. In oMer to give a clear idea of the land fortifications of San-
tiago, which were considerably exaggerated in the first reports of the
battles near the <*ity, I annex a sketch of the same.

Thei^ was a line of ordinary trenches about 9 kilometers long
from Dos Caminos del Cobre to Punta Blanca. I also noticed two
batteries, but they were in such unfavorable positions that they could
not take part in the battles of July 1 and 3. There were also wire
fences and other obstructions in some places, as well as blockhouses,
etc. The following data will show how few were the guns and of
how inferior quality the material which the Spanish had at their dis-
posal for the defense of the city. There were available —

Six 16-centimeter muzzle-loading guns, two of which became dis-
abled after the first few shots, two more on July 12. It was known
l^forehand that these guns would not be able to fire more than a few
rounds, owing to their defective mounts.

Five 12-centimeter muzzle-loading guns mounted on old carriages.
On July 12 four of these were disabled, and the fifth was good for
only two or thi'ee more rounds, although the charge had been reduced
by one-half.

Twelve 8-centimeter muzzle-loaders, six of which were unservice-
able.

Two 9-centimeter Krupp guns, one of which was dismounted and
consequently disabled on July 2.

Two 7.5-centimeter Krupp guns.

16 SKETCHES Ffa)M THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

Besides these, the fleet had furnished two 9-eentimeter Ilontoria
steel guns with a few rounds, whieh were not fired, and two 7.5-centi-
meter Maxim guns, which could not he mounted, l^ecause the breech
mechanism had remained on board of the ships.

Therefoi'e, aside from the muzzle-loadei*s, which were of very doubt-
ful value, the Spanish had only two 7.5-centimeter and two 9-centi-
meter Krupp guns. Whether the former weiv given a chance to ]>e
fired at all is doubtful; probably the two 9-centimeter guns were the
only ones that took pait in tlie battles of July 1 and 3. It is evident
that with such defective artillery for the defense on land there was
no chance in a fight with the American siege artillery, which by July
10, accoi*ding to statements of American officera, consisted of »U guns
that had Ixien installed.

3. As to the strength of the Spanish troops in tlie line of attack, we
liave the following data:

On Jul}^ 1 there were in the trenches 500 sailoi^s from the fleet; 450
men of four companies of the Provincial Battalion of Puerto Rico, No.
1; 850 of the Talavera Battalion, No. 4; 440 of the San Fernando
Battalion, No. 11; 350 of three mobilized companies; 350 volunteei's.
In all — Sailoi-s, 500; ivgulars, 1,740; irregulars, 350; volunteera, 350;
total, 2,940.

These were the fighting forces. Besides, there were in the city some
cavalry of the C-ivil Guard and some soldiers who had been assigned
to other duties. Of these troops, two companies, one of the Provin-
cial Battalion of Puerto Rico and one of the Talavera Battalion, in all
not over 250 men, were defending the fortified position of San Juan.
At the Socapa there were 400 men, 450 at the Morro, and 120 at Piinta
Gonla battery. Finally, for the defense of the line from Las Cruces
to Aguadores, about 4 kilometere, there were six companies of the
Cuba regiment of infantry and two coini)anies of irregulars, in all
about 550^ men.

4. The battles of July 1 and 3 at El Caney and San Juan aiv the
only ones of imi)ortance in the campaign against Santiago. The
above figures show that those two positions had very inadequate
forces for their defense. It is incomprehensible why the Spanish
commander in chief, after the American troops had arrived and their
plan of attack was known, did not at least have the troops from
Morro Castle and the Socapa, where th(\v were of no use whatever,
cooperate in tlie defense of the threatened i)ositions in the main line.
To hold El Can(\v and San Juan as against the vastly superior Ameri-
can forces was an impossibility, although the positions were i)articu-
larlv well chosen and the ground verv difficult for the assailants.
AVith the same daring with which the American troops made the last
assault on these posit icms, the Spanish defended them firmly and with
coolness, firing one volley after another. On the spot they were to

SKETCHES PROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 17

defend, officers and men fell in great numbers, with that courage
which has ever distinguished the Spanish soldiers. When the Ameri-
cans finally succeeded in the assault, they found the trenches of San
Juan filled with dead, and they buried the brave Spanish soldiers
where they had fallen by simply filling up the trenches with earth.
The total losses of the Spaninh during the defense of El Caney and
the attack on the city were :

Killed — Brig. Gen. Vara del Rey, 3 staif officers, 12 officei's, and 08
men. Missing — Col. Jose Baquero, 4 officer, and 116 men. Prison-
ers— 2 officers. Wounded — Lieutenant-General Linares, 6 staff offi-
cers, 30 officers, and 339 men.

On July 4 Colonel Escario succeeded in reaching Santiago with
3,000 men. But these troops were exhausted from the march, and
the city had no provisions for them. It was therefore no wonder that
the power of resistance of the garrison was not strengthened by their
arrival, and that the Spanish, in view of the bombardment which they
could not answer, had no recourse left but to capitulate honorably.

5. An unlucky star was hovering over Santiago. No one had
expected an attack on this city, and the events there are another
proof that in war it is the unexpected and surprising operations, if
well planned and somewhat favored by luck, that usually promise
success. The Spanish troops were surely not wanting, in bravery and
good behavior. The cause of the defeat must therefore be sought
elsewhere, and in my opinion it can be explained as follows :

(a) No thought had been taken of supplying the large cities with
provisions. If not sooner, at least immediately after the breaking
out of the war, the commander in chief ought to have assisted these
places in the most energetic manner in laying in supplies, and where
no blockade had been declared it could have been done.

(6) It was the plan of the Spanish commander to defend the whole
coast, even the smaller harbors. This necessitated a scattering of the
troops. If it was not deemed expedient to concentrate all the troops
at Havana, the one truly fortified place, which maneuver would
have completely changed the character of the war in Cuba, a concen-
tration of the troops should have been effected at least within the
east-ern province as well as the western province. Why was it that
Guantanamo was garrisoned by about 7,000 men, Santiago de Cuba
by 5,000, and Manzanillo by 5,000, and that at a time when Cervera's
fleet had already entei'ed Santiago Harbor? On May 28 at the latest,
when the fleet had been closed in and there could no longer be any
doubt as to the American plans, the troops should have been concen-
trated at Santiago, bringing with them all available provisions. The
Americans might have taken Guantanamo and Manzanillo. That
would have been of little importance from a technical point of view.
The American troops would have met with energetic resistance upon

12483 2

18 SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

landing and in their attack upon Santiago, and it is questionable
whether they would have been able to break such resistance with.
17,000 men.

(c) The Spanish troops had no field artillery, and their siege artillery
was utterly unserviceable. It is due to this lack of artillery that the
Americans were enabled to line up their forces without opposition
from the Spanish ; that tliey showed themselves superior to the Spanish,
not in number onl}- , in the fights against the fortified positions at EI
Caney and San Juan; and finally, that they were able to place their
siege artillery in position without being harassed b}^ the Spanish.

G. It now remains to speak of the manner in which the naAy and.
army of both belligerent parties cooperated in joint operations, and.
finally, to examine minutely into the bombardments of the batteries
of Morro Castle, the Socapa, and Punta Gorda. The destruction of
Cervera's fleet will be treated in a separate chapter. Of course, in
exi^editions of this nature it is always the navj'^ that furnishes the
basis. If the control of the sea has been gained, but can not be pre-
served, the transport and landing of troops are dangerous enterprises,
which a wise commander will always avoid. Success is also dejxindent
on a strong and well-equipped transport and war fleet. This should
be borne in mind by all nations that are engaged in colonial politics
and are in possession of colonies, in order to secure new markets for
the surplus production of men and merchandise. Of course the anny,
as the organ which is to execute the work, should be equal to the
requirements made of it in a foreign country. But there is still another
factor which plays an important part in such expeditions, and which
should not be underestimated, and that is the cooperation of the navy
and army. This factor has been lacking, not only on the American
but also on the Spanish side. On the American side there was at
least some agreement on important tactical questions and the navy
placed itself willingly at the service of the army. But on the Spanish
side the conditions weix3 so peculiar that a cooi)eration of navy and
army can hardly be spoken of, except in so far as marine troops took
part in the battles at Santiago. Was Admiral Cervera under orders of
General Linares or General Toral, or under Captain-General Blanco,
or directly under the ministr}^ of marine at Madrid? The first does
not appear to have been the case, but it seems that Admiral Cervera
received orders both from General Blanco and from the ministry of
marine. Another example: The general de marina at San Juan de
Puerto Rico was in command of the flotilla at that place; he was not
under orders of Governor-General Macias, however, but under those
of Admiral Mantarola, at Havana. I believe this question, which
has hitherto been given little attention, had an essential share in seal-
ing Admiral Cervera's fate. The cooperation of the navy and army
is of the greatest importance, and at the great maneuvers in time of
peace it should receive the same attention that other problems do.

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

19

7. The American fleet has in every respect performed its tasks in
front of Santiago. The transport fleet was convoyed to the places
chosen by war ships, and the landings were effected under the same
protection. A systematic blockade had been established, and in this
connection the main object, namely, the destruction of Cervera's fleet,
was never lost sight of. Thanks to the intelligent dispositions of the
commander in chief of the fleet and the skill of the American officers
and crews, this object was attained with complete success. Inci-
dentally the batteries of the Morro, Socapa, and Punta Gorda were
lx>mbarded by the American fleet, and these bombardments offer so
much that is of interest and so many points of discussion for naval
officers that I shall have to speak of them somewhat more at length.
How much has been said of these bombardments! How many times
have the batteries of the Morro and Socapa been placed out of action,
the guns dismounted, the fortifications leveled to the ground ! Bat-
teries which did not even exist, as, for instance, Morro C-astle proper
and Estrella Battery, were said to have returned the galling fire, the
latter completely destroyed, the former nothing but a heap of ruins !
Such were the newspaper reports, of the inaccuracy of which I had an
opportunity of convincing myself personally on the scene of events.
Unfortunately, I am not in a position to state which of the American
ships did the firing, nor how many projectiles were discharged in the
different bombardments, nor the kind of projectiles and the results
as to hits. But on the other hand I can give from personal observa-
tion accurate statements as to the condition of the Spanish batteries
after the surrender of Santiago, and as my own observations have
been supplemented by reliable information from others who were also
on the scene, I am enabled to furnish sufficient material to permit an
estimate of the actual conditions.

8. On the different days when the bombardments took place the
following guns were available in the different batteries of the Morro,
Socapa, and Punta Gorda:

Bombardment.

Date.

No.l May 18

No. 2.

May 31

2^0.3 Juue 3

No.4 June 6

No.5 1 Jane 14

No. 6 June 16

Morro.

One 16 cm. muzzle-
loader mounted on
a woo<len carriage;
could tire only 3
8hot8.

Same and four 16 cm.
muzzl e-loadors
mounted on car-
riages.

do

do

Socapa.

Two 8 cm. muzzle-
loaders.

One 16 cm. Hontoria
naval ^tm not yet
ready lor service.

Punta Gorda.

Two 15 cm. Hontoria
howitzers, muzzle-
loaders.

Do.

do
do

One 16 cm. Hontoria. . . Do.

Same and one 16 cm. Same and one 16 cm.
Hontoria naval gun. Hontoria naval gnn.

do
.do

No. 7.

June 18 do

No.8 , July 2

Same and two 21 cm.
muzzle-loading how-
itzers.

Same and two 21 cm.
ni uzzle>loading how-
itzers.

Same and one 21 cm.
muzzle-loading how-
itzer.

Do.

Same and one 16 cm.
Hontoria naval gun.
Do.

Do.

20

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

Hence, on July 2 there were in all —

In the Morro battery: Five rifled 16-eentimeter muzzle-loading
bronze guns, only one of which was dismounted, and two 21-c«nti-
meter muzzle-loading howitzers which were fired on that day only.

At the Socapa battery: Two 16-centimeter Hontoria naval guns
from the Reina Mercedes, Onlv one of these was dismounted. Fur-
ther. three 21-centimeter muzzle-loading howitzers. East of this bat-
tery, on the extreme edge of the shore, there were for the defense of
the first row of mines, one 5.7-centimeter Nordenfeldt rapid-firing gun,
four 3.7-centimeter Hotchkiss revolving guns, and one 1.1 -centimeter
Nordenfeldt machine gun, all taken from the Reina Mercedes.

At Punta Gorda: Two 9-centimeter bronze Krupp guns, two 15-
centimeter howitzei's, and two 16-centimeter Hontoria naval guns
from the Reina Mercedes,

9. About three weeks after the sun*ender of Santiago, I visited
these batteries and made the following observations :

MORRO.

(a) Morro Castle proper, an old fort, consisting of heav}'^ masonrj'-
standing close to the water's edge east of the harbor entrance, was
not armed at all. It was used as barracks for the Spanish garrison.
The outside walls had suffered considerabl}- from the bombardments,
the upper story had been completely destroyed, and in different
places pieces had l^een shot away. The inner walls showed large and
small shot-holes made by shells of diffei*ent calibers, the largest of 30
centimeter.

(6) From the houses between the castle and the light-house, about
200 meters distant, nothing had been removed. Some of them had
been completely destroyed, others more or less damaged. The houses
situated a little farther back and lower down had suffered no inju-
ries. The light-house, built of iron plates about 2.5 centimet-ers
thick, had been pierced at the front by several small-caliber shells,
the largest being of 15 centime tera. The rear wall had been blown
out entirely.

(c) About 100 meters east of the light-house is the new battery, sit-
uated about 63 metere above the level of the sea. The following is a
ground plan of this battery :

The guns are standing on concrete foundations built into the ground
and fire over a wall erected for protection in front of them, consisting

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 21

of wooden boxes filled with cement. This protection is further
strengthened by sandbags placed in front of it. Between each two
^uns wooden ban-els fiUed with cement have been placed on top of
the wall. The spaces between them are pai^tly filled with cement or
sand. The cross section between two foundations is about as follows:

a, Cement boxes; h, barrels filled with cement; c, sandbags.

The distance between each two guns is about 6 meters.

(d) Parallel with the front of the battery, at a distance of about
10 meters, a trench 1.5 meters deep and 60 centimeters wide has been
dug. A smaller trench leads in zigzag line f ix)m each gun to this
trench. For the two 21-centimeter howitzei's, which were located
farthest east and separated by a larger space from the 16-centimeter
muzzle-loaders, there was a hole about 1.5 meters deep and 4 meters
square, intended as a shelter. These shelters are said to have been
f i-equently used by the Spanish.

(e) The five 16-centimeter muzzle-loaders are bronze guns dating
from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. One of these bore
the dates 1668, 1718, 1769. About the middle of the present century
these guns were adapted for centering by means of studs. The two
21-centimeter howitzers farthest east were rifled iron muzzle-loaders.

(/) All of these seven guns were mounted on iron sliding carriages
with front pivots, turning on rails built into the concrete. As recoil
checks, small iron plates were used which, at the i-ear of the top car-
riage, were pressed firmly against the compressor bars by means of
an ordinary pivot screw. For indirect elevation of the guns there
was an ordinary graduated disk with a hand. There was no sight
scale on the graduated arc of the carriage. All the guns were
adapted to be trained directly. When the Americans took possession
of the battery they did not find any tangent scales, but the American
chief of the batteiy stat-ed that they had been there.

{g) Near some of the guns cartridges were lying about. A few
feet west of the right-wing gun and a little to the rear was an
uncovered pile of projectiles for the 1 6-centimeter guns. They were
iron projectiles, with centering studs. The point, which was spheri-
cal in shape, contained a perforation for the fuse which had been
stopped up with cotton waste. The fuses themselves could not be
found. Near this pile of projectiles stood several cartridge boxes.
Judging from the cartridge-bag material lying about and the powder
scattered around it may be assumed that the cartridges were being
made right there.

22 SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

(h) In the batteiy itself only minor injuries could be noted. Tlie
right-wing gun had been upset by a shell, but none of the other guns
nor the cement protection had received any injuries. A few pro-
jectiles had struck into the ground in front of the sand bags and
destroyed a few of them. Back of the battery was lying an Ameri-
can 20-centimeter shell, which had not been exploded. The base
fuse had been removed.

80CAPA.

(i) The new battery erected here is located, like that at the Morro,
on the highest point of the ridge, about 400 meteors west of the
entrance.

(k) The five guns installed here are in a straight line — the three
21-centimeter howitzers in the left wing and the two 16-centimeter
Hontoria naval guns in the right wing. The composition of the
battery is about the same as that at the Morro, except that there are
no barrels on top of the cement boxes at the 16-centimeter guns,
probably so as not to restrict the angle of fire of these guns and
because they are protected by a 3-centimeter shield. Immediately
back of the guns is a trench of little depth connecting the gun
positions with each other. The 16-centimeter guns are separated
from the howitzers bv a broad traverse.

(1) The 21-centimeter howitzers are like those at the Morro. The
two 16-centimeter Hontoria guns were taken from the Reina Mer-
cedes, They are long guns of modern construction on central pivot
mounts, but not rapid-fire guns. The pivot sockets are built into
the concrete foundation. These guns could probably not be fired
oftener than once in two minutes.

{m) About 20 metei*s back of the guns was a frame house with
sheet-iron roof, built partly into the ground, and protected toward the
sea by a small embankment of earth. This was an ammunition
magazine for the battery. It still contained a number of 16-centi-
meter projectiles with the necessary cartridges and powder boxes.-
The place was little suitable for an ammunition magazine, and it is a
wonder that it was not hit.

{7i) Evidently the Americans fired more sharply at this battery
than at the Morro battery, probably because it contained the only
modern guns whose effects were to be feared.

One of the howitzers had received a hit of small caliber in the left
side of the top carriage, but without placing the gun out of action.
The shield of one of the 16-centiraeter guns had been pierced from
below by a 15-centimeter projectile, and the carriage had also been
injured, so that the gun became unserviceable. No other damages,
are noticeable in the guns, but at different places shots had passed
immediately in front of the guns and hit the gun protections and
fiandbags.

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 23

PUNTA OORDA BATTERY.

(o) This battery was not fired upon by the Americans, although it
took part in the firing on several occasions.

10. According to the above, the final result of the numerous bom-
bardments was but one gun placed out of action in the Morro and one
in the Socapa battery. The loss in human life was a few killed and
wounded. Punta Gorda battery, the only important position in a
question of forcing the harbor entrance, remained uninjured. As I
have already said, I am unable to state the total number of project-
iles which the American ships fired in order to attain this modest
result. In any event, the number is out of proportion to the result,
and has proved once more a fact well established by the history of
naval wars, namely, that coast fortifications are extremely difficult to
place out of action, even with an expenditure of large quantities of
ammunition. The American method of firing may perhaps be suscep-
tible of improvement — that is not for me to say. But the American
naval officers may take comfort in the thought that other seafaring
nations would not have done any better in their place — perhaps not
so well; for no navy, with the exception of the French, has made it a
point in time of peace to make the bombardment of coast fortifica-
tions, fortified cities, etc. , the subject of thorough, practical study.

11. As for the fire of the Spanish batteries, I have read of but one
case where a Spanish projectile hit an American ship. It was in a
fight with the Socapa battery that the battleship Texas received a hit,
probably from one of the 16-centimeter guns taken from the Reina
Mercedes. The projectile struck the port side about 20 feet abaft the
bow and exploded, after passing through a stanchion between decks
killing one man and wounding six. The American officer who took
charge of the battery .at Morro Castle also told me the following amus-
ing incident : There was a bombardment of the Morro battery at night,
and one of the American ships was throwing her search light on the
battery. The Spanish answered the fii^e part of the time. The ship
with the search light was not hit, but the battleship Iowa, lying quite
a distance away in the dark, was unexpectedly struck by an acci-
dental hit from one of the Spanish howitzere. The projectile passed
through the deck, entered the officers' mess-room, explocled there, and
caused some minor damages to the rooms; but none of the crew were
hit. But what more could be expected of the kind of guns the Span-
ish had at their disposal? It must surely have given the American
officers who took charge of the battery a slight shock when they saw
the dates 1608, 1718, etc., on the guns which they had been fight-
ing. Part of the mediaeval howitzers still had charges in them when
the American officer took possession of the Morro battery. He there-
fore decided to fire them, which gave him an opportunity of estab-
lishing the fact that even with the greatest elevation the range was

24 SKETCHES PROM THE SPANISH- AMERICAN WAR.

only 800 yards! It is possible that the cartridges had suffered from
humidity; but, on the other hand, it is quite as probable that this
was really their greatest range. One thousand meters was not a bad
I)erformanee for guns of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
No wonder that the Spanish could not reach the hostile ships with
these guns! This will also explain why the Spanish garrisons, seeing
the uselessness of their efforts, often stopped firing during the bom-
bardments and withdrew to the trenches. It was on these occ^isionii
that the newspaper reports stated that the batteries had been silenced,
when, as a matter of fact, they were uninjured and in condition to
resume their " unbloody work" at any time.

12. But now another question. Did the American fleet really allow
itself to be deceived by these batteries ? In the beginning, perhaps.
And why not? I do not hesitate to acknowledge that I had the same
experience, together with several other officers. When we inquired
into the nature of the batteries, we had no idea of the venerable age
of those guns, but set them down as 12 and 16 centimeter guns. It is
true that we did not go through a fight with the batteries, and that
is the essential factor for estimating their efficiency. From observa-
tions made at the Spanish batteries I judge, as already stated, that
the Socapa battery was the main objective of the Americans. They
seem to have known that the only serviceable guns, namely, the 16-
centimeter Hontoria guns from the Reina Mercedes, had been set up
there ; but Morro battery, too, was fired upon quite a number of times.
Would the Americans have done this if they had known what miser-
able guns their enemies had ? Hardly. So thei'e can be no doubt that
in the beginning at least the Americans were deceived as to the
strength of the foe, whom they overestimated, as is usually the case
in war. Moreover, there was no occasion for the American com-
mander of the fleet, even if the Spanish batteries had been recognized
as efficient and dangerous, to attack them under prevailing circum-
stances. If the harbor entrance was to be forced, neither the Morro
nor the Socapa battery need have been considei'ed, because they could
not sweep the narrow entrance with their guns. The Punta Gorda
battery was the only one that controlled the entrance, and owing to
the great distance and the difficulty of ol)serving the fire, it was almost
impossible to place this battery out of action from the sea. Then, why
the bombardments of the batteries and the immense expenditure of
ammunition, especially since the American commander in chief did
not intend to force the entrance, but on the contrary was desirous of
obstructing it, as is plainly shown by Ilobson's attempt? A simple
blockade, without any further attack on the fortifications, would
have had exactly the same result. I can not possibly believe that
the American commander in chief had nothing more in view than to
harass tlie enemv bv the numerous bombardments and reassure the
home press. My idea is that Admiral Sampson, as a jwactical and

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 25

experienced gunner, liad a very definite object in view in these bom-
bardments. I have no proofs to offer in support of this assumption,
but I have an idea that there is something in it. After the batteries
liad been brought' out all the subsequent bombardments were nothing
more or less than target practice. The admiral wanted to accustom
his officers and men to sharp firing. The whole crews were made to
practice at regular intervals — the commanders in tlie manner of
handling their ships, the officer's in conducting and superintending
the firing, the gun captains in training and aiming, the gun and ammu-
nition crews in serving the guns and passing the ammunition, and all
these under conditions of actual war, in fights with coast batteries.
When the decisive day arrived — the battle on the high sea, ship
against shij) — the American fleet was well prepai'ed and able to
achieve its ta&k in a brilliant manner and in the shortest possible
time.

13. Whether I am right or wrong in this assumption, whether it
was a question of actual bombardments or of target practice, the
final result remains the same. Even at target practice each one fires
as well as he can. Therefore we are still confronted with the fact
that the coast fortifications, in spite of vastly superior naval artillery
and the expenditure of immense quantities of ammunition, were not
placed out of action. What lessons are we to derive from this ?

Aside from the forcing of harbor entrances, where the assailant
must eventually expose himself for a shoil time to the hostile fire,
cases may arise in war where it becomes necessary prior to such forc-
ing, or for other reasons, to destroy cei-tain forts. The history of war
teaches us that this is one of the most difficult problems. It should
therefore be made a subject of study in time of peace, the same
as any other problem. Of the necessity of studying tactics and
strategy and their practical application, everyone is convinced, from
the commander in chief to the j'oungest lieutenant. Immense sums
are being expended for coal alone in order to have the ships of the
fleet pass through all manner of evolutions in tactics and strategic
maneuvers. Money should also be devoted to target practice under
exactly the same conditions as in actual war. For what is it that
decides a naval battle ? The tactics of the commander in chief of the
fleet and the commanders of the different ships are certainly of some
influence on the battle, but nothing more. The decision will always
be dependent on the good training of officers and men for the fight
and the good firing of gun captains and officers. That is what the
naval battle of Santiago has once more plainly demonstrated.

V. THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA AND CIENFUEGOS.

1. Immediatel}' after the rejection of the Union's ultimatum by
1^ Spain, and the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the two
nations, Havana was blockaded, and later Cienfuegos.

26 SKETCHES PROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

On our way to Havana, about the middle of May, we met in the
Yucatan Channel the first American war ships. They were a cruiser
of the Raleigh class and a torpedo cruiser. The former, painted dark
gray and stripped for service, having only a signal yard at the fore-
topmast, being in all other respects cleared for action, made a good
appearance. A large number of the crew were standing on the upper
deck and near the guns, curiously eying the f (treigner who had entered
the line of blockade. After the exchange of a few signals as to name,
place of departure, and destination, we resumed our course for
Havana. The next morning (May 17), through the veil of mist cov-
ering the shore, we had a first glimpse of the mountain at Mariel, which,
by its peculiar shape, affords the sailor an excellent point of bearing.
A heavy fog was still enveloping Havana, and was not dispersed
until the sun rose higher in the cloudless blue sky. The first object
that met our eyes was the old castle of the Morro, with the red and
yellow Spanish flag waving proudly in the wind. We could dis-
tinguish the high light-house to the left of the entrance, and adjoining
it a huge mass of stone walls and fortifications. Havana from the
sea forms a singularly beautiful pictui'e ; but this was a time of war,
and our eyes, after gazing admiringly on the magnificent panorama,
turned, as though instinctively guided by the military spirit, to the
long rows of fortifications visible close to the shore at the Vedado,
indistinctly at first, then more and more sharply. There was much
to be seen. During the short moments while we were passing by, we
had to observe carefully in order to gain at* least an approximate idea
of the value and strength of the forts. The whole line of fortifica-
tions at the Vedado api)eared to have been recentlj' constructed. At
Santa Clara and La Reina workmen could be seen strengthening and
changing the original batteries. To the left of the harbor entrance,
also, we could see two or three newly erected batteries extending as
far as Cochima (Cojimar?).

The American blockading vessels remained at a considerable dis-
tance and were apparentlj' composed of only a few gunboats of the
Annapolis class and auxiliary cruisers (small steamers or yachts armed
with a few rapid-fire guns). We were slowly approaching the harbor
entrance, and with the assistance of a pilot entered the harbor,
passing through the mine obstruction and the channel, which was
literally lined with guns, though mostlj^ of old designs. Great num-
bers of people, mostly soldiers and workmen, were crowding both
sides of the entrance. Silently they were staring at our ship, and
the same dismal silence also prevailed in the harbor itself. The
beautiful wharves for loading and unloading steamera were empty.
Only a number of workmen out of employment were sitting or lying
around. A few boats were moving about in the harbor. All the others,
as well as the larger sailing vessels which in time of peace are engaged
in coasting trade, were at anchor in the inner harbor. The coal

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 27

depots at the other side of the harbor contained immense supplies,
but at the quays and coaling piers, which are the busiest places in
normal times, there was not a single vessel to be seen. Finally,
when we entered the harbor proper, we saw a few Spanish warships —
the cruiser Alfonso XII, torpedo gunboats Marques de la Ensenada,
Nueva Espana, Conde de Venadito, and a number of smaller gun-
boats. These ships, also painted gray, stripped for service and
cleared for action, made at a first glance a very good appearance,
especially the large cruiser; but a second glance through glasses
suflSced to convince us that the large cruiser, Alfonso XII, had no
large guns on board, which caused us to infer that on the inside also
everything was not as it should be (and, indeed, it appeared subse-
quently that the boilers were unserviceable). Close to the Alfonso
XII the wreck of the Maine could be seen above the water, furnishing
the key, so to speak, to the strange changes which Havana had under-
gone in such a short time, the warlike preparations of the garrison
on the forts outside, the stillness of the harbor, the inactivity of the
population, and the appearance of the Spanish warships cleared for
action.

2. A walk through the streets of the city revealed the usual every-
day life. Of course the traffic was not as great as in time of peace.
The wealthier families — Cubans and Spaniards as well as foreign-
ers— had left Havana in large numbers. Many beautiful houses, the
former residences of these families, were now standing empty. Beg-
gars were lying about in front of the church doors and in the main
streets, among them women with half -starved little children, but not
in very large numbers. Many a coin was dropped into their out-
stretched hands by the passers-by; but there was nothing to indicate
at that time that the blockade had entailed serious results for the
poorer population. Many stores in the principal streets were open,
but in the majority of cases the clerks were taking it easy, either in
the store or in front of it. The restaurants and cafes, on the con-
trary, were enjoying good patronage. The prices, of course, were
higher than usual, but not extravagant; and for good pay, good din-
ners could be had in these restaurants. Meat was, on an average,
l.oO marks (37 cents) a pound. Eggs were particularly expensive.
The general opinion was that there were sufficient provisions in the
city to sustain the blockade for some length of time; but what was to
become of the poorer class of the population in that event was a
problem. At the restaurants the large number of uniforms was strik-
ing. They were worn b}' the volunteers, who were represented at the
capital in particularly large numbers. A special guard of honor of
volunteers had been ordered for Captain-General Blanco, and the}'
had taken charge of the guard service at the palace. As for the mil-
itary qualities of these half soldiers, they were probably not of a high
character, for proper training and drilling were lacking here as well as

28 SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

in Puerto Rico. From the city I went to the seashore and took a look
at the fortifications, especially Santa Clara and La Reina, and I
could not help admiring the energy and zeal of the Spanish. Every-
where the greatest activity prevailed. From early until late work
was going on at the fortifications. The old forts were being strength-
ened by earthworks and heavy guns mounted at Santa Clara. In
some of the forts volunteers could be seen practicing at the guns until
late at night; other divisions of volunteers had gathered for instruc-
tion; feverish activity everywhere, from the private to the officer and
Captain-General. The latter frequently visited the forts and inspected
personally the progress of the work. But in view of all this energy
one may well ask, Was there not too much to be made up that had
been neglected in time of peace ? It is not possible to make soldiers,
especially accurate and cool-headed marksmen, in a few weeks or
months. That can only be done by constant practical training under
able officers in time of peace.

3. On May 14 the Spanish gunboats Conde de Venadito and Nueva
Espana had made an attack on the American blockading vessels, and
as this is the onlj^ instance of initiative on the part of the Spanish
ships at Plavana, I will give an account of it. The Conde de Venadito
is one of the older cruisers, of 1,200 tons displacement, launched in
1888, having a speed of 12 knots, armed with four 12-centimeter guns
and a few light rapid-fire guns. The Niui va Espa na is a torpedo gunboat
of GOO tons, armed with two 12-centimeter guns and a few light rapid-
fire guns, reputed to have a speed of 18 knots, but in reality she
would probably not make more than 14 knots. The 12-centimet^r
Hontoria guns were installed behind shields. According to the state-
ment of a Spanish officer, these could be fired not of tener than once in
five minutes. No target practice had taken place. The Nueva
Espana had fired the first shot at an American war ship. Iler torpedo
armament consists of four Schwartzkopff torpedoes of the older type,
with small explosive charge (about 25 kilograms), and two torpedo
tubes. No regular exercises in torpedo launching had taken place.
Both vessels have a great deal of woodwork. On the forward conning
bridge is a saloon with heavy wood wainscoting, tables, chairs, etc.,
none of which had been removed for the fight. Both ships went out
to sea at 5 o'clock j). m., followed at some distance by two small tugs.
The blockading line was quite a distance from the shore, and it was
about an hour before tlie engagement commenced. Five American
vessels, probably only gunboats and auxiliary cruisers, were soon
surrounding the Spanish ships, so that tlie latter could use their guns on
both sides. The vessels approached to within 8 kilometers. A suc-
cessful hit from the Spanish is said to have caused tli(^ American
sliips to retreat, but owing to the darkness the Spanish ships did not
dare follow tliem, and returned to Havana at 8.30 p. m. without hav-
ing l)een liit once. This was not very much of a success, and does

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH- AMERICAN WAR. 29

not appear to have raised the spirit of the Spanish ; for, even after the
harbor flotilla had been reenforced by the cruiser Infanta Isabel^ it
never again attempted an attack on the American ships, either at
night or in daytime. That does not speak very highly for the initia-
tive and spirit of entei'prise on the part of the Spanish naval officers,
esi)ecially as the blockading fleet consisted only of gunboats and
inferior auxiliary cruisers, which later were reenforced by the large
cruiser San Francisco. Even the latter might have been successfully
atta<;ked at night by the Spanish torpedo boats under able command
and with intelligent handling of the torpedo weapon.

4. In order to cut oif the supply of provisions from the sea the
cities of Matanzas, Cardenas, and Cienfuegos, which are connected
with the capital by railway, had been blockaded since the beginning
of the war. Several attempts of the United States to land troops at
these places were unsuccessful, owing to the inadequate means with
which they were undertaken. The Americans therefore confined
themselves to a few insignificant bombardments, and finally to the
blockade alone. When I arrived at Cienfuegos, on June 11, 1 did not
meet a single American vessel keeping up the blockade, either in
Yucatan Channel or in front of Cienfuegos. I have subsequently
been told that the American ships would often leave the harbor with-
out any guard and then suddenl}' reappear at the end of a few days.
I infer from this that the Americans did not handle the blockade
service very strictly at Cienfuegos. The result was that several
steamei's were successful in running the blockade. If the Spanish
Cfovemment had used some energy in securing blockade runners at
the beginning of the war, or had encouraged them by premiums,
Havana, as well as the other provinces of the island, could have been
abundantly supplied with provisions. How little such enterprises
were supported by the Spanish Government is shown by the fact that
at Cienfuegos, for instance, two large steamers were lying idle during
the whole period of the war, while with a little more energy they
might have been of the greatest service. Besides Cienfuegos, the
waters near the Isle of Pines — ^the town of Batabano among
others — were very favorably situated for blockade runners. From
suitable anchoring places in deep water, which are abundant in that
vicinity, the cargoes could have been taken ashore by smaller vessels.
Of course, all such matters require preparation and decisive action —
conditions which did not exist among the Spanish. As a matter of
fact, at different times in the course of the war supplies did reach
Cuba just in that manner, and that was the reason why the United
States saw themselves compelled to extend the blockade from Cape
Antonio to Cape Cruz, the whole territory here under discussion.

5. When we arrived at the entrance to Cienfuegos we noticed to the
right the ruins of a light-house, which the Americans had fired upon
in an unsuccessful attempt at landing. To the left of the harbor

30 SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

entrance, which was now plainly visible, was a large cascle in the
usual Spanish style of architecture, standing on an elevation, and
below it the town, which, with its white houses hidden among trees,
reached down to the water's edge. The houses were mostly one-story
high, with porches running all around. Some boats and small steani-
ei*s were lying at the landing piers. After hoisting the necessaiy sig-
nals and waiting patiently we saw two Spanish gunboats approachin*^.
We could plainly see that they had been cleared for action and were
extremely suspicious, for they advanced, but very slowly. Finally,
they seemed to come to the conclusion that the white ship with awn-
ings, lying there quietly, without any warlike preparations, could
have only a peaceful mission. A boat was lowered, the pilot came on
board, and we ran in. The entrance is similar to that at Santiago de
Cuba, and quite narrow. There is a bend to the north which makes
it difficult for large ships to enter the harbor, l>ecause tlie current
coming from several directions is usually very strong at this place, so
that a ship turning slowly might easily run aground on the eastern
point. Here also the indefatigable activity of the Spanish troops
could be noticed. They were working energetically on new batteries,
which were armed with field guns. There were mines in the entrance.
Works of defense, trenches, etc., had been built in the direction of
the castle. The number of regular troops was conspicuous; thei'e
appear to have been no volunteers at that place. As we passed, the
soldiers stopped in their work to take a look at the ship. At one of
the landing piers, at the narrowest place of the entrance, a crowd of
people and regular soldiers had gathered. A band on the porch of
one of the houses was playing "The Watch on the Rhine," a courtesy
extended to the German ship by the Spanish commander. We
steamed into the large bay and after passing several small islands
and shallow places we saw before us the city of Cienfuegos. The
channel is narrow even here ; the large l)ay has many shallow places,
and only a narrow passage leads to the city, at which our ship cast
anchor some distance from the shore. Xevertheless, the harbor of
Cienfuegos is one of the best of the whole island of Cuba, and with the
expenditure of the necessary funds a very fine place could be made
of it. Outside of Santiago, whose commerce, owing to the inaccessi-
bility of the country back of it, will probably never be developed to
any great extent, Cienfuegos is the only good harbor on the southern
coast, and has therefore probably a great future. It is also to be
noted that the largest sugar factories of Cuba, which are mostly oper-
ated by American capital, are in the vicinity of Cienfuegos.

6. The small Spanish gunboats lying in the harbor were doing guard
service at the entrance, relieving each other every day. Besides these
the torpedo-boat cruiser Oalicia was in the harbor. An unlucky star
seems to have been over this vessel. At first it was stated that she
was to be docked in order to make repairs. Afterwai*ds she was again

SKETCHES PROM THE SPANISH- AMERICAN WAR. 31

r pronounced seaworthy; but the fact is that she iiever left the harbor
dnring the whole period of the war. There was no lack of provdsions
noticeable in the city. The Spanish Government had bought up the
provisions and set selling prices on them. For instance, a pound of
beef was only 80 pfennigs (16 cents) — certainly a low price consider-
I ing that the blockade had already lasted two months. On June 13
gun fire was heard in the direction of the entrance. The Spanish
t •■' gunboats went out and had a slight engagement with an American
' ( auxiliary cruiser, probably the Yankee. The gunboat Vasco Nunez
I de Balboa was shot through the bow above the water line, and sev-

(eral of the crew were wounded. In other respects the engagement
was of no importance. The following day we left Cienfuegos, spoke
the American cruiser Yankee^ which was on blockade service, and
: after stopping a few days at the Isle of Pines we shaped our course
for Havana.

■

7. In the morning of June 22 we came within sight of the table-
land. We kept close to the shore in order to inspect the harbor of
M ariel and to see how far the American blockading line extended. It
^vas not long before the blockading ships, among them the gunboat
Wilmington^ which was lying close to Mariel, came in sight. There
was the usual exchange of signals. A heaAy thunderstorm was
threatening. Morro Castle, which had l)een visible in indistinct out-
lines, disappeai'ed behind a dark cloud. The storm came up rapidly.
The flashes of lightning followed each other in quick succession, the
thunder roared, and the rain was coming down in torrents with a
force only possible in the Tropics. The blockading ships had van-
ished from sight. We could hardly see a ship's length in front of us,
and the torrents of rain continued to fall, merging the lines of the sky
and the sea. As we had made out Morro Castle before the stonn
commenced, I had the ship steer for it very slowly. Soon it com-
menced to clear up in the direction of the land, and while the storm
continued to rage on tEe sea and the whole line of blockade was
still enveloped in rain, we entered the harbor with the assistance
of the pilot. Involuntarily the thought occurred to me, what an
opportunity that would have been for a blockade runner; but
the matter is not as simple as it looks. It is true that at this
season of the year a heavy thunderstorm, usually about noon or in
the afternoon, may be counted upon almost daily. Still the
chances of being thus favored are too slim to make it advisable
for a ship to attempt to run the blockade in daytime. The only real
opportunity is at night. The American blockading fleet consisted of
the gunboat Wilminyton, two gunboats of the Annapolis chuss, one
or two monitors and about four auxiliary cruisei'S, the latter partly
small vessels. The ships were distributed over a line about 30 miles
long, surrounding the harbor in an arc at a distance of about 120 to
140 kilometers. In my opinion it would not have been difficult for a

32 SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH- AMEBIC AN WAR.

fast ship (15 or 16 knots would have been sufficient, since the Amer-
ican blockading vessels, with the exception of a few small cruisers,
did not exceed 12 knots) to run the blockade at night. The require-
ments were that the night should be as dark as poassible, the lights
on board darkened, and the course shaped straight for the entrance
through the middle of the blockading line. As the beacon light was
kept burning all the time, there was no difficulty about steering for
the entrance. The blockade runner would have had to depend en-
tirely on her speed and maintain her course without regard to hostile
projectiles. The firing of guns, including rapid-fire guns, with night
sights is so difficult that hits can hardly be counted on unless the dis-
tance is very small. To approach the line of blockade by hugging
the shore I consider hazardous. The vessel could not have remained
entirely hidden, owing to the close formation of the line. There would
have been danger, as soon as the alarm signal was given, for the block-
ade runner to be cut off from Havana by the blockading fleet and
forced upon the shore.

8. Since our last visit to Havana, about a month ago, there was
hardly any change noticeable in the aspect of the town and the con-
ditions prevailing there. The harbor was empty and deserted. Two
steamers, however, could be seen, of rather enterprising appearance,
one of them even with two small rapid-fire guns on board. The Span-
ish war ships were still at anchor at the same place. There were no
foreign war ships. Work on the improvement of the fortifications
was still going on with the same restless activity. The volunteers
continued their drills. Provisions were expensive, but the prices were
held down by the Government, so as to prevent excesses on the part
of the dealers. The poor were being taken care of as far as possible
by the distribution of food in free kitchens and by entertainments for
their benefit. The theaters were kept open. On certain days thei'e
was music in the public places. The Governor-General did all he
could to keep up the spirit of the inhabitants. The rate of sickness
and death was said to be hardly higher than usual. The climate at
this time of the year is especially unfavorable, because the beneficial
effects of the rainy season are not yet felt. Inside of the fortified
region the Government had laid down so-called zonas de cultivo, which
were intended for the raising of vegetables, etc., and were expected
to prove of great benefit. One of the chief ailicles of food consisted
of pineapples, which in time of peace are exported in incredible num-
bera, and which could now be bought in quantities for a fabulously
low price.

0. In the forenoon of June 24, I noticed some preparations on board
the Spanish steamers Montevideo and San Domingo, from which I
inferred that they were about to put to sea. The time was well chosen.
The moon set about 10 o'clock, and .at midnight both steamers, with

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH- AMEBIC AN WAR. 33

all lights darkened, passed through the entrance. They were suc-
cessful in eluding the American ships. I afterwards met the Monte-
video again at Vera Cruz, with a full cargo, ready to leave the harbor
at any moment; but as far as I could ascertain, the steamer, after
putting to sea, preferred to return and unload her cargo again. The
San Domingo^ upon her return to Cuba, was captured by American
blockading ships and run ashore near the Isle of Pines.

10. We remained at Havana until June 29. We then proceeded to
Kingston and from there to Santiago de Cuba and Cienf uegos, casting
anchor at the latter place on the evening of July 8. The blockade
was now quite strict, as we had an opportunity to find out upon
approaching Santa Cruz. At Trinidad we met the American gunboat
Helena^ and at Cienfuegos the cruiser Detroit^ lying close to the har-
bor. Nevertheless, the auxiliary cruiser Eeina Maria Crist ina^ a large,
fast steamer, armed with fourteen 5-centimeter rapid-fire and several
revolving guns, had succeeded in entering the harbor of Cienfuegos.
Her cargo consisted of dried codfish and ham. Part of the steamer's
^ns and ammunition were used to reenforce the fortifications. The
city itself had not again been harassed by the American ships. Com-
munication with Havana by rail was kept up, though there were fre-
quent delays in the arrival of trains, owing to the lack of fuel. There
did not appear to be any great scarcity of provisions. A proclama-
tion by Captain-General Blanco, published in the Gaceta de la Habana,
apprised the city of the catastrophe of Santiago, which was so disas-
trous to the Spanish.

The Spanish at Cienfuegos gained an idea that the ships had gone
down with all their crews. It was not learned at that time that the
ships had been run ashore and that the Americans had taken many
prisoners. The heavy blow was borne with comparative equanimity.
It was the general opinion that the fate of Santiago was also sealed
and that then peace negotiations would be opened.

11. On July 10 the crcM^ of the steamer Alfonso XII arrived at
Cienfuegos and was transferred to the auxiliary cruiser Reina Maria
Cristina. The Alfonso XII had attempted to run the blockade at
Havana, keeping close to the shore, but had been compelled b}" the
American blockading ships to run ashore at Mariel. The majority
of the crew was rescued. The cargo was destroyed by the Americans,
who fired upon the steamer and set her on fire. In connection Avith
this attempt to run the blockade we seek in vain for an explanation
as to why the cruisers, torpedo gunboats, and other vessels in Havana
Harbor did not assist the blockade iimner. The time of her arrival
could have been announced b}^ cable. It then became the duty of
the Spanish warships to go out in accordance with a prearranged plan
and try to divert the blockading ships. Such a maneuver would not
only have raised the moral courage of the garrison, condemned to

12483 3

34

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

demoralizing inactivity, but would in aU probability also have been,
attended with success.

12. We left Cienfuegos on July 12, and after visiting Vera Cruz,
again returned to Havana on August 1. The blockading fleet
appeared to have drawn closer together, so that there was one ship to
every 2 miles. The flag ship San Francisco was also seen this time.
Few changes wei-e noticeable in the city itself. There was not as yet
an actual famine, but the poorer classes were evidently much worse
off than they had been on our former visit, for the number of beggars
in the streets had increased. Crowds of poor people would come
alongside the ships in boats to try to get something to eat. It was a
sad sight to look upon those half-starved women and emaciated little
children, barely covered with miserable rags, holding out their hands
imploringly and asking for alms. Everj'^thing floating around in the
water was examined by these miserable people. Nothing, escaped
their eyes. Parings of fruit and other refuse were caught up and.
sucked out. The suffering was terrible, and we were powerless before
it. All could not be helped, but at least a few. This scene was
repeated every noon and evening. The crews gave willingly what
could be spared, and more than that. Ashore, as already stated, the
poor people wei^e being taken cai'e of as far as possible by free kitch-
ens. Since the middle Of July about 30,000 rations had been distrib-
uted in these kitchens. The health conditions were remarkably good
this year. Yellow fever had not yet made its appearance, but there
was typhoid fever and dysentery. The sentiment of the population,
as weU as of the troops, seemed to incline toward peace. A general
feeling of listlessness had settled upon them since the capitulation of
Santiago. "If the Americans would only attack Havana," the people
would say, "they would soon find out what the garrison of the capital
is made of. They would get their heads broken quick enough. But
Uncle Sam is only beating about the bush. He is not going to swal-
low the hot morsel and burn his tongue and stomach." No wonder
that the Spanish troops, condemned to inactivity, poorly fed, cut off
from the whole world, and without any prospect of relief, were anxious
for the end to come. And so peace was being talked of everywhere,
and there was a persistent rumor that the French ambassador at
Washington had been empowered to conduct peace negotiations.

13. After a cruise around Cuba, Haiti, and Puerto Rico, upon which
I had started at the beginning of August, I returned to Havana for
the fourth time on September 3. How different everything looked!
The clouds of smoke of the blockading ships were no longer seen on
the horizon. That circle of brave vessels, greedy for prey, ready
every niomeiit to pounce upon anything that came within their reach,
had vanished. Our first glance was for tlie flag on Morro Castle.
The red and yellow colors were still waving there, but there seemed
to be an air of sadness and listlessness about them, as though they

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH- AMEBIC AN WAR. 35

were anticipating their fate of having to make way for another flag
without having been conquered. The harbor entrance was animated.
Many sailing vessels were going in and out. In the harbor itself
German, English, and Norwegian steamers were busily engaged in
loading and unloading. Alongside the custom-houses there were a
number of American and Mexican sailing vessels that had brought
food and wine. All the storerooms were filled with provisions of
every kind. The city had awakened to new life, business houses
were once more open, merchants were again at their work, the streets
were full of people; yet there was an air of depression over the whole
city. The one thought, what was to become of them now, seemed to
have cast a spell over everything. The insurgents were lying close
to the city, and many of the inhabitants of Havana went out to visit
with friends or to satisfy their curiosity. Will the United States
succeed in dispelling the specters they have conjured up? Will
Cuba Libre triumph, or will the island be annexed to the Union?
These are the questions which are now ever present.

14. As peace is now at hand, there is no reason why a discussion of
the fortifications of Havana, which were erected or improved by the
Spanish with so much skill, should be kept secret any longer. I will
therefore try to give an approximate idea of the same :

(a) The harbor entrance had been made inaccessible by several
rows of mines. Along the entrance many guns had been set up which
were fired through embrasures from behind thick masonry walls. All
these guns were muzzle-loaders of old types. Farther inland there
was a torpedo battery — two ordinary laun<3hing tubes, which had been
temporarily installed on a float without any protection.

(6) The object of the shore fortifications was partly to defend the
entrance and partly to prevent landings. During the first few days
after the breaking out of the war the Spanish had feared a bombard-
ment of Havana and a landing of American troops at the Vedado,
and this fear was well founded, as there was only one fortification
on the Vedado, and that not entirely completed. The Americans
allowed that opportunity for attacking Havana by surprise to go by
without taking advantage of it, because they were themselves by no
means prepared for the war and had neither troops nor transports in
readiness. By dint of unremitting activity the Spanish were able
in the coui-se of the war to place the following works in good condi-
tion, part of them having been newly erected :

EAST OF THE ENTRANCE.

Battery Xo. 1 (permanent): Four 15-centimeter Ordoiiez guns; on
the wings, two 5.7-centimeter Nordenfeldt rapid-fire guns.

Battery No. 2 (permanent): Two 30.5-centimeter Krupp guns; four
21-centimeter Ordonez howitzers; two 5.7-centimeter Nordenfeldt
rapid-fire guns.

36 SKETCHES FEOM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

Velasco battery (temporary): Three 28-ceiitimeter Krupp guns;
three 12-centimeter Hontoria naval guns; one 5.7-centimeter Norden-
feldt rapid-fire gun.

Between the latter two batteries there were three small temporary
batteries, the first of which was armed with two 9-centimeter field
guns and the second and third with three 12-centimeter and 15-
centimeter guns, respectively.

WEST OF THE ENTRANCE.

La Punta (permanent) : Two 15-centimeter OrdoSez guns.

La Reina (permanent, but considerably strengthened and newly
armed) : Three 16-centimeter Hontoria naval guns (from the cruiser
Alfonso XII); two 25-centimeter muzzle loaders; seven 21-centimeter
muzzle-loading howitzers.

Santa Clara (permanent, but considerably strengthened and newly
armed): Two 30.5-centimeter Ordonez guns; three 28-centimeter
Krupp guns; four 21-centimeter howitzers. On the flank, two 5.7-
centimeter Nordenfeldt rapid-fii-e guns and three 15-centimeter guns.

Battery No. 3 (permanent): Four 21-centimeter Ordoilez howitzers;
two 15-centimet«r Ordonez guns; two 24:-centimeter Ordofiez guns.

Battery No. 4 (temporary): Three 16-centimeter Hontoria naval
guns (from cruiser Alfonso XII); four 15-centimeter OrdoSez guns;
two 5.7-centimeter Nordenfeldt rapid-fire guns.

Besides these, temporary stands had been erected on the west wing
for field guns.

(c) The shore fortifications had their bases of support in some of
the larger forts, like El Principe and Atares forts, forming the inner
belt around the city. An outer belt had also been established at a
distance of about 10 kilometera from the city. The fortifications on
the outer belt consisted of a large number of infantry sites protected
by artificial obstructions, stakes, wire fences, etc. For each two or
three of these sites there were more extensive works with gun stands.
Thus, all the important points had been connected by one long line of
fortifications. The defense of the coast east of battery No. 1 near
Cochima (Gojimar?) w^as suprisingly weak. Batteries Nos. 1 and 2
are trained toward the sea; only one 4.7-centimeter rapid-fire gun
covers the flank. The fortifications on this part of the coast consist of
only one gun site with two field guns. It would seem as though a
landing with a sufficient force of troops, assisted by the fleet, might
have had a chance of success. Fortunately for the city the fortifica-
tions were not put to a severe test. Aside from a few shots at the
l)eginning of the blockade, about twenty shots wei'e fired at the
American cruiser San Francisco toward the end of the war, namely,
on August 12. The ship did not answer the fire. A Spanish pro-
jectile hit the stem of the American cruiser as she was steaming
away, but without causing serious damage or loss of human life.

SKETCHES PROM THE SPANISH-AMEKICAN WAR.

37

15. In order to show in a comprehensive form the steamers which
during the war ran the blockade of Cuba, I give in the following table
the names of the steamers and the different harbors they entered,
together with their respective cargoes :

Harbor.

Oienfaegoe
Do....

Name of ship.

Steamer Mostaerrat
Steamer Adnla

Do.

Santiago de Gntw a .

Calbanena

Do

Steamer Keina Maria Cria-
tina.

Steamer Polaria

Steamer Alava

Steamer Franklin

ManaaniUn

Sagna la Grande a .

Date.

Apr. 26
June 17

Jane 22

May 7
July 4
— do ...

Steamer Anita bJunelS

Steamer Fritjot Nansen i July 3

MatJiTmaa Steamer Montaerrat

Gay o Frances a..

Batabano

Do

Steamer Franklin

Coast steamer Arturo.
Coast steamer Sara...

July 29

July 31
2> June 13
6 Jane 24

Do.
Do.

Do.

Do

Do

Nuevitasa.

Bark Tres Hermanos '6 June 20

do ' July 14

Do.

Do.

La Isabella (sea-

S>rt of Sajnia la
rande).a

San Ca/etano.

Coast steamer Victoria J uly 13

Steamer Villaverde ft June 23

Brig Bnjia ! July 2«

Steamer Saffi ' May 20

Steamer Franklin June 11

I

Steamer Chateau Lafltte June 17

Steamer Begnlus July 19

Steamer Pralrono bAug.B

Cargo.

War material.

SO barrels flour, 50 barrels corUt SO sacks

rice, 10 tubs butter, 15 barrels pork, 15

barrels beef, 10 barrels hard tack, 0

sacks beans, 5 hacks pease.
1,000 boxes bacon, 50 barrels bacon sides,

600 barrels codfish, 200 sacks beans.
800 sacks barley, 14,000 sacks rice.
2,500 sacks flour, 6 barrels codflsh.
2,495 sacks flour, 3,056 sacks com, 200

sacks spices, 833 sacks potatoes.
Small quantities flour, rice, and meat.
Small quantities potatoes, onions, meat,

and nee.
8,000 sacks rice, 805 sacks beans, 600 sacks

pease, 500 sacks flour, 1,399 boxes bacon,

218 boxes codfish, a large quantity of

smoked meat, 15 barrels drugs.
3,495 sacks flour, 1.350 sacks com, 500

sacks rice, 165 sacks beans.
800 sacks com, 150 sacks flour, 20 sacks

pease, 100 sacks beans, 80 cans lard.
35 boxes flour, 20 half boxes and 2,490

sacks corn.
Beans, flour, and com.
156 tubs bacon, 200 sacks rice, 100 sacks

com, 129 barrels flour, 60 boxes meat,

65 boxes condensed milk.
237 sacks com. 20 sacks pease, 100 sacks

flour, 200 sacks beans, 5 sacks lentils,

12 boxes salt meat, 120 cans, 2 barrels,

and 4 tubs lard.
4,785 sacks flour, pease, coffee, beans,

com, and rice.
6 barrels lard, 438 sacks rice, 22 sacks

beans, 200 sacks flour.
125 sacks pease, 96 sacks rice, 185 barrels

wine, 660 sacks salt, 50 boxes oil, 5

boxes cheese, garlic, hard -tack, and

uenuer.
2,2W boxes flour, 284 sacks rice, 2,593

sacks beans, 06 sacks spices, 50 sacks

pease, 697 sacks com, 72 sacks coffee.
50 barrels codfish. 6 barrels soup, 3,885

barrels flour, 9,295 sacks flour, 5,000

sacks rice.
6,573 barrels flour, 1,000 sacks wheat,

4,000 sacks corn, 450 boxes canned

meat, 1.000 barrels pork, 500 barrels

bard- tack, 30 boxes groceries, 1 box

quinine.
400 sacks flour, 100 sacks rice, 100 sacks

beans, 200 sacks com, 272 tubs lard, 20

baslcets garlic, 10 baskets onions.

The above demonstrates once more how difficult it is to maintain
a blockade even under the most favorable circumstances, as in this
case, where the Spanish navy did not make a single attempt to shake
off the blockading ships. I am unable to saj- what part of the pro-
visions mentioned in the foregoing table went to Havana; probably

a These ports were never declared to be blockaded.

b These porta were not declared to hare been blockaded until after theKe dates.

Only four of the above-mentioned ports were included in the PreHideiit's proclamation declaring
certain ports to be blockaded, viz, Cienfuegos and Hatanzas on and after April 22, 1898, and Manzan-
illo and Batabano on and after June 27, 1898.

Out of the 22 instances given in the table of vessels entering Cuban ports during the war, there
were but 9 of these which ran the blockade.

O. N. I.

38 SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

all those that were landed at Batabano, but I have information from
reliable sources that on August 12 the military administration of
Havana had provisions on hand for three months longer, outside of
what the blockade runners had brought into the country and what
was hidden away in the houses of the city. One can therefore
understand tlie indignation of Captain General Blanco when he heard
that the peace protocol had been signed. But of what use would
have been a further resistance on the part of the Spanish gan-ison ?
The United States Government only needed to make the blockade
moi'e rigid. That would necessarily have sealed the fate of Havana
sooner or later. A fortress in the ocean, cut off from its mother
country, can be rescued only with the assistance of the navy.
The enemy who has control of the sea need only wait patiently until
the ripe fruit drops into his lap.

The lessons to be derived from the foregoing are evident and need
no further explanation. May our colonies be spared the fate of
Havana.

^U-'<i. — OPPICB OP NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.
W*R NOTKS No. IV.
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD.

SKETCHES

SPANISH-AMERICAIf WAR.

COMMANDER J .

(CONCLUDED.)

THAHSLATBD FHOM TOE OBI

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

WASHINGTON:

aOVERNMKNT PRINTING OFFICE.
1809.

: v/^

K^

LV

^j^SS^^EE^

APR 26 1899'

flOGE,

From the
J. S. Government.

INTRODUCTORY.

Sketches from the naval battle of Santiago and occupation of Puerto
Eico, by Commander Jacobsen, of the German protected cruiser Oeier^
given in this number of the War Notes, are a continuation of Sketches
from the Spanish- American War, by the same officer, given in War
Notes No. III.

ElOHABDSON CLOVEB,

Commander^ U. S. N.j Chief Intelligence Officer.
Navy Depabtment, March 27^ 1899,

Approved :

A. S. CUOWNINSHIBLD, Rear- Admiral^ U. 8. N.j

Chief of Bureau of Navigation.

3

SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

By Commander J.

[TransUted from the Marine-BimdBohaa, January and February, 1899— Con clnded.]

VI. THE NAVAL BATTLE OP SANTIAGO.

1. I have no official sources at my disposal from which to give an
account of the battle. The reports of Admiral Sampson and the com-
manders of the American ships, as well as the reports on the condition
of the Spanish vessels after the battle and on the positions and move-
ments of all ships during the battle were published in the Kew York
Herald. From the Spanish side nothing has been published except a
short report of Admiral Gervera to Captain- General Blanco and an
article entitled << Admiral Cervera's fleet" published in the Eevista
General de Marina. Under these circumstances it is inevitable that
errors and omissions will occnr in the account of the battle; but, on the
whole, it will probably give an approximately correct idea.

Paragraphs 2-13, inclusive, have not been translated as they were
from United States publications containing:

(1) Descriptions of the United States and Spanish vessels engaged
in the battle.

(2) Ohart showing the positions of the ships during the battle at dif-
ferent times between 9.30 a. m. and 1.15 p. m. from the records of the
United States Kaval Board appointed to plot such positions.

(3) Description of the engagement compiled from official reports of
the commanders of the United States vessels.

(4) Condition of Spanish vessels after the battle, as shown by the
United States board appointed to examine them.

14. With Admiral Sampson's permission the officers of the Oeier
inspected the Spanish ships on August 12, more than a month after
the battle, at which time the following observations were made:

(a) The ships, after coming out of the harbor entrance on a westerly
course, turned to starboard and ran ashore in small coves, where they
probably saw the best chance for their crews to reach the shore through
the surf.

(b) The reason for beaching the ships can probably be found in the
fact that the fires which broke out on board after the first American

5

hits could not be controlled by the crews, who had lost their heads
under the hail of hostile projectiles. All three of the ships present
pictures of the most frightful ruin, chiefly due to the explosions and
the conflagrations, which did* not reach their full intensity until after
the ships had been run ashore. All the woodwork and combustible
material had been burned. The following will give an idea of the
intense heat that must have prevailed:

The iron deck beams and other horizontal iron parts were very much
warped; the bearings of the connecting rods had been melted; the iron
masts had been partly melted where they pass through the upper deck;
the brass frames of the ports between decks had been partly melted,
and the ports themselves were found on deck converted into large
lumps of glass ; parts of the rapid-fire mounts had been melted, the lead
in the small caliber and machine-gun projectiles had melted and run
out, and the casings had been reduced to ashes.

[c) Besides the conflagrations and subsequent explosions, the ships
sustained such severe leaks when running ashore that it will be impos-
sible to float them again, with the exception of the Maria Teresa^ which
is now being attempted to be hauled o£f.'

All the masts of the ships had fallen aft and had been hurled to the
deck with their tops. Only the mainmast of the Maria Teresa was
left standing, which is an evidence that she ran ashore at less speed,
which is further shown by the fact that she sustained less leaks than
the other ships. The mainmast of the Oquendif had fallen to star-
board and broken in two upon striking the railing and one part gone
overboard.

[d) Nothing definite could be ascertained as to the boats that had
been on board. There was nothing left but the wrecks of two iron
steam launches hanging in the warped and partly broken davits on
board of each of the ships.

[e) The engines were probably intact in all of the ships at the time
they ran ashore, for they were apparently running at great speed — at
least the Oquendo and the Vizcaya.

The machinery installation on board the ships was about as follows:
a. The two main engines and six main boilers are located in five
water-tight compartments below the protective deck. Above them,
between decks, and protected by lateral coal bunkers, are two large
auxiliary boilers of at least 12 tons capacity, and many auxiliary
engines, conspicuous among which is a large and powerful centrifugal
bilge pump with a discharge pipe of about 300 mm. diameter. The
protective deck, extending from the stem to the after torpedo room, is
slightly vaulted forward of the boiler rooms, and pierced above the
boiler and engine rooms for the passage of smokestack casings and
engine skylight, but is protected at this place by a strong glacis, rising

1 In the meantime the Maria Teresa has been floated by American wreckerH, bat
she sank on her way to Norfolk. — Ed. ** Rundschau."

at an angle of about 30 degrees from the inner bunker walls. The
openings in the engine skylight and smokestack casings were protected
by iron gratings. The protection by lateral coal bunkers extended
through boiler and engine rooms, reaching to the battery deck, a
height of 3.5 meters. Alongside the engine rooms in each of the
bunkers to port and starboard forward and starboard aft was a room
for engine supplies, while to port aft was a well-equipped workshop,
extending nearly to the ship's side. In the workshop was a small
1-cylinder steam engine for' driving transmission gear, actuating a
turning-lathe, a boring engine, a grindstone, and very strong shears,
also five vises. The supply rooms appear to have been well equipped,
but everything seems to have been stored in wooden closets and on
wooden shelves, for all the tools were found scattered on the floor in
wild conAision.

//• There was a surprising number of rough castings, especially of
stuffing boxes. Spare parts for the main engines were found suspended
in the engine skylight; covers, pistons, and slide-valve faces for low-
pressure cylinders on the bulkheads. To the smokestack casings were
secured three connecting rods, eccentric rods, etc.

y, Nothing could be noticed of any provisions having been made for
the protection of the machinery installations except the iron gratings.
In the Almirante Oquendo coal sacks were found near the auxiliary
boiler, but their object could not be determined, the boiler room being
flooded. The steam pipes above the protective deck do not appear to
have been disconnected before the battle. Valves leading to auxiliary
engines, which were not used during the fight (such as ash-boisting
machinery, pumps for auxiliary boilers, etc.), were found open. The
centrifugal bilge pump above mentioned also appeared to have been in
gear. The bulkhead doors above the protective deck were all open.
They could not have been opened subsequently, since all the bulkheads
had been warped by the heat, but the bolts were intact.

(/) At the time of our inspection nothing could be ascertained
regarding the injuries in the engine rooms, because they were all under
water almost up to the protective deck. It was learned from an Ameri-
can engineer engaged in the wrecking operations of the Infanta Maria
Teresa that no dead bodies had been found in the engine and boiler
rooms, and hence it is probable that there have been no material inju-
ries to the boilers and steam pipes. All the bunker bulkheads and con-
necting doors are said to have been open and all the fires of the boilers
lighted.

{g) The damages above the protective deck had been caused chiefly
by the conflagrations, but also by hits from the enemy's secondary bat-
tery. The inadequacy of the lateral protection of the engine rooms
was striking. The supply rooms and workshops had been hit a num-
ber of times. Shots which entered the coal did not go through. Only
one hit was noticed in the auxiliary piping above the protective deck of

8

the Infanta Maria Teresa. The shot had gone clear through the pipe
without rippiug it open, from which it may be inferred that there was
no steam in it at the time.

(A) On the gan and apper decks the smokestack casings had been
perforated in several places, also the smokestacks themselves. Appar-
ently no measures had been taken for closing up these shot holes. The
electric wiring had been struck in many places. Shot holes were also
noticeable iu the speaking tubes. It was not possible, owing to the
complete destruction by fire, to make aiiy further investigation of the
means of communication and command.

(0 The three ships inspected had all their guns on board. The
only ones that could not be found were the two 7-centimeter rapid-fire
boat guns, but pivots had been provided on both sides of the stem,
where these two guns were apparently intended to be installed for use
against torpedo boat attacks at night

(k) From the slight losses which the American ships claim to have
sustained, it may be judged that the training of the Spanish gun crews
must have been very inadequate. This is not surprising, in view of
the statement of one of the Spanish naval officers to the effect that no
target practice is held in Spain in time of peace. Other circumstances
also give evidence of very inefficient handling of the guns. The turrets
and their guns, with the exception of the forward turret of the Almi-
rante OquendOj were found entirely intact. The loading apparatus for
the 28centimeter guns (Wbitworth, Manchester, 1895} was of the
hydraulic order, and the loading time was abont two minutes. The
14-centimeter rapid-fire guns also were probably not used to their best
advantage, owing to want of experience. There was evidently no lack
of ammunition, for near some of the guns a number of cartridges were
found, and some of the guns were still loaded, but had not been fired.
To what circumstance it is due that the breechblocks of two of the
guns were found lying in the rear of the guns with their pivot bolts
torn off, could not be explained. Perhaps this may also be attributed
to inefficient handling of the projectiles.

{I) Only the port side of the ships was fired upon. The starboard
side shows but a few holes, where shots have passed out. Where the
course of projectiles could be traced it was usually ranging from port
aft to starboard forward. The destructive effect of the American pro-
jectiles is mainly due to the conflagrations caused by them. Aside
from a shot through one of the turret roofs, no hits were observed in
any of the armored turrets. Neither have any projectiles pierced the
side armor, which shows no injuries. Only indentations are noticeable
in places where projectiles have struck the armor. Projectiles of 15
centimeters and larger calibers that had hit the ship had in many
instances gone out through the other side, making holes about 1 meter
square, but without bursting. As the same observation has been made
iu the bombardments of Santiago and San Juan, it may be assumed

9

•

that it is due to the nncertaio functioning of the base fuse. It is not
probable that the Americans used armor-piercing shell, as Iragments
of projectiles of different sizes found in the vicinity show that explosive
shell and not nonexplosive shell were used. Projectiles which had hit
smokestacks and masts had gone clear through, making only small,
round or oblong shot holes. Hits of small-caliber projectiles (5.7-centi-
meter) could be noticed in large numbers, and this was corroborated by
the statement of an American officer to the effect that they were used
in great quantities.

(m) The question whether the Spanish had any intention of making
use of the torpedo weapon may probably be answered in the negative.
The torpedo armaments of the ships, although including a large num-
ber of tubes, were so defective that there could hardly be any chance
of success as against the powerful American ships. The armaments
consisted of two bow, four broadside, and two stern tubes, all above
water and of antiquated design, with large cartridges, band-brakes,
etc., all located above the armored deck and entirely unprotected. In
a very primitive manner the tubes had been partly protected by grate
bars lashed with chains.

(n) The projectiles ^ere 35-centimeter Schwartzkopff torpedoes with
large depth-regulating apparatus.

No war-heads were to be found, with a single exception. According
to the statement of an American petty officer, the war-heads had been
left at Santiago, where they were to be used in connection with the
mine obstructions. It is true that this does not agree with the fact
that a torpedo head exploded on board the Almirante Oquendo. It is
possible, however, that the ships retained one or two warheads to be
used in case of necessity as against rams, since the broadside tubes
were adapted to be turned in any direction, or perhaps it was the com-
mander's wish to take a war-head along.

(o) The following points support the assumption that it was not the
intention to make use of the torpedo weapon :

a. Not one of the tubes still in existence was loaded,vand all the
tubes were closed. In the tubes destroyed by shots or otherwise no
remnants of torpedoes were found.

/5t. The remaining torpedoes, almost without exception, were lying in
their places along the ship's side. No torpedoes were found lying back
of the tubes, with the exception of the bow tubes of the Almirante
Oquendo.

y. There was no pressure in any of the f asks. This is shown by
the fact that the flasks were entirely uninjured, although the heat had
partly melted the tailpieces of the torpedoes.

6. In several of the torpedoes lying on top, the protecting cap for
the depth-regulating apparatus had not been taken off, while it is
necessary to remove it in order to put on the war heads.

e. In a few of the torpedoes the sinking valves had been put in place,

10

but in most of them they were still found soldered, with connecting
links raised.

C. The tabes for filling the launching cartridges were not connected,
and only on the Almirante Oqnendo was the powder charge in readiness.

A. INFANTA MABIA TEBBSA.

(p) This was the flagship, and the first one to be beached, about 6
miles from the entrance of Santiago. The ship's bow was lying only a
little higher than usual above the waters line, the stern a little lower;
otherwise upright. She evidently ran ashore at slow speed, for aside
from the fact that there were only small leakages in the bottom, no
boiler explosion took place, nor was the mainmast thrown down. In
other respects also her injuries are much less than those of the other
sbips. The ammunition rooms appear to have been previously flooded,
and therefore did not explode.

{q) This ship shows very few hits from the hostile guns, especially
few of small caliber as compared with the others. While all the wood-
work bas been burned, the same as on the other ships, little damage
has been sustained by the ship's hulL The ship has therefore been
floated by the Americans.^ All leaks had been stopped up, the ship
pumped out, and then hauled off by steam tugs about 6 feet toward
the sea. In this operation she sprang another leak aft and was again
filled with water. On the day of our inspection this leak was being
stopped up and the water pumped out by means of four steam pumps.
Heavy articles, such as anchors, chains, etc., had been transferred to
one of the wrecking steamers. While the ship was dry the two forward
boilers had been set to work, and with them the auxiliary piping and
several bilge pumps.. One of the workmen stated that the engines had
been found intact. The engine rooms could not be visited, because
they were under water up to the tops of the cylinders. It could only
be ascertained that the engine skylight had not been damaged.

(r) Three hits of large caliber — ^probably 20-centimeter — were
observed:

a. A shell had entered the after torpedo room close above the
water line, had passed through a heavy stanchion and a lateral bulk-
head, and out through the starboard side, where it had torn a hole
about 1 meter square. There were no indications to show that the
projectile had burst. The shot hole on the starboard side was slightly
forward of and about 1 meter higher than that on the port side.

/3. Another projectile had passed through the whole length of the
compartment above this torpedo room and out through the starboard
side, likewise without exploding.

y. A heavy shell must have exploded at the upper conning bridge,
for the top of the conning tower, without having been perforated,
showed large oblong scars, caused by heavy explosive fragments.

1 She sank again on her way to the United States. — £d. " Rundschau.^'

11

(«) A 15-ceDtimeter shell had strack the port bow and loosened the
reenforcement ring of the hawse hole. No injaries from explosive
fragments were noticed here.

Another 15-centimeter shell had perforated the 3-centimeter shield
of a 14-centimeter rapid-fire gan on the port side. Fragments had
destroyed the shaft of the elevating gear and both hand wheels.
Others had perforated the forward smokestack casing. This hit
appears to have annihilated the whole crew of this gun, near which
six charred bodies were found.

Another 15-centimeter shell had damaged the after smokestack, after
passing through the empty part of a coal bunker, which was still filled
with coal to within 1 meter of the ceiling.

(t) Very tlBw small-caliber hits were noticed, only 6 in the ship's sides,
2 in the forward, and 5 in the after smokestack, though one of the lat-
ter may perhaps have been caused by a 15-centimeter projectile. Near
the stem three indentations were noticeable in the side armor, proba-
bly caused by 5.7-centimeter projectiles which, striking at a very small
angle, had glanced off.

(tt) Further observations made are as follows:

All the breechblocks of the rapid-fire guns and parts of the mechan-
anism of the revolving guns had been thrown overboard by the Span-
iards. Whether the turret guns had also been rendered unserviceable
could not be ascertained. In any event, they had not been injured by
hostile projectiles nor by the conflagrations. The gun sights were also
missing. Inside the armored turrets no damages of any kind were
noticeable. Even the paint had hardly suffered fVom the heat. In
the after-turret gun a projectile had been rammed home, but appar-
ently the cartridge had not been entered. The conning tower was not
injured, only burned on the inside.

(v) The torpedo-launching tubes and torpedoes had been less dam-
aged by shots and fire than in the other ships. The complete remnants
of twenty-four torpedoes were found, with the exception of the war
heads. Only a few practice heads were found.

B. ALMIRANTE OQUENDO.

'(tr) This ship sustained very severe leaks when running aground.
She lies over to port, with the bow about 1 meter light and the stern
1^ meters deep. The ship appeared to have her back broken in the
region of the foremast. The rapid-fire ammunition room just forward
of the after turret had exploded. Amidships everything above this
room had been hurled down. The protective deck was heaved up and
wrenched Irom the sides. The deck beams throughout were badly
warped, and both sides of the ship showed large holes, through which
the water was washing in. The second explosion had taken place in
the forward rapid-fire ammunition room. The effects were about the
same as aft. On one side they were still further increased by the

12

exploBion of a torpedo war head in the forward broadside torpedo room.
Here the aperture in the ship's side had reached the dimensions of two
meters in width and about 5 meters in length, its lower edge being
formed by the armor.

{x) The Almirante Oquendo had suffered more than either of the other
ships from hostile projectiles.

a A 15 to 20 centimeter shell had torn a piece about 20 centimeters
wide and 50 centimeters long from the upper edge of the gun port in
the top of the forward 28-centimeter turret and burst inside. A num-
ber of small holes, caus(^d by shell fragments, covering a space of about
1 meter square, were noticeable in the top of the turret. There were
no other traces of shell fragments. The bore was empty, the breech-
block closed, and a shell was found in the rear of the gun in position
for loading. Back of the gun and to the left of it two charred bodies
were found, and to the right a mass of human remains that had appar-
ently formed two more bodies. A head was found lying on the plat-
form under the gun. Where the turret commander had been standing
another charred body was found lying on its back, with the gun sights
under it. The gun itself appeared to have sustained no injuries.

fi, A shell, probably of 20 centimeter caliber, had passed through the
ship's side in the engine workshop, where it had demolished the trans-
mission shaft, the boring engine, and the turning lathe^ then through
the engine skylight and exploded on the other side of the latter, in the
engine supply room.

y. A heavy projectile had passed through the smokestack and out
through the starboard side without having bursted in the ship.

c^. About 25 meters from the stem a heavy shell had struck the
'tween-decks and passed through it. On the starboard side inboard,
several small holes were visible, apparantly from fragments of this
shell.

£. A shell, probably of 15centimeter caliber, had hit the shield of
the fourth 14-centimeter rapid-fire gun. The irregular holes noticeable
in the forward smokestacks are probably attributable to fragments of
this shell. The wheels of the revolving and elevating gear of this gun
had also been damaged.

r. A 15-centimeter shell had passed through the port coal bunker
and out through the starboard bunker.

7/. A 14-centimeter rapid-fire gun on the starboard side had been hit
on the left side by a 5.7-centimeter shell ranging forward. The pro-
jectile with solid x)oint had passed entirely through the forward hoop
and penetrated the bore to the depth of 2 centimeters. There were no
splinters from the gun, but the displaced metal had been forced out at
the edges, which is a proof of its great tenacity. The point of the pro-
jectile had been broken off and was lying near the gun. The hole is
about 15 centimeters long and at the widest place 5 centimeters wide.

B. In the whole port side about forty small-caliber hits were counted.

13

most of them amidships. The smokestacks had also been hit several
times by small projectiles.

z. Olftier observations made on board the Almirante Oquendo are as
follows:

The armor had not been injared by any hits. In two of the rapid-
fire guns the sights were found set for ranges of 13 and 14 kilometers,
and in the 5.7-centimeter afber-port gun at 10 kilometers. The sights
of all the guns, with the exception of the revolving guns, had traveling
eyepieces. None of the sights were found set for short ranges. Some
of the 14-centimeter rapid-fire breechblocks were missing, while some
of the guns were found completely loaded.

(y) The torpedo tube in which a torpedo had exploded had been torn
into small fragments, the largest of which were a guiding bar and a
hinged door. The torpedoes secured to the ship's side had also been
destroyed, with the exception of the fiasks, which had been burled
several meters from their positions. The bulkhead 'tween-decks near
the place of the explosion showed traces of the same. Pieces* about 4
centimeters square had passed entirely through it, while still smaller
pieces had penetrated it to the depth of several millimeters. The
conning tower had remained intact.

In the forward torpedo room torpedoes were found near each of the
tubes, but without war heads on them. The port tube had the depth-
regulating apparatus in readiness. The outer cap of one of the tubes
was still open. The tubes had been bent by the grounding of the ship.
They were not loaded.

O. VIZCAYA.

{z) The Vizcayaj like the Almirante Oquendo, is so seriously damaged
that there is no prospect of hauling her off. This ship also ran ashore
at great speed, and the keel was apparently broken in two, for with
each sea the stern would rise and fall with loud creaking and groaning.
The vessel was lying almost upright with only a small list to port.
All the rooms below the protective deck, and the after rooms above it,
were flooded.

Near the forward turret an explosion had taken place in the lower
part of the ship, probably in one of the ammunition rooms. The wood
part of the upper deck had been burned, and the iron plating torn
open, and through the gap could be seen a chaos of brokon anchor
gear, capstans, chains, cement, rubbish, torpedo tubes, etc. The hull
is about equally damaged on both sides.

or. The protective deck had been ripped open and the plating folded
back on the starboard side, between the forward smokestack and the
ship's side, probably as the result of a boiler explosion. The pivot
sockets of the 14-centimeter rapid-fire guns had been torn away and
the guns bent back to such an extent that the bores were pointing
upward almost vertically.

14

y5. Hot coal gas and smoke issuing from an open banker hole showed
that the coal was still burning.

y. The Vizcaya has suffered little from hostile fire. A 15 to 20 centi-
meter shell had struck the forward broadside topedo room, dismounted
the port tube, and had apparently killed a number of men. Several
charred bodies were found scattered over the whole room.

A 20-centimeter shell, ranging forward, had passed through the
ship's side, through a locker amidships near the second 14-centimeter
rapid-fire gun, and through a lateral bulkhead abaft of the forward
turret^ then, striking the turret, had glanced off without causing any
impression, and exploded on the starboard side.

A heavy shell had entered the gun deck forward of the after turret
and passed out through the starboard side without bursting in the
ship.

Besides these three large-caliber hits, about twelve smaller ones
could be noticed in the broadside, most of tbem of 4.7 and 5.7 centi-
meter caliber; also five hits in the forward and one in the after
smokestack.

Other observations were made as follows:

Tlie conning tower had not been damaged by projectiles, but com-
pletely burnt out on the inside. The conning bridge was totally
demolished. Two charred bodies were found still lying in the tower,
also several bodies or parts of bodies in different places on the iron
gun deck. Many rapid-fire cartridges, either whole or in part, were
found scattered about ; also a quantity of exploded small-arm
ammunition.

The breechblocks of two 14-centimeter rapid-fire guns were found
near the guns. In one of these guns the projectile had been jammed
near the muzzle. The whole cartridge was found in one of the bores.
The breech was open.

6. The torpedoes had not been made ready for use and the tubes
were not loaded.

15. If we compare the observations made by the officers of the Geier
as to the number of hits with the results of the examination made
Immediately after the battle, we obtain the following figures:

Hits from —

10-cm. projectile . .
32.7-cni. projectile
20-ciu. project ile . .

^^'•^W. projectile

Secondary battery

Maria Teresa.

Oqnendo.

Visoaya.

1

6 IV

20 XV

5

5 III

3 IV

2
6
4 III

42 XL

11 xviir

Colon .

In the above table the Arabic figures designate the results of the
United States Board, while the Boman figures represent the observa-
tions made at the time of our inspection in August last. It will be

15

noticed that there is not much discrepancy in the figures. Of course,
observations made so long alter the action can not lay claim to abso-
lute accuracy, especially as our sojourn on board was necessarily short.
The traces of many hits have been partly obliterated by the powerful
action of the surf, especially in the superstructures, of which hardly
anything is left standing. It may therefore be inferred that the figures
of the United States Board are more nearly correct than ours; but even
tliey probably fall short of the actual results.

16. The Brooklyn was hit about twenty times by shells and several
times by fragments and machine gun projectiles. The cruiser sustained
no serious injuries of any kind. The lotoa is said to have been hit
twice in the bow, just above the water-line, by 15-ceutimeter shells and
seven times by small-caliber projectiles. The Texas and Indiana were
hit twice by light projectiles without sustaining serious injuries.

17. In order to be able to realize the complete defeat of the Spanish
fleet it is necessary to call clearly to mind its situation in Santiago
Harbor. Oervera had entered the harbor on May 19. As early as May
27 five hostile cruisers with several gunboats and auxiliary cruisers
were observed in front of the harbor, and there was no longer any
doubt that the whole American battle fleet was blockading the harbor.
Then followed the bombardments of Morro Castle and the Socapa, sev-
eral shells falling into the bay, and the Spanish ships retreated closer
to the city. On June 3 the Merrimnc was sunk, but the entrance
remained unobstructed. On June 22 occurred the landing of the
American troops, who on July 1 attacked the fortifications of the city.
Five hundred men of the landing corps of the Spanish ships took part
in the defense and are said to have fought very valiantly.

18. The Government authorities at Havana were very anxious to
have the fleet leave the harbor, in order to remove the main object of
the attack upon Santiago; for the ships had been the cause of the
blockade and of the attack on the unprepared city. Hence it was
imperative that the ships should leave. It is probable that ever since
the middle of June this had been suggested to Admiral Cervera by the
authorities at Havana; but the Admiral ax)pears to have declared that
it was impossible to make an attempt to run the blockade at night.
Whether direct orders were finally given to leave the harbor under all
circumstances I have not been able to ascertain.

19. Admiral Cervera was in a very difficult jMJsition. He was expected
to act in some manner. He did not dare make the attempt at night,
and so he decided to go out with his fleet in broad daylight. The
whole crew fell a victim to this fatal decision. Instructions for the
order of the Bortie and the taking of the western course had been pre-
viously issued by the chief of the fleet. According to the Bevista Gen-
eral de Marina, Vol. XI, No. 3, August, 1898, the Admiral was entirely
convinced of the impossibility of defeating the enemy or of reaching
another Cuban harbor, even if he should succeed in steaming right

16

through the hostile fleet. It is to this feeling of helplessness and impo-
tence as against the American naval forces more than to anything else
that I attribute the defeat. The Spanish ships had spent a month and
a half in the harbor without even attempting to attack the blockading
fleet when a favorable opportunity presented itself, or even of harass-
ing it. The two torpedo-boat destroyers were not used for the purpose
for which they were intended. This inactivity and lack of initiative
must have had a very demoralizing effect on the officers and men. If
we add to this the certain knowledge that the opposing forces were
much stronger, it will be readily understood that the idea of general
flight after coming out of the harbor entrance was the only acceptable
one, especially in view of the possibility of beaching the ships, thereby
rendering them unserviceable, and eventually rescuing the crews. From
the very moment that this feeling of impotence took possession of the
Spanish and led to the above reflections their fate, psychologically
speaking, was sealed. We do not mean to disparage their valor and
tenacity in the midst of the hostile fire; but, on the other hand, it is
quite natural that the Admiral, seeing that everything was happening
as he had foreseen, was the one who set the example of running his
ship ashore. All the other commanders followed this example.

20. On the American side the situation was just the reverse. Ad-
miral Sampson's fleet was fully conscious of its power. The blockade
was being conducted in accordance with carefully prepared plans, as
were also the arrangements in case of the enemy's attempt to escape.
Frequent engagements with the Spanish forts had given commanders
and crews that calm and assurance in the handling of their weapons
which guarantees success. The long blockade service, exhausting and
monotonous, hardly interrupted by any action on the part of the Span-
ish; had strung the nerves to the highest pitch, and everybody was
anxious for the end to come. Suddenly the enemy attempts to escape.
All the passions that had been smoldering under the ashes break forth.
The welcome opportunity for settling accounts with the enemy had
come at last, and with a wild rush the American ships fell upon their
victims. At the beginning the American fire, owing to the excitement
of the personnel and the great distances, was probably not very effect-
ive; but when the Spanish admiral turned to westward and the other
ships folld^ed him the moral superiority of the Americans reasserted
itself. The commanders, calm and cool-headed, had their ships follow
the same course, and the Americans, having every advantage on their
side, recommenced the fire on the fleeing ships, which soon resulted in
their total annihilation.

21. I have already spoken of the lack of training of the Spanish
crews, the neglect of gun and torpedo target practice, the inadequate
education of the commanders of the ships and torpedo-boat destroyers.
It is mainly due to these deficiencies that the defeat was hastened and
that the American ships sustained so few losses. Furthermore, there
can be no excuse for having allowed the cruiser Cristobal Colon to

17

leave Spain without her heavy armament. It has also been stated that
the rapid-fire gans of this cruiser were unserviceable, so that she was
really completely defenseless. The training of the engine personnel
also was totally unreliable, which is not surprising in view of the fact
that the Spanish ships, as a rule, are not sent out on extensive cruises.
The bottoms of the Spanish ships had not been cleaned for a long time,
and as they had been lying in Santiago Harbor for a month and a half
they were considerably fouled. Thus the cruisers Maria Teresa^
Oquendo, and Vizcayaj which in all official books are credited with 18.5
knots speed, went into the battle with a speed of from 10 to 12 knots
at most, and the Cristobal Colon^ which is the latest ship and was to
run 20 knots, hardly attained a speed of 13.5. Under these circum-
stances, in every way unfavorable for the Spanish, whose crews were
insufficiently trained and physically and morally enervated by long
inactivity, whose ships were inferior in number, speed, and fighting
efficiency, it is no wonder that the victory of the Americans was easy
and paid for with insignificant sacrifices.

22. There was only one chance for the success of the sortie. It should
have been made at night in scattered formation. After a personal
investigation of the locality, it is my opinion that it is entirely practi-
cable for a fleet to leave Santiago Harbor at night. The wreck of the
Merrima^ did not constitute an obstruction. It is true that Admiral
Sampson's report on the night blockade states that the light-ships
were lying from 1 to 2 miles from Morro Castle, according to the state
of the atmosphere, and that they lighted up the channel for half a mile
inside. Even the best search light, however, does not reach farther than
1 mile. Therefore the illuminati^ could not have been very effect-
ive. Moreover, the shore batteries, by opening fire upon the light-ships,
could have compelled them to change their positions; but, strange to
say, this was never done. The dark nights at the time of the new moon
about the middle of June would have been best suited for the enter-
prise. Besides the four vessels of the fleet, two large Spanish merchant
vessels lying in Santiago Harbor might have been taken out in order to
deceive the enemy. The six vessels, with lights darkened, should have
followed each other out of the harbor entrance, in predetermined order,
as fast as possible. They should then have steered different courses,
previously determined, with orders not to fight except when compelled
to do so by the immediate vicinity of a hostile ship or when there was
no possibility of escaping the enemy in the darkness. A rendezvous
should have been fixed for the next day, where the ships that succeeded
in escaping were to assemble.

23. If the fleet did not dare attempt a night sortie and was neverthe-
less compelled to leave the harbor in obedience to orders, then the
ships should have been headed straight at the enemy. All weapons,
including the torpedo and the ram, should have been used. A bold
attack in close formation was the only chance of success against the

17176 2

18

■

saperior hostile fightiDg forces, who would hardly have found time to
form their liues.

24. I shall not attempt to discuss at length all the lessons which may
be derived firom the battle, because this would lead too far. I will only
enumerate them, and confine myself to dwelling a little more fully on
those which are of- the greatest importance for practical service.

(a) Abolition of all woodwork.
(5) Ko unprotected torpedo tubes.

(c) Protection for all gun crews against shell fire.

(d) Protection of the fire-extinguishing apparatus against shell fire.
{e) Smokeless powder; greatest possible simplicity in the service of

tbe guns and greatest possible rapidity of fire.
(/) Good speed of the ships under normal conditions.
{g) Thorough training of the crews in all branches of the service.

25. The last two are the most important. A ship may show very
brilliant results at the trial trip and be credited with the greatest
si)eed in the different books on the navies of all nations; but for the
ofiicer who is to command the ship in battle this is not a criterion
from which to judge of her efficiency. Frequent trial trips under full
steam, making it possible to discover and cure defects of the machin-
ery in time of peace, and familiarizing the personnel with the function-
ing of the vessel in all its details, can alone give the commander an
idea of what he may expect of his ship in battle. Extensive cruises at
war speed should also be made, in order that the^ personnel may get an
idea of how much more will be required in time of war. This is espe-
ciaUy important in the tropics, where the great heat materially affects the-
physical endurance and efficiency of the boiler and engine personnel.

26. The most perfect training of the crews in all branches of the
service, especially by all kinds of torpedo and gun practice, as nearly
as x)ossible under war conditions, is the foundation of success. As I
said in Part lY of this work, nothing should be left undone to attain
the greatest perfection possible in time of peace. No expense should
be spared to enable those who bear the responsibility of the battle —
the chiefs of fleets and squadrons, as well as all commanders — thor-
oughly to test the actual degree of efficiency of their crews by prac-
tical exercises, resembling as nearly as possible the operations of
actual warfare.

27. Such exercises will also demonstrate whether the weapons, from
a technical standpoint, are equal to all the exigencies of war. I learned,
for instance, that the following defects were found to exist in the Amer-
ican artillery materiel :

(a) Brooklyn. — In the 5.7-centimeter rapid-fire guns cartridges were
jammed in several instances. In the 20-centimeter guns the plugs
stuck several times. Some of the 12.7-centimeter rapid-fire guns
became unserviceable toward the end of the battle because the elevat-
ing gear did not function properly, and all these guns had to be sup-
plied with new mounts after the battle.

■^^

o
o

a:

o

Q.

Z
<

o

o

o
Z z

< <

CO

I-
<

19 i

(b) Texas. — The two 30.5 centimeter gans bad been fired several times
across the deck, considerably damaging the latter. A suggestion made
in time of peace that the gans be tested in that respect had not been
followed out.

(o) lowa.'-On this ship, also, the deck had been damaged by the
firing of the heavy guns. The training gear of the 20-centimeter gans
had not been able to sustain the firing at great elevation.

The most careful examination of the artillery materiel in time of
peace is absolutely necessary. Even when the strictest requirements
are made and fulfdled in testing the guns, it. is no guarantee that the
materiel wUl not in the course of time show defects on board ship. In
order that such defects may not remain hidden, to become apparent
only when tbe guns are used in actual war, at least part of the target
practice should be held with full service charges.

VII. THE OCCUPATION OF PUERTO BIOO.

1. In my first visit to San Juan de Puerto Bico (see Part III of the
Sketches), I found there, to my great astonishment, a comparatively
large German colony. I learned that in all the principal towns on the
island, such as Ponce, Mayaguez, Aguadilla, and Arecibo, Germans
are likewise settled, and in the possession of large business houses,
enjoy the esteem of the Spaniards as well as of the Puerto Bicans.
Under these circumstances it appeared necessary to send thither a war
ship for the protection of the Germans when the Government of the
United States commenced action against Puerto Bico. I have success-
ively visited the harbors of Mayaguez, Ponce, and San Juan. The first
two were already occupied by the Americans, while the third city was
still in the hands of the Spaniards. On the 13th of August it became
known that peace negotiations had commenced, and hostilities ceased.

No great battles were fought in this campaign ; only a few minor
skirmishes took place. But the American troops were marched up in
such a simple and skillful manner that the operations are not without
interest. Moreover, our readers will be glad to learn some particulars
about this beautiful island, in which these many years German mer-
chants, mostly from Hamburg and Bremen, have exerted their best
energy in steady, unremitting toil, and which now, as the price of vic-
tory, falls into the lap of the United States.

2. The accompanying map of the island is the latest and best pub-
lished. It shows the different departments, so that a description is not
necessary. All the turnpikes and roads which are to be considered in
connection with the advance of the American troops, as well as the
raikoad skirting the coast, are also indicated on the map. The moun-
tain range which extends nearly parallel to the southern coast from
Adjuiitas to Oayey is, on an average, not over 1,000 meters high, and
from both towns is continued in several spurs to the eastward and
westward. This range constitutes a weather barrier, as the freah
northeast trades cool the northern part of the island and provide

20

abundant rains, while in the southern part of the island the mountains
prevent this moderation, and the heat often becomes unbearable.
Numerous streams water the fertile soil, which in former years pro-
duced mainly sugar, but now also coffee, tobacco, and bananas, and
furnish large areas of magnificent pastures. The number of inhabitants
in round numbers is 800,000. The area of Puerto Eico is about one-
tenth that of Cuba, which has hardly 1,500,000 inhabitants. The
whole island of Puerto Kico is inhabited. There are no extensive uncul-
tivated stretches, as in Ouba. Still, much remains to be done to obtain
better yields than heretofore from the rich and fertile soil. In the first
place, the agricultural methods should be improved, better communica-
tion established with the coast, and, finally, the mineral treasures of
the island exploited. In this latter direction hardly anything has been
done. As far as the social conditions of the island are concerned, it
has been spared the serious disorders that have been raging in Cuba
during the last few decades. The Spanish, by means of military posts
distributed all over the island, and especially the Guardia Civil, an
excellent police system, have succeeded in maintaining order and
safety throughout the country. There have been minor disturbances,
it is true; but at no time has there been an actual rebellion against the
Spanish Government, such as was spoken of at the beginning of the
Spanish- American war. Nevertheless, there has gradually developed
among the Puerto Kicans an intense hatred toward the selfish Spanish
administration, and with open arms they received the Americans who
came as liberators from the Spanish yoke.

3. The general opinion, reinforced by the United States press, was
that the troops would land east of San Juan, probably at Tajardo.
General Miles was the only one who was informed as to the landing
place selected, and he left Guautanamo on July 21, with the auxiliary
cruiser Yale and seven transports with about 3,500 men. The battle-
ship MaasdchusettSj the cruiser Oolumhiaf and six small gunboats and
auxiliary cruisers, among them the Dixie, Annapolis^ and Gloucester,
accompanied the transport ^eet. Upon reaching Mona Passage the
fleet headed for the southern coast of Puerto Rico, and on July 25, the
troops were landed at Guanica without encountering serious resistance.
The very next day, after a short fight with the Spanish, Yauco, which
controls the railway to Ponce, was occupied.

On July 27, the Dixie, Annapolis, and several other vessels appeared
in front of Ponce and demanded the surrender of the city. The United
States general granted time until the next morning, and told the com-
mander of the city that unless the surrender had taken place by that
time he should at once proceed to bombard the city, and land his men.
Captain-General Macias, at San Juan, had given the commander strict
orders to defend the city to the utmost, but the combined efforts of the
foreign consuls prevailed upon Colonel San Martin to agree to the sur-
render of the city on condition that the Spanish troops would not be
pursued for forty-eight hours. This agreement, however, of which the

21

United States commander had already been notified, was declared null
and void by Captain-General Macias, who at the same time discharged
Golonel San Martin from office, and it was only due to the energetic
efforts of the German and British consuls that the captain-general
became convinced of the necessity of surrendering, and finally con-
sented to the evacuation of the city. Thus the Americans took posses-
sion of Ponce at 6 a. m. on July 28, without loss of life or injury to
property, and on July 29, they landed a large division of troops, con-
sisting of from 5,000 to 6,000 men, with artillery and wagons. On
August 1, two vessels occupied Arroyo, where about 3,000 men were
landed.

4. Thus the Americans in a short space of time had gained posses-
sion of the three principal harbors on the southern coast of Puerto Bico
without firing a single shot. They owe this first of all to the friendly
disposition of the population and the lack of energy of the Spanish
officers, who did not dare offer any resistance. General Miles's sub-
sequent plan of campaign is self-evident. The troops landed at Arroyo
were to advance upon Guayama, thence to Cayey, which lies on tbe
main road to San Juan. The fighting forces at Ponce were also to
advance upon Gayey by way of Juana Diaz, Goamo, and Aibouito. The
troops at Guanica were to advance by way of Yauco, San German, and
Hormigueros, and occupy first Mayaguez, then Aguadilla and Arecibo.
A glance at the map will show that this plan would compel the Spanish
forces, in order not to be cut off, to retreat to San Juan. When all the
United States forces had been concentrated at San Juan, they were to
surround the city, supported by the blockading fleet, and it was here
that the decisive blow was to fall.

5. General Miles's plan of campaign was carried out as intended.
On August 8 General Schwan advanced from Yauco upon San German.
At Hormigueros they were opposed by the Spanish, who with 1,000
men occupied an excellent position; but as soon as the American artil-
lery was lined up and the American lines advanced the Spanish evacu-
ated the heights and retreated. On August 11 General Schwan took
possession of the town of Mayaguez, which had been evacuated by the
Spanish, and met with a hearty reception from the inhabitants. The
American troops pursued the Spanish and succeeded in surprising them
on August 12 at Las Marias. The Spanish troops were resting, with-
out any special measures of precaution, on the bank of the Guasio
River, when the Americans were discerned on the heights. As the
river was very high from recent heavy rains, the Spanish had difficulty
in crossing it. The American commander demanded their surrender;
but it seems that the Spanish had opened fire, thereby compelling the
Americans to answer with their artillery. This caused great confusion
in the Spanish lines. Two companies only succeeded in crossing the
river, the others had to surrender. The Spanish had 40 killed and
wounded. Among the many prisoners who were taken to Mayaguez
were several colonels and captains.

22

On ADgnst 4 the main body of the troops advanced on the excellent
road from Jaana Diaz, a small town about 25 kilometers from Ponce.
On August 9 they took Coamo, which the Spanish were holding with a
force of about 1,000 men. The fight lastied five hours, and ended in
the evacuation by the Spanish, as tbe Americans had succeeded in
going around the enemy's fiank. The Spanish had 15 killed, among
them the commander in chief and and several officers. About 150
were taken prisoners. The Americans had 7 wounded. The Spanish
retreated to Aibonito, where they intrenched themselves in a fortified
position. They were not effectively attacked here, because hostilities
were suspended about that time.

The third division of the American troops had advanced from Arroyo
and taken Guayama on August 5. On August 8, while advancing
toward Gayey, the Americans had a slight engagement with the enemy
intrenched in a fortified i)osition, ending in the retreat of the latter.
But the American troops had to return to Guayama, because they did
not consider themselves strong enough to accomplish the task set them —
viz, to advance as far as Gayey. When, on August 12, the Americans
started a second time, they found the Spanish in the same fortified
position. No fight took place, because the news arrived that peace
negotiations had been entered into.

6. According to the census of January 1, 1898, the Spanish had the
following troops in the different departments:

ABM7.

Sftn Juan..
Areoibo ...
Agaadilla .
Mayagnes.

Ponce

Gnayama .
Namaoao. .
Vieques . . .

Total.

Generals.

2

Com-
inandera.

89
1
2
3
5
4
1
1

Officers.

56

136
15
13
51
51
44
16
4

330

Men.

2,217

253

313

1,101

1,817

997

320

96

6,614

Total.

2,894

269

328

1,155

1,373

1,045

337

101

7,002

NAVY.

Snu Junu . .

Arecibo

Agnadilla .
M ayaguuz .

Ponce

Gnayama . .
Nnmacao . .
Vieques ...

Total

Admirals.

Com-
mauders.

11

Officers.

20
1
1

1
2
1

26

Sailors,
mechMiiics,
and fire-
men.

287
3
2
4

5
2

4
1

808

Marine
infantry.

22

22

Total.

339
4

3
5
6
8
6
2

368

28

Theyolanteers have not been included, because, with very few excep
tions, they laid down their arms as soon as the Americans landed in
Paerto Bico.

7. In Puerto Kico, as well as in Ouba,no plans had been made for con-
centrating the troops at the beginning of the war. The fighting forces
were so small that landings of the enemy at any point on the coast
could not be impeded. The troops, by remaining in their different
departments, might find themselves under the necessity of having to
fight far superior hostile forces, and finally to retreat within sight of
the enemy in order not to be cut ofi:'. The best plan would have been
to concentrate all the troops in a fortified position near Cayey, keeping
up retrograde communication with San Juan. If the enemy had landed
east or west of San Juan, it would have been easy, in view of the good
road, to effect a change of front or for the whole force to retreat to
San Juan, which was the most important point of the Spanish. If
that city had been defended by 7,000 men, it could have resisted the
enemy for a long lime. It is true, however, that without the prospect
of assistance from the Navy, the final surrender of the city, as the
result either of the harbor being forced by the enemy or of starvation,
would have been only a question of time.

8. At the time of our arrival at Mayaguez hostilities had just been
suspended. General Schwan had taken charge of the administration of
the department. The inhabitants were entirely satisfied with the new
order of things, but many families were mourning the fatal defeat of the
Spanish troops at Las Marias. The prisoners taken by the Americans
had been quartered in the barracks and were being strictly guarded.
We had to abandon our attempt to inspect the scene of the battle
because the road, owing to recent rains, was in very bad condition and
obstructed by the numerous baggage carts of the American troops.
But in order to gain at least an idea of the immediate surroundings of
Mayaguez, I drove to Hormigueros, where the first engagement had
taken place between American and Spanish troops. A well-kept road
follows the coast over almost level ground, passing through several
small hamlets. Soon the scenery changes. Cane fields resplendent in
their fresh verdure are seen in every direction, and beautiful hills
closely covered with banana palms and coffee trees appear before our
eyes and gradually rise higher and higher.

In the distance the river may be seen, crossed by a number of iron
bridges, over which the railroad passes that runs along the river. The
road rises very gradually, and after we had passed over the top of the
range of hills we saw at our feet the pretty town of Hormigueros. At
its highest point stands the church from which one must gain a mag-
nificent view over the whole region. We went there, and after mount-
ing the stone steps into the belfry, we saw before our eyes a panorama
of indescribable loveliness. Indeed, a better point could hardly be
found from which to gain an idea of the exquisite beauty of Puerto

24

Bico. Far as the eye can see stretch the pictaresqne ranges of hills
clad in the loveliest green ; at their feet a few scattered cottages and
small hamlets, aud glistening streams winding their way through
them. But we could not allow our eyes to be completely captivated by
the natural charms of the country. We had also to satisfy our military
cnriosity. Oue thing became evident at a glance, namely, that the
church was the best tactical point of the whole region, as all the dif-
ferent positions could be observed from there. The Spanish commander
in chief appears to have realized this circumstance; for, as the kindly
priest of the church told us, it had been his intention to occupy the
church and line up his artillery on the adjoining hill; but the priest
had succeeded in dissuading the commander from this plan, which
would surely have entailed the destruction of the church and town.
Probably no serious resistance had been planned by the Spanish, and
they were therefore only occupying the range of hills between which a
defile leads to the town of Mayaguez, to which the troops retreated as
soon as the Americans commenced to advance after the first few vol-
leys. In the little town of Hormigueros peace and quiet were reigning.
The Americans had already appointed a mayor. A few families from
Mayaguez had come hither to await further developments. On my
return to Mayaguez I had an opportunity of inspecting a company of
United States volunteers. They were nearly all tall, robust men, most
of them with healthy complexions and of good military bearing. All
the volunteers were equipped with Erag^orgensen rifles.

9. On August 16 we left the harbor of Mayaguez and steamed to
Ponce, where we arrived in the evening of the same day. The harbor
was crowded with American war ships, auxiliary cruisers, and trans-
ports; but as a result of the peace negotiations, many of the war ships
had received orders to return to Guantanamo or to proceed to the
United States, so that the harbor was considerably cleared during the
next few days. General Gilmore, in the absence of General Miles, who
was then at Goamo, had established the headquarters of his staff at the
custom-house. The United States garrison was encamped near the
harbor on both sides of the main road leading to Ponce. The camp
consisted of ordinary tents, with camp beds raised a few feet above the
ground. As it always rained several hours during the day and usually
all night long, one may easily imagine the condition of this camp.
Men were constantly at work digging new drains for the water. At
times the guards and patrols surrounding the camp had to wade in the
mud up to their knees. It is a wonder that there was not more sick-
ness in the camp, for the American general told me there were only a
few cases of malarial fever. But exposure to the burning rays of the
sun, to constant rains, and the exhalations of the soil is extremely
dangerous in this climate, as the residents know only too well, and can
not fail but have its injurious effects sooner or later. As a matter of
fact, many cases of fever have subsequently developed among the

25

American troops. I can not understand why the military authorities
had not exercised greater care. Would it not have been better to send
the troops to Goamo, which is located on much higher gi*ound, leaving
only a small garrison at Poncef Such a garrison would have been
quite sufficient for the protection of the latter town, and might have
been quartered in public buildings, such as the church, the theater, etc.
The United States transport steamers are said to have had on board
all the material necessary for the construction of a small shipyard. If
it is true that they carried their preparation to that extent, then better
provisions should also have been made for takiug care of human lives.
If it was not deemed advisable to quarter the men in the towns, then
corrugated-tin barracks should have been taken along, which can be
taken apart and speedily erected on piles driven into the ground.
Ordinary tents were certainly inadequate.

10. On one of the following days we made an excursion to the vicinity
of Ooamo, about 30 kilometers from Ponce. The beautiful wide road
extending all the way to San Juan is a true work of art, and makes it
possible to advance rapidly. The whole distance from Ponce to San
Juan, about 135 kilometers, can be made in vehicles, by changing the
horses twice, in fourteen to sixteen hours. The rise is very gradual.
On both sides are small huts of natives with corrugated tin roofs, or
covered simply with palm leaves and built on piles about L meter high.
Soon we came out upon the open cx)untry, where wooded hills and val-
leys alternated with coffee plantations and banana and sugar-cane
fields. The profuse tropical vegetation, especially the slender palms
with their magnificent crowns, is a constant delight to the eye. After
the rain, which had been falling all through the preceding night, the
foliage was particularly green and fresh and the shady road nearly free
from dust. In several places the road is crossed by the river, which
can usually be forded. Where it is too rapid bridges have been built.
Upon reaching Juano Diaz the landscape becomes even more beautiful.
The heights afibrd a splendid view of the whole region from tlie coast
to the high mountain range. At Coamo we left the main road and soon
reached a beautiful valley made famous by the ^^ Baiios de Coamo."
There is a large hotel for the accommodation of visitors. The bathing
establishment also is very conveniently arranged. A natural spring
furnishes sulphur baths. The only thing that reminded us of war dur-
ing our trip were a few squads of American cavalry and long trains of
wagons, each drawn by six mules, which were taking the necessary
supplies to the troops encamped at Aibonito. From what we could
learn, it seems that the American authorities were preserving excellent
order and safety at Ponce and vicinity, but the Puerto Kican inhabit-
ants showed their hatred for the Spanish so openly that in spite of the
strict measures taken by the. Americans there- is danger of demonstra-
tions by the inhabitants in that direction.

11. On August 23 we made a second visit to San Juan. The mines

26

in the entrance had been removed and the channel was marked by
baoys in the asaal manner. Besides the (Spanish gunboats Isabel 11^
General Conchey Creola^ and Fence de Leon^ and the torpedo-boat de-
stroyer Terror^ there were neither war nor merchant vessels in the har-
bor. The city itself presented the same aspect as before the blockade.
It was not until the latter part of August that steamers arrived and
commerce and traffic were reestablished. I took advantage of our
presence there to learn further particulars about the engagement
between the torpedo-boat destroyer Terror and the United States
auxiliary cruiser 8t. Paul. The commander of the Terror gave me the
following account of the battle:

At 9 a. m. on Jane 22 the lookout at the fort signaled a sospicioaB yeasel. The
commander gave orders for the Isabel II to go oat to recoanoiter and for the Terr&r
to be ready for action. By 11.30 the vessel had come closer and the Isabel II went
out. Upon sighting her, the hostile oraiser immediately hoisted her flog and waited.
The Isabel II opened fire on the foe. The destroyer then received orders to go oat
and assist the Isabel. The Terror, which had been lefb by her fleet at Martiniqne,
had not been able to recover her gnns and ammanition, which daring the voyage
had been transferred to the Maria Teresa in order to make room for coal. The Terror
therefore had no other weapons than her torpedoes and two 57-millimeter gnns with
little ammunition. The Isabel fought the 8U Paul at a distance of from 10,000 to
12,000 meters. As the utmost range of our guns was only 4,000 meters, we could not
assist the Isabel by going closer to her. I therefore gave orders to head the Terror
east, so as not to interfere with the Isabel firing north on the enemy. When we were
sufficiently clear of her and had the open sea before us, I headed straight for the
St, Paul at a speed of from 20 to 21 knots.

The enemy, who hitherto had been firing on the Isabel, now directed upon us the
well-aimed rapid fire of both her batteries, the lower one of which appeared to have
eight, the upper one ten to twelve guns. At 4,000 meters we opened fire with our
guns, in order to keep up the spirit of the crew during the long interval between
the beginning of the hail of projectiles and the launching of the torpedo. Our fire
was very accurate. At the first shot we saw the sheU explode on the stern. Sev-
eral other shots also hit their target, and our men were wild with joy. We had
approached to within 1,200 meters and were about to launch the torpedo when the
Terror commenced to veer to starboard. I had the holm shifted to port, but the
ship kept on turning. Then I ordered the port engine stopped, and still the ship
continued to turn to starboard. I then learned that a shell had exploded on deck
and destroyed the leads to the steering gear and telegraph, so that the vessel fol-
lowed the movements of the screw and was unmanageable. The hand-steering
gear was at once put in operation ; but as we passed the enemy at such close range,
several projectiles hit us, one of them passing through the port side into the engine
room, where it burst. The engine room became flooded and the engine appeared to
have been disabled. We Just managed to steam into the harbor.

From an inspection of the Terror it appeared that the fatal shell,
ranging obliquely downward, had passed through the ship's side, torn
off a steam gauge, killed three men, and struck the lower edge of the
main steam pipe, tearing oif its covering. This had deflected the shell,
and it had passed out through the starboard side. It^as through the
hole made by the projectile in passing out that the engine room had
been flooded up to the lower edge of the steam cylinder; but the
engines continued to run, so that the TerroTj though with gradually

27

slackened speed, was able to reach the harbor under her own steam.
The shortest distance between the Terror and the St Paul had been
800 meters. The gunboat Isabel IIj I was told by her commander, had
not gone closer than within 6,000 meters of the enemy.

12. We then visited the fortification works and made the following
observations, which may be considered as a supplement to the descrip-
tion of the bombardments contained in Part III of these Sketches:

(a) Morro Castle. — On the highest terrace are three 15centimeter
Ordonez guns of 30 calibers length and two 24-centimeter breech-load-
ing howitzers of modem type; direction of fire northwest to west. On
the next lower terrace are two 15-centimeter Ordonez guns. These are
all the guns that had been mounted. Ko guns were dismounted during
the bombardments. The walls of the fort are over 6 meters thick and
extremely solid. They show many hits of heavy, medium, and light
artillery. The heavy projectiles had entered the walls to the depth of
2 meters and torn large pieces out of the masonry work. The smaller
projectiles had done very little damage, which had already been repaired.
One shell had struck the comer of the wall on the lower terrace and
killed two of the men serving the gans and wounded several others by
shell fragments and debris.

{b) Cristobal Castle. — Two 15-centimeter Ordoiiez guns of 30 calibers
length, trained north, fired about eighty rounds during the bombard-
ment. A little to the rear are three 24-centimeter breech-loading how-
itzers of modern type. At one of these an enfilading shot passing
over Morro Castle had struck the breech and killed one man. As a
result of this accidental hit, and to protect the men serving the farther
guns against shell fire and debris, earth traverses had been thrown up
between the guns after the battle. A little farther back and to the
east three 15-centimeter guns, with an arc of fire north by way of east
to southwest, and hence also adapted to fire on the land, were mounted
on central-pivot carriages. These took part in the fight with about
thirty rounds. Finally, at the Princesa Battery, adjoining Cristobal
Castle on the east, there are four more 15-centimeter guns and two
24-centimeter howitzers. Cristobal Castle and the Princesa Battery
sustained only a few hits, slightly damaging the outer walls.

(c) The howitzer and gun batteries of the harbor entrance show no
serious injuries. Morro Castle appears to have been the main object
of the American fire. The fact that many shells did not explode has
been much commented upon.

{d) Besides the fortifications mentioned above, the Spanish had
erected a new battery at Escambron, with three 24centimeter how-
itzers of modem type in central-pivot mounts, for indirect fire. For
land defense a series of earthworks had been erected near San Antonio
and armed with mortars and bronze guns.

13. As we left Morro Castle Spanish soldiers were engaged in tak-
ing down the shield with the Spanish coat of arms over the main

28

entrance. As the remains of the ever-glorions Golumbas had been
removed from the cathedral at Havana, where thoy had a beantifal
and well-cared- for resting place, so it was also desired to carry to
Spain this escutcheon which for centuries had been the witness of the
victories and greatness of the Spanish nation. When both of these—
the remains of the man to whom the whole world owes so much and
the emblem of Spanish power — ^reach Spain there will be profound sad- ^

ness throughout the whole country over the final loss of its colonies.
The history of this short straggle is another example of the instability
of power and fame in the ever-changing destinies of the nations of |

the earth! I

O

I

^■^'OFFICE OP NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.
WaII KOTKS No. V.

INFOnMATIOlN FROM ABHOAD.

EFFECT OF THE GUN FIRE

United States Vessels

BATTLE OF MANILA BAT

By LiBUT. JOHN M. 1J.LICOTI', U. 8. N.,

InUUiaenu Offctr. V. S. S. Haltiiivjn.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

W.ASHINGTON:

GOVERXUEKT PHIXTIXO OFFICE.

isay.

INTRODUCTORY.

This rei)ort on the Effect of the Gun Fire of the United States
Vessels in the Battle of Manila Bay, by the Intelligence Officer
of the U. S. S. Baltimore, has lately been received. In transmitting
it Admiral Dewey calls attention to the value of the information
contained.

The conclusions drawn by Lieutenant Ellicott at the end of his

report are particularly interesting.

EicHARDSoN Clover,

Commander, U. 8, N., Chief Intelligence Officer.
^AVY Department, March 27^ 1S99.

Approved :

A. S. Crowninshield,

Bear-Admiral^ U. 8. JT., Chief of Bureau of Navigation.

3

EFFECT OF GUN FIRE, BATTLE OF MANILA BAY,

May 1, 1808.

U. S. S. Baltimore,
IJoilo^ P. J., January 1^ 1899.
SiB: I have the honor to submit the following report on the effects
of the gun fire of the United States fleet upon the Spanish war vessels
in the battle of May 1, 1898, and respectfully request that it be for-
warded to the OflSce of Naval Intelligence. The report is based upon
a personal examination of all the vessels, personal conversations with
officers who served on them in the action, and extracts from Admiral
Montojo's official report.

Eeina Cristina.

This vessel was flagship of Admiral Montojo during the greater part
of the first engagement. She received a large concentration of gun
fire and was placed hors de combat by conflagrations fore and aft, the
destruction of her personnel, the destruction of her steering gear, and
the bursting of a shell in her super-heater. She was then sunk by the
Spaniards and abandoned in shoal water under the north wall of
Cavite heading eastward, where she burned, with bulwarks awash.
During the conflagration there were frequent heavy explosions. The
injuries visible above water afterwards were as follows:

One large shell across bulwarks at break of forecastle, cutting away
starboard lower boom.

One large shell swept bridge, apparently from starboard to port, and
destroyed starboard search light. Thismay havebeentheshell described
by Admiral Montojo as destroying the steam steerer.

In the forward smokestack the following shells: One 8 inch low, one
8-inch high, one 6 pounder low, one (J-pounder high; and in forward
escape pipe one 5-iiich and one 6-pounder midway.

In ventilator forward of after smokestack, one 6-pounder waist high
and one 6-pounder midway.

The after smokestack fell 60 degrees to port, probfibly caused by the
large shell mentioned by Admiral Montojo as exploding in the super-
heater. This stack was struck, apparently while still upright, by one
8-inch shell low, two 6-pounders near the top, and one 5-inch midway.

Underneath tox)gallant forecastle one 8-inch shell entered near the
deck and close under break of forecastle, going from port to starboard

5

and forward at an angle of 45 degrees, and burst ander the forecastle,
a large fragment passing oat on starboard side.

Two 5-inch shell also penetrated nnder the forecastle on port side
well forward, 6 feet above deck, and burst.

One 5-inch entered on starboard side in same locality and passed out
on port side without exploding.

The mizzenmast, although much burned, showed evidences of having
been pierced six times, and the fore and main masts once, by shells of
various calibers.

The starboard after launch's davit was shot away, as if by a large
shell.

An 8-inch shell pierced the shield of the port forward 16-centimeter
gun, above and to left of the breech, and exploded, slipping the elevat-
ing arc band just its width to the rear and wrecking the elevating
wheel, rod, and pinion on left side of gun. A fragment of this shell
wrecked the elevating gear on the right side of the opposite gun. The
portion of the shield penetrated sloped at an angle of about 30 degrees
with the axis of the shell. The bursting of the shell about 2 feet in
rear of its point of impact was coordinated by a huge hole torn upward
in a sheet-iron bulwark rail arclicd over the sponsou embrasure.

Admiral Montojo reports additional injuries as follows:

A shell burst on the foi-ecastle, disabling all the crews of the four rapid-fire gnns
and driving splinters from the foremast which wounded the helmsman, who was
steering on the bridge.

A shell burst on the orlop deck, setting fire to the lockers of the crew, who fortu-
nately succeeded in putting out the fire.

The enemy *^ » • covered us with a hail of rapid-fire projectiles.

About half past 7 a shell completely destroyed the steam steerer.

Another shell exploded aft, putting nine men out of actiou.

* * * Another carried away the mizzen truck and gaff", bringing down the
ensign and my flag, which were immediately replaced.

Another shell burst in the wardroom * * » and destroyed the wtmnded who
were there under treatmeut.

Another burst ii^ the after ammunition room, filled the compartments with smoke,
and prevented the cou]>liug of the handwbeel. It being impossible to keep down
the fire, this ammunition room had to be flooded when the cartridges were begin-
ning to explode.

Amidships * * * a large shell had penetrated the super-heater, putting out of
action a gunner's mate and twelve men who were serving the guns. .

Another disabled the starboard bow gun.

** * * The fire forward was renewed by a shell which penetrated the side and
burst on the orlop.

When many men had already been saved * * * a shell killed her heroic cap-
tain * • * ^'iio was directing the rescue of the crow.

Summing up, it is in evidence or officially recorded that the Cristina
was struck by five 8-inch, five 5-iuch, and thirteen other large shell, and
by seven 6-pounder and nine other projectiles, or thirty-nine projectiles
in all. These are not all, as Admiral Montojo reports having been cov-
ered by a hail of rapid-fire projectiles, and in conversation has estimated
that the Cristina was hit about seventy times.

CASTILLA.

This vessel had developed sach weakness in steaming to Subig Bay
soiiie days before the battle that she was not under way on the 1st of
May, but in the beginning of the engagement was moored head and
stern in the line of battle, her port broadside bearing. A string of
iron lighters loaded with sand was moored in prolongation of Sangley
Point to protect her water line. During the engagement her bower
chain was cut by a shell and from the impact of another shell she
swung around till her starboard broadside was presented. Being a
wooden vessel she was readily and repeatedly set on fire. About 10
o'clock, while the Pnited States squadron was drawn off, her flag came
down, either by design or accident, and she burst into ilames fore and
aft. She then sank until her main deck was awash, and her bulwarks
and upperworks were completely consumed by flames. Her forward
smokestack fell 60 degrees toward the starboard quarter, probably
weakened, like the Cristina^s, by the explosion of a large shell. Next
to the Cristina she received the greatest injury from gun fire. Injuries
visible to iJispection are as follows :

One 5-inch shell dismounted 37-millimeter gun on port forward
bridge over sponson.

Que 6-inch cut fore and aft beam over port forward gun sponson.

Seven small shell passed through forward smokestack.

Five small shell passed through forward drum room.

A large shell tore a 4-foot hole in the port side below the main deck
and just abaft the port midship gun.

There is a similar injury on the starboard side, nearly opposite.

One 5-inch shell through the after smokestack.

Three 5-inch shell, close together, entered port side under main deck,
abaft after smokestack.

One 6-pounder in after smokestack.

One 6- pounder in after escape pipe.

Two 5-inch entered port aide between mainmast and after sponson.

One 5-incli passed through shield of 37-millimeter gun on port after
bridge, over sponson, dismounting gun.

One 6-pounder cut forward part of upper edge of port after gun-
sponson embrasure.

One 1-pounder cut forward vertical edge of same.

One 5-inch raked outside of starboard after sponson.

One 6-inch entered starboard side, under main deck, under midship
gun.

There are two jagged holes, 4 feet and 1 foot in diameter, on starboard
side under main deck, abreast after smokestack.

One 5-inch on starboard side under main deck, just abaft forward
sponson.

One 5-inch through after side of forward starboard sponson.

8

One 5 inch through port after sponson, forward side, near deck.

Two scars of small shells on port after 16-centiuieter gun shield.

Several small holes in after smokestack as if from fragments of a
bursting shell.

Total, two G-inch, twelve 5 inch, and four other large shell; three
6-pounders and sixteen other small shell; thirty-seven shell in all.
Survivors tell of three 8-inch shell which burst on the orlop deck for-
ward, amidships, and aft, causing fires which could not be controlled.
This rai.'^es the known hits to forty.

Admiral Montojo states:

The CasHlla * * * had aU her guns put out of action except one on the poop.
* * * Riddled by shot and in flames from the enemy's shellS; she was sunk and
abandoned by her crew.

Survivors state that they were rescued by boats from shore which
came off in obedience to a prearranged signal.

DON ANTONIO DE ULLOA.

This vessel was not in repair on May 1, parts of her machinery being
on shore. She was moored head and stern on the left of the Spanish
line, in Canacao Bay, just behind Sangley Point, her starboard broad-
side bearing, the port guns having been removed to be emplaced on
shore. The low sandy point was expected to form some protection to
her hull. She was only manned by men enough to fight her starboard
battery, about half of her normal complement. She received but little
gun fire in the first engagement, but was riddled and sunk by the lead-
ing American ships in the second, and was abandoned with colors
flying. She listed heavily to starboard just before settling, but righted
on the bottom and lay with her poop awash, superstructure and fore-
castle above water. She had sent down yards and topmasts and these
si)ars were on shore, except the lore yard, which had been untrussed
but not sent down. The slings of this yard were cut during action
and the yard fell across the forecastle on the sheet bits, breaking the
beam at the break of the forecastle. The other injuries visible above
water are as follows:

One C-pounder entered under forecastle from forward, passed through
the midship waist ventilator and burst in front of pilot house, near
deck.

One 8 inch raking shell entered at break of topgallant forecastle
just under the deck and burst.

One 8-inch burst just under the superstructure deck, port side, on
line with after end of pilot house, a long half fragment passing out
through the skin of the ship.

One 5 inch came over starboard rail a little farther aft and passed
out through port bulwarks.

Six 6-pounders came over same way between superstructure and
poop, and passed out through hammock nettings on port side.

One 8 inch passed clean through both sides, starboard to port, just
under after break of superstructure deck and near mainmast.

One G-inch came in starboard rail abaft mainmast and passed out
through i^ort hammock netting.

Seven large shells, probably 5 inch, ripped across superstructure
deck,.comingfrom direction of starboard bow.

One 8 inch across forecastle from starboard to port dismounted star-
board 6-pounder gun, cutting away the mount.

One 6-inch shell passed through the shield of this gun.

Three 6-pound ers from starboard to port passed through mount of
port 6-pounder gun.

One small raking shell gouged skin of ship just forward of port
sponson.

One large shell ripped poop in front of mizzenmast.

One large shell cut starboard binnacle stand.

Three large shells ripped poop deck, coming from direction of star-
board bow.

Two large shells burst under poop, one near break and one aft, forc-
ing up the leek.

The left side of after 4.7-inch gun shield and the sponson rail were
cut through by a 6-inch shell.

Total hits observable: Four 8 inch, three 6 inch, one 5-inch, and four-
teen other large shells; ten 6pounder and one other small shell;
thirty-three projectiles in all.

Admiral Montojo states:

The Ulloa * * * was sunk by the holes made along her water line by the
enemy's projectiles.

DON JUAN DE AUSTEIA.

This vessel was sunk by the Spaniards behind Cavite Arsenal, in
Bacoor Bay,about two cables off shore abreast the west arsenal gate,
after retiring from battle at the end of the first engagement. She
wns anchored by the port anchor and sank heading east, her top-
gallant forecastle above water and poop awash. After being aban-
doned, and while sinking, she was set on fire by a ])arty from the
Petrel sent for that purpose, and burned from the after engine-room
bulkhead to the stern. Her starboard guns remained trained on the
bow, and port ones on the beam.

Twelve empty 6 pounder cartridge shells lay at starboard forecastle
gun and nine at the port one. A full box of 1-pouuder ammunition
remained on starboard side of superstructure near the pilot house.

The injuries to this vessel were as follows:

Two 6-pounders, or smaller, scarred foremast.

One 6-pounder and one 5-inch entered port side under topgallant
forecastle and burst without causing fire.

One 6-inch or 8-inch passed, through superstructure deck under the

10

bridge on port side and barst in the captain's galley, caasing no fire,
there being no woodwork in its neighborhood.

Another similar shell coming from same direction (one and one-half
points abaft the beam) struck the snperstractare deck near the corner
of the pilot house, glanced up and demolished the steering wheel and
gear and engine telegraphs.

Two 6-pounder8 passed through the pilot house, one from port to
starboard low, and one from starboard to port halfway up.

One 5-inch cut through the mizzenmast about halfway up.

One 5 inch entered under port hawse pipe and burst, damaging
port torpedo tube.

One 6-pounder entered at waterway under superstructure on main
deck, port side.

One 5-inch entered port hammock netting abreast the mainmast

One 6-pounder struck the rail abaft the poi t after 4 7-inch gun.

No further injuries were found after the vessel was raised. Summing
up, she was hit by the following shells: Two tt-inch or 8-inch, four 5-
iuch, five 6-pounders, and to other small shells; thirteen projectiles in all.

The Austria has two bow torpedo tubes. When raised a 14.2-in< h
Schwartzkopff' torpedo was in the upper starboard outboard rack
abreast the tube, and another lay on the deck in rear of the starboard
tube without a head.

The Austria assisted in rescuing the men from the Castilla before retir-
ing behind the arsenal.

ISLA DE LUZON.

This vessel and the Isla de Cuba maneuvered together on the Spanish
right fiank, more retired than the other vessels, circling together at
considerable speed. The Luzon retired behind the arsenal at the end
of the first engagement, anchoring near the Austria^ and was sunk by
her own crew. Iler stern settled upon a submerged wreck, keeping the
cabin above water and the topgallant forecastle awash. After sinking
her head lay northeast, she being about a cable's length southwest of
the Austria, She was set on fire .'ind burned by the same party which
burned the Austria^ the damage by fire being almost identical.

One 4.7-inch common shell, nose fuzed, remained in a rack between
the after guns.

The injuries by gun fire were as follows:

One large shell crossed her rail in wake of the two forward guns,
disabling both guns.

One shell cut the chain topping lift of the fore gaft\ letting the peak
fall across the bridge.

The jLweon assisted the Cuba in rescuing men from the Beina Cristina
before retiring behind the arsenal.

Admiral Montojo states that —

The Luzon had three guns dismounted and some Hiuall injarics to her hull.

11

There seem, therefore, to have been three hits in all. No additional
injuries could be discovered when this vessel was raised.

ISLA DE CUBA.

Admiral Montojo transferred his flag to this vessel when the Cristina
was abandoned. After rescuing a part of the latter's crew she stood
in behind the arsenal and was anchored by the starboard anchor a
cable's length southwest of the Luzon^ heading southeast. She was
sunk by the Spaniards and burned by the PetreVs party in the same
manner as the Austria and Luzon, Her main-battery guns remained
trained on the bow. This vessel used armor-piercing shells from her
after 4.7-inch guns, and these being the only guns of that caliber firing
armor- piercing shells in the engagement, it must have been one of these
which struck the Baltimore.

The injuries to the Cuba were as follows:

One 6-pouuder through the pilot house, starboard to port.

One shell cut away both forward vangs abreast the pilot-house rail.

One 6-pounder passed through under the topgallant forecastle with-
out exploding.

One 6-pounder glanced from left side of starboard after 4.7-iuch gun
shield.

One G-pounder struck conning tower shoulder high, but did not
penetrate.

Total hits, four Gpounders and one unknown caliber; five in all.

The Cuba showed no additional injuries when raised.

MABQUES DEL DUKRO.

The Vuero was in action in the left wing of the Spanish line and
under steam. She assisted in rescuing the survivors of the Cristbia
and retired like the others behind the arsenal, where she was anchored
close to the shore, about 800 yards west of the C\iba^ heading east, and
was there scuttled and abandoned. A ])arty from the Petrel burned
her. She was entirely gutted by fire and lies with bulwarks awash.
She shows the following injuries from gun fire:

One 8-inch shell entered close under topgallant forecastle deck,
starboard side, and probably exploded.

One 6-iucli very close to the latter, probably exploded; there being
no evidences of egress by either of these shells.

One 6-j)ounder passed through midship gun sponson, starboard side,
forward of gun shield.

One 6-pounder passed through after bulwarks, starboard side, down
through deck and out port side near break of poop.

Admiral Montojo reports :

The Duero had one engine crippled, as well as her 12-centimetor bow gun and one
of her sponsous.

Thus there seem to have been five hits in all.

12

VELA SCO.

Tliia vessel was undergoing extensive repairs and lay at moorings
near tbe east water front of Cavite arsenal. Her main deck in wake
of tbe boilers bad been removed to take out tbe latter, wbicb were on
sbore. A new superstructure deck bad been laid, but was unfinished.
Slie bad no steering gear in place. Sbe took no part in tbe action.
All ber guns bad been removed to be mounted in sbore batteries. Sbe
was sunk by tbe Spaniards after tbe first engagement and tben burned
by a party from tbe Petrel. Sbe lies on an even keel, beading westward,
witb bulwarks awasb, and was not seriously injured by fire. There are
evidences of tbe explosion of a quantity of small-arm ammunition on
her deck aft, probably when sbe was burned. Sbe was struck by one
stray shell, which crossed ber stern from port to starboard, carrying
away the taffrail and kedgeancbor fluke on starboard quarter.

GENERAL LEZO.

«

Admiral Montojo states that this vessel was under repair and not in
action. After tbe second engagement sbe was found anchored in
Bacoor Bay by tbe port anchor about 2 cables south of the Liizon^
heading south and settling. Sbe was burned by a party from tbe
Petrel, her after magazine exploding with great violence, as well as
some ammunition on deck. Her midship guns were missing and,
although she had a bow torpedo tube, there were no evidences of tor-
pedoes on board. The elevating gear of her 9-ceutimeter bow gun had
been damaged by a projectile. She lies with main deck about 2 feet
under water.

ARGOS.

Tbe Argos was a hydrograpbic survey vessel lightly armed and not in
tbe fight. She remained anchored behind the arsenal about 800 yards
west of the Velasco, and was scuttled by the Spaniards and burned by
a party from the Petrel, She settled till her bulwarks were awash,
heading east. One large shell struck her starboard bulwarks at break
of forecastle, passing outward.

Summary of hits in evidence or officially reported.

Name of vessel. •• ^^

»<?v

Nnni- I

ber of , Koniarks.

Iiil8.

Keina Cristina

CaMtillu jm^:.-, .

Don Antunio do Ulloa ^V, : .

Don Jnnn de Austria a^'V* ■

Isla de Caba r. .r: .t .

Isla de Luzon

Marques del Duoro ".

Volasco •.

General Lezo

Argos

39 Probably not more than half.
•40 , Do.
33 Do.

13 . Complete record.

5 Do.

3 Do.

5 Probably more.

1 Probably all.

1 1 Do.

1 Do.

Total 141

13

Of these, thirteen were 8-inch, six 6-inch, and twenty-two others 5-inch
or larger; thirty-one were G-pounders and twenty-nine others smaller
calibers.

The Spanish ships had removed all light spars, slang gafifs, and
snaked rigging, but they went into action without unshipping awning
stanchions, ridge ropes, or canopy frames, and they carried many of
their boats. They were all painted gray except the Castilla. She was
still white except her gun sponsons, which were gray, and her smoke-
stacks yellow.

The killed and wounded, as nearly as I have been able to ascertain
by painstaking inquiry, were as follows:

Veartcl.

Killed.

Wounded.

Total.

Seinn Cristiiia

130
23

90

80

2

6

22

10

0

4

220

Castilla

IU3

iBla do C uba

2

Isla de Lnzon

6

Don Juan do Aii8fria - - - - - - - -

22

Don Antonio de Ulliui

8
0
6

18

MarQuof) del Diicro

0

Shore batteries

10

Total

1C7

214

381

Officers killed and included in the above: Reina Christina, captain
and six others; Castilla, one; I>on Anto7iio de Ulloa, captain and two
others.

The total casualties agree with Admiral Moutojo's official report.

The following points in connection with my examination seem to be
brought out or emphasized:

1. The sides of iron and steel built cruisers do not arrest projectiles
enough to explode them.

2. The incendiary effect of bursting 8-inch shells is great, and far
greater than would seem proi)ortionate to that of lower calibers.

3. At ranges over 2,500 yards the gun shields of cruisers are in no
sense a protection, but insure the annihilation of the gun's crew and
the disabling of tbe gun if struck by a large projectile.

4. War ships of the present day will generally be placed hors do
combat by contlagration and the destruction of their personnel before
they are sunk by gun fire.

Very respectfully, John M . Ellicott,

Lieutenant, United iSiates Xavy, Intelligence Officer.

To the Com3iandi:n'g Officer, U. S. S. Baltimore.

1

n

"^ IX /<! OFFICE OF NAVAL IITTELLIGENCE.

~ War Notks No. VL

INFORMATION FROM ABROAD.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

BLOCKADES AND COAST DEFENSE.

SEVEEO G;0MEZ NJJSEZ,

CAPTAIN OF AUTILLERY.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

WASHINGTON :
GOVERNMENT PRINTIUa OFFICK

cA^'^jir^ii'^—

coatj^t

^

-^^

NOV S4 1899

'Wuwi V'^^A/Z^^i^

INTRODUCTORY.

Since the issue, of the interesting diary by Lieut. MtLller y Tejeiro,
of the Spanish navy, there has been nothing written in Spain on the
war worthy of reproduction until lately a work by Severe G6mez
Ntinez, a captain of artillery, who served in the city of Habana during
the war. The aversion of the Spaniards to writing on the war and
their reticence thereon is characterized by the writer as a <' deathlike
silence." In his final conclusions he states:

It is Barprising how mncli has been written in foreign countries on the Spanish-
American war during these few months. We have before us dozens of American,
English, French, Italian, and German books, reviews, and periodicals, in which
writers relate, to their hearts' content, the phases of our defeat. And in the face of
this wonderful activity, which often interprets erroneously the causes of the appall-
ing decline of Spain, we, on the other hand, preserve deathlike silence. This is
not as it shonld be. In the United States, for instance, there is not a single officer
of high rank who took an active part in the war but has furnished, in books or
reviews, an exposition of the facts, substantiated by documents, and the Govern-
ment, in its turn, has followed the same plan and published reports of the Army
and Navy. Among ns, as stated, deathlike silence reigns, and thus it is that foreign
critics lack all knowledge of our claims to vindication which, though slight, may
nevertheless throw light on many things, for by the side of much that is bad and
for which we are being justly censured, there is also some good which is being
ignored, while it shonld be truthfully and conscientiously set forth, so that we may
not be judged without being heard and considered more inefficient and incapable
than we really are.

The correspondence of Admiral Cervera, which was published by the
Office of Kaval Intelligence at the close of the recent war with Spain,
and was obtainable only in part, is given in full in this work.

This translation of Captain Nunez's book is complete except where
indicated in the first chapter. The paragraphs there omitted are the
personal opinions of Captain Ntiiiez regarding the actions of our people.
His feelings under the circumstances are pardonable, but his ideas have
no historical value.

The concluding chapter of a previous work on the Spanish- American
war by Captain Ntinez, entitled Ships, Guns, and Small Arms, ia given
in Appendix A.

Appendix B is the decree of the council assembled in the trial of
General Jos^ Toral Yeldsquez, commander in chief of the Spanish

3

forces, and other officers engaged in the defense and surrender of San-
tiago de Cuba, translated from El Mando Naval Ilustrado of Septem-
ber 15 and October 1, 1899.

Richardson Gloveb,

OommandeTy U. 8. N.j Chief InteUigenoe Officer.
Navy Department, October 5, 1899.

Approved:

A. S. GROWNmSHIELD,

Chief of Bureau of Navigation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Introduction 7

Chaptbr I.— Thb United States Plan of Campaign :

Political blindness — What Spain coald do— What the United States could

do— Naval strategy 9

Chapter II.— Blockades and Privateering :

Laws regnlating them — Letters of marque and reprisal — Brutality of

blockades — Blockading on a large scale 16

Chapter III.— Operations of the United States Squadron :

Before the arrival of Cervcra's squadron — What the Naval Annual says —

Initial orders of the Navy Department at Washington 24

Chapter IV.— Operations of our Squadron :

Opinions of Admiral Cervera — Replies thereto— Appalling deficiency of

our naval power — Sortie of the squadron 33

Chapter V. — The Beginning of the End:

Increase of the United States fleet — Operations on the Cuban coast —
Bombardment of different ports — Operations against Puerto Rico-
Destruction of our cables — Our squadron at Santiago 50

Chapter YI. — Blockade of Harbors :

The Oquendo and Vizoaya — Blockade of the coast — ^Aspect of the blockade
of Habanar— Conditions of the blockade of Santiago — Sinking of the

Merrimao — A few strange facts 63

Chapter VII. — Coast Defense :

Stationary defenses — Mobile defenses — Shore batteries — Sea forts— Float-
ing batteries — Torpedoes — Torpedo boats — Monitors — Battleships and

cruisers I.. .... 82

Chapter VIII.— What a Military Port should be :

Choice of location — Commercial cities — ^Military ports — Geographical sit-
uation—Santiago de Cuba 90

Chapteb IX. — Conclusions:

The political aspect — The naval aspect — The military aspect — The needs
of our nation 98

5

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

BLOCKADES AND COAST DEFENSE.

By Seyebo Gr6MEZ NT^flBZ, Gaptain of Artillery.

[TnuuUted £rom the Spanieh,]

INTRODUCTION.

I frankly ackuowledge that I bad considerable misgivings when I
gave the first book of this work to the public.

I was afraid that a storm would be raised against it, and although I
always try to use moderation in my criticism, I had at times to fight
with so many obstacles in conforming to that line of conduct that I
was tempted to tear up what I had written.

But the conviction triumphed within me that anyone who knows
anything relative to the defeats we have suffered is under moral obliga-
tions to speak out, and that by doing so he renders a valuable sei^vice,
because nothing is gained by suffering in silence; on the contrary, by
clearly setting forth the facts we make the benefits inherent in truth
accessible to all, and at the same time, by conveying an accurate
knowledge of the errors which have brought us to our present pitiful
condition, we give a better understanding of the responsibilities which,
in the distribution of the same, fall to each entity, and of the dangers
which the future has in reserve for us — dangers of death, of absolute
disBolutiou, of complete annihilation — which will fall down upon us
with crushing force, unless we place our whole trust and energy at the
service of one single idea, the defense^ preservation^ and development of
what there is Uft to us of owr country.

Fully convinced of the necessity of promulgating these theories, I
put in print the second volume of The Spanish- American War, inspired
by the same motives as set forth in the preface to that work, although
at present I possess more freedom of action, since I do not labor under
the disadvantages which I experienced before. The causeof this change
is the good will and approval with which the public has received the
first part of this work, entitled Ships, Guns, and Small Arms, and the
kindness with which the press has commented upon it. From these
circumstances I gather the conviction that the great mass of the people
is not indifferent to the causes of the present terrible decline of Spain,
and that therefore it will not be labor lost to examine into the disaster
for the purpose of deriving lessons therefrom and obtaining the means
for obviating still more radical misfortunes.

As the subject of the present volume, I propose to analyze the princi-
pal system of warfare (if I may be permitted to use that term) which the

7

8

United States employed against our colonies — ^the blockade — in order
to explain the fatal circamstances which rendered efficacioas a coarse
of action hitherto looked upon as a secondary means of little conse-
qnence in naval conflicts, and will then enter upon an analysis of coast
defense and show, always with reference to the results of the Spanish-
American war, how necessary it is for our country to prepare for the
defensive, applying the maxim of less theory and more prcLctice, less
studies and more action.

And when I set down these words, with which I closed the first book
of this work, it must not be supposed that I deem studies and theory
^superfluous; on the contrary, the less studies are required in the execu-
tion of anything, the more studies are necessary in the preparation
therefor. Technical knowledge is becoming each day more indispen-
sable, and we may be sure that as its foundation grows more solid the
mind will be more and more freed from fantastical schemes, followed
by irresolute action, with serious detriment to the service. What I
mean is this, that to defend our coasts it is not sufficient to widen the
fleld by studies a posteriori, when the essential thing, a knowledge of
the harbors, is an already much abused matter, on the subject of which
innumerable plans have been drawn and lucid essays written; we
should also understand that our tendency should be to begin with the
acquisition of the most modern and perfect material with which to
equip our works of defense, because the factors of defense and, to a
certain extent, their location are subordinate to their equipment
There was a time when it was possible to pursue the opposite course;
that is to say, to construct fortifications with numerous emplacements
for guns, which were to be had in large numbers; but nowadays, when
guns are very expensive and of complicated construction, it is indis-
pensable to h ve the guns first and adapt to them the works of defense,
and that is precisely what requires a great deal of previous study on
the part of those who are called upon to decide as to the acquisition of
our future war material, because, as was said by a general of our army,
well known for his scientific learning:

They should be inspired 'with the most complete knowledge of the technical prin-
ciples which underlie modern inventions, and it is only with such knowledge and
the application of the results achieved in other countries, together with further
experiments in our own, that the problems which present themselves, uue after
another, can be speedily solved and the country prepared for the future.

To these ideas we might add the advisability of giving an impulse,
on a large scale, to our military industries — gun, shell, cartridge, and
powder factories — but as the men who are at present in charge of our
military matters appear to have realized this, we do not deem it neces-
sary to insist upon it.

But it should be remembered that nothing we have said is opposed
to the rapid development of our defenses, with less studies and more
acti<^.

SEVERO Gk^HEZ l^T^HfEZ*

Madrid, Jnr^^ J2, 1899.

CHAPTER I.

The United States Plan of Campaign.

political blindness — ^what spain could do — ^what the united

states could do — naval strategy.

Anyone wlio had not seen the war coming must have been blind.

• ••*«* •

To ns the war seemed inevitable and imminent. Nevertheless the
news which reached Cuba from the Peninsula revealed great confidence
that the conflict would be settled peaceably. The mistake was patent
and the harm it worked was infinite. This hope should never have
been harbored in Spain, and yet there were people who believed in it,
and their bejief seemed warranted by the absolute calm that reigned,
for neither in Spain nor in Cuba were any of those rapid and energetic
measures taken which the war demanded in the way of provisioning
the country, concentrating the troops, and developing the naval power.

The plan of campaign of the United States commenced to be clearly
outlined. The astonishing voracity of the press in that country gave
free play to its anxiety and devoted itself to sketching the outlines of
the naval and military operations likely to be undertaken against us.
The Yankee strategists attached the greatest importance to our navy,
which appeared to be quite strong judging from the published lists of
our warships and the attributes with which they were credited, among
others the speed and efficiency claimed for our destroyers, which really
succeeded in producing a certain panic among the United States sailors.
We feel sure that the exaggerated reports about the expedition of
which they formed part were not without influence on 4^he subsequent
maneuvers of the United States squadron.

In the United States the war was considered so imminent that more
than two months before it broke out, namely, on February 13, the New
York Herald gave to the press a complete plan of operations, which
was considered of semiofficial character.^

Much of this plan was so rational that there could be no doubt as to
its having been traced by an expert hand, and it might very well have
been taken as a basis for the future policy of our country. But perhaps
our Government had better information. We had not, and, moreover,
there was so much consistency between what the plan said, what log-
ical reasoning advised, and what the Americans did that we will take
it for the basis of our argument.

' We considered it of safficient importance to undertake the task of translating
and publishing it in the Diario del £j6rcito at Habana. It appears to have been
inspired by the strategic board.

9

10

It might be objected that there coald be little foaudation for a plan
of war which was imparted beforehand to the enemy. Anticipating
this objection, we will say that anyone who has lived in the United
States and is acquainted with its mode of being knows that there is
nothing hidden in that country. This special idiosyncrasy is carried to
such a degree that even the most secret plans are published. As an
example, we might cite the filibustering expeditions, which were
always announced beforehand and afterwards confirmed by facts.

In the plan of war referred to, the following questions were dis-
cussed :

In case war should be declared between Spain and the United States,
what would be the plans of campaign of the two nations f

Would Spain be the first to take the offensive?

Would the initial action be taken by the United States?

Would the struggle be easy if carried abroad, on land or on the sea,
or in both places, and to what extent?

These different subjects are discussed in the following manner:

In strategy there are three thiiij^s which demaud special cousideration :

(1) The base of operations.

(2) The objective.

(3) The line of operations.

The base of operations is the position from which the forces are able to advance
and to which they can withdraw.

The objective comprises fonr different phases : Attack upon the enemy's commerce ;
bombardments of hostile ports; blockade of hostile coasts; invasion of hostile
territory.

The line of operations designates the place where the fighting occurs — that is to
say, the scene of war generally.

THE SPANISH BASK OF OPERATIONS.

The principal base of operations for Spain would be the island of Cuba, and for
the United States, Key West. Cuba is the largest island of the West Indies and the
most importan t Spanish colony. It is situated at the entrance of the Gulf of Mexico,
130 miles south of the State of Florida and 75 miles distant from Key West, from
which it is separated by the Florida Channel. To the east, the island is separated
from Haiti by the Windward Passage, which is over 50 miles wide ; 90 miles to the
south, in the Caribbean Sea, lies the island of Jamaica ; to the west, Yucatan Chan-
nel, 130 miles wide, separates it from the nearest part of Central America.

The extent of its coasts, leaving minor sinuosities out of the question, is 2,000
miles. The littoral is very dangerous and full of rocks and reefs, and of sand banks
extending several miles into the sea. Owing to these sand banks there are only few
places where it is possible to land. There are not to exceed fourteen bays of suffi-
cient depth to allow warships of average draught to enter.

Hence there are along the coasts arms of the sea which are protected by keys and
sand banks and can only be entered through straits and sinuous channels, at the
extremities of which the bays open, or which terminate toward the outside, between
sand banks, in the shape of bays.

This configuration must be taken into consideration from a strategic standpoint
and from the point of view of the advantages and disadvantages which these coasts
present. From what has been stated it will be seen that it would not be a difficalt
operation to close the ports of Cuba against a foe and leave them open as places of
safety and refuge for the friend.

11

WHAT SPAIN COUIJ) DO.

For the defense of the eastern part of Caba Spain could ^eep the Windward
Passage nnder surveillance, using it as a lookout upon the Caribbean Sea. On that
Bide the island terminates in Cape Maysi. The Windward Passage at the place
where it separates this cape from Haiti is about 45 miles wide. Practically the
whole navigation -between the eastern coasts of the United States and the lower part
of Central America goes through this passage. Cape Maysi is a point of low land,
uninhabitable, without any port; the nearest anchorage is the harbor of Baracoa, 25
miles distant, on the northern coast of the island.

The base of operations of a squadron designed to blockade the Windward Passage
might be either Baracoa on the northern coast or Guant^amo on the southern
coast. The harbors of both are suffiiciently deep for warships of large draught.

THE DBFENSIVK SQUADRON.

Two squadrons would be necessary, one to operate on the north from Baracoa, the
other on the south from Guant^namo, and in order to insure cooperation between
the two fleets a line would be required from sea to sea across the country. When
this line is established and the patrol of the Windward Passage and the Caribbean
Sea provided for, the action would have to be extended to the northern channels
toward the central part of Cuba, farther remote from the passage referred to. For
that purpose another harbor would be required to serve as a depot not far from
Baracoa — ^Nipe, foi instance, 75 miles distant from the former.

The harbor of Nipe is very safe and its water deep. This bay is 9 miles long and
from 3 to 7 miles wide. The distance of 75 miles from Baracoa could be made by
the squadron in five hours if necessary, or one division might be kept at Nipe and
the other in the Windward Passage, one of which could be cruising while the other
remained at its station.

BAHAMA CHANNEL.

From Nipe the Bahama Channel can be effectively blockaded by the Spanish
fleet. The limits of the cruising line from Nipe might be 150 miles, from, the island
of Lobos to Crooked Island, 600 miles from Puerto Rico.

A powerful hostile squadron might make an attack from the northeast, in which
case the Bahama Channel and Windward Passage would play an important part,
because it is there that the principal battles would take place.

The ships necessary to close these passages and operate in the south in case hostile
forces should present themselves from that direction would be 3 armored cruisers,
4 cruisers of large tonnage, 8 smaller ones (including gunboats and seagoing torpedo
boats), and a few torpedo boats as adjuncts of the armored cruisers.

The fleet required to control the sea on the northern and eastern coast of Cuba
might consist in all of 3 armored cruisers, situated 150 miles apart, 4 large protected
cruisers at intermediate stations relative to the former, and 8 smaller cruisers or
gunboats between each of the large cruisers and the line of harbors which serve as
bases.

Such a fleet, in the positions indicated, could be concentrated in twelve hours at
any point where the enemy might appear with sufficient forces and with the inten-
tion of breaking through the line, and would moreover guard a good part of the
Windward and Mona passages, so as to prevent hostile attacks from the south.

As we have stated, the squadron of the south might be stationed at Guant^amo;
but this harbor might prove inadequate for the needs of the large squadron of the
north, especially in connection with the southern squadron.

If that should be the case, the harbor of Santiago de Cuba would constitute a
better base for the fleet, as it has better resources. It is situated 5 miles from the
coast, and can be reached only through a narrow channel which is intricate and
tortuous and in several places only 200 feet wide.

12

THB KEY TO THE ISLAND.

On the nortbwest Cuba is bounded by Florida Channel, 130 miles wide, and Yuca-
tan Channel, 100 miles wide. For operations in Florida Channel, the base might be
a line 45 miles long connecting Habana with Matanzas. These two cities play the
most important part from the standpoint of strategy and commerce.

Habana, the capital of Cuba, is the key to the island; but its defenses, like those
of all other Cuban harbors, are old and Tulnerable and equipped with guns that are
not adapted for attacks upon modem armored ships.

Habana is practically undefended,^ and yet, by adequate defenses for its harbor
and coasts, it might have been made an impregnable base of operations, and at the
same time a base for refitting and a safe depot for men as well as supplies of every
kind for the ships, and the center of the necessiury reserves.

Matanzas, the other extreme point of the western base, is a much smaller city
than Habana, its population reaching only 70,000 at most. The channel is 4 miles
long and 1 mile wide, and is defended by three antiquated batteries.

The coast between Habana and Matanzas is open and can be safely navigated at
a distance of 3 miles. Within this base the ships can cruise without danger by day
and night. If the adversaries should attempt to effect a landing here, they might
find it impossible, provided there were some mobile defenses and some means for
harassing the enemy on the sea. This action could be further extended by con-
trolling the 80 miles of the Florida Channel in the manner indicated below, and the
result would be the destmction of the hostile commerce in that direction. A first-
class battle ship could be stationed midway of the channel, 40 miles from Habana,
and one armored cruiser between this battle ship and Key West, and another between
the battle ship and Habana. On both sides of the line formed by these three large
ships would be placed large protected cruisers, and in the intervals between them
dispatch boats.

YUCATAN CHANNEL.

In this arm of the sea might be stationed three cruisers, assisted by three or four
gunboats, to watch for and pursue merchant vessels. At Cape San Antonio there
are no harbors, but good anchorages are quite near where the gunboats could have
their stations. In case they should find it necessary to go into port, there is Bata-
ban6, between cays, but well marked by buoys, and with 12 feet of water. Gun-
boats would be quite safe here, because no large ships can enter from without.

ATTACK UPON COMMERCE.

Having indicated the bases of operations which Spain might occupy in order to
render both the defensive and offensive effective, and having examined into this sec-
ond and most important conception of strategy, we will branch out on some other
considerations.

The principal objective of attack will be the enemy's maritime commerce. The
disposition of the Spanish fleet as above set forth will facilitate the pursuit of
United States vessels navigating in the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico.

THE COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES.

All merchant vessels bound for Central America passing through the straits
between the West Indian islands would be at the mercy of a couple of cruisers of the
Alabama type.

If Spain wanted to operate against the commerce of the United States, she would
have to watch, besides the Caribbean Sea, the outer part of the Gulf Stream, begin-
ning at Cape Hatteras, in the vicinity of which the merchant vessels bound for the
south usually leave the Gulf to avoid the current.

'In treating of the defenses of Habana we shall see how erroneous this opinion

13

Another important point where the commerce with North America might be inter-
cepted is about 1;000 to 1^200 miles east of New York, in a circle not exceeding 300
miles in diameter. At this place pass all the merchant vessels from Europe bound
for the eastern ports of the United States.

THB SPANISH COMMBRCE KNDAKGBRSD.

We should remember that in warfare upon commerce the party attacking may
suffer as much damage as the party attacked. Suppose Spain should intend the
destruction of the United States commerce. In that case she might lose her own
maritime commerce, for the simple reason that she would be compelled to devote
the ships which are necessary for the protection of her commercial routes to the pur-
suit and destruction of hostile merchant vessels in the courses which they in their
turn have to follow.

The Spanish merchant marine consists of 960 vessels, 402 of which are steamers of
over 1,000 tons ; 37 of these have a tonnage of over 3,000 and 37 are of tonnage between
2,000 and 3,000. Thirty-two of all the merchant vessels have a speed of 12 knots,
and only 2 of them attain 16 knots an hour. These latter vessels are therefore
Bubventioned by the Government, and in case of war they must be placed at the
disposal of Spain. The greater part of her commerce would be placed outside of
her flag.

BOMBARDMENTS AND BLOCKADES.

Among the main objectives is the possibility of Spain bombarding, blockading, or
invading the United States coasts.

Bombardments appear attractive, but would not be of much avail, if practicable
at all. The large cities of the United States cannot be reached by the guns of a hos-
tile fleet without great danger to the fleet itself. A superior and powerful navy
might take the risk, but for an inferior navy like the Spanish it would mean meeting
disaster half way.

LANDING OF FORCES.

The landing of Spanish forces in the United States is a hypothesis which must be
rejected. If Spain had a squadron of the flrst order she might invest Key West,
although even then it would require a bombardment in good earnest to reduce the
forts defending the entrance. But this would not be of any advantage, as our forces
would be at a distance from the ''Key,'' beyond the range of the guns of the fleet.
The naval station might be destroyed and some coal captured, but to reduce the
place would require a large amount of ammunition, which would be difficult to
replace, and it would not be worth spending it for that purpose.

From these few remarks it may be concluded that Spain's only objective would be
the destraction of our commerce, especially to the West Indies, wbere our traffic is
extensive and our prestige great. These losses would injure us, but they would not
profit Spain either and would have no influence on the duration of the war. The
depredations of the Alabama were of no influence on the conclusion of hostilities
between the North and South.

THE LINE OF OPERATIONS.

The third point of importance in naval strategy is the line of operations, which
in this case is clearly indicated. It would consist in protecting Cuba by means of
an offensive fleet, acting as a defensive fleet, as far remote from tbe coasts as pos-
sible; that is to say, this fleet would always have to maintain contact with the
bases of operations and be in condition at any time to search for and annihilate any
hostile forces that might attempt to enter its waters by forcing a passage. If the
passage were forced it would probably be impossible to eject the enemy. If the
Spanish fleet should be victorious, it would then be in condition to attempt block-
ades and bombardments.

14

On the other hand the Spanish fleet might be defeated, its line broken, its forces
demoralized, and then Habana and Matauzas, Ynoatan Channel, and the Wind-
ward Passage wonld fall into onr hands, and Cnba would cease to be a Spanish
colony.

WHAT THE UNITED STATES GOULD DO.

The plan of campaign sets forth that the principles of strategy
require from the outset the number of ships that will be necessary for
the defensive as well as the offensive; it indicates the theories to which
they would have to conform and states that the scene of war wonld be
the same for them as for us, but with the advantage in their favor that
the United States forces would be a thousand times better situated
than the Spanish. It then proceeds to treat of the invasion of Spain.

It states that the invasion of Spain would probably not enter into
the plan of campaign, but that no doubt attacks might be made by
war ships upon the fortified harbors of Spain, in which case the fire of
cruisers of the most modem type would rage in the bays of Biscay and
of the Atlantic.

To invade the Peninsula would require many transports to take the
troops across the ocean. The long line of communication would have
to be protected and the army of Ouba might constitute another obstacle
requiring an army to fight it. Nevertheless the invasion would follow
if the first attack were crowned with success. This first attack, of
course, would be made upon Ouba.

ATTACK UPON HABANA.

Gnha can he leaohed easily. The lines of communication are short and can be
protected without difficulty, and, moreover, in the very heart of the hostile country
we should fiud thousands of allies. It is a question to he carefully considered
whether it will be necessary to make an inyasion of the island. Contributions of
arms, food, and military supplies sent to the interior by our war ships would weaken
the Spanish forces and encourage the Cuban insurgents, so that the military forces
required by the United States would be less than an army corps. There is a saying
that Napoleon ended in Spain. Well, Spain might end in the Pearl of the Antilles.

CHARACTER OF THE WAR.

Thus the war would' from the beginning be of a naval character and the fight
would be concluded in a short time. We need not speak of the confidence of our
people in this fact; nevertheless we do not want to indulge in exaggerations which
would cause disappointment if the conflict should not be short, because there are
many things which can not be foreseen, and the Americans should not be put in the
same class with the unfortunate French people, who in 1870 shouted: ''On to Ber-
lin ! " and whose predictions of one month of campaign were ridiculed by every
nation.

It is true that the forces we have at our disposal are superior to those of Spain in
every class except that of torpedo boats; it is also certain that the auxiliary fleet
under our flag is much larger and can be mobilized more readily, and that, leaving
valor entirely out of the question, the discipline and training of our Navy are of a
very high order, because superior intelligence and noble traditions animate our
service, and it is equally certain that our facilities for refitting are superior and that
we have better resources for meeting the expenses incident to a war. It is further

15

tme that our house is better guarded, that we can sapply oar forces more easily with
ooal, provisions, and war supplies, and that we have yards for constraction and
repairs conveniently at hand.

COALING AND RBPAIBING.

In the matter of coaling facilities we have an enormons advantage, beeaose the
Spanish ships have to rely to a great extent on imports from without. They would
have to get coal from friendly nations, who, through the obligations of international
laws, would have to become neutrals.

The coal depots in Spain would soon become exhausted and the resupply might
prove difficult, if it is not entirely prevented by our cruisers on the sea. There
would also be great difficulties in the matter of making repairs which, while often
necessary in time of peace, become numerous in time of war.

The task of our Navy would be the reduction of Habana, the blockade of Cuba
and Puerto Rico, the equipment of the Cuban insurgents, the destruction of Spanish
commerce, and the defense of our bases of supplies and other ports. This is work
of tremendous magnitude and will require great energy. Naval battles must be
fought before Habana will fall into our hands, and to this object we shall be able to
devote all the ships of our Navy that are not required for the protection of our
coasts.

The oatastrophe of the Maine occurred on the 15th day of February,
1898, at half past 9 o'clock at night, and this plan of war against Spain,
as set forth above, was published two days prior to that date, on Feb-
ruary 13, in the Herald. This is one more circumstance in support of
the fact that that catastrophe was simply a pretext skilfully utilized by
the Americans for launching themselves into the fight, and that the
latter had long been decided upon and was oneof the secret aspirations
of the United States.

But this plan of campaign, as well as many other manifestations of
hostility against us, might well have been thoroughly considered by
those who were at the head of our affairs, in order to adopt the more
rational of the two following propositions:

If we had a squadron that could measure itself with the United States
fleet on equal terms — ^then on to war!

If we did not have such a squadron, nor any resources, nor any sup-
port, and if we had no plan and were not able to formulate one — then
we should by all means acknowledge this to ourselves and avoid the
war.

Was it so very difficult to decide which of these two courses would
be best!

The facts which we give farther on show that the problem was clear
and simple. There could be no doubt as to the fact that we had no
squadron to speak of. If with the knowledge and in spite of all this
the war was nevertheless necessary for absolutely imperious reasons
which are beyond my ken, then we had to enter into it with all possible
energy, without beating about the bush, and set on foot all offensive
means that we could possibly raise.

Nothing but the most vigorous and heroic; initiative could keep our
national honor intact.

OHAPTEE IL

BlOOKADBS and PBIVATEBBINa.

LAWS BEOULATING THEM— LETTERS OF MARQUE AND REPRISAL —
BRUTALITY OF BLOOKADES — ^BLOOEADINa ON A LARGE SCALE.

Pasquale Fiore defines blockades as oi)erations of war which consist
in surrounding a hostile coast in order to intercept all communication
by sea, maintaining an arc around such coast with a number of ships
that are really and effectively in condition to prevent by force any ship
which might attempt to cross the blockading line from doing so, with-
out exposing themselves to be sunk by the guns of the station vessels.^

^ The principal rules which at present govern blockades may be sammed np as
follows :

(1) Objects of a blockade. — A belligerent may blockade, in whole or in part, the
coasts, ports, and roadsteads of the hostile country, as far as may be necessary to
attain the object of the war; but the war must actually exist, and in case of civil
war, one of the parties must be seeking to recover the right of sovereignty in the
territory which it occupies together with the other party.

(2) Different kinds of blockades,— A. blockade may be simple or by notification. It is
considered as by notification when formal notice of the same has been given toother
nations by the nation establishing it. Other blockades are termed simple. In the
former case, the captured parties must establish discontinuity of the blockade in
order to become exempt from the penalties imposed upon those who break it. In
the latter ease, it devolves upon the captors to establish the existence of the block-
ade at the time of the capture.

(3) Authority of the commander in chief of the forces, — When the commander in
chief of a squadron establishes the blockade of a port, the blockade is not to be
considered void for lack of special authority, unless the respective government has
disauthorized such commander in chief. Some doubt the sight of a commander in
chief to order a blockade without instructions when he is near the seat of his Gov-
ernment, where it would be easy to receive such instructions ; but the more generally
accepted opinion is to the contrary.

(4) Necessity of notification-^X private neutral vessel bound for a blockaded port
is not liable to capture unless it has been expressly notified of the blockade, and
such notice entered on the ship's log, by a vessel of the squadron maintaining the
blockade. The intention alone of entering a blockaded port, when this fact is not
connected with others, is not sufficient to decree the condemnation of a neutral ves-
sel. Notification of the blockade given to the government of a neutral nation is
considered sufficient for the citizens of that nation.

(5) Effectiveness of blockades, — In order to be binding, the blockade must be main-
tained with a number of ships sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy's
coasts. As a general rule, temporary absence of the ships maintaining the blockade
is permitted. The blockade ceases when the ships maintaining it withdraw for any
reason, giving rise to the conclusion that the enterprise has been abandoned, at least
temporarily.

(6) Breach of a blockade. — If the blockade is absolute, it is considered broken by
any positive act committed by a vessel for the purpose of entering or leaving the
blockaded port, except in case of injury or distress.

(7) Penalties. — The penalty threatening those who. break the blockade of a port is

confiscation of both vessel and cargo.
16

17

According to him, therefore, the blockade is the occupation of waters
within the jurisdiction of the enemy, which naturally carries with it an
exercise of sovereignty which is estimated differently by difflerent
writers on international law; for while Hiibner, Ortol&n, and Haute-
feuille admit that the belligerent party acquires that sovereignty when
it occupies waters within the jurisdiction of its enemy, others are of
opinion that such right is not incontrovertible, because the blockaded
coast is almost always in the power of the enemy, who exercises his
sovereignty as far as the range of the guns of his ports extends, and
that therefore the right of blockade is really practiced on the high seas
where the blockading vessels are stationed, and those seas are not sub-
ject to any State. Hence the generally accepted opinion is that the
blockade is founded solely on an exigency of war, to which neutrals
must submit, although it prejudices them. Oessner, following the
opinion of Grotius, also considers blockades a necessity of war which
should be confined to cases in which they are absolutely indispensable;
and Dudley Field (Outlines of an International Code, art. 891) says that
belligerents can only blockade military ports, and only as far as may
be necessary to take possession of contraband of war, meaning by '^ mil-
itary port" a fortified harbor or one occupied by more troops than are
required for the maintenance of internal order. He bases this opinion
on the principle that the hardships of a blockade will be effective only
in ports belonging to an island or which unite exceptional conditions.^

There can be no doubt that the island of Cuba united these conditions,
and hence it is that in the United States' plan of campaign, which we
have^ described in the preceding chapter, the blockade played quite an
important part, in as far as it relates to the operations of the Ameri-
cans, as also to the operations of defense against any which the Spanish
might undertake, for they realized that, owing to our lack qf naval
power, the island of Ouba, separated from Spain by -a longdistance
and without direct means for supporting its army and people as a result
of its agricultural conditions, could be easily cut off and reduced by
starvation, without much effort or bloodshed.'^ This was in pursuance
of the theory of humanity under which the Yankees had for a long
time been taking shelter to hide their intentions.

But the Americans never imagined that they might be able to establish
a blockade of the entire coast of Cuba, because they were far from
realizing that our squadron was as deficient as it actually was. At first,
therefore, they only announced the blockade of the northern coast com-
prised between Bahia Honda, Habana, Matanzas, and Cardenas, and
only when they had positively ascertained that not all the destroyers
were coming over, and that the only ships which we could make imme-

Un the work cited by Captain Nuflez, David Dudley Field presented a draft out-
lining a proposed code, not one having any authoritative sanction. — O. N. I.

'^The greater part of the articles of first necessity, such as flour, rice, bacon, dried
beef, butter, etc., were imported into Cuba.
6884 2

18

diately available were those of Gervera's division, was the blockade
extended to the soathern coast, first from CienAiegos to Santiago de
Cuba, and subsequently to the entire island after our squadron had
been closed in at Santiago Harbor. After that the blockade at times
assumed the character of a veritable farce (juergd). With glasses we
could see from the batteries of Habana, among the blockading ships
and exercising functions of vigilance and even chasing coasting vessels
and carrying orders back and forth, private tugs of the United States
Press and pleasure yachts, on boardofsomeof which we could distinguish
lady excursionists and almost feel the excitement of champagne.

And in the face of all this, we did not even use the one method of
warfare which the enemy feared, privateering, while in the United
States, though not under the name of privateers, yet under that of
auxiliary vessels, there were in the blockading fleet numerous craft whose
functions, as a matter of fact, were identical with those of privateers.

There was, there must have been something, some secret reason^which
the people suspected at the time and which was, perhaps, the obstacle
to our issuing letters of marque and reprisal which, by their moral
force alone, would have compelled the enemy to divide his squadron,
and in that case, who knows whether our defeat, if we had to suffer it,
would not have been less disgraceful f

This something — could we not find out what it was! Could we not
ascertain to whom we are indebted for it?

For if there were no obstacles, no embargoes, it was a grave respon-
sibility not bravely to resolve upon privateering.

The convention which abolished privateering for some States, and
was sanctioned by others, namely, by Spain, the United States, and
Mexico, who were not signatories to it, and only accepted articles
2, 3, and 4, says:

Appendix to Protocol No. XXII.

DRCLAKATIOX.

The plenipotentiaries who signed the treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, assembled
in conference, ,

Considering that,

Whereas the maritime law in time of war has for a long time been the subject of
unpleasant controversies; and

Whereas the uncertainty of the law and duties relative to this matter gives rise,
among neutrals and belligerents, to differences of opinion which may lead to serious
difficulties and even conflicts ; and

Whereas it would therefore be of advantage to establish a uniform doctrine on a
point of such great importance; and

Whereas the plenipotentiaries assembled at the Congress of Paris could not better
voice the intentions of their respective Governmente than by trying to introduce
into the international relations fixed principles on this point :

Now therefore the said plenipotentiaries, being thereunto duly authorized, have
agreed to unite upon the means for attaining this object and have consequently
resolved upon the following solemn declaration :

1. Privateering ia and remains aboUahed.

2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.

19

3. Neutral ^oods, with the exception of coutrabuud of war, are uot liable to cap-
ture under the enemy's flag.

4. Blockades, in order to he Jfinding, must he effective; that is to say, maintained hy a
force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.

The Governments of the undersigned plenipotentiaries bind themselves to submit
this declaration to the States who were not called upon to take part in the Congress
of Paris, and to invite them to accede to the same.

Convinced that the above maxims can not help but be received with gratitude
by the entire world, the undersigned plenipotentiaries trust that the efforts of their
respective Governments in the direction indicated will meet with the most complete
success.

This declaration is not and shall not he binding except as to the powers who have
acceded to it or who will accede to it.
Done at Paris this 16th day of April, 1856.

For Austria : Buol-Schauemsteik, HCbker.

For France : A. Walbwski, Bourqukney.

For Great Britain : Clarendon, Cowley.

For Prussia : Manteuffel, Hatzfeldt.

For Russia: Orloff, Brunnow.

For Sardinia : C. Cavour, De Yillamarina.

For Turkey : Aali, Mehemmed Djemil.

It is therefore incontrovertibte that Spain, with good international
law on her side, could have decreed and practiced privateering and
derived from this means of commercial warfare, which the Yankees
dreaded, every advantage consistent with the laws regulating iV

It would have been the more natural for Spain to adopt this means
of warfare^ as she had to do with a nation that had uot acceded to the
abolition of privateering, and which, for that reason, was also at liberty
to practice it if it cared to. If the war had been between Spain and
one of the powers which had declared themselves in favor of the aboli-
tion of privateering, it would have been quite a different thing.

' Privateering is completely regulated by law, and therefore offers no danger of
crime nor abuse.

The conditions imposed by conventional law as well as usage, and which will
always be observed by civilized nations to make privateering legitimate, are as
follows:

1. The taking out of a letter of marque and reprisal.

2. The giving of security.

3. The opinion of a competent court as to the captures made by privateers.

A letter of marque aud reprisal, which Is to be issued by the commander in chief
of the squadron, is a legal document conferring upon a private individual a com-
mission in due form to take an active part in the operations of war and antagonize
the enemy in the waters specified in Huch letter.

Under the Spanish law a person who wishes to equip a vessel for privateering
must make application to the chief of the naval forces of his province for permis-
sion to do so, setting forth in his petition the kind of vessel he intends to equip, its
displacement, the weapons and ammunition it is to carry, and the number of per-
sons who are to form the crew, as also the securities which he offers ; when these
legal formalities have been complied with, the document referred to is issued to the
captain of the vessel.

In the absence of such special authorization by the sovereign or the head of the
State any act of aggression committed by a private individual, except iu case of
natural and legitimate defense, is considered piracy.

Letters of marque can be issued only to merchant vessels of the power whose

20

The negative attitude toward the suppression of privateering, says
Ortoliin, assumed by a nation like the United States or like Spain,
which possesses within itself all the necessary factors for making it
now, as in the past, a naval power of the first order, deprives the prin-
ciple of the declaration of Paris of that character of universality which
is necessary to make it an absolute and uniform rule of international
naval law founded on treaties. The principle of legitimate defense
inherent in sovereignty implies necessarily, for a nation engaged in
warfare, the right to call to arms all its citizens, and organize on land
and on the sea a national militia; this being one of the rights which
writers call primitive and absolute. The powers which agreed to limit
or abandon the principle of privateering pursued chiefly the object of
avoiding the repetition of the abuses that were attributed to it. But
such excesses are not inherent in that mode of warfare. The abuses
sometimes committed by privateers should be attributed, first of all,
to the uncertainty of the rights and duties between neutrals and bel-
ligerents, to which uncertainty the second and third articles of the
Paris declaration put an end as far as possible by laying down a uni-
form doctrine as to certain important points, which had already been
observed by all nations, with the exception of Great Britain.

From whatever point of view we may look at this question, the
mistake remains apparent: There is no possible excuse to justify our
not having taken advantage of this means of warfare.

And on the other hand, what did we gain by not practicing priva-
teering! Was it not a covert method of privateering which the United
States practiced! In this connection we reproduce below what the
Diario del Ej^rcito of Habana said during the blockade (June 10) :

What is the United States method of warfare if not privateering f It is evident

colors they carry and over which the sovereign exercises his jurisdiotion, as the law
of every country, as a rale, prohibits its merchant vessels from soliciting or accept-
ing letters of marque from foreign powers. Some treaties stipulate that the bellig-
erent power may treat as pirate any neutral vessel in possession of a letter of
marque and reprisal from the enemy of the former.

Letters of marqne are usually issued for a limited term therein specified, and
when that term expires they become void ; that is to say, from that moment on the
vessel ceases to be a privateer and becomes once more a merchant vessel. Hence, if
such vessel, after the expiration of the term for which the sovereign had granted
the commission, continues to practice privateering, its actions assume the character
of illegality, and any captures it might make are likewise illegal and the prize
courts must annul them, restore the captured vessels to liberty, make the captor
pay the costs and damages, and impose upon him such penalty as the laws of the
country provide for punishing such irregularity.

Letters of marque also become void as to their effects on the day when the treaty
of peace is signed, and vessels captured after such date must be returned to their
legitimate owners, except in case of an express stipulation modifying this general
principle; but in the former case the owners of the captured vessels are not entitled
to indemnity, the privateer having acted in good faith.

The property captured, whether by a warship or a privateer, and whether belong-
ing to the enemy or to neutrals, is not conceded as a prize to the captor, unless a
special court instituted for that purpose declares the capture valid and legitimate.

21

that they are practicing it, because not only do they utilize, in their so-called
blockade, the ships of the squadron proper as privateers to chase and capture our
mercantile y^sels, but they have also equipped nnmerous merchant vessels for war
and are devoting them to that operation.

The merchant vessels which the United States has equipped for war are cruising
in our waters, capturing our vessels, and taking them to its ports, there to be
confiscated and the proceeds distributed, which is no more nor less than what priva-
teers do. Why can we not do the same thing f

If it is a question of name under which the true purpose is covered up, let us
resort to the same method. Whether they are called auxiliaries to the squadron or
whether they are called privateers, the service rendered by these merchant vessels,
equipped for war, is the same — they capture hostile vessels which they meet and
paralyze commerce. It is arrant madness that Spain, from incomprehensible scru-
ples, is not doing what the United States has been doing ever since the beginning of
the naval campaign.

Here in Cuba we have valuable factors which we could use in such enterprises.
There are numerous coast vessels which could be made to do service as auxiliaries to
the fleet, if we do not wish to give them the more explicit name of privateers.

Besides, the blockade of the island of Cuba never was effective, and
this must at times have been apparent and would have famished facili-
ties for taking in provisions.

The mt^ority of writers on international law agree as to the fact that
the blockade ceases the moment the ships forming the arc of vigilance
and force disappear for any reason whatever from the waters of which
they have taken possession.

There are some authors, like Hautefeuille, Negrin, Biqnelme, Ortolan,
Halleck, and Faachille, who lay down the radical principle that, if the
blockading ships are compelled to leave the blockaded port, either on
account of stress of the weather, or injuries, or to rest their crews, or
from lack of provisions, the blockade becomes ineffective, and in order
to reestablish it new notification is required.

Others, like Bello, Perels, Bluntschli, Le Moine, Wheaton, Heffter,
and Scott, do not admit that the blockade ceases when the blockading
ships absent themselves because of fortuitous circumstances, and it is
their opinion that the blockade is not to be considered interrupted on
that account. This is the theory generally professed by English, and
hence by American, writers as opposed to the other theory advocated
by French authors, with better right and reason.

Our rear-admiral Manuel J. Mozo, in a recent and very excellent
treatise on the Eights of People, which is used as text-book in the gen-
eral school of the Armada, declares himself in favor of the French
doctrine, because, he says, if the blockade consists in the conquest of
thi enemy's maritime territory, really and effectively maintained by the
naval forces of the blockading party^ it is clear and obvious that when
such conquest ceases and the occupation is suspended the blockade
also ceases and is suspended, and it is not necessary to enter upon an
investigation as to the causes thereof, for, whether they are voluntary
or involuntary, fortuitous or predetermined, the result remains the
same. In either event they put an end to the dominion and jurisdiction
which the blockading party had assumed and in virtue of which it pro-

22

hibited access to the waters over which it had control and which ipso
facto return to the jurisdiction and dominion of their original sovereign;
and as the latter had x>ermitted the entrance and sojourn of vessels of
friendly nations in these waters, such vessels are at liberty to take
advantage of the permission without being considered blockade break-
ers, for since there is no actual blockade it could hardly be broken.

Leaving aside these controversies of law, we n^ ust fix our attention on
the point on which all authors agree, namely, that when the blockading
squadron raises the blockade in order to engage in another operation of
war, and especially when compelled to raise it in order to meet an
attack of the hostile squadron, the blockade ceases, and in order to
reestablish it the same formalities must be gone through as though it
were a new blockade.

Now, then, the United States squadron was repeatedly compelled to
abandon the blockade of Babana and several other ports of the island
in order to look after other objectives which were not due to fortuitous
causes, but, on the contrary, to the necessity of giving attention to the
danger represented by our squadron. The fact may be pointed out
that for three days the United Statei^ ships were absent from the waters
of Habana, owing to the rumored approach of Gervera's squadron, dur-
ing which time they left at the blockading station only a few inefficient
vessels, some of them sailing craft, which could not really be considered
as blockading ships, because they lacked the necessary attributes and
power to prevent by force the ingress and egress of the harbor. The
blockade of Habana must have ceased several times if the law had
been properly laid before the nations of the civilized world.

Tbe newspaper above referred to said under date of May 5:

The blockade of Habana, Cienfaegos, Matanzas, and Cardenas is not effective,
and the proof is that it was broken by several steamers, among them the Cosme
Herrera, AviUs, Monserrat, and a number of sailing vessels which have entered or
left said ports.

In the second place, the naval forces of the United States for three days, firom
Sunday, May 1, to Wednesday, May 3, had to abandon almost entirely their block-
ading mission because they were needed elsewhere; which goes to show that they
were insufQcient to render the blockade of such harbors aa Habana real, effective,
and absolute, and this very day, while the Indiana, Iowa, Monigomeryf New York, and
Marhlehead, that is to say, all the powerful hostile ships, are out of sight, anyone
could run the blockade, for ouly the Wilmvngton and a few merchant vessels in the
service of the squadron are left in ftont of Habana to blockade the harbor.

Having gone somewhat extensively into these questions, we will not
close this chapter without setting forth our ideas as to the brutality
and inhumanity of blockades when practiced as they were practiced in
Cuba.

For reasons of universal morality the different nations have turned
their attention to making wars more humane, by dictating general
measures and agreeing to abstain from methods contrary to civilization
and which work hardship to the innocent, the noneombatants, women,
children, invalids — in a word, all those whose destruction leads to
nothing and whom it is barbarous to injure.

23

To this end treaties and conventions have been drawn up which
regulate the use of the instruments of war and put restrictions on
destructive tendencies. An absolute and extensive blockade, under
the circumstabces under which Cuba had to sustain it, is not a means
of war, but of oppression and death, which is contrary to every law of
God and man, even though it is considered the most gentle method to
reduce the enemy.

Perhaps it is because it has never before been attempted on a large
scale and in an absolute manner that it has escaped the perspicacity of
the " humanizers " of wars to place restrictions on the system of reduc-
ing to starvation not only the combatants, but an entire population —
old men, women, children, and invaUds, who, as a general rule, should
not be subjected to the privations incident on battles — in these times
when so much philanthropy and so much universal love is being
preached.

The blockade as practiced in Cuba caused a thousand times more
victims and more horrors than bursting shells, the burning of cities,
the massacre of battles, and all the cruelties of weapons. The blockade
makes living expensive, extinguishes the means of livelihood, gradually
decimates the population, destroys family life, annihilates human beings
without distinction — or rather, with one distinction, for it strikes par-
ticularly the feeble, the children, the women, and the sick.

Let the observations I have made on the subject of the practice of
naval blockades, the most important of modern times, be taken into
consideration when the ^^ humanizers" of war meet again, and let them
not only take thought of regulating the use of bursting shell and the
protection of real property, but also give a prominent part in their
deliberations to the hnmanization of the blockade as far as it affects
those who should not be made to suffer the rigors of war in a brutal
manner; for it is brutal to redu(*.e to starvation and death human
beings who have no share in the conflict and are in no manner respon-
sible for it.

In our opinion, absolute blockades should be limited to fortified
cities and harbors, and as far as towns are concerned there should be
restrictions on the introduction of men, arms, ammunition, and war
supplies; but it is not humane to extend these restrictions to food,
medicines, and clothiug for the noncombatant inhabitants.

In the Spanish- American war the whole enormity of the effects of the
blockade become apparent in the frightful mortality. After two
months of blockade in Cuba there could be seen in the cities and in
the country thousands of human beings looking like ghosts, and men,
women, and children dying of hunger in the public roads. A sad con-
trast to the condition of that war, fought on the pretext of humanity!

We will now leave this subject to speak of the advantage and influ-
ence which the mistakes and incompetence of the men at the head of
our affairs and the scantiness and deficiency of our war resources had
on the United States plans of campaign.

CHAPTER in.

Operations of the United States Squabbon.

*

BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF GERYBBA'S SQUADRON — ^WHAT THE NAVAL
ANNUAL SAYS — INITIAL ORDERS OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT AT
WASHINGTON.

The first si^al of ^^ Hostile squadron in sight" was made by the
semaphore at Monro Gastle on Friday, April 22, at 5 o'clock p. m., while,
strange to say, it was not until Monday, the 25th, that President
McKiuley signed the joint resolution declaring that war between the
United States and Spain had commenced on the 21st.

From the telemetric observatory of Morro Castle we witnessed the
first appearance of the enemy and closely followed the movements of
the hostile ships, the vague outlines of which could be seen on the
horizon.' The gunners stood in readiness to fire and all were waiting
for the moment when fire would be opened; but to everybody's sur-
prise the United States ships kept beyond range, at a distance of about
20,000 meters from the batteries, and in that position they remained the
next day. It was evident that they were refusing battle and that their
plan of campaign was founded on the blockade.

It was well known that one of the enemy's most ardent desires was
to take Habana as early as possible. Why was the enterprise delayed ?
Why were the tactics changed!

In order to explain this we must begin by giving some interesting
data.

The Naval Annual — a very important book which has been published
for fifteen years by T. A. Brassey — furnishes us certain antecedents, to
which we shall refer.

The nominal forces of the two belligerent fleets was believed to be
approximately equal.^

> A few moments later three flteamers came out of the harbor, among them one
United States vessel, the Saratoga, displaying her flag. As soon as she had rounded
the Morro she sped away at full speed. We shall never be able to comprehend why
that vessel did not remain in our power.

^Thls error, which had so much to do with the declaration of war, and for which
we had to pay so dear, should never have prevailed in Spaiu, for there was one man
at least who, thinking of the future and foreseeing the conflict which was hanging
over us, devoted many hours to the study of the United States Navy and published
extensive technical data concerning the ships of that nation. It was Adolfo Marti-
nez Jurado y Rufz, a captain of artillery, subsequently assigned to the navy-yard at
Habana, who carried out this work with unflagging perseverance and on his own
initiative, following step by step the United States publications and making every
possible efibrt to obtain information. A year before the breaking out of the war he
published an album of the United States fleet, a perfect piece of work, which contains
all the ships, their plans of construction, the material of which they are built, their
armor, armament, speed, engine installation — in a word, everything necessary t-o
form a correct idea of the modern ships of that navy. This work was known at
Madrid. Pity it is that it was not made to serve better purposes than to be used in
the telemetric observatories of the Habana batteries to supplement ob8er\'ation in
case of the opening of fire, which unfortunately never occurred on a large scale!
24

25

In order to give an idea of what is taken into account by naval
experts — and Lord Brassey has the uuiversal reputation of being one
of them — in estimating the military ef&ciency of war ships, we will here
copy the comparison made by the Naval Annual:

ClaAS of ships.

United
States.

S]>ain.

Batiloflhipa

Armored cniieen

Armored coast-defense vessels

Annoredram

Cmlsers, protected

Cruisers, unprotected

5
2
6

1

21
8

1

7

5

10

The following tables show the classification which OoL Sir George
Clarke gives in the Naval Annual of the real fighting ships, which is
evidence of the slight value attached to small vessels and shows how
the naval forces are estimated among powerful nations :

UNITED STATES.

Class.

Battleships

Annored craisers.

BatUeehip

Armored cruisers.

Name.

Tons.

Iowa I 11,410

cinAMi Date of
opeea. lg^^J^ch.

Armaments.

17

1896

Indiana

Oregon

Massachusetts

Texas (second cLiss) ....

NewTork.

Brooklyn.

jio,

228

6,315

8,200

9,215

16

17.8

21

21.9

1893

1892

1891

1895

4 30
8 20
610

20 57
6 87
4 83
8 20
415

20 57

,6 37
230
615

12 57
6 37
6 20

12 10
8 57
4 37
8 20

1212

12 57
4 37

cm.
cm.
cm.
mm.
mm.
cm.
cm.
cm.
mm.
mm.
era.
cm.
mm.
mm.
cm.
cm.
mm.
mm.
cm.
-cm.
mm.
mm.

SPAIN.

Pelayo 9,900

I

16 ,{

1887
1897

Carlos V

9,Zi5 '

I I

!

20 ! 1895

Crist6bal Gol6n 6,840

i

Viacaya 7.000

Oquendo 7.000

Infanta Maria Teresa < 7,000

Cisneros 7,000

Princess de A stnrias 7,000

20

20
20

20

20
20

1895

1891
1891
1890

1896
1896

2 32om.
2 28cm.
1 16 cm.

12 12-cro.

2 42-mm. Nf., R. F.
8 67-mm. H., R. F.

13 37-mm. H., rev.
2 28-cm.

10 14 -cm.

4 10-cm.

4 57-mm., R. F.
10 13.2-cm.

6 12-cm.
10 57-mm.
10 37-mm.

2 28-cm.
10 14 cm.

8 57-mm., R. F.

8 37-mm. H., rev.

2 24 -cm.
10 14-cm.

8 67-mm.,R. F.

8 37-mm. H., i«^v.

NOTB.— The Vitoria and Numajicia are excluded as being little more than harbor defense ships.

26

This comparison shows the superiority of the United States in battle
ships and protected cruisers, while Spain bad apparently more armored
cruisers; but when the time arrived for using them it was found that
out of the seven only four could be made immediately available, nor
could the only battle ship be made available for immediate service.
Consequently, far from being equal to the Americans in effective naval
forces, we proved to be very much inferior in number and quality of
fighting ships. On the other hand, we had more personnel, for while
the United States Navy counted only 12,000 men and no reserves, we
had 23,000 men besides the reserves, including officers.

The hostile squadron which made its appearance off Habana was the
so-called North Atlantic Squadron, which had for months been in proc-
ess of organization at Hampton Boads, carrying out practices along
the coasts of Florida, and after the blowing up of the Maine it was
stationed at Key West, a few hours' distance from the Cuban shore.'

We have already spoken of the composition of this squadron in the
first part of this work (Ships, Guns, and Small Arms, p. 34 et seq.)- It
was under the command of Mr. Sampson, at that time captain, who was
very anxious to attack Habana, although he is said to have expressed
the opinion that the battle of Habana would have to be fought at the
expense of some of his ships, and in view of the equality which was
supposed to exist between the United States naval forces and those of
Spain and the recent loss of the Maine, that would have been a serious
calamity.

The squadron was admirably officered. But the United States Gov-
ernment decided, very wisely, to try the crews first and give them addi-
tional training, and not send them at once into a battle which could not
help but be fierce, without initiating them by means of less difficult
operations in which the victory would be sure and complete, and where
the gunners would acquire greater facility in firing. This was the more
important as the Maine catastrophe, in which 266 sailors lost their lives,
had given rise to certain fantastic legends that Cuba and its ports were
full of mines and torpedoes which could sow death and destruction
everywhere and at all times.

The principle prevailed which underlay the plan of campaign
described iu the first chapter, namely, that before proceeding directly
against Cuba it would be necessary to fight naval battles to see whose
was the preponderance on the sea. This will also explain why the
Americans kept their ships so close together and why Sampson's squad-
ron always remained near the Flying Squadron, which was under
Schley's orders, so that the two fleets, in case of necessity, might be
.able to cooperate in a battle against the Spanish fleet with overwhelm-
ing superiority. As we go on we shall see that the plan was carried
out in full.

' This was an excellent base of operations. It was stated that dnring the blockade
of Habana even beefsteak and fried potatoes were daily sent to the crews of the
fleet from Key West.

27

For this reason it would have been of great advantage if those who
had charge of condacting the war on the Spanish side had made efibrts
to divide the United States squadron, which could surely have been
accomplished by permitting privateering or resorting to the system
adopted by the United States, namely, disguising privateers in the
shape of auxiliary vessels, for while some of these auxiliary vessels
were commanded by regular naval officers, like the St. Paul^ which had
been given to Gaptain Sigsbee, of the Maine, the majority of them were
commanded by officers of a special corps of reserves formed of active
and retired sailors of the merchant marine. What was there to pre-
vent us from giving the same character to our merchant vessels and
following the example of our enemies, who thus equipped for war not
less than 128 vessels? If it is true, as maintained by some, that priva-
teering is no longer any use in our time, why were our enemies so anx-
ious that we should not resort to itf And why did we reserve the right
to practice itt

A few score auxiliary vessels would have constituted a menace to
commerce, which the Americans worship, and would have compelled
their squadrons to subdivide and operate without that close correla-
tion which gave them so much strength. A threat of operations against
the undefended ports of Florida or against the United States fleet at
the Philippines — anything in the nature of naval strategy or plan of
campaign — should have been resorted to, so as to make at least an
attempt to scatter Sampson's and Schley's squadrous.

Nothing of all this was thought of; or if it was the people did not
hear of it. If there was any fixed and concerted plan of campaign, if
every resource of intelligence was exhausted in formulating it, it has
not come to the knowledge of the general public, and thus, while the
American people are already in i)ossession of official reports rendering
an account of everything that has happened, of the expenses incurred,
the injuries suffered, we know nothing at all except what we see before
our eyes in the evidence of our terrible debacle. We must envy the
system of other nations, for obviously we have among us noue who are
capable of imitating it.

The opinion which Sir Oeorge Clarke formed of the naval capacity
of Spain is pitiful, and 'it has gone abroad and become the opinion of
the world on the strength of his authority.

'^In Spain," says the !N^aval Annual, '^some efforts of preparation
were made, but want of money, of resources, and of administrative
capacity proved fatal. At the beginning of 1898 there was not a single
completely effective war ship, and in home waters there was no organ-
ized squadron. The isolated force in the Far East, compoii^d maiuly
of obsolete craft, of which the flagship was scarcely the equal of our
Active, was not, in the modern sense, a real fighting body. The effi-
ciency of a navy, involving the fulfillment of exceedingly complex con-
ditions, is a delicate test of sound government and of national vigor.

28

Spain tbronghout her history, in spite of great Datnrnl advantages, has
never proved able to create and maintain a really eflScient fleet."

We think these statements are a little exaggerated. There was a time
when Spain was all-powerful on the sea. Everyone knows the causes of
our decline. As far as the present time isconcerned, Brassey's opinion is
correct and is confirmed by the sad facts of a terribly disastrous con-
flict. But we will not yet despair; we still think that days of rejoicing
and glory may return if we can become convinced that morality and
order and good government are the basis of the civil and military pros-
perity of nations.

The Americans had a pretty accurate idea of our deficiencies, thanks
to information received from intelligent spies operating in Spain.

Among a number of documents recently published by the United
States is one, bearing no signature, which is unique of its kind and may
be of interest as being suggestive. It can be found in the original on
page 27 of the second volume of the Eeport of the Secretary of the
Navy, 1898, and is as follows :

April 16, 1898.

Sir : Yesterday the Spanish Govemment began to take extraordinary precautions
to prevent the getting out of news relating to the movements of ships or anything
pertaining to war preparations. It is quite probable, therefore, that definite infor-
mation in regard to these subjeots will be difficult if not impossible to get. My
latest information, which I have telegraphed, is to the effect that the torpedo squad-
ron, consisting of three destroyers, three torpedo boats, and the Ciudad de CadiZj
Colon, and Teresa are at the Cape de Verdes awaiting iustruotions. It is said that the
Colon and Teresa left Cadiz not properly provisioned. Provisions and coal have been
sent to them. I have no reason to believe that they have not a full supply of
ammunition. The Oquendo and Visoaya, from Puerto Kico, should arrive at Cape de
Verdes to-day. Although I have no definite information, I believe the Pelayo
arrived at Cadiz yesterday, coming from Cartagena. It w&s intended that she
should, go, after a few days' necessary delay in Cartagena, and it is reported that
she was sighted in the Straits of Gibraltar day before yesterday. The Proserpina,
OsadOf Destructor, Barcelo, Retamosa, Ilahana, Salcon, torpedo boats and destroyers,
and the Vitoria are now practically^ ready iu Cadiz, awaiting the arrival of the
Cdrlos Fand the Pelayo, The Alfonso XIII is also about ready iu Cartagena.

The installation for moving the guns by electricity in the Carlos V is not com-
pleted, and I am unable to get at any estimate of the date when she will be entirely
ready for service. I know on good authority, however, that in an emergency she
could be used at once, working some of her machinery by hand. Work is being
pushed, also, as rapidly as possible on the Cisneros, but she can hardly be ready for
several weeks. The trans-Atlantic steamers Mexico, Panama, Santo Domingo, San
Augnstin, and Villaverde, now in Cuban waters, arc bein^ armed as auxiliary cruisers.
To this number should be added the Columbia and Normannia, recently purchased
in Germany, and the Giralda, now being converted in Barcelona. This makes 21
auxiliary craisers concerning which I have quite definite information. The two
steamers bought in Germany were strengthened there and are in condition to receive
their artillery and crew when they arrive at Cadiz, which is expected to-day. I call
your special attention to the newspaper slip which I inclose, entitled, ''Fe en la
Armada.^' It was published in the Heraldo of April 6, the leading and most influen-
tial paper of Madrid. The Iroparcial of the following morning called attention to
it and spoke in very severe terms of the impropriety of a former secretary of the

29

navy speaking bo unreservedly of such important matters at this critical time. The
following is a translation :

''We had an opportunity to-day to talk for a long time with General Ber^uger,
the last minister of marine under the Conservative cabinet.

''To the questions which we directed to him concerning the conflict pending
with the United States he was kind enough to inform us that he confided absolutely
in the triumph of our naval forces.

" The attack on our island ports is not to be feared, he said, by taking advantage
of the darkness of night.

"The reason of this is that Habana, as well as Cienfuegos, Nue vitas, and Santiago
are defended by electrical and automobile torpedoes, which can work ' at a great
distance.

" SefioT Canovas del Castillo, who did not neglect these things, arranged for, in
agreement with me, the shipping to Cuba of 190 torpedoes, which are surely located
in these ports at present.

" The transportation and installation of these war machines was in the charge of
the distinguished torpedoist, Sefior Chaodn.

"I have already sold that we shall conquer on the sea, and I am going to give you
my reasons.

"The first of these is the remarkable discipline that prevails on our war ships, and
the second, as soon as fire is opeued the crews of the American ships will commence
to desert, since we all know that among them are people of all nationalities.

" Ship against ship, therefore, a failure is not to be feared.

"I believe that the squadron detained at the Cape de Verdes, and particularly the
destroyers, should have and could have continued the voyage to Cuba, since they
have nothing to fear from the American fleet.

*'In this class of ships we are on a much higher level than the United States."

The Company Bandera Espaiiola have been ordered to suspend the voyages of
their ships to Habana, and I presume the Government intends to take these ships
into service. Also the Compa&la Trasatl^ntica has ordered its ships not to touch at
Corunna hereafter, presumably for the same reason.

It is said quite openly here that the intention of the Government is to make some
kind of an effort on our coasts. I am inclined to believe that they have this plan in
view; but I have been unable to verify the reports or to get at any of the details.

Just at this moment, here at Madrid, everything is very quiet. Considerable tur-
bulence is reported from the provinces. How great this may be we are unable to
judge, as the Government is keeping a sharp watch on the telegrams and does not
permit news to be disseminated. A few days ago there was some excitement and
danger of a mob here in Madrid, after the announcement of the proclamation of the
armistice in Cuba. That crisis is now apparently passed. Everybody here expects
war, and the lower classes ardently desire it. The Government and the more intel-
ligent classes dread it, but will accept it if it is forced upon them. The press has
fed the people with all sorts of nonsense about the superior bravery of the Spanish
sailor, the superior discipline on board the Spanish ships, and the greater fighting
power of the navy.

The people believe that this superiority of the Spanish navy over that of the
United States is overwhelming and that they must defeat us. This opinion is shared
also by many intelligent persons — in fact, I believe, by all Spaniards. They say
they have nothing to lose ; they could not be worse off with the war than withont it,
as they are about to lose Cuba anyhow; but they can do incalculable damage to our
commerce, and seriously injure, if not destroy, our Navy, and although they would
probably be beaten in the end, they will have taught us a salutary lesson for the
future. One of the most intelligent, best-informed Spaniards I have met here, a
man who had traveled much and claims to have a great admiration for the United
States, and who knows much about our history and resources, a senator of the King-
dom, told me yesterday that the thing that he dreaded most was the long period

80

that the hostilities would last. He was sore that the struggle might last three
years ; that he could very weH understand and appreciate the feelings and ambitions
of a yonng and powerful nation like the United States for conquest; that he could
understand that we were desirous of taking the islands of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and
the Canaries, and even of coming to Madrid itself; but what he could not under-
stand was that, while protesting a desire for peace, a decided disinclination to the
annexation of any territory, the people of the United States had done everything in
their power to foment the rebellion in Cuba and to make it impossible for Spain to
overcome it by the force of arms.

I give you this as a matter of interest solely, bat it represents the attitude of the
intelligent, educated, and traveled Spaniard.

This is certainly remarkable information.

The Secretary of the United States l!^avy, on April 6, addressed to
Sampson, commander in chief of the North Atlantic Squadron, the
following instrnctions:

Washington, April 6, 1898.
Sir: In the event of hostilities with Spain the Department wishes you to do all
in your power to capture or destroy the Spanish war vessels in West Indian waters,
including the small gunboats which are stationed along the coast of Cuba.

2. The Department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to be exposed to
the fire of the batteries at Habana, Santiago de Cuba, or other strongly fortified
ports in Cuba, unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within
those harbors. Even in this case the Department would suggest that a rigid
blockade and employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish the desired
object, viz, the destruction of the enemy's vessels without subjecting unnecessarily
our own men-of-war t.o the fire of the land batteries.

There are two reasons for this :

First. There may be no United States troops to occupy any captured stronghold,
or to protect the landing, until after the yellow-fever season is over, about the first
of October.

Second. The lack of docking facilities makes it particularly desirable that our
vessels should not be crippled before the capture or destruction of Spain's most for-
midable vessels.

3. The Department further desires that, in case of war, you will maintain a
strict blockade of Cuba, particularly at the ports of Habana, Matanzas, and, if pos-
sible, of Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos. Such a blockade may
cause the Spaniards to yield before the rainy season arrives.

4. All prizes should be sent to Key West or other available United States ports
for adjudication.

5. Should it be decided to furnish the insurgents with arms and ammunition, the
Department suggests that Nuevitas and Puerto Padre would be the most suitable
places to land them and establish communicatioos with the Cubau forces.

6. Should the Department learn that the Spanish fieet had goneito Puerto Rico, it
is possible that the flying squadron may be sent thither, in which case some of your
vessels may be needed to reenforce that squadron.

7. The Department hopes to be able to out the cable off Santiago de Cuba, even if
it has to employ a special cable vessel for this purpose, and it has also under consid-
eration the practicability of cutting the cable near Ha1>ana and connecting the end
to one of the vessels of your command, so that you can always be in communica-
tion with the Department. This plan has not yet l>een decided upon. Please con-
sider it.

8. The Department need not impress upon you the necessity for stringent sanitary
regulations. It leaves this matter, as well as the details in regard to conducting

'31

operations^ to the commander in chief, in whose jndgment it has the greatest confi-
dence.

Wishing you every success, very respectfully,

John D. Long.

Admiral Sampson answered these confidential instructions on April
9, fi*om Key West, expressing himself in favor of a direct attack upon
Habana, and setting forth the manner in which the batteries could be
easily destroyed, Captains Evans, Taylor, and Ohadwick concurring in
his opinion. We will trea( of this matter more fully when speaking of
Habana in the volume which is to follow the present one.

The next instructions of the Secretary of the !N"avy were as follows:

Washington, April SI, 1898,

Sir : The Department's instructions of April 6 are modified as follows :

You will immediately institute a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, from Car-
denas to Bahia Honda ; also, if in your opinion your force warrants, the port of Cien-
fnegoe, on the south side of the island. It is considered doubtfulif the present force
at your command would warrant a more extensive blockade.

If it should become necessary for the army to embark for Cuba, the navy will be
required to furnish the necessary convoy for its transports. For this reason it does
not seem desirable that you should undertake at present to blockade any more of the
island than has been indicated. It is believed that the blockade will cut off Habana
almost entirely from receiving supplies from the outside.

The Navy Department is considering the question of occupying the port of Matan-
zas by a military force large enough to hold it and to open communications with the
insurgents, and this may be done at an early date if part of the army is ready to
embark. If this operation is decided upon, you are directed to cooperate with the
aimy and assist with such Tessels as are necessibry to cover and protect such a
movement.

If you obtain any information of the movements of Spanish ships of war in any
part of the West Indies you will, if practicable, inform the Department.

In conducting the other operations you will be governed by the iustructions con-
tained in the Department's letter of April 6.

The Department does not wish the defenses of Habana to be bombarded or
attacked by your squadron.
Very respectfuUy,

JoHX D. Long.

2fothing could be more precise, simple, clear, and of sounder judg-
ment than these instructions.

We may gather from them that the Government at Washington had
definitely decided to avoid the operation of attacking Habana, because
the information that was being received and the weakness of Spain
which was becoming more and more apparent, rendered it probable
that better and easier results could be attained by a simple blockade.
Yet in all these admirable initial orders there may be noticed a certain
fear of the Spanish squadron and a desire to keep the ships intact for
the encounter with them and to accumulate naval forces with the same
object in view, and that is the reason why so much circumspection was
required of Sampson; for the loss of any of his ships at Habana--
which was by no means an improbable result if they entered upon an

32

engagement with the batteries, and which woald have produced bad
effects iu the United States, where there was a strong faction opposed
to the war, the partisans of which were decreasing as reports of easy
victories arrived, bat which is still in existence — would destroy the
pretended naval equality of which some prominent Spaniards were
boasting, either from ignorance or because they were misinformed.

In whatever light we may look at this matter, it is obvious that it
would have meant a great deal to us if we could have divided the
United States squadron by means of privi^teering, having recourse, as
a last resort, to an attempt or threat of some daring operation.

It would likewise have been of good effect if we had compelled the
enemy to engage in a battle against Habana. A victory there would
have cost them much time and blood. Such a battle could probably
have been provoked on several occasions when one of the best Yankee
battle ships, through her own heedlessness, came within range of
the windward batteries. If the first shots had been exchanged at
that time, who knows how the battle would have ended, for it is not to
be supposed that a battle ship would be undignified enough to take to
flight before a battery. The officers in charge of the artillery at the
forts could hardly control themselves in the presence of certain superior
orders. This is a matter of which we shall speak more at length when,
in the course of this work, we take up the organization of the fortifica-
tions of Habana; for we wish to i)oint out that the artillery of a forti-
fied place, when iu the presence of the enemy, should be accorded more
liberty of action, as a whole, as also in each battery or group of bat-
teries, than was the case at Habana.

We have already expressed our admiration for the foresight and
strategic judgment shown in the orders of the United States Navy
Department, and as we pursue this purely technical analysis we will
show that on our side, on the contrary, everything was confusion,
incompetence, and terrible discord.

CHAPTER lY.

Operations of oub Squadron.

opinions of admiral oeryeb a— replies thereto — appalling
deficiency op our naval power — sortie of the squadron.

The comparison of both navies, based upon the studies made in pre-
vision of a war with the United States, suggested to the admiral the
following considerations on February 25, 1898: ^

If we compare the Nayy of the United States with our own, coanting only modem
vessels capable of active service, we find that the United States have the battleships
Iowa, Indiana, MassachusetUj Oregon, and Texas ; the armored cruisers Brooklyn and
New York; the protected cruisers Atlanta, Minneapolis, Baltimore, Charleston, Chicago,
Cincinnati, Columbia, Newark, San Francisco, Olympia, Philadelphia, and Raleigh, and
the rapid unprotected cruisers Detroit, Marhlehead, and Montgomery, Against this
we have, following the same classification, the battleships Pelayo, Infanta Maria
Teresa, Fizcaya, and Oquendo, armored cruiser Coldn, and protected cruisers Cdrlos V,
Alfonso XIII, and Lepanto; no fast unprotected cruisers; and all this, supposing the
Pelayo, Cdrlos V, and Lepanto to be ready in time, and giving the desired value to the
Alfonso XIII, I do not mention the other vessels, on account of their small military
value, surely inferior to that of the nine gunboats, from 1,000 to 1,600 tons each, 6
monitors still in service, the ram Katahdin, the Vesuvius, and the torpedo boats and
destroyers, which I do not count. I believe that in the present form the comparison
is accurate enough.

Comparing the displacements, we find that in battleships the United States have
41,589 tons against our 30,917 tons; in armored cruisers they have 17,471 tons against
our 6,840; in protected cruisers, 51,098 against 18,887, and iu fast unprotected cruist^rs
they have 6,287 and we none. The total of vessels good for all kinds of operations
comprise 116,445 tons against 56,644 tons, or something less than one-half.

In speed our battleships are superior to theirs, but not to their armored cruisers.
In other vessels their speed is superior to ours.

Comparing the artillery, and admitting that it is possible to fire every ten minutes
the number of shots stated in the respective reports, and that only one-half of the
pieces of less than 20 cm. are fired, and supposing that the efficiency of each shot of
the calibers 32, 30, 28, 25, 20, 16, 15, 14, 12, 10, 17.5, 5.7, 4.7, and 3.7 be represented by
the figures 328, 270, 220, 156, 80, 41, 33, 27, 17, 10, 4, 2, and 1, which are the hundredths
of the cubes of the numbers representing their calibers expressed in centimeters
/(caliber in cm.)»\ ^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ artillery power of the American battleships is

represented by 43,822, and that of ours by 29,449; that of the American armored
cruisers by 13,550, and that of ours (Coldn) by 6,573; that of the American protected
cruisers by 62,725, and that of ours by 14,600; that of the American unprotected
cruisers by 12,300. Therefore, according to these figures, the off'ensive power of the
artillery of the United States vessels will be represented by 132,397, and that of ours
by 50,622, or a little less than two-fifths of the enemy's.

' The data and letters which follow were published in La Epoca, and have been
ciroalating for some time in numerous facsimile copies, which have not been denied.

33
6884 3

t4

To arriye at this appalling oonclusion I have already said that it has been neces-
sary to count the Pelayo and Cdrloi V, wliich probably will not be ready in time;
the LepanlOf which surely will not be ready, and the Alfon90 XIII, whose speed ren-
ders her of a Tory doubtful utility.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF AS OFFBNSIVIB CAMPAIGN.

Now, to carry out any serious operations in a maritime war, the first thing neoes-
sary is to secure control of the sea, which can only be done by defeating the enemy's
fleet, or rendering them powerless by blockading them in their military ports. Can
wedo this with the United States? It is evident to me that we can not. And even
if God should grant ns a great victory, against what may be reasonably expected,
where and how woold we repair the damages sustained? Undoubtedly, the port
would be Habana, but with what resources? I am not aware of the resources
existing there, but judging by this department, where everything is scarce, it is to
be assumed that the same condition exists everywhere, and that the immediate
consequences of the first great naval battle would be the enforced inaction of the
greater part of our fleet for the rest of the campaign, whatever might be the result
of that great combat. In the meantime the enemy would repair its damages inside
of its fine rivers, and aided by its powerful industries and enormous resources.
This lack of industries and stores on our part renders it impossible to carry on an
offensive campaign.

If the control of the sea remains in the hands of our adversaries, they will imme-
diately make themselves masters of any unfortified port which they may want in
the island of Cuba, counting, as they do, on the insurgents, and will use them as a
base for their operations against us. The transportation of troops to Cuba would
be most difficult and the suocesss very doubtful, and the insurrection, without the
check of our army, which would gradually give way, and with the aid oi the
Americans, would rapidly increase and become more formidable.

These reflections are very sad; but I believe it to be my unavoidable duty to set
aside all personal considerations and loyally to represent to my country the
roHonrces which I believe to exist, so that, without illusions, it may weigh the con-
siderations for and against, and then, through the Government of His Majesty, which
is the country's legitimate organ, it may pronounce its decision. I am sure that this
decision will find in all of us energetic, loyal, and decided executors. Our motto is
<'the fulfillment of duty."

[lb the admUral.*^

Madbid, March 4, 1898,

I notified yon that, when I should have recovered somewhat fh>m the painful
impression caused by the reading of your personal letter, I should answer it, and I
now do so, and will first take up the comparative study of the United States naval
forces and ours, which, taken absolutely as you have done, omitting some of our ves-
sels at Habana, which are available for a conflict with the United States, show a
difference of tonnage, but not so excessive as would appear from your lines. In my
opinion, the matter should be studied from the standpoint of the present distribution
of the United States forces, remembering that it will be to their interest to maintain
the ships now in the Pacific for the protection of San Francisco and the arsenal of
San Diego, as also their costly trans- Pacific liners plying between the former city
and Australia and China, and also to protect the Hawaiian Islands, about to be
annexed to the United States, for which reason naval forces are being maintained
there. With your good judgment you will understand that the long and difficult
voyage which these forces, among them the Oregon, would have to make in order to
join the Atlantic forces, leaving the Pacific region unprotected, could not be effected

^The matter inclosed in brackets, on this aud subsequent pages, does not appear
i n O. N. I. publication, ' ' Views of Admiral Cervera.'' The brackets have been inserted
by O. N. I.

35

wiibont the knowledge of othen, and so far all snoh knowledge Ib absolutely lack-
ing. I mnst therefore refer yon to the inclosed statement; while It shows deficien-
cies, which the Gk>yemment is endeavoring to remendy at any cost by the acquisi-
tion of new elements, if only in the matter of speed, they do not exist to such an
extent as stated in the comparison with the United States Atlantic Squadron. There
is no doubt that, in order to concentrate our nuclens offerees, -we shall require some
time, the vhole month of April, in my estimation.

Since I have been in charge of this department. His Majesty's Government has
known the situation of the great nuclens of our naval forces, which are being
remodeled or repaired abroad, and in conformity with such knowledge the Govern-
ment has endeavored, and is endeavoring by every possible means, with a view also
to the general interests of the country, to pursue in its relations with the United
States a policy of perfect friendship, although at times points have come up which
were not easy of solution. But with your good j udgment yon will understand, and
I want therefore to remove some misapprehensions regarding the island of Cuba;
our flag is still flying there, and the Government, to meet the sentiments of the peo-
ple, even at the cost of many sacrifices, desires that this Spanish colony should not
be separated from onr territory, and is trying by every possible means, political,
international, and military, to solve satisfactorily the Cuban problem. That is
the prevailing opinion of the country, and it conforms its actions thereto. As already
stated, the Government is acquainted with our situation, and for that reason is
endeavoring to collect all possible resources at Habana Harbor, fortifying it so that
it may serve as a base for our naval forces, equipping it with a dock, already in
.operation, where onr ships will be able to repair slight damages.

It is my opinion that it will not be possible, either on our side or the enemy's, to
repair those ii^Juries which may be caused by the action of a battle in the short
period of time in which international military campaigns are enacted, compared
with the material interests they affect. The other harbors of the island, such as
Gienfnegos, Santiago de Cuba, etc., are prepared to be closed by means of torpedoes.
In your estimate yon do not count for anything the effect of homogeneous troops,
well trained and disciplined, as against the United States crews of hirelings (mer-
cenaria), and you might find historical facts, evoking sad memories for us, to con-
firm what I say. I will close, never doubting for one moment that you and all of us
will fulfill the sacred duty which our country imposes upon us, and in giving you
my opinions in answer to yours there is nothing that I desire more than peace.

Segismundo Bermejo.]

The above letter was accompanied by the following comparative
statement of the tonnage of the principal ships:

[NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON.

Po8»ihle formation.

Tons.

New York

Indiana

liMsaohufletts

TexM

Brooklyn

Iowa

Montffomc
MsrbiUM

Detroit

Kastavine

Terror

Yorktown, diepetoh boat .

8,200

10,288

10,288

6,316

9,271

11, 410

2,000

2,000

2,094

1,071

8,600

Total tonnage

5 torpedo boats i average speed, 21 knots.

66,537

Viwsaya

Pelayo

GArlos V

Maria Teresa

Oquendo

Crist6bal Co16d

Alfonso XUI

M. Ensenada

Alfonso yrr

Venadito

Relna Mercedes

Infanta Isabel

Total tonnaee

3 destroyers and 8 torpedo bont« : av^r
age speed, 25 knots.

Tons.

7,000
9,900
9,250
7.000
7,000
6,800
4,826
1,064
3,900
1.189
3.00t)
1,189

162,818

I

168.018.

36

lAtUT from the admiral.

Cartagena, March 7, 1898,

[Yesterday I reoeiyed your personal letter of the 4tli, to which I am about to reply,
but you must first permit me to give you a general idea of our situation as I see it.
That it is the intention of the United States to engage us in war appears beyond all
doubt, and it therefore becomes more important each day to examine into the advan-
tages and disadvantages which such a war may have for us. Inspired by these ideas,
I deemed it my duty as a patriot to reply to the official communication through
which I was advised of the distribution of the American vessels and the condition of
certain points on the United States coasts, and I did so in my personal letter of Feb-
ruary 25 last. To-day, feeling at liberty to express my ideas more freely in a con-
fidential letter, I will reply to your communication.]

An examination of our forces, based upon what I already knew and upon recent
information and observation, not only confirms what I said, but shows it to be still
worse. I have visited the Vitoria, on which I counted, and from my visit I have
drawn the conviction that we can not count on her for the present conflict. Neither
does my information permit me to count on the Pelayo, Cdrlos V, or Numancia, And
yet, as this opinion is not based upon personal observation, I include them in the
inclosed statement [solely because you have included them in yours]. Whatever
may be the direction given to the conflict, either war, negotiations direct or through
a third party, an arbitrator or otherwise, the longer the decision is delayed the
worse it will be for us. If it is war, the longer it takes to come the more exhausted
we will be. If it is negotiation of any kind, the longer it is postponed the greater
will be the demands, each time more irritating, which will be presented by the
United States, and to which we will have to yield in order to gain time in the vain
hope of improving our military position. And as our position can not be improved,
let us see what we can expect from a war under such conditions.

It would be foolish to deny that what we may reasonably expect is defeat, which
may be glorious, but all the same defeat, which would cause us to lose the island
in the worst possible manner. But even supposing an improbability — that is, that
we should obtain a victory— that would not change the final result of the campaign.
The enemy would not declare himself defeated, and it would be foolish for us to pre-
tend to overcome the United States in wealth and production. The latter would
recover easily, while we would die of exhaustion, although victorious, and the
ultimate result would be always a disaster. Only in case we could count on some
powerful ally could we aspire to obtain a satisfactory result. But, besides having to
discount the high price to be paid for such an alliance, even then we would only be
postponing the present conflict for a few years, when it would become graver than
it is to-day, as is the present insurrection in comparison with the last.

Even admitting the possibility of retaining Cuba, this island would cost us enor-
mous sacrifices by the necessity of being constantly armed to the teeth. And here
the problem already pointed out by somebody arises : Is the island worth the ruin
of Spain? (Silvela, in Burgos.) I do not speak on the subject of privateering,
because it seems to me that no man acquainted with history can attach any value
to privateering enterprises, which nowadays are almost impossible on account of the
character of modem vessels.' [Although I do not attach much importance to cer-
tain details, which can have but little influence on the general events, I shall never-
theless speak of some upon which you touch, in order to set forth my point of view
in answering your letter.]

The accompanying statement [which appears to me to be more correct than the
one inclosed with your letter] shows that our forces in the Atlantic are approxi-
mately one-half of those of the United States, both as regards tonnage and artillery
power.

^We do not agree with this opinion. In the course of this book we show that
privateering might have brought us many advantages.

37

I hare never thought of the forces which the United States has in the Pacific and
Asia in connection with the development of events in the West Indies; but I have
always considered these forces a great danger for the Philippines, which have not
even a shadow of a resistance to oppose to them. And as regards the American
coasts of the Pacific, the United States has no anxiety about them. I think yon are
mistaken in believing that during the month of April our situation will change. As
I have said above, I am sure that neither the Carlos V, the Felayo, the Viioria, nor
the Numancia will be ready, and nobody knows how we will be as regards 14-centi-
meter ammunition. It seems sure that by the end of April the 25.4- centimeter guns
of the Coldn will not be mounted. Even if I were mistaken, then our available forces
in the West Indies would be 49 per cent of that of the Americans in tonnage and
47 per cent in artillery. Our only superiority would be in torpedo boats and'
destroyers provided all of them arrive there in good order.

I do not know exactly what are the sentiments of the people concerning Cuba, but
I am inclined to believe that the immense majority of Spaniards wish for peace above
all things. But those who so think are the ones who suffer and weep inside of their
own houses, and do not talk so loud as the minority, who profit by the continuation
of this state of affairs. However, this is a subject which it is not for me to analyze.

Our want of means is such that some days ago three men went overboard while
manning the rail for saluting, throngh the breaking of an old awning line. A new
line had been asked for fifty days ago, but it has not yet been replaced. [More than
one oflSoial letter has been written on this interesting subject.] In times past, forty-
three days after the Hemdn Cortes was laid down the vessel was at sea. It is now
fifty-one days since I requested the changing of certain tubes in the boilers of a steam
lannch of the Teresa, and I do not yet know when it will be finished. This will prob-
ably be the proportion between us and the United States in the repair of damages, in
spite of our having the Habana dock, which is the principal thing, but not all. As
for the crews, I do not know them, but I may say that the crews that defeated our
predecessors at Trafalgar had been recruited in the same way. [I beg that yon will
not consider this an argument against yours, for that would be accusing me of great
presumption in speaking of what I do not know. It is simply a thought that occurs
tome.]

These are my loyal opinions, and for the sake of the nation I express them to [yon
with the request that you will transmit them to] the Government. If you should
deem it advisable for me to express fhem personally, I am ready to do so at the first
intimation. After I have done this, thus relieving my conscience of a heavy weight,
I am quite ready to fulfill the comparatively easy duty of conducting our forces
wherever I may be ordered, being sure that all of them' will do their duty.

Pascual Cervbra.

With the foregoing letter the admiral inclosed the following statement :

Comparison with the United States fleet,

SPAIN.

Protected vessels actually there, or unprotected, but with a speed of over 15 knots :

Yizcaya

Oquendo

Marqnto de la Enftennda.

Displaco-
raent.

Armament.

Tont.
7,000
7,000
1,064

6,130
6,130
1.100

[15,0641
[23 percent.]

[13,3601
[23 per cent.]

38

ComparUonjoiih ths United 6UUe8 fleet — Gontiiiu«d.

UNITED STATES.

Same kind of vessele :

New York

iDdianii

MaasachiiRettA.
Texaa

Brooklyn ...

Iowa

Monteornery
ICarbielioarl .

Detroit

Iwror

To these may be positively added:

SPAIN.

Diaplaoe-
ment.

Arauunent.

Tons.

' 8,200

6,400

< 10.288

0.304

10.288

9,304

6.315

4,550

8.271

7,880

11,410

8,860

2,089

4,100

2,089

4,100

2,080

4.100

8,000

2,896

65,639

60,904

'

Infanta Maria Teresa

Cristobal Coldn

AlfonaoXIII

Diaplaoe-
meat.

Tons.
7,000
6,840
4,826

18,606

A,muuDent.

6,190

a8,400

4,340

18,960

a Without the 25-oni. gnna, the value of which is repreaented by 1,248.

UNITED STATES.

Dlaplaoe-
ment.

Azmameiit.

MfnnA|^1>oll<l ----T,., ....,,

Tom.
7,875
7.876

4,790
4.790

Columbia

14,750

9.580

Pelayo . . .
CArlosV,

Doubtful addiUone,

SPAIN.

UNITED STATES.

Atlanta

Charleston . .

Chicago

Newark

Philadelphia

Dolphin

Yorktown ..

Armament.

4,270
4.570
4.470
6,740
7,640
TOO
3,320

31,710

39

IhtibtfiU oddittoiM— Continued.
In the Sonth Atlantic they have :

Anuament.

dndnnati 8.200 4,706

All the other veeselo have very little military yalae, with the exception of the
torpedo boats and destroy era, not mentioned in this statement, including the Katakdin
and Vesuviiis,

From the admiral.

Cadiz, April 6, 1898.

[In last night's mail I received your letter of the 4th, having previously received
your telegram concerning the same matter. It is precisely] on account of the
general anxiety prevailing [that] it is very important to think of what is to be done,
so that, if the case arises, we may act rapidly and with some chance of efficiency,
and not be groping about in the dark, or, like Don Quixote, go out to fight wind-
mills and come back with broken heads.

If our naval forces were superior to those of the United States, the question would
be an easy one; all we would have to do would be to bar their way. But as our
forces, on the contrary, are very Inferior to theirs, it would be the greatest of follies
to attempt to bar their way, which could only be done by giving them a decisive
naval battle. That would simply mean assure defeat, which would leave us at the
mercy of the enemy, who could easily take a good position in the Canaries, and by
establishing there a base of operations, crush our commerce and safely bombard our
maritime cities. It is therefore absolutely necessary to decide what we are going
to do, and, without disclosing our proposed movements, be in a position to act when
the time comes.

This was the substance of my telegram, and my ideas have not changed since then.
If we are caught without a plan of war, there will be vacillations and doubts; and,
after defeat, there may come humiliation and shame.

[You will understand these frank and loyal statements of an old friend and com-
rade, who desires nothing more than to help the Government and act with circum-
spection.

Pascual Cervera.]

[To the admiral,

Madrid, April 7, 1898.
We are in the midst of a serious international crisis. While I have not yet lost
all hope of a peaceable solution, it being the wish of the Government to avoid war
at any cost, wo have ndw reached the utmost limits of concessions by using the
influence of foreign powem; but the President of the United States is surrounded
by the waves which he himself has raised and which he i.s now trj^ing to appease.
It devolves upon you as the admiral of the squadron, and owing to the prestige
which you are ei^joying in the navy— -or God himself has singled you out for that
purpose— to carry out the plans which will be formulated and intrusted to your
intelligence and valor. I believe I have done all that yon asked me to do, as far as
it was in my power; if I have not done more it is because I have not had the neces-
sary means at my disposal. In this, as in everything else, my conscience is entirely
clear. In the instructions which you will receive a general idea is outlined which
you will work out with your captains. I will close, begging that you will express
my regards to the personnel under yonr orders and confirming the confidence which
H. M. and the Government place in your high ability.

SVGISMUNDO BBRME.TO.]

40

From the admiral.

Cadiz, April S, 1898.
[I have received all your telegrams. The ships are ready and I expect to go out
this eyening. I have Jnst sent the paymaster to San Fernando for the money, as the
Captain-General advises me that it has been received there. At Cape Verde I shall
await the instructions which you are to send me. The reproduction of the cipher
telegram differs in one word; it says that the instructions se ampliardn (will be
amplified), while the first telegram received said ae empleardn (will be used); that
is the reason why T indicated my idea of protecting the Canaries, and now, as pre-
viously stated, I shall wait.] I regret very much to have to sail without having
agreed upon some plan, even in general lines, for which purpose I repeatedly
requested permission to go to Madrid. From the bulk of the telegrams received I
think I see that the Qovemment persists in the idea of sending the flotilla to Cuba.
That seems to me a very risky adventure, which may cost us very dear, for the loss
of our flotilla and the defeat of our squadron in the Caribbean Sea may entail a
great danger for the Canaries, and perhaps the bombardment of our coast cities. I
do not mention the fate of the island of Cuba, because I have anticipated it long
ago. I believe a naval defeat would only precipitate its ultimate loss, while if left
to defend itself with its present means, perhaps it would give tlie Americans some
annoyance. We must not deceive ourselves concerning the strength of our fleet. If
you will look over our correspondence of the last two months you will see, not that
1 have been a prophet, but that I have fallen short of the true mark. Let us not
have any illusions as to what we can do [which will be in proportion to the means

available].

Pascual Cervera.

From the admiral.

St. Vincrnt (Caps Verde), April 19, 1898.

[The San Frandaco, and with it your instructions and letter, an*ived yeatenlay.
If the Oquendo and Vizcaya have really sailed for here, they have now been out ten
days and must arrive to-day or to-morrow, for that is all the time they would require
to make the voyage of 2,400 miles from Puerto Rico. But I am thinking that per-
haps the date state<1, the 9th, is that of the cablegram issuing the order, and not the
date of sailing, in which case they will arrive later.]

The boilers of the Ariete are practically unserviceable, so that this vessel, instead
of being an element of power, is the nightmare of the fleet. She could only be used
for local defense. The boiler of the Azor is eleven years old and is ot tbe locomotive
type. As for the destroyers Furor and Terror, their bow plates give as soon as they
are in a seaway, and some of their frames have been broken. [ViUaamil has had
this remedied as far as he has been able.] The Plutdn had an accident of this kind
when coming from England, and had her bows strengthened at Ferrol.

I do not know whether the port of San Juan de Puerto Rico afibrds good protec-
tion for the fleet. If it does not, and if the port of Mayaguez can not be e£fectively
closed, tbe fleet would be in a most unfavorable position. However, before forming
a judgment, I shall await the arrival of the Vizcaya, whose captain, Eulate, is
thoroughly acquainted with Puerto Rico. I am constantly preoccupied about the
Canaries. It will be necessary to close and fortify the port of Graciosa Island, as
well as the island commanding the port of La Luz in Gran Canary.

[From your instructions] it seems that the idea of sending the fleet to Cuba has
been abandoned, I believe very wisely.

Concerning Puerto Rico, I have often wondered whether it would be wise to accu-
mulate there all our forces, and I do not think so. If Puerto Ri«o is loyal, it will not
be such an easy job for the Yankees ; and if it is not loyal, it will inevitably follow
the same fate as Cuba, at least as far as we are concerned.

On tbe other hand, I am very much afraid for the Philippines, and, as I have said
before, the Canaries; and above all, tbe possibility of a bombardment of our coast.

41

which is not impossible, considering the audacity of the Tankees, and oonnting, as
they do, with fonr or Qve yessels of higher speed than onr own. For all these
reanonsy I am doahtful as to what it wonld be be^t for me to do; and I will not take
any decision without your opinion and that of the council of captains, as indicated
in your letter.

I leaye this letter open until to-morrow, in case anything shonld happen.

I was here interrupted by the information that the Vizcaya and Oquendo were in
sight, and I have had the pleasure of seeing them come in and of greeting their
ca]>tain8. The crews are in the best of health and spirits, but the Vizcaya needs
docking badly. During the trip from Puerto Eico she burned 200 tons more than
the Oquendo, which means a diminution of her speed of from 3 to 5 knots according
to my reckoning, and a diminution of her radius of action of from 25 to 30 per cent,
thus losing the advantage of speed [to which you called special attention in your
instructions]. Both are now coaling, but it is a long job, for, unfortunately, we do
not feel at home here. We are indeed unlucky !

[Until to-morrow. The mail has come in and will shortly go out again; I will
therefore close this. « • «

Pascual Crrvera.]

From the admiral.

[For lack of time I could not tell you yesterday about the council which met on
board the Co16n, and only sent you a copy of the proceedings.]

The council lasted nearly four hours. The prevailing spirit was that of purest
discipline, characterized by the high spirit which animates the whole fleet, and
especially the distinguished commanders, who are an honor to Spain and the navy,
and whom it is my good fortune to have for companions in these critical circum-
stances. The first and natural desire expressed by all was to go resolutely in quest
of the enemy and surrender their lives on the altar of the mother country ; but the
vision of the same mother country abandoned, insulted, and trod upon b}** the enemy,
proud of our defeat — for nothing else could be expected by going to meet them on
their own ground with our inferior forces — forced them to see that such sacrifice
would not only be useless but harmful, since it would place Spain in the hands of
an insolent and proud enemy, and God only knows what the consequences might be.
I could see the struggle in their minds between these conflicting considerations. All
of them loathe the idea of not going immediately in search of the enemy and finish-
ing once and for all. But, as I said before, the vision of the country violated by the
enemy rose above all other considerations, and inspired with that courage which
consists in braving criticism and perhaps the sarcasm and accusations of the igno-
rant mtfsses, which know nothing about war in general and naval warfare in partic-
ular, and which believe that the Alfonso XIII or the CHetina can be pitted against
the loica or Massaohuaeits, they expressly and energetically declared that the inter-
ests of the mother country demanded this sacrifice from us.

One of the captains had certain scruples about expressing his opinion, saying that
he would do what the Government of His Majesty should be pleased to order; but
as all of us, absolutely all, shared these sentiments— it is hardly necessary to say —
his scruples were soon overcome. [My reason for mentioning this is to give you an
exact report of everything that happened.] Another of the captains, certainly not
the most enthusiastic, but who may be said to have represented the average opinion
prevailing in the council, has, by my order, written down his ideas, and 1 send yon a
copy of his statement, which reflects, better than I could express them, the opinions
of all. This document represents exactly the sentiment which prevailed in the
meeting.

[Believing that 1 have fulfilled my duty in giving Your Excellency an accurate
account of all that happened, I reiterate the assurance of the excellent spirit of all.

Pascual Cebvera.]

April 21, 1898.

42

MnrUTSS OF PROCEKDnfOS.

The seoond in oommand of the naval forces and the captainaof the yessels, having
met on board the craiaer CoUn, by order of his excellency the commander in chief of
the squadron , and nnder his presidency , the president submitted for discussion the
following question :

** Under the present circumstances of the mother country, is it expedient that this
fleet should go at once to America, or should it stay to protect our coasts and the
Canaries and provide from here for any contingency f"

Several opinions were exchanged concerning the probable consequences of our
campaign in the West Indies ; the great deficiencies of our fleet compared with that
of the enemy were made manifest, as well as the very scanty resources which the
islands of Cuba and Puerto Kico are at present able to offer for the purpose of estab-
lishing bases of operations. In consideration of this, and the grave consequences
for the nation of a defeat of our fleet in Cuba, thus permitting the enemy to proceed
with impunity against the Peninsula and adjacent islands, it was unanimously agreed
to call the attention of the Government to these matters by means of a telegram as
follows :

** Commander-Qeneral of the Squadron to the Minister of Marine : In agreement
with the second in command and the commanders of the vessels, I suggest going to
the Canaries. Arieie has boilers in bad condition ; boiler of Azor is very old. Cana-
ries would be protected from a rapid descent of the enemy and all the forces would
be in a position, if necessary, to hasten to the defense of the mother country."
On board cruiser Col6n, April 20, 1898.

Fascual Cbrvxra.

Jos£ DB Parxdeb.

Juan B. Lazaoa.

Emiuo DIaz Morbu.

VICTOR M. Congas.

Antonio Eulatb.

joaquin bustambntb.

Fbrnanbo Villaamil.

OPINION OF CAPT. vfCTOR M. CONGAS.
[Gommander of the hsttleahlp Infanta Maria TtfrMo.]

Concerning the subjects presented for discussion by the admiral of the fleet at the
council of war held on board the battleship Cristobal Col6n my opinion is as follows:

(1) The naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior to our own in
number and class of vessels, armor, and armament, and in preparations made —
besides the advantage given the enemy by the insurrection in Cuba, the possible
one in Puerto Rico, and the latent insurrection in the East — that they have sufficient
forces to attack us in the West Indies, in the Peninsula and adjacent islands, and in
the Philippines. Since no attention has been paid to that archipelago, where it
was perhaps most urgent to reduce our vulnerable points, which could have been
done with a single battleship, any division of our limited forces at this time and
any separation from European waters would involve a strategic mistake which
would carry the war to the Peninsula, which ^vould mean frightful disaster to our
ooaHts, the payment of large ransoms, and perhaps the loss of some island. As soon
as this fleet leaves for the West Indies it is evident that the American Flying
Squadron will sail for Europe; and even if its purpose were only to make a raid or
a demonstration against our coasts, the just alarm of all Spain would cause the
enforced return of this fleet, although too late to prevent the enemy from reaping
the fruits of an easy victory.

The only three vessels of war remaining for the defense of the Peninsula, the
Cdrloa F, the Pelayo, whose repairs are not yet finished, and the Alfonso XIII, of
very little speed, are not sufficient for the defense of the Spanish coasts, and in no

43

manner for that of the Canaries. The yaoht Giralda and the steamers Germania and
Normania [of the acquisition of which official notice has been reoeiyed] are not
vessels of fighting qualities and add no strength to oar navy.

(2) The plan of defending the island of Puerto Rico, abandoning Cuba to its fate,
is absolutely impracticable, because, if the American fleet purposely destroys a city
of the last-named island, in spite of all the plans of the Government on the subject,
and even though it would be the maddest thing in the world, the Qovemment itself
would be forced by public opinion to send this fleet against the Americans, under the
conditions and at the point which the latter might choose.

(3) Even deciding upon the defense of Puerto Rico, the trip across at this time,
after the practical declaration of war, without a military port where the fleet mi^ht
refit on its arrival, and without an auxiliary fleet to keep the enemy busy — who, I
suppose, will make St. Thomas its base of operations — is a strategic error, the more
deplorable because there have been months and even years in which to accumulate
the necessary forces in the West Indies. It seems probable, judging from the
information acquired, that the supplies accumulated at St. Thomas are intended by
tiie enemy to establish a base of operations in the vicinity of our unprotected Vieques
(Crab Island). For all these reasons the responsibility of the trip must remain
entirely with the Government.

(4) Adding these three battleships and the CristShal Coldn, without her big guns,
to the two remaining in the Peninsola and to the few old torpedo boats which we
have leffc, it is possible to defend our coast from the Guadiana to Cape Creus, includ-
ing the Balearic and the Canaries, thanks to the distance of the enemy from its base
of operations. This defense, however, will have to be a very energetic one if the
enemy brings his best ships to bear on us, [and it will not be possible to save the
coasts of Galicia and of the north of Spain from suflering more or less if the enemy
brings along a light division, nor even the protected coasts from an attack here and
there, as our ships are too few in number to be divided].

(5) It is very regrettable that there are not enough vessels to cover all points at
one time ; but duty and patriotism compel us to present clearly the resources which
the country gave us, and the needs which present circumstances bring on the coun-
try in danger. *

(6) Lastly, I believe, with due respect, that the military situation should be laid
before the minister of marine, while I reiterate our profoundest subordination to his
orders, and our firm purpose most energetically to carry out the plans of operations
he may communicate to these forces. But after pointing out the probable conse-
quences, the responsibility must remain with the Government.

St. Vincent, Cape Verde, April 20, 1898.

Victor M. Concas.

From the admiral,

St. Vincent, Cape Verde, April 22^ 1898,
[My Dear General and Friend : I have not yet answered your letter of the 7th,
which the San Francisoo brought me, because, though I have written you since, I
did not have it before me.]

It is impossible for me to give you an idea of the surprise and consternation
experienced by all on the receipt of the order to sail. Indeed, that surprise is well
justified, for nothing can be expected of this expedition except the total destruction
of the fleet or its hasty and demoralized return, while in Spain it might be the safe-
guard of the nation.

[It is a mistake to believe that the Canaries are safe, which is only the case with
reference to Santa Cruz, Las Palmas, and one or two other places. But is Graciosa
Island safe, for instance? If the Yankees should take possession of it and fortify the
port they would have a base for any operations they might wish to undertake
against Spain, and surely the battalions will not be able to eject them from there.

42

MnrUTBS OF PR0CEEDIN06.

The second in command of the naval forcee and the captains of the Teasels, having
met on hoard the craiser CoUn, hy order of his excellency the commander in chief of
the squadron, and under his presidency, the president submitted for discussion the
following question :

''Under the present circumstances of the mother country, is itezx>edient that this
fleet should go at once to America, or should it stay to protect our coasts and the
Canaries and provide from here for any contingency V*

Several opinions were exchanged concerning the probable consequences of our
campaign in the West Indies ; the great deficiencies of our fleet compared with that
of the enemy were made manifest, as well as the very scanty resources which the
islands of Cuba and Puerto Kico are at present able to offer for the purpose of estab-
lishing bases of operations. In consideration of this, and the grave consequences
for the nation of a defeat of our fleet in Cuba, thus permitting the enemy to proceed
with impunity against the Peninsula and adjacent islands, it was unanimously agreed
to call the attention of the Government to these matters by means of a telegram as
follows :

** Commander-Qeneral of the Squadron to the Minister of Marine : In agreement
with the second in command and the commanders of tbe vessels, I suggest going to
the Canaries. Arieie has boilers in bad condition ; boiler of Aeor is very old. Cana-
ries would be protected from a rapid descent of the enemy and all the forces would
be in a position, if necessary, to hasten to the defense of the mother country."

On board cruiser Coldn, April 20, 1898.

Pascual Cerviera.

JOS£ DB PaRXDBS.

Juan B. Lazaoa.
Emilio DfAZ MOREU.
VfCTOR M. CONCAS.

Antonio Eulatb.
joaqufn bustamemte.
Fernando Villaamil.

opinion of capt. yfctor m. concas.

[(Tommander of the bAttlesfalp Infanta Maria Tere$a.]

Concerning the subjects presented for discussion by the admiral of the fleet at the
council of war held on board the battleship Cristdhal CoUn my opinion is as follows:

(1) The naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior to our own in
number and class of vessels, armor, and armament, and in preparations made —
besides the advantage given the enemy by the insurrection in Cuba, the possible
one in Puerto Rico, and the latent insurrection in the East — that they have sufficient
forces to attack us in the West Indies, in the Peninsula and adjacent islands, and in
the Philippines. Since no attention has been paid to that archipelago, where it
was perhaps most urgent to reduce our vulnerable points, which could have been
done with a single battleship, any division of our limited forces at this time and
any separation from European waters would involve a strategic mistake which
would carry the war to the Peninsula, which would mean frightful disaster to our
coasts, the payment of large ransoms, and perhaps the loss of some island. As soon
as this fleet leaves for tbe West Indies it is evident that the American Flying
Squadron will sail for Europe; and even if its purpose were only to make a raid or
a demonstration against our coasts, the just alarm of all Spain would cause the
enforced return of this fleet, although too late to prevent the enemy from reaping
the fruits of an easy victory.

The only three vessels of war remaining for the defense of the Peninsula, the
Cdrlos V, the Pelayoy whose repairs are not yet finished, and the Alfonso XIII, of
very little speed, are not sufficient for the defense of the Spanish coasts, and in no

43

manner for that of the Canaries. The yaoht (xirdlda and the steamers Germania and
Normania [of the acqnisition of which official notice has been received] are not
vesaels of fighting qnalities and add no strength to oar navy.

(2) The plan of defending the island of Puerto Hico, abandoning Cuba to its fate,
is absolntely impracticable, becanse, if the American fleet purposely destroys a city
of the last-named island, in spite of all the plans of the Government on the subject,
and even though it would be the maddest thing in the world, the Government itself
would be forced by public opinion to send this fleet against the Americans, under the
conditions and at the point which the latter might choose.

(3) Even deciding upon the defense of Puerto Rico, the trip across at this time,
after the practical declaration of war, without a military port where the fleet mi^ht
refit on its arrival, and without an auxiliary fleet to keep the enemy busy — who, I
suppose, will make St. Thomas its base of operations — is a strategic error, the more
deplorable because there have been months and even years in which to accumulate
the necessary forces in the West Indies. It seems probable. Judging from the
information acquired, that the supplies accumulated at St. Thomas are intended by
the enemy to establish a base of operations in the vicinity of our unprotected Vieques
(Crab Island). For all these reasons the responsibility of the trip must remain
entirely with the Government.

(4) Adding these three battleships and the CristSbal CoUn, without her big guns,
to the two remaining in the Peninsula and to the few old torpedo boats which we
have left, it is possible to defend our coast from the Guadiana to Cape Creus, includ-
ing the Balearic and the Canaries, thanks to the distance of the enemy from its base
of operations. This defense, however, will have to be a very energetic one if the
enemy brings his best ships to bear on us, [and it will not be possible to save the
coasts of Galicia and of the north of Spain from suflering more or less if the enemy
brings along a light division, nor even the protected coasts from an attack here and
there, as our ships are too few in number to be divided].

(5) It is very regrettable that there are not enough vessels to cover all points at
one time; but duty and patriotism compel us to present clearly the resources which
the country gave us, and the needs which present circumstances bring on the conn-
try in danger. *

(6) Lastly, I believe, with due respect, that the military situation should be laid
before the minister of marine, while I reiterate our profound est subordination to his
orders, and our firm purpose most energetically to carry out the plans of operations
he may communicate to these forces. But after pointing out the probable conse-
quences, the responsibility must remain with the Government.

St. Vincent, Cape Verde, April 20, 1898.

Victor M. Conoas.

Fr&m the admiral.

St. Vincent, Cape Verde, Jpril 8£f 1898,
[My Dear General and Friend: I have not yet answered yonr letter of the 7th,
which the San Francisoo brought me, because, though I have written you since, I
did not have it before me.]

It is impossible for me to give you an idea of the surprise and consternation
experienced by all on the receipt of the order to sail. Indeed, that surprise is well
justified, for nothing can be expected of this expedition except the total destruction
of the fleet or its hasty and demoralized return, while in Spain it might be the safe-
guard of the nation.

[It is a mistake to believe that the Canaries are safe, which is only the case with
reference to Santa Cruz, Las Palmas, and one or two other places. But is Graciosa
Island safe, for instance f If the Yankees should take possession of it and fortify the
port they would have a base for any operations they might wish to undertake
against Spain, and surely the battalions will not be able to eject them from there.

44

Snch a thing will not be possible at present, with the sqnadron at the Canaries, bnt
it will be inevitable when the sqnadron has been destroyed.]

Yon talk abont plans, and in spite of all my efforts to have some laid ont, as wonld
have been wise and prndent, my desires have been disappointed [to snch an extent
that, if the circumHtances had been different, I should have applied to be placed on
the retired list, and I shall ask for it, if God spares my life, just as soon as the dan-
ger is over. 1 should even apply for it to-day, without caring a straw for being
accused of cowardice, if it were not for the fact that my retirement wonld produce
among the sqnadron the deplorable effect of a desertion of itn admiral before the
enemy J. How can it be said that I have been supplied with everything I asked for?
The Colon does not yet have lier big guns, and I asked for the poor ones if there
were no others. The 14-centimeter ammunition, with the exception of about 300
rounds, is bad. The defective guns of the Fizcaya and Oquendo have not been changed.
The cartridge cases of the Colon can not be recharged. We have not a single Busta-
meute torpedo. There is no plan or concert, which I so much desired and have sug-
gested in vain. The repairs of the servomotors of my vessels have only been made in
the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Vizcaya, after they had left Spain. In short, it is a
disaster already, and it is to be feared that it will be a more frightful one before long.
And perhaps everything could be changed yet ! But I suppose it is too late now for
anything that is not the ruin and desolation of our country.

[I can understand that your conscience is clear, as you state in your letter, because
you are a good man and your course is clear before yon, but think of what I tell you
and yon will see that I am right. I assembled my captains, as you told me, and sent
you by telegraph an extract of their opinions. I have since forwarded yon a copy of
the minutes of the meeting, and by this mail I send you an official letter comment-
ing on it. I have nothing further to add.]

The Vizoaya can no longer steam, and she is only a boil in the body of the fleet.

But I will tronble you no more. I consider it an accomplished fact and will try to
find the best way out of this direful enterprise.

Pascual Cervkra.

St. Vincent, Cape Verdk, April 24 j 1898.

The telegram ordering us to start has just arrived, and I have given orders to trans-
ship from the Cddiz to these vessels coal, supplies, crews, and the artillery of the
destroyers, which was on board the Cddiz.

I intended to sail without finishing the provisioning of the ships, but since the
Cddiz is to remain here, I have decided to ship as much coal as possible. I will try to
sail to-morrow.

As the act has been consummated, I will not insiHt upon my opinion concerning it.
May God grant that I be mistaken ! You see I was right when I told you that by
the end of April the Pelayo, Cdrlos V, Vitoriay and Xumanda would not be finished ;
that the Col6n would not have her big guns unless we took the defective ones; that
we should not have the 14-centimeter ammunition with which to fight, etc.

With a clear conHcience I go to the sacrifice, but I cannot understand the [unani-
mous] decision of the general officers of the navy against my opinion.

T have been informed of the sailing of a cargo of [5,700 tons of] coal for Puerto
Rico, where it is expecti*d to arrive on the lltli or 12th of May, but I am much aftaid
that it may fall into the hands of the enemy.

It is a mistake to suppose that I can accept or avoid a naval battle at will. The
Vizcaya, on account of her stay in Habana and not having had her bottom cleaned
for nine months, is nothing more than a buoy, and I can not abandon her.

[Pascual Cer\'^ra.

27th.
I am almost in despair at the slowness of the Cddiz ; she is well prepared for a
voyage, but very poorly for loading and unloading. I think we can start to-morrow.]

45

At Sea, May 5, 189S,
Dbar Juan : To complete our oolleotion of documents, I think proper that yon
shonld have the inclosed copy of a telegram &om Villaamil to Sagasta. I send yon
this letter by two destroyers which I am sending to Martinique in search of news.
All is well on board, and the spirit is excellent. We shall see what God has in store
for us. The final result is not doubtful; but if we could only start with a good
lucky stroke! God be with us! Good-bye. Regards to your folk, etc.

Pascual.

Telegram from Villa<imih

April 22, 1898.
[PrXxedbs Sagasta, Madrid :

[(To be deciphered by naval key.)]
In view of the importance to the country of the destination of this fleet, I deem
it expedient that you should know, through a friend who does not fear censure, that,
while as seamen we are all ready to die with honor in the fulfillment of our duty, I
think it undoubted that the sacrifice of these naval forces will be as certain as it
will be fruitless and useless for the termination of the war, if the representations
repeatedly made by the admiral to the minister of marine are not taken into con-
sideration.

F. ViLLAAMIL.i

ADDENDUM TO CHAPTER IV.

At the conclasion of the war the Office of Naval Intelligence pub-
lished a pamphlet under the title of '^ Views of Admiral Cervera
Begarding the Spanish Navy in the Late War," being a translation of
a series of letters published at Madrid in La Epoca of November 5,
1898, in vindication of the Spanish Navy. The pamphlet referred to
contains the following letters in addition to those given in Captain
Nunez's book.

In January, 1898; Admiral Cervera wrote to one of his relatives :

DEFICIENCIILS OF THE NAVAL INDUSTRY.

''About two years ago I wrote you a letter concerning our condition to go to war
with the United States. I requested you to keep that letter in case some day it
should be necessary to bring it to light in defense of my memory or myself when we
had experienced the sad disappointment prepared for us by the stupidity of some,
the cupidity of others, and the incapability of all, even of those with the best of
intentions.

''To-daj'' we find ourselves again in one of those critical periods which seem to be
the beginning of the end, and I write to you again to express my point of view and
to explain my action in this matter, and I beg you to put this letter with the other
one, so that the two may be my military testatpent.

'' The relative military positions of Spain and the United States has grown worse
for us, because we are extenuated, absolutely penniless, and they are very rich, and
also because we have increased our naval power only with the Col6n and the torpedo
destroyers, and they have increased theirs much more.

'' What I have said of our industry is sadly confirmed in everything we look at.
There is the Cataluna, begun more than eight years ago, and her hull is not yet com>
pleted. And this when we are spurred on by danger, which does not wake patriot-
ism in anybody, while jingoism finds numerous victims, perhaps myself to-morrow.
And the condition of our industry is the same in all the arsenals.

^ See the addendum which here follows.— O. N. I.

^' Let OS eoBsMer, now, our prirate indastries. The Maqninista Terrestre y Marf-
tima snpplies the engines of the Alfonso XIII; Cadiz the Filipinos, If the Cdrlos V is
not a dead failure, she is not ^hat she should be ; everything has been sacrificed to
speed, and she lacks power. And remember that the constniction is purely Spanish.
The company of La Grafia has not completed its ships, as I am told. Only the
VUoaya, Oqtiendo, said Maria Teresa are good ships of their class; but, though con-
structed at Bilbao, it was by Englishmen. Thus, manifestly, even victory would
be a sad thing for us. As for the administration and its intricacies, let us not speak
of that; its slow procedure is killing us. The Vizcaya carries a 14-cm. breech plug
which was declared useless two months ago, and I did not know it until last night.
And that because an official inquiry was made. How many cases I might mention !
But my purpose is not to accuse, but to explain why we may and must expect a dis-
aster. But as it is necessary to go to the bitter end, and as it would be a crime to
say that publicly to-day, I hold my tongue, and go forth resignedly to face the trials
which God may be pleased to send me. I am sure that we will do our duty, for the
spirit of the navy is excellent; but I pray God that the troubles may be arranged
without coming to a conflict which, in any way, I believe would be disastrous to us.'

STATE OF THB FLEET.

In the beginning of February Admiral Cervera wrote to a high official personage :
''Although I am sure that I am telling you nothing new, I think it is not idle, in
these critical times, to males a study of the condition of the fleet. We must dis-
count the Alfonso XIII, so many years under trials that it appears we shall not have
the pleasure ever to count it among our vessels of war. The fleet is reduced to the
three Bilbao cruisers, the Coldn, the Destructor, and the torpedo destroyers jPurorand
Terror. The three Bilbao battle ships are practically complete, but the li-cm.
artillery, the main power of these vessels, is practically useless, on account of the
bad system of its breech mechanism, and the bad quality of the cartridge cases, of
which there are only those on board.

''The CoUn, which is undoubtedly the best of all our ships from a military point
of view, has not received her guns. The Destructor may serve as a scout, although
its speed is not very high for this service in the fleet. The Furor and Terror are
in a good oondition, but I doubt if they can make effective use of their 75-mm.
pieces. As for the supplies necessary for a fleet, we frequently lack even the most
necessary. In this arsenal (Cadiz) we have not been able to coal, and both at Bar-
celona and Cadiz we could only obtain half of tUe biscuit we wanted, and that only
because I had ordered 8,000 kilos to be made here. We have no charts of the Amer-
ican seas, although 1 suppose that they have been ordered ; but at the present time
we oonld not move. Apart f^om this deficient state of the material, I have the pleas-
ure to state that the sprit of the personnel is excellent, and that the country will
find it all that it may choose to demand. It is a pity that a lack of better and more
abundant material, greater supplies, and less hindrances are wanting to put this
personnel in a condition to amply carry out its role."

"I note," said the Admiral in another letter, ''what I am told concerning the
heavy artillery of the Coldn. It is to be very much regretted that there is always so
much underhand work about everything, and that there should be so much of it now
regarding the acceptance of the 254-mm. guns, because if we finally take them, it will
seem that we are yielding to certain disagreeable impositions, and if things come to
the worst, it seems to me we will have to accept, as the proverb says, 'hard bread
rather than none ; ' and if we have no other guns, and these ones can fire at least 25 or SO
shots, we will have to take them anyhow, even though they are expensive and ineffi-
cient. And we must not lose time, so that the vessel may be armed and supplied
with ammunition as noon as possible.''

47

Some time aftenrards, when matters wore getting worse and worse^ the admiral
was more explicit still. Shortly after the Dnpay de Lome iucident he said :

"I do not know when the Pelayo and the Cdrlos Twill be able to join the fleet,
bnt I suspect that they will not arrive in time. Of the first one I know nothing at
ally but I have received some news concerning the second one, and certainly not very
satisfactory as regards the time it will talce for it to be ready. It seems to me that
there is a mistake in the calculation of the forces we may connt upon in the sad
event of a war with the United States. In the Cadiz division I believe the Numanda
will be lacking. I do not think we can count on the L^panio. Of the Cdrlos V and
the Pelayo I haye already spoken. The CoUn has not yet received her artillery, and
if war comes she will be caught withoat her heavy artillery. The eight principal
▼essels of the Havana station have no military value whatever, and, besides, are
badly worn out ; therefore they can be of very little use. In saying this I am not
moved by a fault-finding spirit, bnt only by a desire to avoid illusions that may cost
us very dear.

*' Taking things as they are, however sad it may be, it is seen that our naval force
when compared with that of the United States is approximately in the proportion
of 1 to 3. It therefore seems to me a dream, almost a feverish fancy, to think that
with this force, extenuated by our long wars, we can establish the blockade of any
port of the United States. A campaign against them will have to be, at least for
the present, a defensive or a disastrous one, unless we have some alliances, in which
case the tables may be turned. As for the offensive, all we could do would be to
make some raids with our fast vessels in order to do them as much harm as possible.
It is frightful to think of the results of a naval battle, even if it should be a suc-
cessful one for us, for how and where would we repair our damages? I, however,
will not refuse to do what may be judged necessary, but I think it convenient to
analyze the situation such as it is, without cherishing illusions which may bring
about terrible disappointments.''

MORE DUFICIIENCIICS — THE COUNTRY MUST BE TOLD THE TRUTH.

On February 26 the admiral wrote the following:

'' When I received yesterday the letter in which, among other things, you asked
me if the CoUn could go out for target practice, I answered that the vessel was
ready, and at the same time I took measures so that the cartridge cases which might
be used in that practice should be recharged, but it appears that there is no furnace
in which they can be reannealed, or a machine to reform the cartridge cases. The
extra charges which the vessel brought (72 per gun) are therefore useless.

''I send to-day the official letter which I announced yesterday. Its conclusions
are indeed afflicting, but can we afford to cherish illusions f Do we not owe to our
country not only our life, if necessary, but the exposition of our beliefs f I am very
uneasy about this. I ask myself if it is right for me to keep silent, and thereby
make myself an accomplice in adventures which will surely cause the total ruin of
Spain. And for what purpose f To defend an island which was ours, but belongs to
US no more, because even if we should not lose it by right in the war we have lost
it in fact, and with it all our wealth and an enormous number of young men, vic-
tims of the climate and bullets, in the defense of what is now no more than a roman-
tic ideal. Furthermore, I believe that this opinion of mine should be known by the
Queen and by the whole council of ministers.''

That this thoughtful and patriotic advice was not favorably received by the Gov-
ernment is shown by the following letter a few days afterwards :

''Yesterday I received your letter of the 28th, and I regret very much the painful
impressions caused by my remarks; but I am not surprised, because they are truly
sad, and still, perhaps, they fall beneath the mark, judging from everything one
sees. Just now we have another proof of this in the fact that the difficulty of
obtaining cartridge cases for the CoUn arises from the want of means (money), and

48

this on the eve, perhaps, of a war against the richest nation in the world. I do not
wish to dwell too much on this point, for no practical result coald be obtained.
But every detail points out either our lack of means or our defective organization,
and; above all, onr utter lack of preparation.

''I have deemed it my duty to express my opinions to the proper authorities
clearly and without beating around the bush. Now let orders be given to me; I
will carry them out with energy and decision. I am ready for the worst."

CERVERA. WISHED TO EXPLAIN HIS OPIKION TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

Admiral Cervera's already expressed desire to personally inform the council of
ministers was still more clearly expressed under date of March 16 :

"Yesterday I received your favor of the day before, by which I see that our opin-
ions agree concerning the conflict which threatens our unfortunate country. As
both of us are animated by the best desires, such agreement was sure to come. It
also appears that the whole Government participates in this opinion, but I am afraid
that there may be some minister who, while believing that we are not in favorable
conditions, may have been dazzled by the names of the vessels appearing in the gen-
eral statement and may not realize how crushing a disproportion really exists,
especially if he is not thoroughly aware of our lack of everything that is necessary
for a naval war, such as supplies, ammunition, coal, etc. We have nothing at all.
If this fear of mine is well founded, I think it is of the greatest importance that the
whole council of ministers, without exception, be fully and clearly informed of our
terrible position, so that there may not remain the least doubt that the war will
simply lead us to a terrible disaster, followed by a humiliating peace and the meet
frightful ruin ; for which reason it is necessary not only to avoid the war but to find
some solution which will render it impossible in the future. If this is not done, the
more time is spent the worse will be the final result, whether it is peace or war.

" From this reasoning, as clear as daylight to me, it appears that since w^e can not
go to war without meeting with a certain and frightful disaster, and since we can
not treat directly with the United States, whose bad faith is notorious, perhaps
there is nothing left for us to do but to settle the dispute through arbitration or
mediation, provided the enemy accepts. However, this order of consideration does
not come within my sphere of duty, which, as the chief of the squadron, is limited
to reporting the state of military affairs and then carrying out the orders of the
Government. The latter, however, must be fully infoimed of the situation. Before
dropping this subject I must insist that perhaps it would be well for me to verbally
inform the members of the cabinet and to say that I am ready to start at the first
intimation.

'^ Concerning the available forces and what may be expected of them, I will be
very glad if Ansaldo carries out his promise about the 254-mm. guns of the Co16n.
The 14- cm. cartridge cases are absolutely necessary. This vessel has only 30, and
it is to be supposed that the stores of the Oquendo and Vizcaya are not better sup-
plied. For the present the firm is supplying only 100 per week, and suppos-
ing that the first ones have already arrived or will arrive in Cadiz one of these
days, at this rate we won't have finished until October. Then they have to be
charged ; therefore they can never be ready in time for the present confiict. I
thought I would have the first ones by January, and I will not have them nntil
April. The engines of the Pelayo are ready and the vessel can sail, but how about
the secondary battery and the armored redoubt? These will not be ready. If the
old battery could be mounted ! But I donbt it : the ports will no^^permit it. 1 have
heard it said that the crew which brought the Pelayo was taken from the ViUma,
which is another proof of our excessive poverty. It will be very well if the
Cdrlo8 V is soon ready, but I understand that the 10-cm. battery has not yet been
mounted, and then the trials are to be made.

49

" I never had gjetkt confidence in the purchasing of Yessels. Too much fnss is made
over every detail by ignorant people. It was through this that we lost the Garibaldi,
and now we have lost the Brazilian ornisers. In fact, we have only secured the
Coldn^ an excellent ship, but which has not yet arrived, and the Vald^a, And sup-
posing that we had everything our own way, and that Providence should grant naa
victory, which is highly improbable, we would then find ourselves iu the condition
explained in my last and which it is not necessary to repeat. It only rests for me now
to be informed of the destination of the fleet I believe the Teresa ought to be in
Cadiz, where the cartridge oases are to be recharged, and she could sail as soon as all
her guns were mounted.

*'I will insist no more, but the voice of my conscience, animated by my love for
my country, tells me that in saying this I am fulfilling my unavoidable duty."

CONDITION OF THE FUSBT IMMEDIATELY BEFORE TUE WAR.

In the month of April, shortly before the war, Cervera wrote :
<*My fearH are realized. The conflict is coming fast upon us; and the CoUm has
not received her big guns; the Carlos Fhas not been delivered, and her 10-cm. artil-
lery is not yet mounted; the Pelayo is not ready for want of finishing her redoubt,
and, I believe, her secondary battery; the Vitoria has no artillery, and of the
Numanda we had better not speak.

''But aft* r all I am glad the end is coming. The country can stand this state of
affairs no htnger, and any arrangement will be a good one, however bad it looks, if
it comes without our having to lament a great disaster, as may happen if we go to
war with a few half-armed vessels, and with want of means and excess of incum-
brances.''

6884 4

OHAPTER V.
The BEannoNO of the End.

mOBEASE OF THE UNITED STATES FLEET — OPERATIONS ON THE
CUBAN COAST — ^BOMBARDMENT OF DIFFERENT PORTS — OPERA-
TIONS AGAINST PUERTO RICO — ^DESTRUCTION OF OUR CABLES —
OUR SQUADRON AT SANTIAOO.

The Americans used every endeavor to increase their fleet, withoat
having to stop at such considerations as kept qs back. We should be
glad to give here a list of the 128 vessels which they purchased and
equipped for war nnder the name of anxiliaries of the fleet. We do
not do so in order not to burden the reader with numerical data, and
will confine ourselves to a short review of the strength of their Navy
on August 15, 1898J

^ A list of the TeBsels pnrohased, their valae, and the names with which they were
christened, may be foand in the Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Vol. 1, 1898.

Through the United States Consul at Cadiz, C. L. Adams, says the New York
Herald, the Navy Department at Washington received detailed information as to
the Spanish merchant marine. Mr. Adams fdmished a complete list of all vessels
carrying the Spanish flag, specifying those which might be used as auxiliary
crnisers in time of war, and those which woold probably continue to be merchant
steamers nnd might be captured by a United States fleet of light vessels sent to the
coasts of Spain.

The following is the information fhmished by Consul Adams :

Compafifa Trasatldntica (Barcelona and Cadiz) : Thirty-two steamers, 20 of which
have over 12 knots speed and some of which are ready to be fitted out as cruisers
and armed transports. These vessels carry on traffic with Puerto Rico, Cuba, Mexico,
New York, Liverpool, the Philippines, Rio de la Plata, aud Africa.

Pinillos Silenz y Ca. (Barcelona) : Five steamers, 3 of which can be equipped as
auxiliary cruisers. These ships go to Puerto Rico, Cuba, Mexico, aud the United
States.

F. Prat y Ca. (Barcelona) : Five steamers of 2,000 tons each; same route as those
of Pinillos S^enz y Ca.

De Aarotegui (Bilbao) : Seven freight steamers; same route as preceding ones.

Compalifa de Navegaoi6n La Fleoha (Bilbao): Seven freight steamers; to Liver-
pool and preceding lines.

Hijo de J. Jover y Serra (Barcelona) : One steamer of 2,000 tons. Route : Spain,
Puerto Rico, and Cuba.

J. Jover y Costa: One steamer of 2,000 tons. Route: Spain, Puerto Rico, and
Cuba.

Sociedad de Navegaci6n 4 Industria (Barcelona): Four steamers. Route: Spain
and Canaries.

Empresa de Navegacidn H vapor La B^tica (Seville) : Twelve steamers. Between
Spain, England, and Germany. Freight vessels.

Compafifa Maritima (Barcelona): Eighteen freight steamers. Carry on traffic

50

51

At that time the personnel of the I^avy, which at the breaking out of
the war nambered only 12,000 men, had risen to 24,123, and the iieet
was composed as follows :

Battleships, first class 4

Battleships, second class 1

Armored cruisers 2

Coast-defense monitors 6

Armored ram 1

Protected cmisers 12

Unprotected cmisers 3

Gnnboats 18

Dynamite craiser 1

Torpedo boats 11

Old warships, inclading monitors 14

Atudliary Navy,

Auxiliary cmisers 11

Converted yachts 28

Coast-guard vessels 15

Lighters 4

Converted tugs 27

Colliers 19

Miscellaneous vessels 19

To these must be added a number of stipulations and contracts for
supplying the squadrons at Guba and the Philippines with coal and
fresh provisions; also hospital ships, tank and distilling ships, repair
ships, steamers of great speed to carry orders back and forth, etc.

The difficult and arduous task of blockading was therefore performed
by our enemies with comparative ease, the vessels being frequently

with the coasts of England and Spain. (This and the preceding line belong to
McAndreu &, Co., London. )

P. M. Tinore y Ca. (Barcelona) : Four freight steamers; traffic between Spain and
England.

Compafifa Bilbaina de Navegacidn (Bilbao) : Six steamers for transportation of
mineral between Bilbao and England.

J. M. Martinez de las Bivas (Bilbao) : Three steamers for transportation of min-
eral between Bilbao and England.

Hijos de Tom^ Haynes (Cadiz): Eight freight steamers; between Spain and
North Africa.

Sociedad Islef&o Maritima (La Palma and Mallorca) : Five steamers ; traffic between
Barcelona and Balearic Islands.

Sociedad Mahonesa de Vapores. Five steamers ; Barcelona and Balearic Islands.

Ibarra y Ca. (Seville) : Twenty-one steamers ; coast traffic.

Claverla Lozo y Ca. (Gijon; : Five steamers; coast traffic.

Melit^n Gonzalez y Ca. (Gijon) : Five steamers ; coast traffic.

Espalia y Ca. (Seville): Five steamers; coast traffic.

Compafifa Valenciana de Navegaci6n (Valencia) : Five steamers; coast traffic.

The conclusion which the Herald drew from this statement was that we should
probably use many of these steamers as auxiliary cruisers, and the others it held out
as a bait to the United States auxiliaries, reminding them that the prizes would be
distributed as follows : One-half would go to the United States Treasury and the
other half to the officers and crews. There can be no doubt as to this system being
privateering, and it was practised as often as there was a chance.

52

relieved and in constant communication with the base of operations
established at Key West and Dry Tortugas.

Now and then the bombardment of some port on our insular coasts
was combined with the blockade. Among the most important, aside
from the bombardment of Santiago, of which we will speak separately,
may be mentioned the following:

On April 25 the torpedo boat Gushing attempted to reconnoiter the
Day of Cardenas; the Ligera, which went out to meet her, fired and
hit her condenser, destroying it, as was subsequently learned. The
torpedo boat withdrew.

On April 27 Admiral Sampson received notice that works of defense
were being erected at Matanzas and he decided to stop tlie work. To
that end he entered the bay with his flagship, accompanied by the
Puritan and Cincinnati. The works were bombarded without any
effect on the new batteries of Morrillo, Punta Gorda, and Punta Saba-
nilla, all of which were of sand and rose only a little above the level of
the sea. The works answered boldly and the ships withdrew. The
French and Austrian consuls protested against this bombardment, of
which no previous notice had been given to the city.' On the 29th of
April the JEJa^gle engaged with our small gunboats, among them the
Diego Velazquez, at Oienfuegos, with the intention of reconnoitering the
entrance of the bay. Soon after the Marblehead fired upon the entrance,
and the batteries of Pasacaballos and gunboats Satelite, Lince, and
Oaviota answered.

The same day the squadron was apparently trying to effect a landing
at Mariel, which was not carried out, because as three towed launches
full of men approached the beach of Herradura they were received by
the fire of the troops belonging to the Gerona battalion and had to
reembark in great haste. It should be remembered that the Americans
had chiefs of the Cuban insurrection and many insurgents on board
their vessels as pilots, and they were the ones who went ahead in these
operations. The troops which had occasion to repulse these attempts
at landing stated that they heard the classic voices of the Cubans
apostrophizing the Spanish as they were wont to do in their battles.

On April 30 the steamer Argonauto was captured near Cienfuegos,
and 1 colonel, 6 officers, 3 sergeants, and 5 privates were taken pris-
oners. The vessel was looted in a barbarous manner.'^

On May 6 a torpedo boat opened fire on the works of the battery of
Punta Maya at Matanzas; Punta Sabanilla battery answered, and the
torpedo boat withdrew without having caused any damage. On the
8th the small gunboats Ligera, Alerta, and Antonio Lopez, starting from
Cardenas, met the hostile ships Wiiislow and Machius between Buba ,

^ We touch on these bombfirdmeuts lightly so as to follow the thread of the oper-
ations, intending to describe them more fully in the future.

'A trustworthy person told us that as the passengers rushed to the boats hot
water and steam were thrown upon them.

53

and Mangle keys. Fire was opened and they were forced to leave the
bay.

On May 11 the boats of the Marhlehead and Nashville, under cover
of the guns of said vessels, and the Winslow attacked the mouth of the
bay of Cienfuegos, with a view to effecting a landing. They were
received by the fire of the artillery and infantry, which compelled them
to withdraw, with one dead and eleven wounded. The same day the
MaehiaSj Wilmington^ and WiTisJotv, accompanied by the coast-guard
vessel Eudsonj attempted an attack upon Cardenas, and were all
repulsed by the fire of our Antonio Lopez.^ The Winslow was struck
by many shells, disabling her engine and boiler, causing a conflagration
on board, and killing Ensign Bagley and five sailors. Her commander
was wounded. The vessel and crew were rescued through the inter-
vention of the Hudson, which towed her out of range. •Combined with
this operation was the landing of a force at Cay Diana, in the bay of
Cardenas, for the purpose of blowing up the mines located there. The
enterprise could not be prevented, owing to superior hostile forces, and
for the first time the Americans raised their flag in Cuba.

On the 12th San Juan de Puerto Rico was bombarded by 11 vessels
under Admiral Sampson's command; they withdrew without having
produced any effect, being repulsed by the fire of the batteries of the
forts. On the 14th the gunboat Diego Velazquez sustained an engage-
ment with a hostile vessel at Cienfuegos. On the 15th an American
vessel appeared in front of Caibarien, but retreated when fired upon
by our launches. On the 20th a gunboat fired from a distance upon
Varadero and Punta Camacho, between Cardenas and Matanzas, and
on the same day two vessels entered the bay of Guantdnamo, firing
upon Playa del Este and the gunboat Sandoval. The fire was returned
firom Punta Caracoles and the mouth of Guantduamo Eiver, and they
retreated without having done any damage. Two batteries of anti-
quated guns had been established here, one at Caimanera and the other
at Cay Toro. On June 13 the Yankee had an engagement with a gun-
boat of ours and the batteries at the entrance to Cienfuegos. On the
15th of the same month the Texas, Marhlehead, and Suwanee entered
the outer bay of Guant^namo, where there were no defenses, properly
speaking, and took possession of it. On the 22d the 8U Paul had
an engagement with our destroyer Terror, assisted by the gunboat
Isabel II, near San Juan de Puerto Rico. The fire of the rapid-fire guns
of the St, Paul caused several deaths and serious damage on board the
Terror, which was thereby prevented from firing her torpedoes. This
fact is worthy of notice in connection with battles between torpedo
boats and cruisers.

On June 21 a vessel appeared before Mariel, exchanging heliographic
signals with the shore. The old guns of the Fort San Elias battery

^ The report of the Secretary of the Navy states that there were shore batteries
here. This we have already denied in the first yolome of this work.

54

opened fire, bat it fell short. On the 29th the Eagle and the Ttmkton
had an engagement with some of our troops at the mouth of the river
Hondo. On the 30th the Histy Wompatucky and Hornet^ while making
a reconnoissance between Gape Graz and Manzanillo, had an engage-
ment with oar vessels anchored there, the field batteries erected ashore,
and some infantry. The Hornet was strnck several times and was
completely disabled, the main steam pipe having been cat. She was
towed oat of action by the Wompatuck, On Jaly I oar gunboats at
Manzauillo, the Delgado ParejOj Estrella, and OuantdnamOj under way,
and the Cuba Espanola, Maria^ and Ouardiduj at anchor, under cover
of the field batteries of the place, sustained an engagement with the
Scorpion^ Osceola, Hornet, Wompatuck, and others, which retreated
after three hours of firing, one of them having been injured. On July
2 the anchoring place of Tunas was attacked by two hostile vessels,
one of them a turret ship, followed by transports. They were repulsed
by a battery of two 8-centimeter Krupp guns. They returned to the
attack on the 3d, and were again repulsed by the same guns and two
Plasencia guns. They had evidently intended a landing.

On the 12th of the same month the JEagle gave chase to the Santo
Domingo west of the Isle of Pines. On the 15th the Annapolis engaged
the shore batteries near Baracoa. On the 18th the Wilmingtonj Helena,
Scorpion, Hist, Hornet, Wompatuck, and Osceola again attacked the
vessels and batteries at Manzanillo, destroying the gunboats we had
at that anchoring place. The same day ^ the Annapolis, Wa^, Leyden,
and Topeka took possession of the BayofNipe, destroying the gunboat
Jorge Juan.

On the 30th three vessels bombarded Punta Maya, at Matanzas. The
improvised 21centimeter battery to the west returned the fire and the
vessels retreated.

On August 12 the Newark and Resolute carried the First Battalion
of Marines to Manzanillo, where they were joined by the Suwanee, Hist,
and Osceola, They then asked for the surrender of the place, which
was reftised, and the city sustained a bombardment.

At daybreak of the 13th it became known that the peace protocol
had been signed and the battle was suspended.

The transports with the army corps intrusted with the campaign
against Puerto Eico were convoyed from Santiago to the southern coast
of that island by the Massachusetts (flagship), Columbia, Yale, Dixie,
and Gloucester, The Columbia and the Yale also carried troops. This
squadron was under the command of Gapt. F. J. Higginson. At
Guanica the jinnapolis and Wa^ joined the fleet, and at Ponce the
Cincinnati, The Puritan and Amphitrite^ together with the New
Orleans, were blockading San Juan On June 18 Ponce fell into the
hands of the enemy, represented by the Dixie, Annapolis, Olouoester,
and Wa^p, and their landing forces. On July 1 the Gloucester and

' According to United States reports Nipe Bay was taken the 2lBt. — O. N. I.

56

Wasp took possession of Arroyo. On August 6 the Amphitrite landed
forces at Cape San Juan. They took possession of the light-house,
which they abandoned again ux)on an attack by our troops on August 8.

These operations did not lead to serious battles, as may be judged
from the small number of casualties sustained by the hostile squadron.^
The main thing was to blockade, terrify, and make a show with lively
bombardments of open and undefended places, without any decisive
battles. The preconceived plan of cutting Cuba off from all assistance
firom without was entirely successful. As it became obvious that our
squadron, in which we had placed so much confidence, was nothing but
an illnsi<m, the Americans grew more and more audacious.

In order to isolate us completely, they sought to cut the cables con-
necting us with Europe. Spain, after four centuries of dominion iB
Cuba, did not have a single cable of her own connecting her with her
wealthy and much coveted colonies. Let the reader make his own
comments on this fact, which is one more item on the list of criminal
neglects.

In Cuba we harbored the hope that, inasmuch as the cables are pro-
tected by international law, the United States would not dare do
anything against them. But such was not the case. The intention
of destroying them was very obvious from the beginning, for, as pre-
viously shown, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Long, suggested it to
Sampson in his preliminary instructions, before hostilities had broken
out. Hence the Americans never thought of respecting this sacred
property. On the contrary, they made every effort to destroy it, and
succeeded in cutting us oft' from the rest of the world and from the
mother country, so that toward the end of the campaign the only means
of communication from Habana was the cable by way of Key West,
of which the Americans had taken possession. According to some
writers, who have given this matter special attention, it is not certain
whether the island was cut off from other countries. But certa.in it is
that Santiago preserved communication by means of the English cable
until the last days of the blockade, because this cable was lauded quite

1 The total namber of casaalties sastained by the United States Navy in these
actions and at Manila is as follows :

Battle of MaoiUi

Battle of Cieiif uegoa

Battle of Cardenas

Batileof San Juan

BMttleof OnantAnamo

Battle of Santiago de Caba:

June 22

Jiily3

OnboardBagle. Jnly 12

On board liancroft, Aagnst 2 . . .
On board Amphitrite, Augnat 6
On board Yankee, Auguat 11 . . .

Total.

Knied.

1
6
1
6

1
1

17

Wounded.

9

11

8

7

18

9

10

1

67

Total.

9

12

8

8

10
11
1
1
1
1

56

a distaDce inside the bay and could Bot be cat. And it is also cer-
tain that the Americans did whatever they pleased about the cables,
without auy protest from the civilized world against this spoliation.
Although some claims have been formulated, it was more from the
staudpoiDt of commercial enterprise than from that of international
law, aud the object was to claim damages rather than punish and exact
amends for the abuse. It would almost seem as though the powers of
Europe were afraid of what is called the Colossus of the North.

On April 25, Long issued instructions to Sampson, contrary to former
suggestions, not to touch tbe cables, and when the latter complained
of this order, the Secretary replied that there was some idea of declar-
ing them neutral. The cable from Habana to Key West was at once
taken possession of by the Americans, and we shall see that the so-called
neutrality was nothing but a feint to better conceal the real intentions
and to prepare the final blow in Europe.

This was the general policy of the Americans: Stoical calm in order
to prepare the ground; decided action when they knew that their plans
had been perfected and that no one could bar their way.^

We will now mention the principal operations carried out by the
Americans to destroy the cables.

The order to cut the cables south of Ouba was issued April 30. On
May 11 the Eagle dragged unsuccessfully for a cable laid between Cien-
fuegos and Bataban6 in shallow and clear water. On the same day.
Captain McCalla reported that the cable between Cienfuegos and Man-
zanilla had been successfully cut by boats used close to the shore. Both

* One of the many proofs of the solidarity which existed between the United States
and England against Spain is the following telegram :

''London, July 13. — The first meeting of the Anglo-American League took place
at Safford Honse to-day. The Duke of Sutherland presided. There were present
the Earl of Grey, the Earl of Jersey, Baron Farrer, Baron Brassey , Baron Tennyson,
Baron Monks well, Sir John Lubbock, Rear- Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, the
Archbishop of Canterbury, the Archbishop of York, Cardinal Baugfaau, the Duke of
Westminster, Henry M. Stanley, and many others. The Duke of Fife sent a letter
stating that he regretted very mach not to be present at the first meeting, but that
it was utterly impossible.

"The Duke of Sutherland stated in the opening speech that the society had noth-
ing to do with politics, its only and exclusive object being to give expression to the
affeotiou and cordiality existing between the people of Great Britain and that of the
United States, and he believed that this effort would be appreciated and find an echo
in the United States.

"Upon the motion of Lord Brassey it was resolved that —

"Whereas the people of the British Empire and that of the United States are
closely allied by the bonds of blood; and whereas they have inherited the same
literature and laws and preserved the same principles in their Governments: and
whereas they recognize the same ideas of liberty and humanity, and are closely
allied in many parts of the world by questions of interest; now, therefore, this
society is of opinion that every possible effort should be made, in the interest of
civilization aud peace, to insure the most cordial and constant cooperation on the
part of both nations."

An executive council to represent the association was then appointed.

57

of these cables were lauded in Spanish territory and laid in Spanish
waters, so that no question was raised on account of their destruction.
The cutting of the latter cable could only be effected about 180 meters
from the shore, because the boats employed in the work were covered
with such a galling fire that they were compelled to retreat after cutting
two of the three cables they had found there.

The St Liyuis and Wompatuck^ the latter especially fitted for this class
of operations, attempted to cut the cable from Santiago to Jamaica
during the night of May 16, but had to abandon the enterprise when
the Wompatuck was discovered by one of our patrol boats.

On May 18 the attempt was renewed and the cable was successfully
grappled in 500 fathoms of water, hardly a mile from the Morro. When
these vessels were fired upon from the Morro they could do nothing
but steam out, with the picked-up cable. Captain Goodrich of the 8L
Louis, was under the impression that there were two cables here and
was in hopes that the second one had been damaged; if this was not
the case, the enterprise was a failure.

On May 19 the same vessels attempted to cut the French cable at
Guantdnamo. A gunboat succeeded in preventing them and compelled
the United States ships to retreat when they had already grappled the
cable. The other end of it was landed near Mole St. Nicolas, west of
Santo Domingo. Captain Goodrich went thither, and on the morning
of May 20 he cut the cable in deep wat.er, being careful not to pass
inside the 3-mile limit from Santo Domingo.

An attempt was then made to cut the cable from Puerto Rico to Ponce;
but the nature of the bottom and the deep water prevented its success.
Captain Goodrick was of opinion that specially fitted vessels with ade-
quate apparatus were required for this service of cable-cutting. He
said in this connection :

I ventare to remind yoa that cable grappling is a very slow and tedious operation,
often necessitating repeated drives over the same ground. The good fortune which
has atteoded our efforts so far is quite Exceptional in grappling practice.

In the East, Commodore Dewey, who was master of the Bay of Manila
after the destruction of the Spanish squadron, made application to the
representatives of the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company at Manila
for permission to send telegrams the same as under normal conditions.
The Captain-General refused permission, whereupon Dewey cut tlie
cable and took the end of it on board his ship. Before he could make
use of it, considerable time elapsed owing to the lack of iustruments
and operatois. But soon after he had succeeded in establishing com-
munication with his Governmeut, the Spanish Government exercised
its right by reason of its contract with the Eastern Extension Telegraph
Company and sealed the end of the cable at Hongkong, thereby isolating
Dewey and Manila.

From the above it will be seen that shore batteries and boats, in spite
of their weakness, in many instances prevented the cutting of the

58

cables, and also that cable-catting is a difficult operation in deep water,
even wben there is no enemy to contend with.
In this connection Admiral Colomb says:

Ab to international law, it is understood to be clear that a nentral cable within
the enemy's territorial waters takes the chances of war, as does all neutral property
in the enemy's territory. But the somewhat curious and clearly misuntlerstood
point is, that out of territorial waters a neutral's cable is protected by international
law as being neutral property, and can not be cut there except in defiance of the
rights of neutrals.

If I rightly understand matters, Captain Goodrich transgressed international law
by cutting the French cable outside the 3-mile limit off Mole St. Nicolas. He
respected the neutrality of Haiti, which did not count for much, but he destroyed,
or attempted to destroy, French property on the high seas. Apparently the Frencli
cable from Cuba to Haiti was in three conditions. It was open to destructiou by
the belligerent within 3 miles of the Cuban shore, without raising any claims of
neutrals. From the Cuban 3-milo limit to the Haitian 3-mile limit the cable was as
much French property as any French mail steamer in the same waters, and the bellig-
erent had just as much right to cut the cable as he bad to capture the French mail
steamer. Within the Haitian 3-mile limit the cable waa doubly protected. It was
French property in Haitian territory, so that French rights and Haitian rights
would have been equally defied had the cable been touched in those waters.'

Practically, then, it seems that, quite apart from any difficulty arising from grax>-
pling cables in deep water, an intending belligerent proposing to astonish us by
way of dramatic surprise would have to cut all oar cables within three miles of our
own shores or else leave it alone. The lesson appears to be that it is not impossible
that, if we were at war, attempts might be made to damage us in that way, and it
seems a legitimate conclusion to assume that the ends of our cables ought to be
covered and protected by a few of the longest-ranged guns properly mounted in a
battery. Where possible, as illustrated by the usefulness of the Spanish gunboat at
Guantl^namo, naval force should be localized with the same defensive object. On
the whole, the lesson does not seem unsatisfactory.

The case of the Manila cable is evidently special, and it is understood to be so.
We may have noticed by the announcement in the papers the other day that the
Eastern Extension Company had brought a claim against the American Government,
which the Ameiican Government had in the first stage disallowed. It is evident
that the claim made is likely to raise the whole question of the neutrality of cables,
but. the matter being eubjudioe, I might prejudice it by offering any opinions. All
I will say is that we should watch the case as closely as we can.

Relative to this matter we will say that, as is well known, the theory
of the strongest predominates. Everything is permissible to the i)ow-
erful. While we refrained from privateering, the Americans not only
carried *on something very similar, bat also cat oar cables, withoat any
consideration or respect, and no one has interfered nor will interfere.
Perhaps the nations of Europe may have to pay dear for this selfish
conduct.

We now come to the fate of our squadron.

From Admiral Cervera's letters there is no doubt that the four
cruisers and the three destroyers — Terror, Plutdfij and Furor — left

^ There is at present great uncertainty as to what constitutes territorial waters;
some hold that it extends to 3 miles; others claim 5. The range of guns which was
formerly the standard has changed so much nowadays that it would perhaps be
proper that an international agreement should settle this point definitely.

59

Gape Verde in a precarioas condition, and it will also be understood
that the return of the other three torpedo vessels, together with the
Oindad de Oddiz, to the Canaries, must have injured us much in the
eyes of the world and must have had a demoralizing effect in our own
country.
On this point we read in the Naval Annual :

It mast be assumed that the Spanish Government, in the peculiar cironmstances,
felt bonnd to make an apparent effort to snccor Cuba in the face of the strong opin-
ion of Admiral Cervera and his officers that disaster was inevitable. The movement
across the Atlantic must be regarded as political rather than naval.

We add no comment of our own. We only wish to state fa<;ts and
give the opinions of others, in order that each one may, with absolute
independence, form his own dispassionate judgment.

Admiral Gervera, with the Ooldn and the Maria Teresa^ had left Cadiz
on April 8, and on the 15th he reached Cape Verde (Porto Grande),
where the Oquendo and Vizcaya joined them. They remained at anchor,
transhipping coal from the Cddiz and making repairs, until the 29th,
when the squadron started for Cuba with the admiral's flag hoisted on
the Maria Teresa.

There were great difficulties to contend with. Several times it became
necessary for the Teresa to tow the Plutdn^ the Oquendo the Terror j and
the Coldn the Furor; damages had to be repaired, the greatest pre-
cautions used, and practices carried out. On the 12th the squadron
came in sight of Martinique, where it stopped from 5.15 to 6.15 a. m. One
of the destroyers went into port. The vessels with extreme caution
then shaped their course for Cura9ao, where they arrived on the morn-
ing of the 14th. The Teresa and Vizcaya went in, while the Oquendo,
the Ooldn, and the destroyers remained outside.

At midnight the Terror was towed inside. On the 16th the Plutdn,
with the Teresa and Vizcaya, entered the bay, and the engine of the
latter was repaired. The squadron took as much coal as it was possible
to obtain and started on the 18th for Santiago de Cuba, where it arrived
on the morning of May 19. There it took some coal, under very unfa-
vorable conditions, from the depots of the Juragua Mining Company
and the San Luis Eailway.^

The Americans, who had accurate information as to the starting of
the squadron from Cape Yerde and its probable course for the West
Indies, had maintained their squadrons, one near Habana (Sampson's)
and the other at Hampton Beads (Schley's). On the supposition that
Cervera would go to Puerto Eico, it was decided that Sampson's fleet
should take position in the Windward Passage. To that end it started
on May 4 with the battle ships Iowa, Indiana, and New York, the moni-
tors Amphitrite and Terror, a few auxiliaries, and one collier. The *
monitors proved an impediment because they had to be towed long

^The operations of the squadron while in this harbor, that is to say, to Jnly 3
when it went ont, are closely connected with the land battles, and we shall therefore
speak of them when we come to that part of our account.

60

distances and resnpplied with coal several times. On the 7th Sampson
arrived at Cape Haitieu, where he was advised from Washington that
no news bad been received of the Spanish squadron. ]S^or did the two
vessels which had been detached to cruise east of Martinique and
Guadeloupe, the Harvard and SU Louwy succeed in sighting our squad-
ron. On the evening of the 9th Sampson held a council with his cap-
tains and decided to shape his course for San Juan de Puerto Eico to
see whether the squadron was there. But at 11 o'clock he received a
telegram from Washington advising him of the rumors of the press to
the effect that the Spanish squadron had been sighted off Martinique,
and indicating the expediency of his return for fear of an attack upon
Key West and the breaking of the blockade at Habana.'

But Sampson continued on his course to San Juan, and at daylight
of the 12th the bombardmen£ commenced. The admiral says that he
could have taken the pla>ce, but i^hen he found that our squadron was
not there and that he would have to leave his ships there until the
army of occupation arrived, he decided to return to Habana. Our
opinion does not coincide with his. To bombard a fortified place is
easy; to take it is quite a different matter. It is reasonable to suppose
that Sampson was very desirous to take San Juan and make himself
popular, but he had not counted on the resistance he encountered, and
that is what caused him to desist. It is said that the following night,
while en route for Habana, he learned that Cervera had been sighted
at Martinique, and afterwards he received official notice of his arrival
at Oura9ao on the morning of the 14th. The Harvard was chased by
the Terror^ which had remained behind, probably on account of injuries,
which compelled her to go to Fort-de- France, which the Harvard had
left owing to international laws, which provide that there shall be an
interval of twenty -four hours between the going out of two belligerents.
In the meantime the battleship Oregon was shaping her course for the
Bermudas to join Sampson's squadron, aft«r her long voyage from the
Pacific coast.

On May 13 Sampson received orders to proceed to Key West, and
Schley was also instructed to go there from Hampton Roads. The lat-
ter arrived on the 18th, and Sampson with his flagship New Yorh the
same day, the remainder of the squadron following him closely.

Obedient to orders from the Department at Washington, several fast
cruisers were guarding the passages between Haiti and Puerto Eico.
The St, Louis had been at Santiago on the 18th and bombarded the
Morro and Pniita Gorda at short range. She was struck by a shell in
the bow. It is a pity that the Socapa battery had not been completed
at that time, as it could have seriously injured the ship, which, in con-
junction with the Wompatuckj was attempting to cut the cable. From

^This part of Sampson's condnct does not seem clear. If he had information as
to the livherea outs of our squadron, why did he undertake the bombardment of San
Juan f What we have read concerning this matter seems cleverly devised^ but is not
oonvinoing.

61

there she proceeded to Ouant&namo without having sighted the Spanish
squadron, which, as stated, entered Santiago Harbor ou the 19th.

On the 2oth the 8t, Paul captured a vessel, the Restormel^ carrying
2,400 tons of coal for our squadron. This vessel had been at San Juan de
Puerto Eico, had gone thence to Curasao, and arrived there two days
after Cervera had departed. Her captain informed the Americans that
there were at San Juan two other vessels loaded with coal. It was also
learned that there were only 2,300 tons of coal at Santiago.

m

Schley, with the Flying Squadron and the loway while o<i' Gienfuegos,
received instructions to go to Santiago, where he arrived on the 26th,
finding the Minneapolis^ St. Paul, and Yale already there. By that time
it was positively known that Gervera's fleet was at Santiago, and Samp-
son received orders to proceed there at once, lie arrived off Santiago
on June 1.^ The Oregon had in. the meantime joined his squadron.

On the subject of so important an operation as the entering of Ger-
vera's squadron into this harbor, the English YiceAdmiral P. H.
Golomb, a well-known authority on naval matters, to whom reference
has already been made and will again be made in the course of this
work, says in a recent article entitled The Misfortunes of Gervera:

Instead of crossing the Atlantic at 10 knots^ Cervera was only able to cross at 7
knots, and then his coal was exhausted by the time he got to Martinique. Because
of thiS| and because of the breakdown of one, if not two, of the destroyers, his
presence at Martinique was known all over the world a few hours after he arrived
there. Then further delay in the search for coal came about by the visit to Curasao,
and again the presence of the squadron and its hapless condition was everywhere
known. It could only cross to Cuba at the rate of some 5 knots, and when it finally
arrived at Santiago, on May 19 — four days later than should have sufQced to finish
the stroke at Key West — the fate of the squadron was as absolutely sealed as if it
had run there and then into the heart of the combined American fleets.

It was, of course, instantly blockaded. Probably, had there been ample supplies
of coal, and ample appliances for coaling at Santiago, it would not have been able to
get away for a stroke in the time allowed. As it was, there were neither of these
things in the Spanish port, and it was but a question of time when Cervera's squad-
ron would fall with the surrender of Santiago to a laud attack, or be driven out by
the land force as rabbits are driven out of their holes by a ferret.

It followed that nothing could be done by the Americans until the Spanish squad-
ron was put out of existence, and all the existing force of America was thrown upon
a point that became of consequence when Cervera appeared there.

Still obeying orders that had no reason in them, Cervera made an attempt to
escape on July 3. Had the squadron been everything in reality that it appeared on
paper, the attempt was probably hopeless; but it may be said that had tactics
apparently more dangerous, but really more hopeful, been adopted, it is not impossi-
ble that a better show might have been made. As it was, with foul bottoms, the
wrong guns, and not the whole of them, and short ammunition, the fate of the
unfortunate ships was only made more certain by a run alongshore, which enabled
the Americans to employ all the fire possible against their enemies without any hesi-
tation caused by the danger of hitting their friends.

It might have been worse for Cervera, but perhaps it would have been better for
Spain, had Cervera taken the position that was his due as the leading Spanish

> While the Americans boast of having known the situt^tion of our squadron for a
long time, it is certain that none of their actions bear this out.

62

admiral, and absolutely refiued to take a part in annihilating the naral power of
his country.

The plan of operations, which, according to Admiral Golomb, Gervera
was expected to carry out, was as follows:

The moment it put to sea it was hound to have on the American Navy all the par-
alyzing effect of Lord Torrington's ''fleet in being/' * and, indeed, it had precisely
this effect when the time came. The news that the squ^idron had left St. Vincent
forced the Americans to abandon the blockade of Cuba practically, brought down
to Cuban waters the division of the United States fleet, that, somewhat owing to
popular and very ignorant clamor, had been detained in the north, and it drove
Sampson's division away to the eastward, and to a position which would hardly
have contributed to the success of Cervera's operations had success been possible.

The program I had sketched as a likely one for Cervera to follow — when I sup-
posed that he had with him, in fact, what paper accounts gave him credit for — was
the following : I assumed that the four cruisers would take the three destroyers in
tow and steer straight for the passage between Martinique and St. Lucia, timing
itself so as to pass through in darkness on the ninth or tenth day, so as not to be
seen from either shore; then to pass well to the southward of Jamaica, to round the
west end of Cuba, well out of sight, and to strike a blow at the ahippiMg, tratuports,
etc., in Key Weet, an the fifteenth day, aaon after daylight. It waa a pretty program^
a daring one no donhtf }mt I think quite feasible had all been ae it appeared to be.

' A fleet inferior to the hostile forces and which refuses battle, constituting a con>
stant menace for the enemy.

OHAPTEB VI.

BliOOEABE OF HABBOBS.

THE OQUBNDO AND YIZOAYA— BLOOEADB OF THE GOAST— ASPECT
OF THE BLOCKADE OF HABAI9A — CONDITIONS OF THE BLOCKADE
OF SANTU.GK) — SINKING OF THE MEBBIMAC— A FEW STBANGE
FACTS.

From all that has been Btated in this book we mast come to the con-
clusion that the United States really feared our squadron and the forti-
fied places on our colonial coasts. The Americans had no conception
of the small number of our available vessels, and thought that those
we did have were models of their kind. This fact — though we do not
imagine that in the long run the struggle would have been decided in
our favor, as it would soon have become apparent that it was moral
rather than material — might at least have been taken advantage of in
good season, and in that event, perhaps, we should not have lost the
whole of our colonial empire; perhaps only the island of Cuba would
have been taken from us, while we should have retained Puerto Rico and
the Philippines.

Among the most important means to that end, from a strategic
standpoint, would have been a basis of naval power in Cuba, adapted
to keep alive among the enemy that uncertainty and dread which was
apparent in all their actions.

This would have been x)08sible if we had retained at Habana the
cruisers Vizcaya and Almirante Oquendoj which, though doomed to be
sacrificed in any event, would without any doubt have done a great
deal more good here in cooperation with the shore batteries.

The Vizcaya had been sent to New York by reason of the dark and
unwarranted rumors to which the Maine catastrophe had given rise.
She was subjected to much annoyance while in New York harbor, but
there is no doubt that her presence there made considerable impression
on the minds of the Yankees. On the 1st of March she entered Habana
harbor.

Shortly after, on the 5th, the Oquendo arrived there.

There can be no doubt that some significance, some plan, underlay
the arrival of these two battle ships at Habana, where they found an
adequate base for brilliant action, and sufficient resources for maneu-
vering, fighting, taking refuge, and keeping a whole hostile squadron
in check.

In the chain of errors, the final link of which — ^for the present! — ^is
the terrible defeat we suffered, not the least, perhaps, is the order for
these two ships to return to Cape Yerde to join the destroyers and
torpedo boats already there and those which Cervera afterwards took
there from Cadiz. It seems to us, though we are not of the profession,
that after the long voyage of the Vizcaya and OquendOj as the result

63

64

of which the former had a foal bottom and had lost her speed, the most
nataral thing woald have been to pat them in perfect condition and
keep them at the scene of the prospective war. In cooperation with the
small bat by no means ineflQcieut vessels which we had at Habana
and other ports of the island, and aaxiliary vessels in the shape of
merchant steamers, they might have constitnted a flying sqaadron which
would have given the enemy something to do and something to fear.

The reader will agree with us that if we had had such a naval force
at Habana the Americans, who had, moreover, to reckon with Cervera's
squadron, which could have gone out a little later if it chose, reenforced
by the Pelayo and one or two other ships, would have been compelled
to divide their fleet considerably, especially if we had considered the
possibility of using some privateer cruisers — under the name of auxil-
iaries, if preferred — against their commerce.

Are these conjectures well founded, or are we mistaken!

We are inclined to believe the former. £ut in case of doubt it must
be admitted that, even if the results of the Oquendo and Vizcaya
remaining in said harbor had not been as favorable as we x>re8ume, it
is at least reasonable to suppose that if those two ships ha<l been kept
at Habana Gervera's squadron would not have gcme to Santiago, and
the latter city, in the eastern extremity of the island, would not have
become the enemy's objective. For there can be no doubt at this time
that it did not enter into the United States' plans to make the capital
of the eastern province the scene of war. The attack of that city
became necessary and easy by reason of the Spanish squadron having
taken refuge there.

Finally, it will be readily understood that it is not expedient to wear
out ships by long voyages on the eve of war. The Vizcaya reached
Cape Verde in unserviceable condition, nothing more than a buoy, as
Admiral Cervera says graphically in one of his letters.

We are firmly convinced that leaving those two ships at Habana
would.have given the enemy much to think of and much to fear, and
would have made it necessary for them to draw their naval forces
farther west. In that event the blockade of Habana and other ports
and coasts of the island would at once have assumed an entirely
difierent aspect, and the whole nature of the campaign would have
been changed.

It was therefore with feelings of profound sadness that we saw the
Oquendo and Vizcaya, obeying superior^orders, steam out of the liarbor
at 5 o'clock in the evening of April 1. The ships stopped at Puerto Bico,
which island they left on the 9tb, shaping their course for St. Vincent,
Cape Verde, and leaving the West Indies at the mercy of the blockade
which was announced a few days later.

A blockade when continued for some length of time is a tedious
operation for warships, because it compels them to remain constantly
on the high sea, alwayson the lookout, in almost unendurable monotony,
which is very exasperating and fatiguing. The United States squad-

65

ron hardly felt these onerous eifects. There being no enemy to be
feared in the immediate vicinity, and bases of operations and large
dockyards and depots being near, the ships coald move at their ease,
and were frequently relieved to replenish the ammunition expended and
resupply themselves with provisions and fresh water.

Hence the blockade of the coast was nothing more than simply quiet
cruising.

The blockades of the harbors were of a more difficult nature, espe-
cially at Havana and Santiago, and as these are naval operations of
unfrequent occurrence, we deem it expedient to describe them somewhat
more at length.

In order to give an idea of the blockade of the former place we avail
ourselves of the observations which were made day and night for nearly
four months by the Central Teleraetric Station at the Pirotecnia Militar,
which was connected by telephone with the telemetric apparatus of the
batteries and with the diif'erent chiefs of the forts, artillery, and bat-
teries, all of which organizations we will describe at length when we
speak of Habana in the book which is to follow the present one.

From the charts which represent the observations of the station
referred to we have selected a few of different dates, in order that the
reader may form an accurate idea of the blockade of a harbor and of
the manner in which the United States vessels effected the blockade of
Habana.

Situation of hostile ships in the order from tdndward to leeward.
[Artillery. Telemetric observatory of the " Pirotocnia." April 22, 1898, 6 p. in.]

Ko.

1
2

3

4

6

7

8
9

10
11

ClaM.

Gnnboat .
Cmiser . .

Name.

Maatfl.

Montgomery..

Yacht

Craiaer [ Marblehead.

Battleship

Iowa.

Gnnboat

Battleship ; Indiana.

Cruisw
do.

Merchant .
do....

New York.,

6884 5

2
2

2
1

3
2

2
2

Smoke-
stacks.

1
2

1
2

1
2

1
3

1
1

Armament.

10 12.5-cm. R. F

6 57-mm

237-mm

2 machine

K.F

10 12.5-cm

6 57-mro

2 37 -ram

2 machine ...

4 30-cm

8 20-cm

6 10cm. R.F.

20 57-mm

6 37-mm

4 32.5-cm.
8 20-cm ..
4 15-cm . . .
20 57-mm.
6 37-mm . .

6 20cm

12 10-cm. R. F

8 57-mm

4 37-mm

4 machine ...

Distance
from

ob8erva-
tory.

Metert.

22,000
23,500

20,500
23,000

20,500

19,500
22,000

20,000
22,500

23,500
22,000

EusTASio DE Amiuvia, Captain,

The United States sqaadroa appeartt at 5^ p. m., followiag a north-
eaaterly coarse. When within 32,000 meterB of thia observatory thesbips
stop and separate into three groups, which take positions to leeward,
north, and windward. The squadron Is composed of battleships Iowa
and Indiana, armored cruiser Setc York, two unprotected cruisers, appar-
ently the Marblehead and Montgomery, and one three-masted craiBer
the type of which can not be made out. The remaining vessels, 11 in
number, are small merchant vessels. The alarm signal ia given from
the forts at 6.20. Two steamers have left the harbor, shaping their
coarse northward, one of them English, the other United States; alsoa
schooner of the latter nationality. At 0.25 p. m. Battery "So. 5 signals
that several ships, believed to be quite near, are discerned in that direc-
tion. At 10 a second alarm signal is given. About 2 o'clock the light
of the Morro light-house is extinguished. All through the night red
and green lights, obvioosly signals of the hostile fleet, are noticed at a
great distance.

April 28, 6.30 P. M.

V

In the morning only tlie Iowa and one merchant vessel, indicated on
the chart, were iu eight. A war ship was sighted to windward at 8
and disappeared shortly after. At 5, a ship was seen passing to wind-
ward at such a distance that she could not be recqgnized. At 5,30 a
small yacht and the Triton appeared, steering toward the Iowa,

68

May 5, 2 P. M.

At 6 there are in sight the Wilmington^ au antiquated cruiser, and
three gunboats. At 9 the dispatch boat Dolphin appeared and stopped,
forming a group with three vessels to windward; they exchange flag
signals and boats pass to and fro. At 10 the Dolphin shapes her
course to windward and disappears. At 12 another cruiser, of anti-
quated ty])e, appears to the northward. At 1 a gunboat appears to
windward. At 3 a small Spanish schooner is sighted, steering for the
harbor. At 3.30 she is captured by a gunboat, which takes her in
tow, and they disappear to windward. At 5.30 the French steamer
Lafayette appears to windward. The hostile ships steer toward her.
At sunset the group formed by the latter and the Lafayette is still in
sight. Nothiug of interest was observed during tlie night.

69

May 1 4, 4.30 P. M.

At 8 three gunboats. At 8.30 two cruisers and one gunboat to wind-
ward. At 8.40 a steam launch appears. At 11 two gunboats disap-
pear to windward, reappearing at 11.15. The Mexican schooner Arturo
leaves the harbor. At 1 a merchant vessel, whose nationality could
not be made out, appears to the northward. A cruiser starts in pur-
suit and fires a shot; the merchant vessel stops, then proceeds on her
course. At 3 two gunboats appear to windward; at 4.20 one of them
disappears. The Gonde de Venadito and Nueva Espana come out of
the harbor, steering first to windward^ then changing their course to
leeward, then again returning to the former direction. A hostile
cruiser, two gunboats, one of them small and ^vith a single mast, and
the tug Triton concentrate to the north. The Spanish vessels steer
toward them. A hostile gunboat advances, followed by the cruiser. The
Gonde de Venadito turns about and steers to windward ; the Nueva Espana
continues on her course toward the United States gunboat. At 4,000
meters the hostile gunboat referred to opens fire, which is returned by
our vessels. The Nv^eva Espana also turns to windward. The United
States vessels stop at 17,000 meters, then retreat to a distance of over
20,000 meters. Our vessels again turn to windward, passing in front
of the enemy, and the Gonde de Venadito fires another shot. They con-
tinue on their course to windward and are joined by the Aguila and
Flecha. At night our vessels enter the harbor. The effect of the shots
could not be ascertained, owing to the distance.

70

May 21, 1 P. M.

0iant9nomoh

Gun6o»f

\

At daybreak there are seen on the horizon the monitor Miantonomoh^
two old cruisers, dispatch boat Dolphin^ first-class gunboat Wilming-
ton^ and seven smaller gunboats; total, 12 vessels. The battle ship
lowa^ which was in sight last night, has disappeared. At 6 a gun-
boat disappears and the monitor Puritan appears to northward. There
remain 11 vessels. At 7 two gunboats appear to northward. Thir-
teen vessels. The nearest is the Wilmington^ about 8,600 meters
distant. At 9 a gunboat appears to northward. Fourteen vessels.
At 10.40 the first class battle ship Indiana and armored cruiser New
York appear to northward. Sixteen vessels in sight. At 12.30 three
more vessels appear, making a total of 19, shown on the chart. From
7 to 8 the telegraph lights of the United States vessels are observed to
be in operation. The searchlight of the Yelasco battery has been in
operation all night. Nothing further of interest during the night.

n

June 10, 9.30 A. M.

I Ounboat

$unbo&t

iWiknit

At daybreak six gunboats, among them the Wilmington and one
cruiser. At 7.40 a gunboat with one mast and one smokestack appears
to windward. To leeward another gunboat is sighted. At 8.30 the
Spanish vessels Conde de VenaditOj Nueva Espana^ Ydnez Pinzdn^ and
Flecha come out of the harbor and steam to windward, keeping about
1,000 meters from the shore. When within 3,800 meters of Battery
No. 1 they turn to leeward. The hostile gunboat sighted to windward
steers to leeward, firing a shot. The cruiser and another gunboat also
fire, but no shells are seen. They proceed to windward and approach
four gunboats. At 10,000 meters from our vessels they open fire, which
is at first quite accurate. Our vessels increase the distance between
them and continue to cruise to leeward, close inshore, as far as Almen-
dares Eiver. In the meantime the enemy has turned to leeward, but
at a distance of over 15,000 meters. At 1.35 our vessels enter the
harbor.

72

June 13,12 M.

X^^rw'ser

At daybreak nine gauboats, among them the Vfilmington^ two craisers,
one of them the Montgomery^ and the monitor Terror. At 7.40 a gun-
boat appears to windward. At 10.30 the gunboat MaplCy displaying a
white flag, steers towards the city and stops 6,300 meters from the
shore. At 11.15 the gunboat Flecha goes out to speak with the United
States vessel, returning to the harbor a few minutes later. The Maple
shapes her course northward. At 12 a gunboat disappears to the
northward. At 3 another gunboat disappears to the northward. At
3.21 a gunboat is lighted far to windward, approaching another gun-
boat, 2,000 meters from the shore. At 3.50 the cruiser Montgomery
advances to within 8,300 meters of the leeward shore. The Santa
Clara Battery fires three shots at her, and Battery No. 4 two. Owing
to the high wind tbe shells were deflected to the left. At the flash
of the first shot the cruiser started at full speed. At 5 a gunboat
ap])roaches the windward shore to within less than 8,000 meters. Bat-
tery No. 2 fired a shot at her and the gunboat withdrew. At 8.30 p. m.
a hostile ship throws her searchlight towards the city on the leeward
shore for five minutes. A group of two vessels could be distinguished.
All through the night light signals were seen, which were watched by
our searchlights.

73

July 6, 6 P. M.

i/tcnlf^ Terror

fCrutS0^ Cru/seH^gomery

At daybreak the horizon can not be distinguisbed, owing to dense
fog. At 7.20 the fog disappears and the following ships are seen : Three
cruisers — the Montgomery^ Yickshurg^ and one of antiquated type — five
gunboats, among them the Machias^ Maple, and one of antiquated type,
and the monitor Terror i Total, 9 vessels. At 7.25 a cruiser appears to
northward. Total, 10 vessels. At 8.30 the gunboat Anita appears to
leeward. Total, 11 vessels. During the day the trans- Atlantic steamer
Alfonso XIIvfdL^ seen burning at Mariel Beach.

74

August 13, 12 M.

At daybreak there are m sight a monitor of the Miantonomoh type,
two cruisers, the Vicksburg and San Francisco and five gnnboats. At
9 a craiser with two masts and two smokestacks appears to the north-
ward. At 8.20 a gunboat appears to leeward. At 9.30 two gunboats
disappear to windward. At 10 the cruiser with two masts and two
smokestacks disappears to windward. At 11 a cruiser with three masts
and one smokestack and a gunboat appear to leeward. At 11*30 a
gunboat appears to leeward. At 2.15 the monitor of the Miantonomoh
type and a gunboat disappear to the north. At 8 red and white lights
begin to be seen on the horizon, obviously from hostile ships. ^N'othing
of interest occurred during the night. The searchlight of the navy
was in operation. The news of the conclusion of peace was received
this day. At daybreak not a single hostile vessel was to be seen on
the horizon, so that it seems that the blockade has been raised.

75

The four electric searchliglits--tliree belonging to the artillery and
one to the navy, the latter designed to guard the net of torpedoes —
were subject to the authorities in command of the fortifications, and in
accordance with their orders illuminated or left in darkness the mari-
time region near the windward and leeward shores and the entrance to
the harbor, thus establishing a system of perfect vigilance which would
have furnished excellent results in case a formal battle had been fought,
and which prevented the enemy from displaying too much audacity.

The light-house at the Morro was lighted, when so ordered by the
authorities, when some friendly vessel was exx>ected, and when it was
not necessary to keep it dark so as not to serve the blockading vessels
as a guide.

The following are incidents of various kinds which occurred during
the blockade of Habana:

April SS, — At 4.50 p. m. the gnnboats Iftteva Espa^a and Marqu4s de Molina went
out of Habana Harbor and returned from off Marianao, having gone outside a dis-
tance of 8,100 meters.

Jpril S7, — ^A hostile cruiser ran aground near Dimas (Colorado Reefs).

May 6, — At 5 o'clock a small gunboat with two masts and two smokestacks
approached to within 4,700 meters of the windward coast of Habana. Batteries
Nob. 1 and 2 received orders to open fire, after several consultations by telephone.
The gunboat escaped at full speed at the first shot. Several shells fell near it.

May 7. — Two gunboats chase a schooner near the mouth of Almendares River,
4,700 meters from the advanced leeward batteries. Batteries Nos. 4 and 5 open fire,
which is so accurate that the vessels are surrounde<l with the cartridges of our shells,
and withdraw with injuries. The schooner was towed into the harbor. A 24-centi-
meter shell of the Punta Brava Battery exploded on board one of the vessels.

May 9. — ^The hostile gunboat Triton approaches to within 4,800 meters of Battery
No. 4, which opened fire, whereupon the gunboat speedily withdrew.

May 10, — The Triton approaches, and is fired upon by Battery No. 5.

May IS, — Two hostile gunboats fire on the coast of Habana from Marianao, and
withdraw.

May 15. — A hostile vessel approached with a flag of truce, and the gunboat Flecha
went out to parley.

May 2S, — ^The vessels of the blockading fleet disappear to the east, leaving only
two gnnboats.

May 27, — The gunboat Marquh de Molina leaves the harbor under a flag of truce,
to confer with a hostile ship.

May B8, — Another vessel under a flag of truce. The Ydnez Ping6n goes out.
Exchange of prisoners.^

June IS, — Battery No. 2, at a distance of 7,020 meters, discharges a S0.5-centimeter
shell against a hostile vessel.

June 14. — Another hostile vessel appears under a flag of truce and the gunboat
Fleoka goes oat to parley.

> Colonel of cavalry Cort^o, Army Surgeon Juliiln, and assistants Faustino Albert
and Antonio Emilio Zazo (of the Argonauia) were exchanged for two United States
journalists taken prisoners at a landing.

76

June 16, — A United States ganboat approached to within 5,000 meters of the
Velasoo Battery, -which opened fire on her, and the gnnboat retreated at fall sjMed.
A hostile ship approaches under a flag of trnce^ and the Nueca Etpana goes ont to
parley.

July U — At 7 p. m. a hostile ganboat approached to within 6,000 meters of the
Cojfmar Battery, which opened fire, and the gunboat escaped at fall speed.

July 19, — At 10 a. m. a cruiser approaches the Chorrera Battery, which opens fire
on her at 7,000 meters. At 6.40 p. m. she' returned and approached to within 6,400
meters, was again fired upon and withdrew.

August 9, — A boat with a flag of truce is detached from the hostile ship San Fran-
eiseo, and the Tdnez Pingdn goes out to parley.

August 4. — Another vessel under a flag of truce. The Tdnez Pinz&n goes out to
confer with her. She returns to the harbor and then goes out again.

August 12. — At 5 o'clock the cruiser San Francisco approached to within 4,000
meters of the windward coast; the Velasoo and Barco Perdido batteries open fire;
she was hit by three shells and withdrew, hoisting a white flag.^

A vessel carrying a flag of truce appears, and the Ydnez Pinzdn goes out to confer
with her.

The following is an approximate record of foreign vessels which
entered or left Habana Harbor during the blockade:

The English cruiser Talbot entered May 2, went out the 11th, and
returned again June 6. The French frigate Duhordieu entered May 6
and went out the 17th. On the same day the French dispatch-boat
Fulton also went out. On the 16th of May tbe French steamer Lafay-
ette entered. Tliis transatlantic steamer had attempted to enter several
days earher, but was prevented by tbe blockading vessels, which took
her to Key West; she was released and entered Habana on the day
stated; but after unloading part of her cargo slie took it on again for
certain reasons and went out May 10 and was once more taken to Key
West. The steamer Cosme Herrera (Captain Sanson) entered April 22,
having eluded the enemy. The AviUs^ of the same company, also
entered. On May 14 the Mexican schooner Arturo weiit out. On May
25 a German cruiser went out. The German cruiser Gcier entered June
22 and left tbe 29tli.^ On June 23 the transatlantic steamers Santo
Domingo and Montevideo ran the blockade at half past 12 at night.
On the 24th the Honduras brig Amapala went out and was captured
by the enemy. On July 5 the English cruiser Talbot left the harbor.
The same day tbe transatlantic steamer Alfonso XIT attempted to
enter, but was surprised and set on fire by bostile shells at Mariel,
where she ran aground trying to reach the port. On July 8 the French
cruiser D^Estaing entered without saluting the blockading vessels and
went out again on the 28th. On July 29 the Talbot entered and went
out again the 30th, saluting the blockading vessels. On August 1 the
German cruiser Oeier entered the harbor, after saluting the blockaders,
and went out again on the 4th. On the latter day the French cruiser
lyjEstaing entered again and went out the 14th.

The blockade of Santiago Harbor offers the peculiar feature that the
electric lighting of the mouth of the channel was effected by the block-

* No white flag was shown, and San Francisco was hit bnt once. — O. N. I.

^The QHer entered CienfuegoH June 16, whero she was entertained by our officers.

77

aders instead of the blockaded, as it was to the interest of the latter to
keep the entrance dark, while it was imperative for the' former to keep
it well illaminated in order that Cervera's ships might not escape.

For the same reason, the position of the blockading ships was more
definitely determined than was the case at Habana.

In the beginning the ships withdrew at night to the open sea. After-
wards they adopted the order shown in the following sketch :

At Night.

A Batt/esh/'p with searchlight
B Supporting battleship ready to open fire
in case of appearance ofenemjf,
C Three small cruisers as pickets.

D Three steam-launch pickets.
E Blockade outer line,
F Spanish ships.

In daytime the blockading vessels extended their line so as to be
entirely out of the range of the gnus of Morro Castle and the Socapa

MORRO.

MAYFLOWeR. ^

/

^ AHeit^ Orleans. |/

\ /

\ /

\ POfO-ER, %l

Oresom. I.^^

V

--^^J --

Iowa,

In the Day-Time,

78

Battery, and also to leave sufficient room for maneuvering in case oar
squadron should attempt to force the entrance. The radius of the
blockading circle was 6 miles, and the vessels nearest the shore were 2
miles distant from it. The more i>owerful ships, such as the Jotro,
Oregon^ and MassachuaetUj were usually opx>osite the entrance, and next
to them the fastest cruisers, New Tork and Brooklynj while the vessels
of less tonnage, the gunboats and auxiliaries, kept nearer the shore.
This disposition shows that there still existed in the United States fleet
a fear of some exploit on the part of our destroyers.

A constant watch was kept up from the heights of the Socapa bat-
teries and Morro Castle, and as soon as there was the least indication
of the enemy attempting to come nearer the rapid-fire guns of the
lower battery and on the crest of the Socapa, the rifles of the infantry,
and the guns at Morro Castle would open a lively fire, which compelled
the enemy to retreat. The Cristdbal Coldfij stationed near Punta Gorda,
the Beina Mercedes^ near Cay Smith, and the torpedo-boat destroyers
also had a share in the defense.

We will follow the same plan that we adopted in connection with the
blockade of Habana, and give first a brief account of the principal
actions of the blockading fleet against the works at the entrance of
Santiago Harbor, and speak more fully of them as opportunity offers.

May 18, — First demonBtration in front of Santiago. One hundred and sixty sheUs
were fired. Punta Goida answered.

May 18 to June 5, — ^A few insignificant bombardments.

June 6, — At 8.30 a. m. 10 vessels, forming two divisions, opened a lively fire^ which
lasted until 11.30, with two intervals of fifteen minutes each. The eastern division
bombarded the Morro and Aguadores, the western division the Socapa and Maza-
morra. In ail, 2,000 shots were fired, 100 guns being in action for one hundred and
seventy-five minutes, being equal to a shot per gun every two minutes.

The Socapa fired only 47 shots, on account of the dense smoke enveloping the
ships. A hostile shell of large caliber hit the Mercedee, killing the second in com-
mand, Commander Emilio de Acosta y Eyermann, a native Cuban, also ^ve sailors,
and wounding Ensign Molins, several sailors, and one boatswain.

June 14, 16, and 18, — Renewed bombardments.

June 22, — The landing expedition disembarks. The Brooklyn, Iowa, and Texas
bombard the Morro and Socapa, which return the fire. Punta Oorda fires only
two shots.

June 22 and 2S, — Landing of army corps at Daiquiri, while the squadron is bom-
barding the coast from Punta Cabrera to Punta Barracos ; lively bontbardment of
Siboney.

July 2, — Bombardment.

July S, — Our squadron goes out and is destroyed by the United States fleet.

The most noteworthy event recorded during this blockade was the
attempt to force the channel made by the Merrimacj a merchant vessel
equipped for war, in command of Lieutenant Hobson. This is also the
only act which the Americans have to record in which heroism was
displayed during this campaign, for the operation carried with it the
probability of death for those who effected it.

79

It occnrred early in the morning of Jnne 3. The blooksding ships
opened a lively fire on the entr^ce, probably in order to prepare the
iray for the operation and divert attention flrom the principal objeot.
Before daybreak the Merrimao entered the harbor, bat waa snrprised
and sank at a spot vhere she constitates no obBtruction to the egress
and ingress of the harbor. Oor crews captured the crew of the Merri-
mao, consisting of Lieut. Bichmond Pearson Hobson and seven sailors,
all of whom, by a miracle, escaped with their lives.

The sketch which we give below has reference to this enterprise, as
described by Lientenant Hobson in a handsome book which he has

O Submmrina IHings, Unmp/oJtd lilines,Moa.9,IQ,Il,tZ.

■ - - f(reiii^¥evi9l.Mo». 1.2,3,4,5.6,7,8. .

* ■ " Hiai ^ruck VeasH, Mo.5.

™ Automatic Torpedoes fired 6/ 'fieina Mercejee' end ^uTonT

recently pablished, and although it contains many exaggerations, as,
for instance, the statement that all the submarine mines cont^ned
000 pounds of gnn cotton, it gives nevertheless a clear idea of the
operation.

Sampson and Hobson worked out the plan of sinking the JUemmoo
in the channel and chose the hoar of 3.30 a. m., Jane 2, for carrying it
into effect

The method of sinking the vessel and the spot where she was to be
snnk were fblly discussed. As to the method, it was dedded to secnre
to the sides of the Merrimao, beloi? tbe wftt«r line, ten torpedoes of a

80

special type charged with brown powder and actuated by electric cir-
cuits. As to the spot, the bend of the chaimel off* the Estrella battery
was selected. The operation was carried out, but was not successfuL
Of the ten torpedoes, only two exploded; in the others, says Mr. Hob-
son, the circuits were destroyed by the Spanish fire. Our shore bat-
teries, the pickets near the entrance, the Plutdn and Eeina Mercedes^
the lines of contact and electric mines, the infantry — in a word, all the
different elements of defense — fired on the MerrimaCj and she was sank
at a spot farther in than had been intended by Sampson and whei*e she
did not obstruct the entrance. Hobson and his crew, clinging to a raft
which had been taken along for the purpose, gave themselves up, but
none of our men touched them except to save them. Mr. Hobson states
that he was rescued by Admiral Oervera himself in his steam launch.
This is an act of chivalry in time of war which even the Americans are
compelled to extol.

At the last hour, the Beina Mercedes was also sunk in the channel,
but likewise without obstructing the entrance.

In order to give a clear idea of the operations of the blockade of the
coasts and ports of Cuba, we must not omit to mention some strange
facts which occurred in the course of it.

Among these we will mention, in the first place, the entrance of the
transatlantic steamer Monserrat into Cienfuegos Harbor, under tlie com-
mand of Captain Deschamps, who eluded the blockade on April 27, and
went out again with great audacity without being caught. The valiant
Captain Deschamps repeated the operation after a trip to the Penin-
sula. This time he entered Matanzas, again eluding the blockade and
keeping himself in readiness to go out whenever he should be ordered
to do so. lie went out on the 16th, after the suspension of hostilities.

When the war broke out, the steamer Purmma Concepcion^ of the
Menendez Company (Captain Gutierrez), was at Bataband. She went
out in search of provisions, eluding tbe blockade, and reached the Cay-
man Islands; not finding there what she wanted, she shaped her course
for Jamaica. When she had taken on a cargo there, a United States
cruiser came alongside; but during the night she eluded the latter's
vigilance and went out to sea, reaching Casilda on June 22. Here she
was chased and, fired upon, but succeeded in going out the 25th and
unloading at Manzanillo. A Honduras steamer reached Bataban6
with provisions. The transatlantic steamer Keina Cristina (Captain
Casquero) entered Cienfuegos, having also been chased unsuccessfully.
The Villaverde, coming from Mexico with a cargo of provisions, entered
Coloma, likewise escaping from her pursuers.

The transatlantic steamer Antonio Ldpez ran aground on June 30,
near Arecibo on the southern coast of Puerto Bico, but succeeded in
getting off^ saving both vessel and cargo.

As already stated, the JSanto Domingo and Montevideo^ under the com-
mand of naval officers, succeeded in running the blockade of Habana

81

and reaching Mexico in search of provisions. They are said to have
had some difficalty there in getting their clearance papers on account of
their character as warships. The Santo BomingOj^ on July 12, reached
a small port situated between Bail^n and Punta Cartas on the southern
coast of Cuba.

The Spanish colony in Mexico sent the island a great deal of assist-
ance, thus famishing an example of generous patriotism.

The steamer Humherto Rodrig^iez rendered excellent services by
resupplying the Holguin Gihara, near Nuevitas, with great risk to her-
self. The J[{ai?a made several trips between Caibarien and Nuevitas.
From the latter port, many officers, and even women and childreu,
escaped from the blockade and went to Caibarien in small boats, navi-
gating between keys and at times pushed by hand. The German
steamer Polaria entered Santiago with a cargo of rice. An English
sloop coming from Jamaica, and the steamer Beina de log Angeles (of
the Menendez Company) also entered Santiago.

Among the strange facts it may also be stated that daring the block-
ade several vessels went out with sugar, and Yankee speculators took
advantage of this circumstance; but this was finally prohibited.
Among the vessels which made trips from Sagua may be mentioned
the steamers Bergen and Mirtltelene.

Another pecaliar fact is that the Texas one night fired on the Marble-
head and Vixen, mistaking them for some of our vessels; but they
escaped without injuries. This circumstance shows that ships may
move about at night with impunity and that it is difficult to hit them.

'The Santo Domingo failed to reach port as here mentioned, having gronnd«'d
between Panta Cartas and Bail6n, and was captured and burned by the converted
yacht Eagle. — O. N. I.

6884 '-6

CHAPTER YII.

Coast Defense.

stationary defenses — mobile defenses — shore batteries — sea
forts — floating batteries — torpedoes — torpedo boats —
monitors — battle ships and cruisers.

Any country that bas anything to lose mast nowadays guard well its
coasts and boundaries by providing them with such elements of defense
as are sanctioned by modern progress.

As far as our own coasts and boundaries are concerned, our admin-
istrations have treated this essential point of military organization with
even more neglect than is apparent at first sight.

In view of the imperious necessity of preserving what we have left
and maintaining it against an enemy, should the case arise, it is a ques-
tion of the highest importance to prepare for the defense of our coasts
and boundaries, and this includes the plans for the rapid and efficient
fortification and armament of our principal ports.

That it is in this direction that the beginning should be made, there
can be no doubt.

Coast defense comprises two d liferent aspects: %

(1) Stationary defenses.

(2) Mobile defenses.

To the first class belong the fortifications that are tied to toe earth;
that is to say, either located on the shore or connected with it, forts
having their foundations on shoals or on the bottom of the sea and
surrounded by water, floating batteries, and torpedoes.

The second class comprises fleets and vessels of every description
operated by sailors and adapted to carry their oftensive action as far
as may be necessary.

The nature of shore batteries, therefore, is defensive and stationary;
that of fleets is oflfensive and mobile.

The first question to be considered is: Which of the two classes
mentioned should be given preference!

As a matter of fact, both are necessary. They should therefore be
developed side by side, and that is what is being done by wealthy and
powerful nations, which, while providing their coasts and ports with
strong defenses, develop and strengthen their fleets at the same time.

But our case is somewhat difierent. We are at present almost entirely
without ships, and the ports along our coasts without defenses. There
is danger impending. What line of conduct should we follow ?

In considering this question, we should observe absolute impartiality
and avoid everything that is akin to prejudice. The general opinion
82

83

coincides with the fact that for offensive warfare nothing can be attained
with a few battle ships. Many are required; they constitute the basis
of a fleet, as the Spanish- American war has demonstrated. But they
cost an immense amount of money and consume vast sums in their
maintenance. Battle ships necessitate navy-yards and docks, which
in their turn require the existence of naval industry and many other
accessory and auxiliary branches of industry, which we lack. The
attemx)ts we made to improvise the same during the war proved disas-
trous, and to this fact is attributed by many a considerable share of our
disasters. Hence the beginning for the defense of our peninsula and
adjacent islands can and should be made with stationary defenses — that
is to say, those comprised in the first class, without, however, losing
sight of the development of our offensive naval power; and we will add
that it is not sufficient to possess a nucleus of active forces, but it is
also necessary to have a well-organized reserve, and this increases the
difficulty as well as the price.

It is the question of money which at present preoccupies us and is of
the utmost importance, rendering It necessary for us to begin with the
most economical part, and provide, firbt of all, for the defense of our
own mother country, which must always remain the base and refuge of
the mobile defenses, if the happy time should ever arrive that we pos-
sess such defenses.

In connection with the Spanish- American war there has been a great
deal of discussion as to these questions concerning the greater impor-
tance of stationary defenses or mobile defenses, and their relation to
each other, which might be called either strategic or tactical, according
as reference is had to distant fighting and the places of refuge and
bases of operations rendered necessary thereby, or to fighting close by,
the actual defense of the coast or harbor which the enemy may elect as
his objective, in which case the factors of mobile defense may be suc-
cessfully combined with those furnislied by the stationary defense.

In our attempt to examine into the different theories in connection
with this matter, we will refer to a naval authority of world-wide repu-
tation, Captain Mahan, who, in recent articles entitled ''The War on
the Sea and its Lessons," touches on this question in a very able
manner.

We take the liberty of availing ourselves of Captain Mahan's argu-
ments, which have indisputable merit.

Jt is proper hero to say, for the remark is both pertinent and most important, that
coast defenses and naval force are not interchangeable things; neither are they
opponents, one of the other, but complementary. The one is stationary, the other
mobile; and, however perfect in itself either may be, the other is necessary to its
completeness. In different nations the relative consequence of the two may vary.
In Great Britain, whose people are fed from the outride world, the need for a fleet
vastly exceeds that for coast defenses.

With ns, able to live off ourselves, there is more approach to parity. Men may
even differ as to which is the more important; but such difference, in this question,
which is purely military, is not according to knowledge.

84

In equal amoants mobile offensive power is always and under all conditions
more efTective to the ends of war than stationary defensive power. Why, tben^ pro-
vide the latter? Because mobile force, whatever Hh.'ipe it take, ships or men, is
limited narrowly as to the weight it can bear; whereas stationary force, geuerally,
being tied to the earth, is restricted in the same direction only by the ability of the
designer to cope with the conditions. Given a firm foundation, which practically
can always be had, and there is no liniit to the amount of armor — mere defensive
ontfit — be it wood, stone, bricks, or iron, that you can erect npon it; neither is there
any limit to the weight of guns — the offensive element — that the earth can bear,
only they will be motionless guns.

The power of a steam navy to move is practically unfettered; its .ability to carry
weight, whether guns or armor, is comparatively very small. Fortifications, on the
contrary, have almost unbounded power t4> bear weight, whereas their power to move
is nil ; which again amounts to saying that, being chained, they can put forth offen-
sive power only at arm's length, as it were.

Thus stated, it is seen that these two elements of sea warfare are in thr strictest
sense complementary, one possessing what the other has not; and that the difference
is fundamental, essential, unchangeable— not accidental or temporary.

Given local conditions which are generally to be found, greater power, defensive
and offensive, can be established in permanent works than can be brought to the
spot by fleets. When, therefore, circumstances permit ships to bo squarely pitted
against fortifications — ^not merely to pass swiftly by them— it is only because the
builders of the shore works have not, for some reason, possibly quite adequate, given
them the power to repel attack which they might have had. It will not be asserted
that there are no exceptions to this, as to most general rules; but as a broa<l state-
ment it is almost universally true.

"I took the liberty to observe," wrote Nelson at the siege of Calvi, when the
commanding general suggested that some vessels might batter the forts, "that the
business of laying wood against stone walls was much altered of late." Precisely
what was in his mind when he said ''of late'' does not appear, but the phrase
itself shows that the conditions which induced any momentary equality between
ships and forts when brought within range were essentially transient.

As seaports and all entrances from the sea are stationary, it follows naturally that
the arrangements for their defense also should, as a rule, be permanent and station-
ary, for as such they are strongest. Indeed, unless stationary, they are apt not to
be permanent, as was conclusively shown in the late hostilities, where all the new
monitors intended for coast defense were diverted from that object and dispatched
to distant points, two going to Manila, and stripping the Pacific coast of protection
so far as based upon them.

This is one of the essential vices of a system of coast defense dependent npon
ships, even when constructed for that purpose; they are always liable to^be with-
drawn by an emergency, real or fancied.

Upon the danger of such diversion to the local security 'Nelson insisted when
charged with the guard of the Thames in 1801. The block ships (stationary bat-
teries) he directed were on no account to be moved for any momentary advantage,
for it might very well be impossible for them to regain their carefully chosen posi-
tions when wanted there.

Our naval scheme in past years has been seriously damaged, and now suffers from
two misleading conceptions — one, that a navy is for defense primarily, and not for
offensive war; the other, consequent mainly upon the first, that the monitor, being
stronger defensively than offensively, and of inferior mobility, was the best type of
war ship.

The civil war being, so far as the sea was concerned, essentially a coast war,
naturally fostered this opinion. The monitor in smooth water is better able to
stand up to shore guns than ships are which present a larger target; but, for all

85

that, it is more vulnerable, both above water and below, than shore guns are if these
are properly distribnted. It is a hybrid, neither able to bear the weight that forti-
fioations do, nor having the mobility of ships; and it is, moreover, a poor gnn plat-
form in a sea way.

There is no saying of Napoleon's known to the writer more pregnant of the whole
art and practice of war than this: ^'Exclasiveness of purpose is the secret of great
successes and of great operations.'' If, therefore, in maritime war you wish perma-
nent defenses for your coasts, rely exclusively upon stationary works if the con-
ditions admit, not upon floating batteries^ which have the weakness of ships. If
you wish offensive war carried on vigorously upon the sea, rely exclusively upon
ships that have the qnality of ships and not of floating batteries.

We had in the recent hostilities 26,000 tons of shipping sealed up in monitors, of
comparatively recent construction, in the Atlantic and the Pacific. There was not
an hour from first to last, I will venture to say, that we would not gladly have
exchanged the whole six for two battle ships of less aggregate displacement, and
that although from the weakness of the Spanish defenses we were able to hug pretty
closely most parts of the Cuban coast. Had the Spanish gnns at Santiago kept our
fleet at a greater distance, we should have lamented still more bitterly the policy
which gave us sluggish monitors for mobile battleships.

The unsatisfactory condition of the coast defenses deprived the Navy of the sup-
port of its complementary factor in the scheme of national sea power and imposed a
vicious though inevitable change in the initial plan of campaign, which should have
been, directed in full force against the coast of Cuba.

The four newer monitors on the Atlantic coast, if distributed amon^: our principal
ports, were not adequate singly to resist the attack which was suggested by the
possibilities of the case, though remote, and still more by the panic among certain
of our citizens.

On the other hand, if the four were massed and centrally placed, which is the cor-
rect disposition of any mobile force, military or naval, intended to counteract the
attack of an enemy whose particular line of approach is as yet uncertain, their slug-
gishness and defective nautical qualities would make them comparatively inefficient.
New York, for iustanco, is a singularly central and suitable point,. relatively to our
northern Atlantic seaboard, in which to station a division intended to meet and thwart
the plans of a squadron like Cervera's if directed a<i:ainst our coast ports, in accord-
ance with the fertile imaginations of evil which were the fashion in that hour. Did
the enemy appear off either Boston, the Delaware, or the Chesapeake, he could not
eflect material injury before a division of ships of the Oregon class would be upon
him; and within the limits named are found the major external commercial interests
of the country, as well as the ocean approaches along which they travel. But had the
monitors been substituted for battle ships, not to speak of their greater slowness, their
inferiority as steady gun platforms would have placed thom at a serious disadvantage
if the enemy were met outside, as he perfectly well might be.

It was probably such considerations as these that determined the division of the
battle fleet and the confiding to the section styled the Flying Squadron the defense
of the Atlantic coast for the time being. The monitors were all sent to Key West,
where they would be at hand to act against Habana, the narrowness of the field in
which that city, Key West, and Matanzas are comprised making their slowness less
of a drawback, while the moderate weather which might be expected to prevail
would permit their shooting to bo less inaccurate. The station of the Flying Squad-
ron in Hampton Roads, though not so central as New York relatively to the more
important commercial interests upon which, if upon any, the Spanish attack might
fall, was more central as regards the whole coast, and, above all, was nearer than
New York to Habana and Puerto Rico. The time element also entered the calcula-
tions in another way, for a fleet of heavy ships is more certainly able to put to sea
at a moment's notice in all conditions of tide and weather from the Chesapeake than
from New York Bay. In short, the position chosen may be taken to indicate that.

86

ill the opinion of the Navy Department and its adviBors, (*ervera was not likely to
attempt a daoh at an Atlantic port, and that it was more important to be able to
reach the West Indies speedily than to protect New York or Boston — a conclusion
which the writer entirely shared.

The conntry, however, should not fail to note that tht' division of the armored
fleet into two sections, nearly 1,000 miles apart, though probably the best that could
be done under all the circumstances of the moment, was contrary to sound practice,
and that the conditions which made it necessar^'^ should not have eKiste<l.

Thus, deficient coast protection reacts unfavorably upon the war fleet, which in all
its movements should be free from anyresponsiliility for the mere safety of the port«
it quits. Under such conditions as then obtained it might have been possible for
Spain to force our entire battle fleet from its offensive undertaking against Cuba and
to relegate it to mere coast defense. Had Cervera^s squadron, instead of being dis-
patched alone to the Antilles, been recalled to Spain, as it should have been, and
there reenforced hy the two armored ships which afterwards went to Suez with
Camara, the approach of this compact body would have compelled our fleet to con-
centrate, for each of our divisions of three ships, prior to the arrival of the Oregon,
would have been too weak to hazard an engagement with the enemy's six. When
thus concentrated, where should it bo placed? Off Habana or at Hampton Roads?
It could not be at both. The answer undoubtedly should be ''Off Habana,'' for
there it would be guarding the most important part of the Spanish fleet and at the
same time covering Key West, our naval base of operationn.

Malian^B reasoning is sucli as to be convincing. We have filled sev-
eral pages with his valuable opinions relative to coast <lefense, and do
not regret it, for the question has come to be of the highest imi>or-
tance, owing not a little to the admirable resistance which the deficient
batteries at the mouth of Santiago Harbor opposed with great per-
sistency to a powerful squadron, compelling it to stop before a few old
guns.

During the last few months attention has again been directed toward
experiments as to the value of coast defenses, and the result is that the
latter have been found efficient to such an extent against large squad-
rons that new means of warfare have been taken under consideration,
and that the greatest interest is being manifest in torpedo boats in con-
nection with attacks on harbors, not as measures of main force, but as
secret factors adapted to enter surreptitiously the anchoring place
where a squadron is stationed and to attempt its destruction.

Very near us, at Gibraltar, where very significant battle maneuvers
are frequently held, of which we hardly take any notice until foreign
reviews publish accounts of tliem, there took place recently thorough
experiments in the nature of a simulated battle, in which the objective
was a squadron attacked at night in the port of refuge by tori)edo boats,
while shore batteries, with the assistance of their electric searchlights,
were in operation in order to deleat and repulse them.

The case is an extremely interesting one. An account of it has been

published by Maj. Gen. J. li. Richardson in the Proceedings of the

Royal Artillery Institntion, and also in the Journal of the United

States Artillery for January and February last, under the title of

"Coast defense against torpedo-boat attack."

87 ■

This study shows that the subtle and daring torpedo boat is given
a i)rominent place in the attack of ports, and conseciuently rapid-fire
guns and the electric illumination of the region controlled by the
batteries are also placed in the foremost rank as far as the question of
defense is concerned.

It is not only in that bold offensive whose object it is to save the
squadrons and keep them from being compromised in engagements with
the guns of shore works that the tori>edo boat is sought to be utilized,
but also for coast defuse.

In this connection we deem it expedient to refer to the measure
recommended in a recent essay, the publication of which was com-
menced in the Eevista General de Marina for the month of June last.*
This article says :

Maritime defenses, stationary as well as mobile, recognize as their base and prin-
cipal foundation the most powerfal weapon hitherto known for fighting battleships,
namely, the torpedo. The rapidity and efiicacy of its effects, the security and sim-
plicity of its operation, its immense moral force, and the constant improvement of
the weapon itself and of the vessels destined to use it exclusively, increase its
importance from day to day, and maritime defenses which dispense with them or do
not give them the prominence they deserve are but incomplete.

What monitors and coast-defense vessels are able to do is a matter of history, and
while it can not be denied that tliey may be useful in certain cases — for in war
nothing is useless that is capable of inflicting any injury, no matter how small, on
the enemy — it is not to be supposed that nations will in future waste large sums of
money in the construction of these factors of defense. We have never had any
until recently, when we built a couple of them, the Numancia and Vitoriaf the crit-
icism of which not even the least charitably disposed are willing to undertake,
because even to attempt to criticise them is equivalent to showing that they possess
no defensive power. If we were to employ them as coast guards in a war, with
what are they going to fight? With modem battle ships? With torpedo boats and
cruisers of high speed? Either hypothesis is absurd. In any case that we may
imagine the employment of these two coast-defense vessels of ours could only
lead to jeopardizing in vain the lives of a thousand men and enveloping in a cloud
of censure the reputations of the hapless commanders whose sad duty it would be
to lead them to destruction. But aside from this palpable example, to think that
the maritime defense of our coasts could be intrusted to ships of large tonnage is to
think of suicide. Five battle squadrons, distributed between Barcelona, Cartagena,
Algeciras, Cadiz, and Ferrol, would hardly be sufficient to prevent the most ordi-
nary coups de main on the rest of the coast. The ships would nearly always arrive
too late to hinder them; and even if they should succeed in coming within sight of
the aggressors, if the latter have cruisers of great speed, the avengers would play
but a sorry idle. It may be objected that they would be able in their turn to attack
the hostile coasts, bat that would depend on the system of defense which the enemy
would employ there; and, moreover, to attack another country is not to defend our
own, nor can there be much comfort in returning the injuries received when we
might have obviated those inflicted upon us.*

In the most favorable case — that is, if the point attacked is one where we have a
squadron stationed — if the attack is made by a battle fleet, it is not to be supposed

> La defensa de las costas, by Salvador Dfaz Carbia, Lieutenant, Spanish Navy.

^The military and economic situation of our country will not permit us for many
years to come to attack another country; we will be grateful if we succeed in
defending our own.

88

that the enemy, who has taken the offensive, will commit the folly of presenting
inferior forces jnst for the pleasare of having us defeat them; they will, on the con-
trary, make sure of their superiority so as to render vain any effort on our part.
And if the attack is effected by fast vessels they will place ours in great danger,
unless we have a reserve on which to draw to replace those put out of action, especi-
ally in such harbors as Cadiz or Algeciras, which, being so open, are particularly
adapted for night surprises. Aside from offensive operations, which do not come
into consideration here, and confining ourselves to coast defense, it is our opinion that
hostile admirals would have to be very dull if our five hypothetical squadrons, in
spite of their power, did not prove entirely inefficient, unless accompanied by other
forces, which in that case would be the ones that would in themselves constitute
the defense.

Of course, these hyx>othetical squadrons are, and always will be, nothing but a
myth in our case. Their cost would amount to oyer 1,000,000,000 pesetas, and their
maintenance would require an appropriation of over 100,000,000 a year. Is such a
plan feasible f Even if it were feasible we could not rely on its efficacy, because, as
we stated at the beginning, the defense, in order to be complete, must be rational,
and our hypothesis was nothing but an absurdity.

If such sad results can be arrived at with such a large number of ships, what can
we expect of the three, four, or five battleships which, in the course of time and by
dint of sacrifices, we may be able to acquire f Tho only thing we can reasonably
expect is that, when we do get them, we will not be much better off than we were
before the disaster ; and truly, rather than that it would be better to desist from
the undertaking, for we shall never find an enemy such as the Americans found in us.

The solution is to abandon the course which, as we have already seen, is a poor
one, and embrace another which, though less well known, may give us better results.
Do not let us accumulate factors without plan or method, without rhyme or reason;
but let us study them from a technical and eeonomic standpoint, selectthose which,
with the least expense, represent the greatest power aud are of the most general
application, and finally combine them intelligently iu order to obtain from them the
best possible results. These are the bases on which any plan of mobilized defenses
must be fouufled, aud hence the type of vessel destined to form the main nucleus is
the torpedo boat. From the destroyer, capable of crossing the ocean, down to the
little 60-tou craft, it is adapted to repulse from our shori'S flotillas of the same type,
as well as powerful squadrons, or transports and convoys. It is true that torpedo
boats require protection aud ports of refuge, as they can not always operate in day-
time; but large squadrons require such ports at night aud arc much more expen-
sive, so that the disadvantage would he the same for both classes of ships. On the
other hand, fast vessels .can always elude au engagement, while battleships have no
other recourse but to accept a battle when it is offered them.

It must be acknowledged, nevertheless, that in the Spanish-American
war tho torpedo boats do not appear to have realized in practice the
expectations that were placed in them in theory.

The superiority of stationary defenses and their relation to mobile
defenses is defined in the following words of Mahaii:

The fencer who wears also a breastplate may be looser in his guard. Seaports can
not strike beycmd the range of their guns; but if the great commercial ports aud
naval stations can strike efi'ectively t-o far, the fleet can launch into the deep
rejoicing, knowing that its home interests, behind the buckler of the lixed defenses,
are safe till it returns.

This argument alcme lends considerable force to our defensive tenden-
cies. If fortified harbors are indispensable in connection with squadrons
so as to enable the latter to operate aud x)ut to sea in oti'ensive actions,

89

it is evident tbat^ in the absence of them, and being necessarily con-
fined to a circumspect defensive, we mnst content ourselves with defend-
ing our coasts if we wish to protect our commercial interests and the
integrity of our territory.

It is probably this last consideration that is most imx)ortant as far as
Spain is concerned. It is obvious that, in view of the shock which our
country has sustained, we can not, for years to come, think of battles
and adventures. But the whirlwind of a European war, which is
always threatening, might very easily involve us in such a manner as
to render it difficult for us to maintain absolute neutrality, and in that
case we should deeply regret our inability to prevent our becoming the
toy of anyone whom it might please to make one of our ports on the
Gantabrian or Mediterranean coast his base of operations or his naval
station. And perhaps that would not be the worst. It might also
happen to us to become involved iu the theory of compensations, under
the rules of which the stronger takes from the weaker whatever he
pleases, and countries are dismembered and distributed at the will of
the more powerful party, unle.^s the former have some power by which
to command respect andattract the sympathy of some other strong party.

An example of what fortified harbors in themselves are worth is fur-
nished by Habana — many times referred to in these pages — which kept
our defeat from being even worse than it was, and that although this
harbor was iu very poor condition to constitute what is termed a mod-
ern fortified city and still less a military port. If this place had been
supported by a few battleships — the Oqueiido and Fi;?caya— there is
no doubt but that it would have formed for the enemy a serious obsta-
cle, capable of altering materially Sampson's and Schley's maneuvers,
and compelled the United States to immobilize the greater part of its
fleet for the defense of its extensive coasts and wealthy cities, which
would have changed the terms of the problem. And it was not only
the coasts that preoccupied the United States, but also its commerce,
especially the coasting trade, which represents very important, and, at
the same time, vulnerable interests.

But applying this argument to our present sorry condition, we repeat
that there is no use in trying to do the impossible. Admitting the
urgent necessity of defense, we shall have to reduce our aspirations
considerably, because tlie financial situation of our country makes it
impossible to do all that is to be desired.

Ilence we must not count on powerful squadrons for a long time to
come. But it will be i)os8ible, within the limit of our resources, to con-
stitute a modest, regular force, which will have to be supf)lemented by
the essential base, the armament and fortification of our coasts.

OHAPTBli VTII.
What a Military Port Should Bb.

CHOICE OF location — COMMERCIAL CITIES — MILITARY PORTS —
GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION — SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

For the defense of a country sacli places sliould be chosen as are best
suited for the purpose, subject to the conditions impose<l by the con-
figuration of the coasts and boundaries. These places, as a rule, are
easily apparent to the eye of the technical expert and even of the
uninitiated.

The exigencies of the defense, however, are sabject to other conditions
besides those represented by the nature of the soil.

On the one liand — confining ourselves to the question of coasts — we
must take into consideration the commercial and social development of
certain ports, which are frequently bound to become strategic i)oints
and to constitute strongholds, even though not well adai)ted for defense.

The difficulties are greater now than they used to be, owing to the
increased distances at which defenses are able to strike, thanks to the
greater i)ower and range of guns.

Hand ill hand with the military development of certain i>laces on the
coast, there have sprung up in the course of years, under the protec-
tion of guns, commercial colonies which have finally come to constitute
large cities and wealthy commercial centers. But the day has arrived
when the i)rogress in the means of attack has rendered the old i)rotec-
tion useless, because projectiles can strike so much farther. And thus
we have come to ])ossess commercial cities, located right on the coast,
which have all the re<iuirements for traffic, but are little suited for
defense.

Still, the defense of such places can not be dispensed with, and there
arises the material difficulty of carrying it into eflect, especially if
perfection is aimed at, which in this case would mean to secure the
city against bombardment.

This ideal can not at present be attained for cities located immedi-
ately on the coast, or very near it, and devoid of natural protection
from the fire of ships and without advanced iwsitions of sufficient
height and extent to install thereon powerful batteries, almost invul-
nerable to fire Irom the sea and which would constitute a grave danger
for warships at a great distance. And even then it would not be at all
certain that bombardments could be obviated, because gunfire at ranges
beyond (),00() or 8,000 meters, when aimed at ships, is very inaccurate.

But since cities so situated can not i)ossibly be left unprotected,
expensive means will have to be resorted to in order to advance the

90

91

first line of battle and protect the destructible property by removing
the line of bombardment to a greater distance, for to obviate it entirely
seems almost impossible.

Nowadays a bombardment is considered an incident of the attack,
and not sufficient value is attached to it to surrender a place as a result
thereof. We are returning to the times of a certain admiral who com-
pared the efifects of a bombardment to the results that would be attained
by attempting to break windows with guineas. But what we want is
to avoid having our windows broken, for we might come across some-
one who had an abundance of guineas and would not mind spending
them in this kind of diversion.

If a commercial city does not possess natural advantages for defense
it will be difficult to guard against bombardments, although the latter
may be considered a danger little to be feared, because, when carried
on from a great distance, its effects must necessarily be slight.

This is the case with some of the cities on our coasts, and any nation
with an extensive seaboard has cities in similar conditions.

Habana is one of the cities which do not possess natural advantages
for defense against bombardments. Few York is not much better off,
but the Americans are trying to remedy this defect by creating defenses
by artificial means. Among the late plans for converting this immense
metropolis into an impregnable city is the construction of sea forts on
the Romer Shoals, 19 miles from the city, off' Sandy Hook, where large
armored cupolas are to be erected almost even with the surface of the
water, to be armed with guns of powerful calibe^', well adapted to keep
any hostile ship beyond the distance from where bombardments would
be effective.

It was the well-known Brialniont who suggested the use of sea forts
and floating batteries out to sea, in which the share of the Navy would
be secondary to the armament, veritable platforms capable of support-
ing the most powerful guns.

A few years ago a distinguished engineer of our Army • suggested a
similar system of floating batteries for the advanced line of the harbor
and city of Barcelona, which, as is well known, does not possess natural
advantages for defense.

In our opinion this method has a disadvantage, as coast defense is
characterized by the stationary nature of the works, nnd although the
engines of floating batteries — formerly bomb ketches — permit only of
slow movement, yet, having to deal with fickle temperaments like ours,
the probability is that they would change their stations many times,
and it might happen that just when we wanted them they would be far
from the spot where they were most needed and to which they were
assigned. Captain Mahan objects to monitors on similar grounds. It
would therefore be preferable to have stationary coast defenses, and, if

' Las baterfas en la defensa de Barcelona, by Mariano Riibio y Bellv6, Lieutenant-
Colonel of Engineers, pablished in the Memorial de Ingenieros, 1897, p. 365.

92

necessary to have tbem out to sea, sea forts are to be preferred whenever
practicable. They cost more, it is true, but on the other hand they do
not require the expense of maintenance, which is indispensable for
floating batteries; they also last longer and are not put out of action
as easily, nor are they subject to being blown up by torpedo boats.

The share of the Navy in coast protection is the mobile defense,
which must be able to attack and operate at a great distance and seek
the hostile armorclad in its cruise, many miles from the shore, and for
these purposes, as shown in the preceding chapter, the torpedo boat is
best adapted.

We have spoken of places which do not possess natural advantages
for defense, and it is obvious that such places can not be considered
military ports in the full sense of the word.

A natural military port — and if not natural, its construction is
extremely difficult and expensive in time and money — requires ample
space for the shelter and protection of squadrons, also docks, depots,
and navy-yards; and the anchoring places, workshops, storehouses,
etc., must be protected from all attacks, including bombardments; for
only thus can they be places of safety adapted to serve as bases of
fleetsi Hence, military ports are not identical with commercial cities,
though frequently classed together. A military port must open into
the sea by a long channel, preferably tortuous and not very wide, so
that, while permitting the country's own ships to pass through, it will
not be easy of access for the enemy. At the head of this channel roust
stretch out a deep bay, on which the stationary resources and the city
itself are located. Tbe entrance to the channel should afford good
positions of suilicient height and extent to install artillery thereon and
erect works of defense.'

The natural advantages which, as stated, Habana lacked, Santiago
de Cuba, on the other hand, possessed to a high degree, and to this cir-
cumstance is partially due the admirable resistance which, with a few
old guns, was so long opposed to the whole United States squadron*,
armed with a large number of powerful modern guns. This resistance
filled with admiration the United States gunners and engineers, when,
upon taking charge of the materiel at the Morro, they convinced them-
selves that there were no other guns than those they saw.

The principal defenses at the entrance to Santiago Harbor were as
follows.*

MOERO.

About 200 meters east of the old castle is the light-house, and about
100 meters east of the latter a new battery, about 03 meters above the

' It seems almost siiperflnons to state that, ia connection with tbe proper con-
iiguratiou, tbe geographical situation must also be taken into consideration, as it
greatly affects the interests sought to be protected.

'^Strefflenr's Osterreichische Militiiriscbe Zeitschrift says that some of the guns at
Sautiago dated from the years 1688| 1718, and 1769, and had been used in fighting
the buccaneers.

ted of wooden

isd filled with

B was 6 meters,

.th cement and

50 meters deep

attery. From

This battery

(old 16-centi-

IG-centimeter

21centimeter

f the entrance,
howitzers and
Bbields; these
he battery was
us were sepa-
ineters back of
iiilding. East
the submarine
imeter Ilotch-

md comprised
ita howitzers,
IS the Socapa
)astle.

le condition of
ntimeter Hon-
•atteries. The

I his report for
t of the Morro
le angle of sit-
Ifht of the crest
pajectory A B^

e mouth of San-
>d in the Kevue
ita di Artiglieria
>ject, condensing
, in the Memorial
writers in ^Tnited

94

corresponding to the firing data for United States S-inch and 12-inch
guns. Thus in this particular case the distance A D (2,0()0 yards) cor-
responded exactly to the fire through the apex of the trajectory, and
the angle of incidence being zero only accidental hits that would
knock off the crest of the parapet could be counted upon to strike the
personnel or materiel.

At shorter distances — ^that is to say, when the crest is situated
between the maximum ordinate of the trajectory ^i B and the ship A^ —
the angle of incidence becomes negative and the fire of the ship's guns
becomes less and less effective. At great distances the fire acquires
greater effectiveness, because the angle of descent will be more favor-
able, but the fire will lose in precision.

The height of 63 meters at which the battery was situated increased
the protection of the parapet and explains to a certain extent the
slight effects obtained by the United States guns.

Captain Benoit, of the French artillery, says:

In the location of their improvised batteries the Spanish were happily inspired,
obviating traverses and earthworks, which, by formiug parapets, increase to a con-
siderable extent the effect of projectiles upon the personnel of the battery. But
they do not appear to have taken any thonght of trying to conceal these batteries,
of too pronounced geometrical forms, and to attract the hostile fire toward fictitious
batteries, losing sight of the fact that the principal defense of coast batteries when
face to face with the guns of always visible ships is their invisibility.

Streffleur's Zeitschrift draws tlie conclusion that experience has
shown once more that *' coast batteries do not have much to fear from
war ships."

The United States Army officers who were charged with taking an
inventory of the defenses of the Morro said:

It is unpardonable that the fleet has not destroyed the city and its defenses in all
these days.

Among the many articles devoted to these questions in the ])roceed-
ings of the Royal Artillery Institution is one which was published in
July, 1893, by Maj. R. P. »Iohnson, who quotes Admiral Selwyn's words:

I hope that naval officers will consider that a fort is a thing to be avoided.

95

In the ^aval Annual for 1898 Mr. J. li, Thurstield concludes an
article on Naval Maneuvers as follows.

Un canon h terre vaut un vaisseau k la mer, and when it comes to defending a nar-
row and tortuoas estuarj^, a few gans not of extreme calibre, but well placed and
well bandied, are worth a whole armada of ships. Nevertheless, it remains as true
now as it was in the days of the Armada, that the snrest way of preventing attacks
on the shore is to impeach the enemy's fleets at sea."

We will add the opinions of some military authorities concerning the
attack of coast batteries by ships.
In a work published in 1896 Admiral Fournier says:

In a battle between ships and cemented coast works, armed with powerful modern
artillery, the risks Incurred by the two parties can not be weighed in the same bal-
ance. Such an operation is conceivable when commanded by necessity in order to
support from the sea, by means of a bombardment at a great distance, the principal
attack on land by a corps of troops having in view the capture and military occupa-
tion of the obstacle. But when efifected by ships alone, it can only lead to a retreat
of the assailant. And indeed, whatever comparative success such bombardment
may have had, the ships will be compelled to withdraw when, without having
gained any material advantage, they tind themselves weakened by the losses and
injuries due to the enemy's tire and by the exhaustion of the greater part of their
ammunition, which exposes them to the danger of falling into the bonds of a hostile
naval force coming to the assistance of the defense, or of bein^ at the mercy of a
storm, which might surprise them on their return and fill them wifh water through
the openings caused by the enemy's shells and perhaps cause them to sink.

In short, the main object of our naval forces should'be, above all else, to fight the
enemy afloat, anywhere and under all favorable circumstances, wherever he can be
found, so as to jnaintain the empire of the sea after reducing him to impotence.
But as long as this result has not been attained it will be imprudent to expose our
ships to coast works in unproductive struggles, which, as a rule, are much more
debilitating and demoralizing to the assailants on the sea than to the defense ashore.

The Memorial de I'Artillerie de la Marine for 1894^ arrives at the
following conclusions:

The great power of guns, the precision of their fire, the use of telemetric devices,
the cour:ie and speed of the target, the employment of powerful explosives in shells,
tbe substitution of smokeless powder for black powder for gun charges, the improve-
ments in the organization of works of defense, torpedo boats, stationary torpedoes,
and electric lights have considerably increased the defensive value of shore batter-
ies. The ship, on the other hand, which represents the ofl*en8ive power, while
carrying nowadays more powerful guns, armor of greater resistance, etc., has
nevertheless, in spite of the greatly increased cost price, remained so frail that it
can be put out of action by a single shell. This increased cost price constitutes
another cause of inferiority, as it excludes the ship from any ofi'ensive, the result of
which is not commensurate to the risks incurred.

• * » « » « «

As concerns the naval operations considered in this article, not only has the defen-
sive power gi'own more than the otfensive power, but these operations themselves
have lost their value almost entirely.

We often hear of ravages wrought on a coast by the guns of fleets, but these are
generally illusions which do not deserve much consideration. All that could be

* Des optl'^rations maritimes centre les c6tes et des d^bar(|uements, by M. D. B. G.

96

attained wonl'd be to caane the popalation along the coast some annoyance, and it is
for something more than that that European nations fight nowadays.

We are among those who believe that the establishment of too numerous batteries
on the coast constitutes a useless ex]iense. They should be established with great
discretion. • • * Hatteries are intended to prevent a sudden descent upon
important cities, or to protect a navy-yard, the preservation of which is necessary
for the national defense.

That favorably situated and well-eqaipped batteries can attain this
object is shown by the gallant resistance and accurate work of the
batteries at Santiago. There is no doubt that the latter were favor-
ably situated, but their armament was inadequate and deficient, being
confined to the few available guns mentioned, and as for protection, it
was limited, as stated, to parapets of sand and earth, merlons of bar-
rels filled with cement, and sandbags.^

The effects of the fire from the United States vessels were very
slight, in spite of their powerful guns.

Morro Castle was riddled with shot holes, as also the houses to the
right of it which were outlined against the sky. The light house, built
of 25-millimeter metal plate, was i)ierced by many small-caliber pro-
jectiles and by two 15 centimeter shells. Another 20-centimeter shell,
which had been fired without base fuse, was found back of the battery.
No damage had been done to the works, except that a few sandbags
had been shot through and the sand had run out.

At the Socapa a 33 centimeter shell exploded on June 16, covering
one of the Hontoria guns with earth ; but by next morning it was again
ready to fire. A 15-centimeter shell iiierced the shield of a Hontoria
gun and injured the carriage, but without dismounting the gun or put-
ting it out of action. On July 2 a shell disabled the carriage of a
Hontoria gun.

Many small projectiles struck the works and guns without doing
much damage.

The metal-roofed building, which was used as an ammunition maga-
zine at the Socai)a, was not touched.

A IG-centimeter Hontoria shell of the Socapa* battery struck the
Texas near the bow^ entering and exploding in the berth deck, killing
one sailor and wounding six others.

A 21-centimeter shell from the Morro hit the lowa^ and exploded in
the officers' cabin without wounding any one.

> For these works of fortification special credit is diie to Col. Florencio Canla in
command of the engineers' corps at Santiago, and for the armament of the same to
Col. Salvador Diaz Ord6nez, in command of the artillery. They and the personnel
of officers nnder their orders deserve the highest praise. Their names will be men-
tioned in due time.

'Indiana. — O. N. I.

97

Amoug the personnel of our batteries there were many casualties, as

shown in the following statement:

1
Batteries.

Date.

Killed.

Wounded.

Total.

Officers.

5

1

Men.
25

'I

8
33
8
6
6

6

2

M orro

June 6
June 16
June 21
Jnnu 26
July 2
June 6
Juno 14
June 16
June 22
July 2

2

1

m

32

12

3

8

Socapa

i

1

35
8

Other work s.....

2

3'

1

i

1
1
1

7
9

1

10
3

Total

10

: ^^

107

128

We wish to mention here the names of some officers who were
wounded and who distinguished themselves by their bravery in the
defense of the entrance to Santiago Harbor: ^

Colonel of Artillery Salvador Diaz Ordonez, commander of the artil-
lery of Santiago.

Commander of Infantry Antonio Eos, governor of Morro Castle.

Captain of Artillery Jose Sanchez Seijas, commander of the battery
on the esplanade of the Morro.

Ensign Venancio Nardiz, commander of the Socapa Battery.

Ensign Eicardo Bruquetas (wounded twice), commander of the Socapa
Battery.

Ensign Fernandez Pina, commander of the Socapa Battery.

First Lieutenant of Artillery Pedro Irizar, of the Morro Battery.

Second Lieutenant of Artillery Juan Artal !Navarro, of the Morro
Battery.

^ We have already spoken of Commander Acosta, who was killed, and Ensign
MolinS; wounded; on hoard the Beina Mercedes,

6884 7

CHAPTER IX.

Conclusions.

the political aspect — the naval aspect — the military

aspect — the needs of our nation.

Following our usaal method of pla(*iiig by the side of the facts the
leFSons arising therefrom, we will set forth those which may be logically
derived from the pages of this book.

In years to come, when the history of this war is written on the basis
of absolutely impartial information, a different method may perhaps be
pursued, giving all the facts first, and at the end deducing the results.
lUit at present we must alternate the facts with the results, because all
nations are waiting to profit by what Spain has experienced, and we
must oft'er them data from which they can judge with impartiality.

It is surprising how much has been written in foreign countries on
the Spanish-American war during these few months. We have before
us dozens of American, English, French, Italian, and German books,
reviews, and periodicals, in which writers relate to their hearts' con-
tent the phases of our defeat. And in the face of this wonderful
activity, which often interprets erroneously the causes of tiie appalling
decline of Spain, we, on the other hand, preserve death-like silence.

This is not as it should be. In the United States, for instance, there
is not a single ofiicer of high rank who took an active part in the war
but has furnished, in books or reviews, an exposition of the facts, sub-
stantiated by documents, and the Government, in its turn, has followed
the same plan and has published reports of the Army and Navy.
Among us, as stated, death-like silence reigns, and thus it is that for-
eign critics lack all knowledge of our claims to vindication, which,
though slight, may nevertheless throw light on many things; for, by the
side of much that is bad, and for which we are being justly censured,
•there is also some good which is being ignored, while it should be
truthfully and conscientiously set forth, so that we may not be judged
without being heard and considered more inefficient and incapable
than we really are.

In the first place, it should be stated that the cause of our disasters
lies much deeper and dates much further back than is generally
believed.

We do not mean to exonerate this or that branch of the S])anish Gov-
ernment, nor do we wish to confine the blame to any particular one.
The evil is so great that there is enough responsibility for all. But it

98

99

is unjust, criminal even, to want to throw the whole burden of responsi-
bility for the catastrophes upon the military institutions, and still that
seems to be the tendency.

(1) Because the Cuban war, the source of or pretext for our ruin,
was due to causes of a political order, and even the measures for sup-
pressing it nnd the election of those who were to bring this about were
in obedience to considerations of the highest political order.

(2) Because our jjrincipal enemy, the United States, without whose
assistance the Cuban insurrection w^ould not have existed and could
not have been continued, was aided by our erroneous policy, which in
these colonial questions went from one mistake to another, without
heeding any w^arning or advice.

(3) If there were deficiencies in the organization of our armed forces
and in the direction and general strategic conception of the war, the
cause must be sought, not in the army alone, but higher, in the disor-
ganized condition of the highest branches of the Government, in the
power whose duty It is to regulate and correct, without hesitation,
whatever may be detrimental, and to keep a close watch always, so
that everyone may be made to do his duty and strive for perfection.

(4) We went to Avar without any support or sympathy, led on by an
erroneous conception of our strength, which may have been excusable
in the common people, but it was inexcusable that it was fostered by
fanatic speeches and by people whose duty it was to know the condition
of our naval and military resources.'

The London Times, in answer to Captain Mahan, says:

The direction of warlike operations should never be influenced by the clamor of
publio opinion, and no government 'worthy of that name will sink millions in
defenses merely for the purpose of calming the fears of people whom Lord St. Vin-
cent appropriately designated as "old women of both sexes/'

It is infinitely simpler and cheaper to educate publio opinion by imbuing it with
sound principles than to accede to mad demands, and one of the most important
lessons of the recent war is that very modest coast defenses are sufficient for all
actnal needs, provided they are well armed and under efficient command. Even
the miserable works hurriedly improvised at Santiago may be said to have fulfilled
their object, since they compelled the Americans to resort to military operations on
land.

As to the naval aspect of the question, the publication of Oervera's
letters has confirmed abroad the opinion of experts. The most emi-
nent critics who comment on our defeat, without losing sight of the
naval responsibilities as to whether it was expedient or not for the
squadron to enter Santiago Harbor; whether or not it could have
reached another port before it was blockaded here, and whether that
would have been preferable; whether the sortie should have been
ordered; whether, when ordered, it was better to go out at night or in
daytime; whether it was better for the ships upon coming out to follow

1 It is interesting to examine England's decree of neutrality, which we expect to
analyze in the course of this work.

100

«

divergent courses, or to hug the shore as they did — without losing sight
of all this, we say, the naval experts of the world agre«:

(1) That the destruction of the sciuadron was decreed from the very
moment that it received orders to leave Cape Verde, for our naval de^-
ciency was unquestionable.

(2) That from that very moment the problem ceased to be naval and
became a political problem, for to political motives only can we attrib-
ute the fact that a squadron which amounted to so little was made to
go out and fight with one so powerful.

This statement is corroborated by the following words:

The United States Navy has demonstratejl its ability to carry out much greater
enterprises than the one intrusted to it last year, and still it can not be said tliat
the fleet as a whole was managed with great skill, by which circumstance the Navy
has contracted a great debt of gratitude with the Spanish Government. — The
Times.

(3) That the main responsibility should not be sought in the disaster
itself, but in events prior to the disaster, in order to ascertain the rea-
sons why we had no fleet, and why the materiel that we did possess
was in such poor condition, in spite of the enormous sums which the
nation had expended upon it.

(4) That even within the limits of our <leficiencies and errors, having
once launched on a mad war, we should have gone into it with mad-
ness, without considering means of attack, without considerations of
any kind, making tear upon commerce to the greatest possible extent.^

From what we now know, it is clear that in .the United States also
great indecision prevailed and grave errors were committed, and if our
ships had been distributed with more wisdom, allowing the Oqu^ndo
and Vizcaya to remain at Habana, and if our troops had been handled
more skillfully, such indecision and errors would have become more
apparent, with not a little prejudice to the enemy.

As to the military aspect, properly speaking, on land as well as on
the sea, there may be found in this book accounts of a number of minor
battles in which the enemy always retreated, perhaps in accordance
with some system, or because it was found expedient; nevertheless
these battles show —

(1) A desire on our part to fight, without measuring the forces, and
thus we see at times troops of infantry fighting from the shore with
only the tire of their rifles, and without any protection, against armored
vessels equipped with powerful rapid fire armament (Cienfuegos, Guan-
tdnamo, etc.), or small gunboats fighting hostile ships of great power

Ut has been positively stated that after the declaration of war a ship left Gibral-
tar with a cargo of saltpeter without being molestedi which is a proof of the lenity
and fear with which we proceeded. It has also been widely reported that after the
Maine catastrophe the City of Paris took to the United States from England a largo
quantity of war material; also men particularly skilled in the handling of modern
guns. It 18 only too well known what difficulties our squadron encountered in the
Suez Canal, aud at whose haudH.

101

(Gardeuas and Gienfaegos); or, again, mountain and field batteries and
old bronze gans cast a centary ago, seeking to engage with modern
ships (Santiago, Tanas, Manzauillo, and Matanzas).

(2) That neither great strategy nor oven great tactics have been dis-
played in this campaign, wliich circumstance may also be partly
attributed to the cliaos reigning in the centers of the administration,
for the heads of States have a ctmsiderable share in the conception of
])lans of campaigns. But when it was a question of testing personal
valor, we find instances of desperate disregard of life — as, for example,
in the battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill — which will find a place in
history among the bloody battles of the world.*

(3) That the blockade as a means ot warfare was effective, owing to
the weakness of our forces, and that blockades assume a very cruel
character when applied to isolated cities which do not possess within
themselves means of subsistence. On tlie other hand, no value is
attached to bombardments.'

In conclusion,, we will set forth certain doctrinal results relative to
the question of coast defense.

From our former book (Ships, Guns, and Small Arms) we deduced cer-
tain principles relative to the materiel — the guns with which the bat-
teries are armed — and from this book may be gathered principles rela-
tive to the works — the fortifications in which the guns are mounted —
as to the greater or less vulnerability from the fire of ships, accord-
ing to the height above the level of the sea at which coast batteries are
installed.

This question is so essential that the old aphorism that ^' a gun ashore
is worth a ship on the sea'' has again come into vogue, but if this saying
is to prove true the gun must be located in the most favorable conditions.

The great height of coast defenses has the disadvantage of being
detrimental to the perforating effects of the fire against tlie vertical
armored sides of ships, but it facilitates the perforation of horizontal
armored decks by the use of howitzers or rifled mortars. Great
height naturally results in the increase of the dead angle; but in
most cases the danger of ships repairing to this angle can probably
be obviated, as coasts are not often entirely rectilinear, an^ hence
some of the batteries can flank the dead angles of others.

Through the resistance of the batteries at the mouth of Santiago
Harbor the value of coast defenses against squadrons has been con-

> This book is not intended to treat of the battles fought on land during the
Spanish-American war. We expect to devote a whole volume of our work to this
phase, at which time we shall further develop this conception.

^In the Kevue Maritime for April, 1899, it is stated that when the contact mines
at Santiago were raised one was found in which the fuse had operated, probably
upon contact with the MerrimaCf but only one-half of the charge of gun cotton had
become ignited as the result of the damaged condition of the latter. At Guant^-
namo the stationary mines showed signs of having been toached; but did not oper-
ate, owing probably to defective fused. This information comes from the United
States, a:id should therefore *^ be put in quarantine.''

102

firmed to such au extent that it does Dot appear amiss to lay down a
few principles on the sitaatiou of coast works.

(1) Coast batteries, being designed to tight the different classes of
war ships which may attack maritime cities, it is indispensable that
their power, precision, and effect upon hostile ships be in harmony
with the ofiensive and defensive conditions of such ships. To this end
it becomes necessary to employ, in the first place, guns of extraordi-
nary power and sufficient caliber to perforate the armor of ships
and turrets; in the second place, guns adapted to assist the former,
but which, besides producing perforating effects, are also capable of
destroying the less strong parts of ships and disabling the rigging;
and finally, guns which by means of so-called curved fire are adapted
to batter the decks of hostile ships.

(2) It will at once be understood that the guns designed to batter
the armor of ships must be of great power and have projectiles of ade-
quate shape to preserve the greatest possible amount of initial energy,
which requires the greatest possible thickness of wall in the projectile
compatible with its diameter.

(3) The fire must have the requisite precision, the zone of fire rela-
tive to the vertical height of the vessel must be extensive, and at the
same time the impact of the projectile must be approximately in the
normal direction. In order to attain these requirements, the height of
the battery above the level of the sea must be limited. But as the
men who serve the guns (usually installed in barbette batteries) must
be protected as far as possible, they should be placed in shelter from
the fire of the rapid-fire guns of ships. These requirements must
necessarily be harmonized, which can be done to a certain extent by
giving the batteries heights of from 25 to 30 meters, although no
general rules can be laid down on this ([uestion, because another
requirement is that the batteries should be merged as far as possible
with the topographic lines of the coast and give the enemy as few
points of reference as possible. ^

(4) As to the second class of guns referred to, there is no objection to
increasing the height when deemed necessary, since the object will fre-
quently be to play upon ships at greater distances, and therefore the
height may be increased to 60 or 80 meters.

(6) Finally, as concerns the howitzer batteries which are designed to
batter the decks of shii)S, it is important to obtain an inclination of fall

1 Major- General RichnrdsoD; speakin;^ of tbe recent experiments at Gibraltar,
above referred to, says: " To convince anyone of tlie ni'cessity for control it is uhu-
ally sufficient to open Hrc from a number of absolutely independent batteries of
Q. F. gnns at a fairly fast target in broad daylight. \o battery, except such as
are very high-sited, say 600 feet, can distinguish JtH own Hhots, and the means of
ranging and hitting, is removed. Very low-sited C^. F.'s often never get on the
target at all. If there is this confusion when working with the easiest possible of
lights, what reasonable certainty of striking torpedo boats can be looked for when*
tlie difficulties of seeing are enormously' increased ?''

103

approximating as much as possible the vertical direction, and at the
same time the piercing power, and hence the energy of the projectile
should be as great as i)ossible. These requirements make it advisable
to place these batteries at a greater height (Italians consider that tbe
height should exceed 100 meters). In this manner not only the objects
referred to may be attained, but at tbe same time the ships will be com-
pelled to take positions at a greater distance, so that the trajectory in
passing over the parapet will be on the descent, and hence at this
■increased distance the precision of the tire will be less and the energy
of the projectiles will be decreased.

But all plans must be subordinated to topographic conditions, and
therefore when no elevated positions are avaihible (which, as a general
thing, would require effective guns of small caliber on the flank to play .
on the deivd angles), these howitzer batteries may be installed at less
elevated points, and, if necessary, higher parapets may be used for the
proper protection of the batteries, and the system of indirect tiring may
be resorted to.

The least that can be expt^cted of us is to see that the defeat we have
suffered may serve us as a warning, in order that it may not lead to the
total obliteration of our nation. If we have been ruined because we
were weak, let us make up our minds to be weak no longer; let us
become strong in our own country, for there is still reason to believe
that a day will come when we shall have something afloat capable of
withstanding misfortunes, something of what some peox>le call 'Hhe
manifest destiny."

The expenses necessary for that purpose are within the limits of the
attainable; but do not let us leave it for others to do; for if some
ambitious foe should further reduce our territory, he would defend his
new acquisition at the cost of tbe conciuered or usurped country. In
other words, if we do not reestablish our military power and defend onr
coasts and boundaries, the probability is that others will defend them
at our expeuHC,

APPENDICES.

105

APPENDIX A.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

SHIPS, GUNS, AND SMALL-ARMS.

By Sevebo Gumez NtJNEz, Captain of Artillery.

CHAPTER X.

Conclusions,
eapid-fiee — seduction of calibee — large calibee — teaining

DEVICES — SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION — ARMOR PLATE — PROTECTION
OF SECONDARY BATTERIES — STRENGTHENING OF DECKS — SUPPRES-
SION OR GREAT RESTRICTION IN TDE USE OP WOOD ON BOARD —
MORTARS IN CONNECTION WITH BOMBARDMENTS — TORPEDO-LAUNCH-
ING TUBES — SMALL-CALIBER RIFLES — THE NATIONAL DEFENSE.

We have now reached the most diflftcult part. To draw conclusions
when there is so little upon which to base them is a task fraught with
difficulties. The fear of makiog mistakes, however, should not deter
us in matters of such vital importance, in whicli the opinions of some,
modified and strengthened by those of others, finally form a consecutive
chain of ideas constantly perfected by the critical study of new cases
arising in practical experience.

The first natural result of the defeat we have sustained is the firm
conviction, which is making its way to the heart of every Spaniard,
that we have been living too long without compass or guide, without
definite aim or fixed ideas, without a vigorous and strong hand to point
out to the nation the horizon of its future greatness and compel it to
follow the straight path, a concerted plan, a system, and a just gov-
ernment, devoting to that purpose all the energies at the country's
command; and as these have not been entirely exhausted, we come to
the conclusion that it may still be possible to repair our great losses by
following a system diametrically opposed to the one which has brought
us so much sorrow and ruin.

It would be unpardonable for us to go back to our former thought-
lessness and indolence. To profit by the severe lessons of the present

107

108

in order to obviate disasters in tbe future is a noble task, and we should
set to work on it as soon as x>ossible.

Every social organism needsrevivifyinginodiiications,and this applies
especially to the army, the national defense, the navy; in short, the
whole armed organization of our country.

To accomplish this there is no better time than the present, while life
is not yet extinct in what remains of our former power.

If we examine the accounts published in the United States, it will be
found that they are almost unanimous in the opinion that the victory
ill the battle of Santiago was due to the 20-centimeter gun, and the
conviction is expressed that there will be a great revolution in favor of
20-centimeter and 25-centimeter rapid-fire guns.

The 57 ram. and 37 mm. guns suffer from the defect of short range,
which fact should be taken into special consideration, because in the
Spanish-American war the battles were fought at greatly reduced
distances.

Eapid fire has gained much ground, and Capt. A. S. Crowninshield
attributes to it the majority of hits upon our ships.

Universal i)raise is accorded the small-caliber ritie. The innocuity of
bullets has not succeeded in coming into favor. • Practical experienc€,
the mortality in battles, the seriousness of wounds, the piercing and
destructive effects of subtle projectiles, must be considered.

To sum up, the following conclusions may be drawn from this book:

(1) Powerful semi-rapid or rapid fire artillery, installed in such man-
ner as to enable it to be utilized from the very beginning of the battle;
to open fire from the greater part of the guns — in fact, from nearly all
the guns of a ship or battery, so as to cover the enemy with a hail of
iron without giving him time to recover. This requires many guns and
instantaneous training devices by means of which the fire can be regu-
lated so as to enable the guns to enter upon the action at any given
moment, for we should always bear in mind that these devices are
delicate, and it is doubtful whether they can be kept intact during the
whole of the battle. With the harmony of the whole should be com-
bined a certain independence of action of the several parts; in other
words, each battery, ty])e, or section of guns should be i)ermitted to
operate on its own account, and be provided with all the elements
required for firing.

(2) Reduction of the large caliber in order to secure greater rapidity
of fire without detriment to the effectiveness of projectiles.

(3) Simplification of the apparatus designed for the handling of the
guns. We should strive for simpler and more rapid mechanism to
facilitate operation by hand at any given moment, so that the com-
mander of a ship or battery may feel assured that some minor injury,
stfch as the breaking or disabling of a tube or electric wire, will not
cause a momentary suspension of fire nnd that the guns can only be
silenced through the effects of hostile projectiles.

109

(4) Large sapplies of ammuDition, in order to make sure that the use
of rapid fire will not entail a lack of ammunition in a fierce and pro-
tracted battle.

(5) Since it has been ascertained that the number of hits on the
water line is very small, it may x)erhaps be possible to reduce the thick
ness and enormous weight of the armor plate, which will permit an
increase in the number of guns and supply of ammunition. On the
other hand, it is obvious that the men who serve the secondary bat-
teries are at present afforded too little protection, and means should
be devised for providing better shelter for them. Tbe necessity of
better protection for decks is also generally conceded.

(6) The upper works of ships should be fireproof. Little*, wood should
be used in the construction, and where it is used it should first be sub-
jected to a fireproofing process. Even aside from projectiles charged
with incendiary substances, experience has shown that ordinary shells
are sufficient to cause conflagrations when they explode in the midst of
wood and other combustible material.^

(7) Chief Constructor Hichborn is of opinion that for bombarding
purposes auxiliary vessels fitted for war should be equipped witli mor-
tars, and that armor clads should be reserved exclusively for use in the
destruction of the hostile fleet.

(8) Torpedo-launching tubes should be done away with on board of
large ships, because they constitute a serious danger through explo-
sions which may be caused by projectiles entering the torpedo rooms.
This is confirmed by what happened on board the Oquendo and Vizcaya,
especially the latter.

(9) The incontestable advantage of small caliber rifles and smokeless
powder.

Before concluding these pages we deem it proper to speak of some
matters of a less general character than the preceding conclusions —
matters pertaining to us directly, to Spain, to our present condition.

The national defense. — Ever since we can remember we have been
hearing of plans for it, and have harbored hopes and listened to prom-
ises tending toward the realization of this ideal. But the time passes,
conflicts come up, we are defeated, and the much- talked of national
defense lives only in our remembrance and serves no other purpose than
to make us regret that we did not have it when the critical moment

' First Lieutenant of Artillery Martin Loma, who examined the contents of one of
the 8-tnch shells fired on May 1 against the hattery of La Luueta at Manila, told iis
that it was char<;ed with ordinary line powder mixed with pieces of oloth saturated
with pitch or impregnated with some other inflammable substance. We learned this
when this book had already gone to press.

[This statement is incorrect. Lieutenant Loma no doubt reported correctly wha
he saw, but was ignorant of the fact that the bursting charge of the shell, consist-
ing of black powder, is contained in a cloth bag, and, that as an additional precau-
tion against premature ignition, it is customary to lacquer the inside of the shell, all
of which would account for the conditions mentioned. — O.N. I.]

no

came, and to inake us feel onee more its peremptory need. At best, we
see now and then some timid attempt, a place here and there being
equipped with artilhry in a desultory and incomplete manner, by piece-
meal, while others of greater importance remain devoid of all protection.

This is the way this serious problem has been treated for the last
twenty-five or thirty years. Will it ever be thus!

We think not. At present we have good reason to believe that
national defense will enter upon a practical era. The question is being
generally studied and there is a profusion of intelligent plans.

As an illustration of the above statements we will mention Ilabana,
where the plans that had been formulated for years would never have
been carried into effect if a powerful will had not asserted itself and
caused at least a few guns to be installed in the works along the coast;
not a sufficient number, but enough anyway to check the audacity of
the enemy.

The expense required will be profitable and is not unattainable for
our treasury, exhausted though it be, as it can be adapted to our finan-
cial conditions. We should not forget that economy in these matters
would be equivalent to greater sacrifices in the future.

There is nothing to prevent us from beginning on the execution of
the plan of defense at once by installing in the fortresses along our
coasts and on the coasts of Africa and the Balearic and Canary Islands
medium-caliber rapid-fire guns. And since large-caliber steel guns are
very expensive and take a long time to construct, let us resort for the
present to howitzers and rifled mortars, which are cheap and can be
manufactured at home. These guns are admirably suited for service
against the weakest x>art8 of ships — namely, decks — which are easy to
hit with comparatively numerous batteries, good telemetric systems,
and an adequate force of well-trained x)ersonnel, who in time of peace
should be given a great deal of target practice and ample. drill in cor-
rection of fire.

All nations, even tiie wealthiest among them, like the United States,
our fortunate rival, accord nowadays great preference to howitzers and
rifled mortars for use in coast defense.

Nor is there anything to prevent us from throwing off our lethargy
and beginning at once on the reconstruction of our armada, so that we
may be equal to the important r6le which we still play among maritime
nations. A well-conceived and scrupulously executed plan might give
us, in the space of a few years, the requisite number of true battleships.

We will close here. Our ideas may be expressed in these few words:
Less theory and more practice; less studies and more action.

APPENDIX B.

THE CAPITULATION OF SANTIAGO

DE CUBA.

DECREE.

[Trannlated ftx>ni El Mnndo Naval Ilnstrado, Sept4?raber 15 and October 1, 18M.\

The Diario Oflcial del Ministerio de la Guerra publishes the sentence
of the supreme council in the proceedings instituted concerning the
capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, and although this document is quite
extensive, Tve do not hesitate to reproduce it in full, so that a sentence
on which the history of the war will be based may not be absent from
El Mundo Naval. The decree is as follows:

The council assembled in the hall of justice on August 4, 1899.
Present: The president, Castro, Gamarra, Martinez Espinosa, March,
Munoz Vargas, Zappino, Lopez Cord6n, Jimenez, liocha^ Piquer,
Urdaugarin, Catnpa, and Yalctlrcel.

It appearing that tliis cause has been prosecuted before this supreme
council, as the tribunal of first and only instance, in the matter of the
capitulation to the enemy of the army forces at Santiago de Cuba
against the following defendants: Jose Toral Velazquez, general of
division and commander in chief, having succeeded to the command of
the Fourth Army Corps of the island of Cuba on the evening of July 1,
1898, when the commander in chief of said corps, Lieut. Gen. Arsenio
Linares, fell wounded; General of Brigade Felix Pareja Mesa, chief of
the brigade of Guantilnamo; Lieutenant-Colonel of Infantry Feliciano
Velarde Zabala, military commandant of Baracoa; Lieutenant-Colonel
of Infantry Kafael Serichol Alegria, military commandant of Saguade
T^namo; Commander of Infantry Arturo Campos Hidalgo, military
commandant of Alto Songo; Commander of Infantry Jos6 Fernandez
Garcia, military commandant of San Luis; Commander of Infantry
Eomualdo Garcia Martinez, military commandant of Palma Soriano,
and Commander of Infantry Clemente Calvo Peyro, military comman-
dant of El Cristo.

It appearing, further, that on the 18th day of May, 1898, two United
States vessels appeared off the entrance of Santiago harbor and bom-
barded the batteries under construction and fired a few shots which
were answered by the forts, and that on the morning of the 19th they

111

112

fired upon the detachment at the Playa del Este at Caimauera and the
gunboat Sandoval.

It appearing, further, that from the 20th to the 22d day of the same
mouth, Calixto Garcia bombarded for two days the towu of Palraa
Soriano with guns and small arms, and that General Vara de Rey
crossed the Cauto River with two guns and compelled the enemy to
withdraw to beyond 2 leagues, having suflfered many casualties, while
16 of our men were wounded.

It appearing, further, that on the 29th day of May, the hostile squad-
ron, among which were discerned the Massachusetts^ Iowa, Brooklyn^
TexaSj Montgomery^ 1 trans- Atlantic steamer, and 12 merchant vessels,
approached to within 5 miles, and on the 3Ist, at 2.30 o'clock p. m.,
opened fire, which was answered by the Morro, Socapa, and Punta
Gorda batteries and the guns of the Colon, firing iu all about 100 shots
in forty-five minutes, which was the duration of the battle.

It appearing, further, that on the 1st day of June, the hostile squadron
was sighted, reenforced by the battleship Oregon, the cruiser Xeir Yorkj
and a gunboat, making a total of 19 vessels iu sight; 4 battle ships,
other ships not classified, a destroyer, the gunboat Vesuvius, another
gunboat, 2 trans- Atlantic steamers, and 5 auxiliary tugs; that on
the 3d day of June, a merchant vessel, the Merrimae, protected by a
battle ship, attempted to force the channel; that the cruiser Eeitia
Mercedes and the batteries of Punta Gorda and Socapa opened fire and
succeeded in sinking the Merrimac and taking one officer and seven
sailors prisoners, and that said vessel went to the bottom without
obstructing the channel.

It apjieariug, further, that on the 6th day of June, at 8 o'clock p. m.,
the hostile squadron commenced the bombardment with ten ships, dis-
charging over 2,000 projectiles, causing serious injuries to the Reina
Mercedes and the garrison quarters at the Morro, without dismounting
any of our guns, which answered the fire with great assurance ; that
we had 1 chief and 8 men killed, and 2 chiefs, 5 officers, and 56. men
wounded; that the bombardment was repeated on the 14th, and that
on the day following the Asia column repulsed at Punta Cabrera an
attack of insurgents who were attempting to communicate with the
Americans; that the bombardment by the squadron was renewed on
the 16th and 21st, while the Gebrero and Rabi detachments were at
Aserradero and the Castillo detachment at Ram6n de las Yaguas.

It appearing, further, that on the 20th day of said month of June
the transports of the hostile fleet, with the landing forces on board,
appeared to the eastward, convoyed by the battle ship Indiana and
otlier war ships, forming a total of 03 vessels; that General Yara de
Rey, with three companies of the battalion Constitucidn, a flying com-
pany of guerrillas, and two guns, took position at El Caney, and four
companies of the Asia Battalion, with a colonel, intrenched themselves
at Punta Cabrera, another at Monte Heal, two more at Cobre, together

113

with the garrisons of Loma Cruz and Puerto Bayamo, and another
division of the Asia Battalion at Punta Cabrera; and in order to
repulse any lauding attempt at Cabafias Bay the commander of the
Asia Battalion, Eamou Escobar, with one company of that battalion
and one mobilized company, took position at Mazamorra.

It appearing, further, that on the 21st and during the night part
of the infantry and light material of the hostile forces was landed at
Berracos, and on the 22d fire was opened by the whole squadron from
Socapa to Daiquiri; that several hostile vessels, towing launches with
lauding forces, supported the bombardment of Siboney and Dai<iuiri,
while the forces lauded on the previous day made an attack on the iiank,
in conjunction with parties of insurgents.

It appearing, further, that on the 25th day of June General Vara de
Key withdrew to El Caney with three companies of the Battalion Con-
stitucion and several guerrilla companies, and entrenched himself for
the purpose of checking the advance of the United States forces.

It appearing, farther, that the enemy was encamped from June 25 to
July 1, in three lines, from Santa Teresa to Sevilla, and that for repuls-
ing the attack of July 1 there were available six companies of the Tala-
vera Battalion, three of the Porto Eico Battalion, three of the San
Fernando Battalion, one and one half companies of sappers, three
mobilized companies, 14 horse and 2 rapid-fire guns, in all 1,700 men,
the forces of the West being at a distance and engaged in other
objectives.

It appearing, further, that at daybreak of July 1 the ships of the
hostile squadron approached Aguadores Inlet, while at the same time
the landing forces opened fire, advancing in large numbers toward
El Caney and Las Lagunas, supporting the gun fire on the positions of
San Juan and El Caney, especially the latter point; that the advance
echelon of San Juan, consisting of two companies under the command
of Colonel Vaquero, was reenforced by another company, and Colonel
Ordonez arrived with the section of rapid fire artillery to check the fire
of the hostile batteries, and the battery situated at El Pozo succeeded
in silencing their fire.

It appearing, further, that in view of the intensity of the hostile fire
from their artillery, machine guns, and small arms, and the number of
wounded, among whom were Colonel Ord6iiez, Commander Lamadrid,
and one-half of the oflScers, it was decided to have the cavalry advance
to protect the retreat and save the artillery, which was successfully
carried out and the enemy was compelled to withdraw upon San Juan;
at that moment General Linares was wounded and General Vara de
liey killed, the latter having succumbed to the numerical superiority of
the enemy and lack of ammunition, when the attack upon El Caney
was renewed in the evening, having already been wounded and shot
through both legs; and that on that glorious day over 500 men and 50
generals, chiefs, and officers were killed and wounded.

6884 8

114

It appearing, further, that General Toral having taken charge of the
command in accordance with regulations, El Caney being lost, the
enemy in possession of San Juan Hill, the railroad left without defense,
the water supply cut ofiP, and the forces deprived of their commanders
as the result of the fierce battle they had sustained, it became neces-
sary to concentrate all the detachments of the forts, which was effected
without casualties.

It appearing, ftirther, that on the 1st and 2d days of July the enemy
fortified himself on the heights of San Juan and San Juan de MiUai*es,
attempting to install a battery close to our trenches, which was fhis-
trated by the sure fire of the Cuban regiment ; that from 5 to 10 o'clock
a. m. of the 2d the enemy attacked the positions of San Antonio,
Oanosa, Guayabito, and Santa Ursula, renewing the attack at noon
with increased intensity until 5 o'clock p. m., and a third time from 9
to 10 o'clock p. m., and being repulsed each time; that simultaneously
with these attacks the squadron bombarded Aguadores, the Morro,
and the batteries of Punta Gorda and Socapa.

It appearing, further, that the enemy devoted the 3d day of July to
intrenching themselves and installing batteries from Loma Quintero to
the San Juan Eiver, overlooking the positions of Santa Ursula and
Oafiadas, and that on the same day, July 3, our squadron, in obedience
to higher orders, left the waters of Santiago and was destroyed on the
reefs of the coast a few hours later in unequal battle, General Toral
thus finding himself deprived of the important factors of defense which
the fleet had furnished him in the way of landing companies and light
artillery, of which the laud forces stood so much in need, owing to their
inadequate artillery, the reduced contingent, and the extent of the line
they had to defend.

It appearing, further, that the city of Santiago, being more closely
besieged by the enemy, had no permanent fortifications left except a
castle without artillery at the mouth of the harbor and a few forts on
the precinct of the city, all of little value, so that almost its only real
defense consisted of the open trenches around the city and other earth-
works thrown up in a hurry and with inadequate material, and that for
the defense of said line, about 14 kilometers in length, there were avail-
able only about 7,000 infantry and 1,000 guerrillas, all of whom had per-
formed constant service in the trenches, without any troops to support
them and without reserves of any kind, since the remainder of the
forces were garrisoning the Morro and the batteries of the Socapa and
Punta Gorda, performing also the services of carrying water to dif-
ferent points, patrolling the city, and rendering such other services as
the inhabitants could have rendered had the city remained loyal.

It appearing, further, that the extent of the line referred to, the posi-
tion of the forces on said line, the difficulty of communication, and the
proximity of the enemy rendered it difficult for the troops stationed at
a certain point of the line to reach speedily some other point more seri-

115

oasly threatened; that the troops had at their disposal only foar 16-
cm. rifled bronze gnns, one 12-cm. and one 9-cm. bronze gun, two long
8-cm. rifled guns, foar short ones of the same caliber, two 8-cm. Pla-
sencia and two 75-mm.Krnpp guns; that the 16 cm. guns, according to
expert opinion, were liable to give out at the end of a few more shots,
that there was hardly any ammunition left for the Krupp guns, and that
the guns enumerated were all there was to oppose the numerons and
powerful artillery of the enemy.

It appearing, further, that the million Spanish Mauser cartridges,
which was all there was on hand at the artillery park and in the army,
would not last for more than two attacks on the part of the enemy,
that the Argentine Mauser ammunition could not be utilized for want
of weapons of that type, nor could the ammunition for Bemingtons,
these weapons being in the hands of the irregular forces only.

It appearing, further, that the supply of provisions furnished by com-
mercial enterprise was inadequate; that owing to the lack of meat and
the scarcity of other articles of subsistence, nothing could be furnished
the soldiers but rice, salt, oil, coflee, sugar, and brandy, and that only
for about ten days longer, and that under these circumstances over
1,700 sick persons at the hospital had to be fed, to say nothing of the
soldiers who spent day and night in the trenches, after three years of
campaign, during the last three months of which they seldom had meat
to eat and were often reduced to the rations mentioned above — poor
rations for soldiers whose physical strength was already considerably
broken.

It appearing, further, that the aqueduct having been cut, there arose
serious difficulties in the matter of furnishing water to the majority of
the forces in the trenches of the precinct, especially on the coast; and
that these difficulties, owing to the bombardment of the city by land
and sea, were increased to such an extent that there was well-grounded
fear lest the soldiers, who could not leave the trenches, would find
themselves deprived of this indispensable beverage.

It appearing, further, that in view of the situation of the enemy in posi-
tions close to ours, entirely surrounding the city and in control of all
the approaehes thereto, it was not x)ossible for the Spanish army to
leave the city without engaging in a fierce battle under the most
unfavorable circumstances, owing to the necessity of concentrating the
forces under the very eyes of the enemy, and in view of the physical
debility of the soldiers, who were kept up only by their exalted spirit
and the habit of discipline.

It appearing, further, that, aside from the numerical superiority of
the hostile contingent, they had, according to trustworthy information,
70 pieces of modern artillery and the support of a powerful squadron,
while no Spanish reenforcements could reach Santiago except by sea,
which latter eventuality had become a vain hope from the moment
when the American ships completely closed in the harbor entrance.

114

It appearing, further, that General Toral having taken charge of the
command in accordance with regnlations, El Caney being lost, the
enemy in possession of San Juan Hill, the railroad lefb without defense,
the water snpply cut off, and the forces deprived of their commanders
as the result of the fierce battle they had sustained, it became neces-
sary to concentrate all the detachments of the forts, which wa« effected
without casualties.

It appearing, further, that on the Ist and 2d days of July the enemy
fortified himself on the heights of San Juan and San Juan de Millares,
attempting to install a battery close to our trenches, which was frus-
trated by the sure fire of the Cuban regiment; that firom 5 to 10 o'clock
a. m. of the 2d the enemy attacked the positions of San Antonio,
Oanosa, Guayabito, and Santa Ursula, renewing the attack at noon
with increased intensity until 5 o'clock p. m., and a third time from 9
to 10 o^clock p. m., and being repulsed each time; that simultaneously
with these attacks the squadron bombarded Aguadores, the Morro,
and the batteries of Punta Gorda and Socapa.

It appearing, further, that the enemy devoted the 3d day of July to
intrenching themselves and installing batteries from Loma Quintero to
the San Juan Eiver, overlooking the positions of Santa Ursula and
Oanadas, and that on the same day, July 3, our squadron, in obedience
to higher orders, left the waters of Santiago and was destroyed on the
reefs of the coast a few hours later in unequal battle, General Toral
thus finding himself deprived of the important factors of defense which
the fieet had furnished him in the way of landing companies and light
artillery, of which the land forces stood so much in need, owing to their
inadequate artillery, the reduced contingent, and the extent of the line
they had to defend.

It appearing, further, that the city of Santiago, being more closely
besieged by the enemy, had no x)6rmanent fortifications left except a
castle without artillery at the mouth of the harbor and a few forts on
the precinct of the city, all of little value, so that almost its only real
defense consisted of the open trenches around the city and other earth-
works thrown up in a hurry and with inadequate material, and that for
the defense of said line, about 14 kilometers in length, there were avail-
able only about 7,000 infantry and 1,000 guerrillas, all of whom had per-
formed constant service in the trenches, without any troops to support
them and without reserves of any kind, since the remainder of the
forces were garrisoning the Morro and the batteries of the Socapa and
Punta Gorda, performing also the services of carrying water to dif-
ferent points, patrolling the city, and rendering such other services as
the inhabitants could have rendered had the city remained loyal.

It appearing, further, that the extent of the line referred to, the i>osi-
tion of the forces on said line, the difficulty of communication, and the
proximity of the enemy rendered it difficult for the troops stationed at
a certain point of the line to reach speedily some other point more seri*

115

oosly threatened ; that the troops had at their disposal only foar 16-
cm. rifled bronze guns, one 12-cm. and one 9-cin. bronze gun, two long
S-cm. rifled guns, four short ones of the same caliber, two 8-cm. Pla-
sencia and two 75nim. Krupp guns; that the 16 cm. guns, according to
expert opinion, were liable to give out at the end of a few more shots,
that there was hardly any ammunition left for the Krupp guns, and that
the guns enumerated were all there was to oppose the numerous and
powerful artillery of the enemy.

It appearing, further, that the million Spanish Mauser cartridges,
which was all there was on hand at the artillery park and in the army,
would not last for more than two attacks on the part of the enemy,
that the Argentine Mauser ammunition could not be utilized for want
of weapons of that type, nor could the ammunition for Eemingtons,
these weapons being in the hands of the irregular forces only.

It appearing, further, that the supply of provisions furnished by com-
mercial enterprise was inadequate; that owing to the lack of meat and
the scarcity of other articles of subsistence, nothing could be furnished
the soldiers but rice, salt, oil, coffee, sugar, and brandy, and that only
for about ten days longer, and that under these circumstances over
1,700 sick persons at the hospital had to be fed, to say nothing of the
soldiers who spent day and night in the trenches, after three years of
campaign, during the last three months of which they seldom had meat
to eat and were often reduced to the rations mentioned above — poor
rations for soldiers whose physical strength was already considerably
broken.

It appearing, further, that the aqueduct having been cut, there arose
serious difficulties in the matter of furnishing water to the majority of
the forces in the trenches of the precinct, especially on the coast; and
that these difficulties, owing to the bombardment of the city by land
and sea, were increased to such an extent that there was well-grounded
fear lest the soldiers, who could not leave the trenches, would find
themselves deprived of this indispensable beverage.

It appearing, further, that in view of the situation of the enemy in posi-
tions close to ours, entirely surrounding the city and in control of all
the approaches thereto, it was not x>ossible for the Spanish army to
leave the city without engaging in a fierce battle under the most
unfavorable circumstances, owing to the necessity of concentrating the
forces under the very eyes of the enemy, and in view of the physical
debility of the soldiers, who were kept up only by their exalted spirit
and the habit of discipline.

It appearing, further, that, aside from the numerical superiority of
the hostile contingent, they had, according to trustworthy information,
70 pieces of modern artillery and the support of a powerful squadron,
while no Spanish reenforcements could reach Santiago except by sea,
which latter eventuality had become a vain hope from the moment
when the American ships completely closed in the harbor entrance.

116

It appearing, further, that for the above reasous there was no possi-
bility of reenforcemeiits arriving before the total exhaustion of pro-
visions and ammunition.

It appearing, further, that under these sad circumstances the pro-
longation of so unequal a struggle could, in the opinion of the acting
commander in chief of the fourth army corps, lead to nothing but
the vain sacrifice of a large number of lives without gaining an3'
advantage, since the honor of arms had been entirely saved by the
troops who had made such a valiant fight and whose heroic conduct
was acknowledged by friend and foe, wherefore the said commander in
chief convened the Junta for the purpose of drawing up the act, a copy
of which appears on page 125 of these proceedings, setting forth that
the necessity for capitulating had arrived.

It appearing, further, that under the terms of the second article of the
military agreement of the capitulation of the army forces at Santiago
de Cuba, a copy of which appears on page 129 of these proceedings, the
acting commander in chief of the fourth army corps. General of Division
Jose Toral, included in said capitulation all the forces and war mate-
rial occupying the territory of the province of Santiago de Cuba, so
that tbe brigade of Guantanamo and the garrisons of Baracoa, Sagua,
de Tanamo, Alto Songo, San Luis, Palma Soriano, and El Oristo were
included in said capitulation.

And considering that from the moment when the United States
squadron established the blockade of Santiago Harbor, the situation of
said city, which was already a difficult one as the result of the internal
war which had been waged in the island for three years, exhausting
every resource of the country and preventing the prompt i)rovisiouing
of the island by land, was very much aggravated through the closing
of the harbor, which precluded the easiest and most expeditious means
for receiving the aid that was indispensable under such critical
circumstances.

Considering, further, that for the effective defense of a maritime place
when attacked by a squadron it is not always sufficient nor practicable
to emi)loy land forces, but that for a successful issue naval forces are
also absolutely necessary, and as such forces were entirely lacking, the
hostile sc^uadron was enabled to acquire and hold undisturbed posses-
sion of those waters, the control of which meant the exclusion of all aid
from Santiago de Cuba.

Considering, further, that said United States squadron, operating in
comparative proximity to the coasts and harbors of its own nation, was
able, without any sacrifice whatever, to maintain and constantly
strengthen the blockade which it had established, frequently relieving
the ships assigned to this service, and feeling always sure of opportu-
nities and means for repairing any injuries of its ships, resupplying
them with coal, provisions, and ammunition, and sustaining its base of
operations under all circumstances.

117

Cousidering, farther, that for a large and powerfal squadron, like
that of the United States, it was an easy undertaking, in view of the
resources at its disposal, to effect a landing at any of the many acces-
sible points on that part of the Cuban coast, under cover of the fire of
numerous guns, and without any danger of meeting resistance, since it
had become a physical impossibility for our army to cover and defend
the whole coast, and since the place where the landing was to be effected
could not be surmised, and the scant contingent of the army at Santi-
ago was not able effectually to guard so large an extent of coast.

Considering, further, that in view of the lack of provisions at Santi-
ago the situation of its defenders was further aggravated by the entrance
of Admiral Cervera's squadron in that harbor, whereby not only the con-
sumption of food was increased, but which also made that city the prin-
cipal objective of the Americans in that campaign, who from that time
on assembled the greater and better part of their naval forces in front
of Santiago and increased the number of their transports for the land-
ing of their army with a large amount of modern field artillery, threat-
ening serious assaults on the city, and making the blockade by sea so
rigid that ingress and egress of the harbor became absolutely impossi-
ble, thus shutting off from Santiago every hope of receiving aid and
compromising the safety of our sijuadron, the capture or destruction of
which was naturally assumed to be the principal aspiration of the enemy.

Considering, further, that after the United States army had been
landed and had established its lines and positions near Santiago, in
conjunction with the insurgent parties, it was difficult for reenforce-
ments, which were so much needed, to arrive by land, and when on the
evening of July 3 Colonel Escario's column did arrive, after having
exhausted its rations on the march, it further aggravated the already
serious situation, which was due principally to nie great scarcity of
provisions.

Considering, further, that after the destruction of Admiral Cervera's
squadron, which ran out of Santiago Harbor on July 3, in obedience
to superior orders, the enemy had no difficulty in realizing that they
could, with imi)unity, carry out all their plans without being impeded
by an army reduced in number, short of ammunition and provisions,
decimated by disease contracted during three years of hard fighting in
a tropical country and in a climate fatal during the summer heat,
devoid of all hope except in Providence, with no alternative except
;death or surrender to the mercy of an enemy, who alone by blockades
on land and sea, without any other means, had succeeded in annihilat-
ing those valiant troops.

Considering, further, that the Spanish admiral, in order to leave
Santiago Harbor with his squadron on July 3, had to recall from said
city the landing companies and field artillery which, in compliance with
naval regulations issued by the chief of staff of the squadron^ had been

118

placed at the disposal of the coumander in chief of the fourth army
corps, for the purpose of cooperating with the latter iu the defense
ashore, and that by the withdrawal and reembarkation of these forces
the number of combatants was considerably reduced and the army
deprived of the use of the rapid-fire artillery, of which there was also
great scarcity.

Considering, further, that in view of the critical situation in which
was placed the acting commander in chief of the fourth army corps of
the island of Cuba, General of Division Jos^ Toral YeMzquez, who, with
an army reduced iu number, decimated by sickness, without subsistence,
and almost without ammunition, had to defend a city, the majority of
whose inhabitants were likewise hostile to Spain, against an army
superior in number and fighting resources, and supported by a power-
ful squadron, the said acting commander in chief, having exhausted
every resource available for sustaining the defense, deeming it impos-
sible to persist, listening to the voice of humanity, and believing to
have fulfilled the laws of military honor, decided that the necessity for
capitulating had arrived.

Considering, further, that the acting commander in chief of the
fourth army corps of the island of Cuba, General of Division Jose
Toral Yeldzquez, has used every means of defense required by the laws
of honor and duty before surrendering to the enemy the forces under
his command in the province of Santiago, as attested by the brilliant
battles sustained from June 22 to the day of the capitulation, and the
many casualties in generals, commanders, officers, and privates during
said battles.

Considering, further^ th^t the situation of the remaining forces of
the province, consisting of the brigade of Guantdnamo and detach-
ments of said brigade at Baracoa and Sagua de Tdnamo, had likewise
become untenable, owing to the fact that the forces at Guantdnamo
had been short of rations since June 15, that the hospital was crowded
with patients, and the city cut off from all communication with the
rest of the island, and the detachments of Baracoa and Sagua de
Tanamo were completely isolated so that they could not even com-
municate with the brigade of which they formed part.

Considering, further, that the garrisons of the towns of Palma Soriano,
Alto Songo, San Luis, and El Cristo, being small contingents and like-
wise isolated, had to be considered echelons or advance posts of San-
tiago de Cuba, and that after the surrender of the principal center
they could not by themselves oppose any resistance whatever to the
enemy in case they should be attacked.

Considering, further that if all the forces above enumerated had not
been included in the capitulation they would necessarily have had to
surrender under worse conditions, or perhaps to succumb, with neither
glory nor profit, to the formidable attack of the numerous insurgent
forces who besieged them in conjunction with the American forces.

I

119

Oousidering, farther, that the general iu chief of the army of the island
of Cnba, in his telegram dated July 13, ISDd, authorized the inclusion
of the forces at Guant^namo, Sagua de Tanamo, Baracoa, and other
towns in the capitulation of Santiago, because otherwise they would
have had to be abandoned.

Considering, further, that according to the statement made by the
general in chief of the army of the island of Cuba, Gaptain-Oeneral
Bam6n Blanco, the authorization to include in the capitulation the
forces mentioned above was never withdrawn from General Toral, since
the Captain-General in his telegram of July 15 notified the former that
he was not empowered to include in the capitulation the division of
Manzanillo which, together with that of Santiago, formed the fourth
army corps.

Considering, further, that in signing th^ capitulation of all the forces
in the province of Santiago de Cuba, General of Division Jos^ Toral
YeMzquez, acting commander in chief of the fourth army corps, did
not act on his own initiative and was not cut off from communication
with the general in chief of the army, but acted in compliance with
instructions received from the latter.

And considering, finally, that the General of Brigade F^.lix Pareja
Mesa, commander of the brigade of Guantdnamo, and the military
commandants of Baracoa, Sagna de T4namo, Alto Songo, Palma
Soriano, San Luis, and El Cristo, when they complied with the order
that the forces and territory under their immediate command should
be comprised in the capitulation, which order was communicated to
them by staff oflBcers of their army corps, they only obeyed their
general in chief.

The defendants, General of Division Jos^ Toral y Velazquez, General
of Brigade F^lix Pareja Mesa, Lieutenant-Colonels of Infantry Feliciano
Velarde Zabala and Rafael Serichol Alegria, and Commanders of
Infantry Arturo Cami)os Hidalgo, Eomualdo Garcia Martinez, Jos^
Fernandez Garcia, and Clemente Calvo Peyro, are entirely acquitted,
all of these proceedings being in conformity with article 591 of the
code of military procedure and other articles of general application.

SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE.

In conformity with the recommendation of the attorneys general, in
their second supplemental bill of charges, testimony is to be procured
as recommended therein and forwarded to the captain-general of New
Castile, in order that he, as successor to the jurisdiction of the general
in chief of the dissolved army of operations of the island of Cuba, may
proceed to take such steps as in justice and equity may be necessary
for the purpose of ascertaining the causes for and fix the responsibility
of the fact that there was not sufficient war material in the city and
province of Santiago de Cuba at the time of the breaking out of the
war with the United States, although such war material had been asked

120

for in good seasou by the artillery park ; this being an important
point which should be cleared np as being closely connected with the
capitulation of said province.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL DECBBE.

Testimony is to be taken from the docament which appears at page
1379 of these proceedings and forwarded to the captain-general of Kew
Castile to be used in connection with the proceedings had under the
auspices of this supreme council assembled in the hall of justice on
July 7 last, to ascertain to what extent the administrative chief of the
army of Cuba is responsible for not having complied with the order of
the general in chief of the same to provision Santiago de Cuba for four
months.

This decree is to be brought to the cognizance of the minister of
war, as provided by law, and for its execution the testimony in this
cause is to be forwarded to the captain-general of New Castile. The
necessary orders are to be issued.

By royal order and in conformity with the provisions of article 634
of the Code of Military Procedure I remit the same to your excellency
for your cognizance and action thereon.

El General encargado del despacho:

3IABIANO CAPDEP6n.

Madrid, At^ust 9, 1890,

O

«

H

' ■ ■ ■ T3FFICE OF NAVAL INTKLLIGKNCIi.
Wah Notes No. VII.
INFORMATION FROM. ABROAD.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS

RBLATIVK TO THK

SQUADEON OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES.

SIlB-AIIMmiL PASCUAL CWlWiL 7 lOPRS.

ntANSLATSI) FROM TBK

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

■WASHINGTON;

aOVKKNMENT PRINTING OFFICB,
1899.

■:iir-, :^i:-4-^

/W WaAI p-^^^uC '

I

mTEODUOTOET.

In the Oortes at Madrid, on the 30th day of October, 1899, the minister
of war was requested by the Count de las Almeuas and Senators Gon-
zalez and Davila to transmit to the senate chamber as early as pos-
sible the proceedings held in the supreme council of war and navy,
from August 1, 1899, to date, relative to the wars in Cuba, Puerto Eico,
and the Philippines.

The minister of war, replying, said in part :

I do not know whether the Count de lae Almeuas and the worthy oompanions whom
he represents have Hiifliciently considered the grave step of brioji^ing into a political
chamber and submitting to parliamentary discussion adjadged causes of the extreme
gravity of those referred to. I repeat that, while I greatly respect such right, 1
believe that there may be serious objections to a debate of this natare, because per-
haps the high tribunal of the army and navy, which has adjudged these causes in
accordance with law and its own couscience, and to whose functions and importance
great respect is due, might suffer, though only apparently, in its prestige. For that
reason I consider it neither expedient nor prudent to transmit to Ijie chamber the
documents asked for.

It is not, therefore, probable that the proceedings of the courts in
the cases of Admirals Cervera and Montojo will be made public.

Admiral Cervera, having in view the vindication of himself, had

obtained from the Queen in August permission to publish certain

documents, given in this number of the War J^otes, which make a

most interesting and connected history of the naval operations of

Spain during the war, and show without need of argument the causes

of her weakness.

BiOHABDsoN Clover,

Commander^ U, 8. N,, Chief Intelligence Officer.

Navy Dbpabtment, December 6^ 1899.

Approved :

A. 8. Cbowkinshibld,

Chief of Bureau of Navigation.

c^

TO THE READER

Being in possession of the documents herein collected, I have thoaght
it my duty to publish them in order to enlighten the public, and that
they may serve as a lesson for the future and as data for history.

I had thought first of having a short statement of facts precede
them, but considering that the events are so very recent, and iiave
affected our unhappy country so much, that any criticism might easily
degenerate into passion, I have thought it best to give simply the
documents and let them explain for themselves everything that has
happened.

I should have liked to do this earlier, but put it off until the termina-
tion of the cause in which I was made a defendant, and since then it
has taken some time for me to obtain permission to publish these
papers, owing to my position as a naval officer and the nature of the
documents, most of which either came from the ministry of marine or
were addressed to it.

To that end I applied to Her Majesty in a petition, a copy o( which
follows, and secured a royal order, a copy of which also follows.

The collection is printed in two kinds of type. The smaller type
refers to documents printed in a certain work where errors and omis-
sions have crept in, and the larger type refers to documents furnished
by myself, the originals of most of which are in my possession, and to
others taken from various publications and even from the journals of
the sessions of the Chambers.

If this publication should help us to mend our mistakes in the future,

my wishes are granted, for all I ask is that I may be useful to my

country.

Fasoual Gebvera.
Madbid, August 80^ 1899.

PETTTTOK

Madam: Pascnal Oervera y Topete, rear admiral of the navy, sets
forth to Your lioyal Majesty, with the most profound respect as follows:

It is well known that owing to the destruction of the squadron under
my command in the battle of July 3, 1898, a' cause was instituted in which
the decree of the supreme council of war and navy has absolved your
petitioner and others. But such decree, in which only a majority con-
curred, is not sufficient to satisfy the opinion which, misled at the time
of the events and for a long time afterwards, has been manifested in a
fierce campaign against the honor of your petitioner, that of the squad-
ron which he commanded, and of the entire navy.

Upon noticing these symptoms the writer attempted to give the
country a full explanation, and to that end he solicited and obtained
the election as senator for the province of Albacete,. but did not even
have a chance of discussing the proceedings of his election.

When your petitioner had been made a defendant in the proceedings
above referred to, he deemed it his duty not to speak until the court
had pronounced its senteuce.

The writer has in his possession many original documents and au-
thentic copies of others, and among them there are not a few that have
been published with errors, and others that have been printed without
authorization, but have come to the knowledge of many people, and
these likewise contained many errors which are bound to mislead pub-
lic opinion.

These documents, many of which were at the time of a confidential
nature, need no longer be kept secret, since peace has been reestablished
and the publication of the same would correct many of these errors and
^erve as a lesson for the future. For all these reasons your petitioner
humbly prays that Tour Majesty will permit him to publish, at his
expense, the documents referred to in order to enlighten the Spanish
people.

Dated August 18; 1899.

8

ROYAL ORDER.

His Majesty baving been informed of tbe petition forwarded by your

excellency on tbe 18tb instant, asking for permission to pnblisb, at your

expense, certain documents in your possession relative to tbe squadron

under your command in tbe naval battle of Santiago de Cuba, on tbe

3d day of July, 1898, His Majesty tbe King (wbom God guard), and in

bis name tbe Queen Regent of tbe Kingdom, in conformity witb tbe

opinion furnisbed by tbe counselor-general of tbis ministry, bas been

pleased to autborize your excellency to publisb all orders issued by tbe

ministry of marine relative to tbe squadron destroyed at Santiago de

Cuba. Tbe above baving been communicated to me by royal order,

tbrougb tbe minister of marine, I notify your excellency accordingly

for your cognizance, and as tbe result of your petition referred to.

Madrid, August 22, 1899.

Manuel J. Mozo, Assistant Secretary,

Rear- Admiral Fasoual Gebveba y Topetb.

i

t

(

COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS

RELATIVE TO THE

SQUADRON OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES.

Prtvatb.] The Minister of Marine,

Madridj Novmnber 28^ 1897.
His Excellency Pasoual Oebyera.

My Dear Admiral and Friend : In answer to your esteemed let-
ters I wish to say that I entirely approve of the instractions issaed to
the squadron and of everything you state relative to speed, diameters,
and tactical movements. With great pleasure I read the telegram rel-
ative to firing trials on board the Vizcayay after so many doubts and
different opinions. But we should, nevertheless, not abandon ourselves
to unlimited confidence, and your good judgment will know how to
restrict the use of these guns' until we have the new cartridge eases,
which, I have been promised, will begin to arrive early in November.
I am continuing my efforts toward fitting out the torpedo boats, but
we have to contend with scarcity of engine personnel, and this need is
further increased by the men working under contract who are about to
leave the service.

Wishing you every happiness, etc.,

Bbgismundo Bermejo.

Nothing new in the Philippines.

Santa Pola, December 5, 1897.

His Excellency Segismundo Bermejo.

My Dear Admiral and Friend: Upon my arrival here I received
your favor of the 28th. I am much pleased to know that you approve
of the instructions I have issued to the squadron. The Oquendo was
ready day before yesterday, for all she needed was to have the dia-
phragm of the condensers cleaned. I am of your opinion that we should
wait for the new 5.5-inch cartridge cases before using these guns for

^ Reference is had to the 5.5 inch Gonztilez-Hontoria rapid-flre gnns.

9

10

target practice, and- 1 am thinking of Rpreading the report that we are
waiting in order not to decrease our supply. One thousand five hun-
dred cartridge cases seems very little to me. I think we should have
at least twice as many, which is the regular supply for this class of
ships. In order to obviate any comment on the fact of our not using
the 5.5-inch guns, I am thinking of having target practice with the
ll-iuch guns only on certain days, and on other days with the small guns
day and night, unless you should issue orders to the contrary. Night
before last we had an exercise with the scouts of this ship and the Terefia^
which was very interesting; the vedettes were discovered with the aid of
the searchlights. We are continuing experiments with the latter in
order to ascertain the best installation for them. The highly interest-
ing question of the radios of action of these ships can be only approxi-
mately settled with the data furnished by this trip of mine. The
reasons why it can not be definitely settled are that the Teresa has
used an unreasonable amount of coal, for which fact I transmit to day
to her commander a reprimand for the firemen; and the OquendOj
owing to an erroneous interpretation of one of my signals, did not fol-
low instructions, but we have data which may be presumed to be correct
for the Oquendo. I will send you in the near future the computations
relative to this matter. I believe I have already advised you in my
former letter that I intended to go out with a squadron for a few days.
I also want to give the steam launches and their officers some tactical
exercises,' under the direction of a superior officer.
Yours, etc.,

« Pasoual Gebvbba.

[Private.]

The Minister of Marine,

Madridj January 5, 1898.
His Excellency Pasoual Cerveba.

My Dear Admiral and Friend: I have just had a call, not only
from the committee of the Ansaldo Company, but also from the Italian
ambassador, relative to the 9.84-iuch guns of the Coldn^ and I am
afraid we will have some trouble concerning this matter. As the
report of the advisory board (centro-consultivo) is utterly opposed to
the acceptance of gun No. 325, and still more of No. 313, you will
understand that the junta over which you preside should suggest to
me some solution toward substituting for these guns, at least tempo-
rarily, guns of other systems. For my part I have conveyed the
impression that if two other guns, to the exclusion of Nos. 325 and
313, could be tried within a very short time, and such trials should
show satisfactory results, the Government might perhaps terminate
this unpleasant matter.

Yours, etc., • Segismundo Bebmejo.

I have in mind, my dear Admiral, what constitutes the press in this
country, and the way they have of always treating us unfairly.

11

The Ocvemar- General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minieter of Coloniee (R, OWdn).

[Bxtniot.]

Havana, Janwiry 8, 1898,

Two and one- third millions are due the navy, and should be liquidated so as to
make it possible to plaoe in commission a number of vessels which are now at the
nayy-yard with iiguries that can not be repaired for lack of funds.

Battle Ship Vizoata, The Admiral,

Cartagena^ January 29, 1898.
His Excellency Segmsmundo Bebmbjo.

My Dear Admiral and Friend : The telegram I sent yon yester-
day Dotified you that the Yizcaya was ready, with her fires lighted, to
go oatjnst as soon as she received instructions and money, the only
things she now lacks. It is true that three or four men belonging
to her crew, and who are absent with my permission, have not- yet
returned, but they have been telegraphed to and will be here very
shortly. However, if the money and instructions should arrive before
they do, the ships will go without them. She has about 600 tons of
coal on board and will continue coaling until the instructions come, or
until her bunkers are entirely filled. She has fires under six of her
boilers and is filling the other four boilers with water. She has also
commenced distilling water, which will be continued as long as may be
necessary. She has provisions on board for forty days. The 2.24-inch
gun mount which was sent to plasencia de las armas and has not yet been
returned, h^s been replaced by another one from the Lepanto. The Vizcaya
is short one lieutenant, as Alvargonz&lez was sent ashore; and as none
can be furnished by the maritime district of Oarthagena(departamento),
I will send for one from the Alfonso; but owing to our hurried departure
he may not arrive in time, and we can not wait. The other two Bilbao
cruisers are also being fitted out. The Teresa begins to coal at once,
and the Oqueiido will receive her relieving tackle to-day, after which
she will immediately commence to take on coal and lubricating mate-
rial. As far as the water supply for these ships is concerned, it is all
right; for, thanks to the exertions of Bustamente and concessions of
the Captain-General, the English company will be ready by to mor-
row to furnish us water at the dockyard at a price of 0.032 peseta
per cubic foot. I have telegraphed to Barcelona to ascertain when we
are to have the sea biscuit. If the coal arrives from England, the ships
can fill their bunkers again, and if not we will only have coal enough
to reach Las Palmas. You are well aware that there is not in the
squadron a man in the crews who has any savings; therefore there are
two things lacking: First, they should be ordered to make assignments
to their families, so as not to condemn 500 or 600 families to starvation,
which might even affect the discipline; second, money should be con-
signed to us at Havana for our own living, because if they count upon
our having collected the pay for January and propose to pay us to date

12

we shall perish miserably. On this vital point I send a telegram. The
Furor will be ready to go out in a couple of days. The Terror will
require at least a week before her boilers will be ready. I gave the
Captain-General your message concerning the torpedo boats and the
crew of the Vitoria. We have not yet received the January con-
signment, and I send a telegram relative to it. Three of our steam
launches are not in condition to be used, and I have asked the Captain-
General to let me have those of the Lepanto and keep ours here to
have the boilers repaired, and they can then be used for the other ship.
The fleet is short five lieutenants and five ensigns, and the departa-
mento says that it has none to furnish. This scarcity will affect espe-
cially the Alfonso, and in order to remedy it to a certain extent I am
going to commission the four midshipmen at the head of the list and
transfer them to the Alfonso. I do not know whether I am forgetting
anything.

Yours, etc., Pascual Cebvbba.

Cabtagena, January 30^ 1898.
Deab Cousin Juan Spottobno : About two years ago I wrote you
a letter concerning our condition to go to war with the United States.
I requested you to keep that letter in case some day it should be nec-
essary to bring it to light in defense of my memory or myself, when
we had experienced the sad disappointment prepared for us by the
stupidity of some, the cupidity of others, and the incapability of all,
even of those with the best of intentions. Today we find ourselves
again in one of those critical periods which seem to be the beginning of
the end, and I write to you again to express my point of view and to
explain my action in this matter, and I beg you to put this letter with
the other one, so that the two may be my military testament. The rela-
tive military positions of Spain and the United States have grown worse
for us, because we are reduced, absolutely penniless, and they are very
rich, and also because we have increased our naval power only with the
Coldn and the torpedo boat destroyers, and they have increased theirs
much more. What I have said of our industry is sadly confirmed in
everything we look at. There is the Cataluiia, begun more than eight
years ago, and her hull is not yet completed. And this when we are
spurred on by danger, which does not wake patriotism in anybody,
while jingoism finds numerous victims, perhaps myself to-morrow. And
the condition of our indu.stiy is the same in all the arsenals. Let us
consider, now, our privat;e industries. The Maquiuista Terrestre y
Maritima supplies the engines of the Alfonso XIII; Cadiz, the Fili-
pinas. If the Carlos V is not a dead failure, she is not what she should
be; everything has been sacrificed to speed, and she lacks power. And
remember that the construction is purely Spanish. The company
of La Grana hiis not completed its ships, as I am told, and only these

13

( Vizoayaj Oquendo^ and Ma/ria Teresa) are good ships of their class; bat,
though eonstracted at Bilbao, it was by Englishmen. Thus, manifestly,
even victory would be a sad thing for us. As for the administration
and its intricacies, let us not speak of that; its slow procedure is kill-
ing us. The Vizca^a carries a 5.5-inch breech plug which was declared
useless two months ago, and I did not know it until last night, and
that because an official inquiry was made. How many cases I might
mention ! But my purpose is not to accuse, but to explain why we
may and must expect a disaster. But as it is necessary to go to the
bitter end, and as it would be a crime to say that publicly to-day,
1 hold my tongue, and go forth resignedly to face the.trials which God
may be pleased to send me. I am sure that we will do our duty, for the
spirit of the navy is excellent ; but I pray God that the troubles may be
arranged without coming to a conflict, which, in any way, I believe
would be disastrous to us. I intrust to you a most interesting corre-
spondence which I had with General Azc^rraga,and which I desire and
request you to preserve, together with this letter and the former one.
In it you will see the opinion of Azc&rraga. Without troubling you
further, I remain your most affectionate cousin, who intrusts his honor

to your hands.

Pasoual Osbveba.

Gabtagena, July 2^ 1898.

GiN^s Moncada,
Antonio MAETf.

Certificate. — Gin^s Moncada y Ferro, mining engineer, and' Antonio
Marti y Pag^n, attorney, at law, state upon their honor that they
repaired this .day to the residence of Juan Spottorno y Bienert, at the
request of the latter, who exhibited to them a letter from His Excellency
Bear-Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, addressed to Mr. Spottorno,
dated January 30, 1898; that the undersigned read said letter and
af&xed their signatures thereto. They were also shown a collection of
documents, of which they read only the headings and signatures, which
documents had been intrusted to Mr. Spottorno by Bear-Admiral
Oervera, and which are as follows : Letters from their excellencies Gen-
eral Marcelo Azc^rraga and Bear- Admiral Segismundo Bermejo; copies
of letters addressed by Admiral Oervera to the last-named gentlemen,
and to his excellency Segismundo Moret y Prendergast, and to Mr. Spot-
torno; copies of ofHcial letters addressed to his excellency the minister
of marine; the original proceedings of the council of war held on April
20, 1898, at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, by the captains of the Spanish
fleet; an opinion written at said council of war, signed by Capt. Victor
M. Concas; a copy of a telegram addressed by Oapt. Fernando Villaa-
mil to his excellency Pr&xedes Mateo Sagasta. A detailed account
is made of all these documents, which we sign to-day. Mr. Spottorno

14

stated that he must have among his papers at Madrid a letter which Bear-
Admiral Gervera wrote to him two or three years ago from Oadiz, and
which is referred to in the letter of January 30, 1898, which we have
signed, and in which letter, which is in answer to one written by Mr.
Spottorno to Bear- Admiral Oervera from Madrid, relative to naval
matters, Cervera said in substance that he foresaw, through the fault
of the whole country, a maritime disaster while he (Cervera) was
placed in command of the fleet, and that he feared that he would be
held responsible, as the Italian Admiral Persano was held responsible
for the destruction of his squadron, for which the whole country was
to blame. As men of honor we attest all that has been set forth.
Dated at Oartagena, Juljr 2, 1898.

GlNl^S MONCADA.

Antonio Mabti.

Oabtagena, February 5, 1898.
His Excellency Segismunbo Bebmejo.

My Deab Admibal and Fbiend: The Col6n has arrived, after
encountering heavy weather in the Gulf of Leon, which carried away a
ladder, a boat, and some other things of minor importance. I did not
want to put this in my telegram, so as not to alarm the uninitiated.
We have not yet received the consignments for January, and as the
squadron has very little money left it has been necessary, in order to
get the Vizcaya off, to resort to private fuuds. On the other hand, the
departamento has already received its monthly allowance for February.
Can not something be done so that the squadron will not always be kept
behind! A remedy must be found if it is desired to keep up the good
spirit now prevailing among the crews, and I beg and implore that you
will be kind enough to remedy this evil. The storm which the CoJdn has
encountered has shown the necessity of her having scupper holes, and
I will see to this at once. I shall not have the GoUn till up with coal,
on account of the condition of her bunkers, unless you should give
orders to the contrary. I have received the royal order corroborating
the telegram concerning the consignments, and you will allow me to
insist on my petition about which I wrote Moret.
Yours, etc.,

PASOtJAL CbBVEBA.

Cartagena, February 3, 185V.
His Excellency Skgismundo Mobet.

Mt Deab Fbiend : I presume you know that upon my arrival here
I found the Vizcaya ready to go out, and I have had the pleasure of
telegraphing to that effect to the minister of marine, who ordered the
fires to be lighted. I mention this because it shows the good spirit of
the crews, which extends to every class, as evidenced by the fact that

15

not a single man was absent at the roll call, although many of them
had leave granted and some had gone to Galicia. There is no wealth
in the Navy (I am not speaking of the officers particularly, althoagh
I do not exclude them). There are many classes of boatswains, gun-
ners, machinists, firemen, and dock-yard men who have nothing but
their pay, which, as a rule, is small, and out of that at least two-
thirds of this personnel Lave to take care of families, for I do not
count the unmarried men; nor do I count the seamen and gunners'
mates, who can leave their prizes to their families, for while they
have the same pay as the others they have fewer needs, and though
I plead for all I want to base my argument on truth. Thus each one
of these ships about to sail from the Peninsula, leaves intrusted to
Divine Providence about 100 families, and yet every one of the men
was there! Whyt They trust that their Admiral will look out for
them, and that the Government of His Majesty will act favorably on
my just petition. But I telegraphed to the minister of marine, asking
that the Government authorize the establishment of assignments to
the families, and he answered that existing regulations would not
permit this, and I therefore sent him a letter on the 31st, a copy of
which I inclose, asking that you will read it. To-day I am in receipt
of the corroboration of the itelegram from the minister of marine, in
which he says that the concession depends also on the minister of colo-
nies, and that he will renew his petitions on that subject. It is for
this reason that I trouble you, feeling sure that you will pardon me
for taking up your attention for a few moments, I don't like to trouble
anyone, and have a great aversion toward a certain class of business.
As an illustration of this, 1 will tell you that while my son Angel was
attached to the legation at Pekin, in order to protect it with the
detachment under his command, he was the only one who received his
pay in Mexican dollars. The whole legation with the exception of
himself received theirs in gold. And although we are both poor, I
never troubled anyone about this when the minister of colonies refused
his entirely justifiable request that his pay be made the same as to the
others.^ But the matter in question today is very different. I am not
advocating my own interests nor those of my family, but of my sub-
ordinates, and it is the admiral's duty to look out for them. I there-
fore beg that you will call this matter up and have it favorably dis-
posed of as it should be.
Trusting that yon will do so, I remain,

Yours, etc., Pasoual Obbvbba.

^ Three months after the date of the ahove letter he was partially indemniilecL —
forty-three months after the termination of his commiMion in Chiun,

16

[Oonfldential.]

General Captaincy op the Squadron, Stapp.

Honored Sir: Althoagb I am sure that I am telling yoar excellency nothing new,
I think it is not idle in these critical times to make a stady of th^ condition of this
fleet; if only to complete statistical statements of condition and power as to those
matters which, for reasons I need not here set forth, do not appear in such state-
ments. We mnst discount the Alfonso XIII, which has been nnder trials for so many
years, and which we shall apparently not have the pleasure of counting among our
available ships, which are therefore reduced to the three Bilbao battle ships/ the
Col^n, the Destructor , and the tori>edo-boat destroyers Furor and Terror, The three
Bilbao battle ships are apparently complete, but yon who have had so much to do
with them while in command of the squadron, and since then in your present posi-
tion, know only too well that the 5.5-inch guns, the main power of these vessels, are
practically useless on account of the bad system of their breech mechanism and the
poor quality of their cartridge cases, of which there are no more than those now on
board.

The CoUUf which, from a military standpoint, is no doubt the best of all onr ships,
is still without her heavy guns. In this matter I have, at your Instructions, com-
municated with General Guill<^n, in order to find a possible remedy, if there is one.
The Destructor may serve as a scout, although her speed is deficient for that kind of
service with this fleet. The torpedo-boat destroyers Furor and Terror are in good
condition, but I doubt if they cihi make effective use of their 2.d5-inch guns. Ab
for the supplies necessary for the fleet, we frequently ladk even the most indispen-
sable. In this departamento we have not been able to renew the coal supplies, and
at both Barcelona and Cadiz we could only obttfin half the amount of biscuit we
wanted, including the 17,637 pounds which I had ordered to be made here.

We have no charts of the American seas, and although I suppose they have been
ordered, we could not move at present. Apart from this deficient state of matdriel,
I have the satisfaction of stating that the spirit of the personnel is excellent, and
that the country will find it all that it may choose to demand. It is a pity that we
do not have better and more abundant material, better resources, and less hindrances
to put this personnel in condition fully to carry out its r61e. I will only add the
assurance -that whatever may be the contingencies of the future these forces will do
their full duty.

Yours, etc., Fascual Cervbba.

Cautagena, February 6, 1898,

[Private.]

The Minister of Mabine^

Madrid^ February 6', 1898.
His Excellency Pasoual Oebvbra.

My Dear Admiral and Friend: I take advantage of this being
Sanday to answer your esteemed letters, beginning with the political
situation. This has not changed at all. We are still receiving visits
in Ouba from American vessels, always with the assurance on the part
of the United States that they are simply visits of courtesy and Mend-
ship. If they involve any other design — as, for instance, to exhibit
their ships and show their superiority over those stationed in our

*I have used this designation as being the official one; but I hare never con-
sidered these ships battle ships, and I deem it a fatal mistake not to designate ships
properly.

17

colonies — their object is attained. The nncleas of their force is stationed
at Dry Tortugas and Key West, under pretext of carrying out naval
maneuvers, which are to last until the 1st of April. We shall see
what will be the outcome of all this. It troubles me a great deal, and
I am trying to concentrate in Spain all the forces we have abroad.
What you tell me of the Vizcaya is entirely satisfactory to me, and I
shall write to Havana all you have stated about this ship, and also as
to her departure.

The official report on the voyage of the Ooldn has acquainted me
with the work that is being done on her, and I have telegraphed the

«

Captain-General to have the work done at once, aside from the scupper-
holes, which you will have made on your own account. General Guillen
has probably called on you. His plans can not be decided upon until
this office is acquainted with them, for influences are being brought to
bear here for the acceptance of the 10-inch guns, which I shall try to
prevent, because it would be a second edition of the 9.45-inch guns and
mounts of the Regtnite. To-morrow I expect to see a gentleman sent
here by Perrone, no doubt for the purpose of discussing these guns,
which matter is to be considered by the council of ministers.

I am awaiting the result of the board sent out, and hope that no
compromise will be made with Canet. As to the voyage of the Ooldn^
I want to thank &er commander for his skillful seamanship. You did
well not to cause any alarm, since her injuries can be easily repaired
and will not prevent the ship from leaving. I should like to comply
with your wishes and take the Alfonso XIII from you, but we must
await her final official trials and find out what this ship is able to do«—
that is to say, whether she can be considered a cruiser or whether it
will be necessary to assign her to special service. From what we
know of her I think it will be the latter. Your report as to the lack
of officers has been forwarded to the director of personnel with my
indorsement. We are very short of officers, especially ensigns; ten
have gone out this last six months and six will go out the next six
months. These are all the ships fitted out in addition to those still
abroad, with much reduced complements.

To your petitions for dues for services, I have answered by telegram
that there has been no delay on the part of this ministry, and if any
delay has occurred at all, it has been caused by the departamentos in
honoring orders of payment without preference of any kind.

Your communication concerning assignments, indorsed by me, is
meeting, on the part of the minister of colonies, with the same interest
which you manifest.

The subject of the exchange of Philippine drafts has given me a
good deal of trouble, their money being worth only 50 per cent. But
in spite of the time elapsed, this transaction has not been reduced to a
normal basis. You are well aware that this central department has no
funds of any kind, nor any branch of the administration, to meet these
10742 2

18

expenses. Gonseqaently the minister of colonies innst advance it, to
be reimbdrsed by the tariff on the colony, since we have no colony
fund, such as exists in the army, taking as a basis the fands of the
regiments and military institutions.
I believe I have overlooked nothing referred to in your letters.
Tours, etc.,

Segismundo Bebmejo.

Cartagena, February 5, 1898.
His Excellency Segismundo Bermejo.

My Dear Admiral and Friend : The engineer from Greusot has
arrived. He tells me that the first guns will be ready in June, and as
it is my belief that* they never keep their promise, it will surely be later
than tbat and this solution does not appear acceptable to me. Are
there no other guns that could be usedf If so, it would be better, and
if not, the Armst^ ong guns, although they are not as good as might be
desired. The dynamo of the CoUn can be fixed here; but as the injury
is in the coil, and we have no spare one, I beg that you will ask for
another coil.

Yours, etc, Pascual Gebvera.

[Pnvate.1

The Minister of Marine,

Madrid J February 5, 1898.
His Excellency Pasoual Cerveka.

My Dear Admiral and Friend : I telegraphed you to-day to have
the Oquendo ready as soon as possible, as she is to perform the same
mission as the Vizcaya in the Gulf of Mexico, conformable to the
council of ministers, as the result of the opinion of the Gk)vernor-
General of Cuba, transmitted in a cipher cable from Manterola. This
will be the last detachment of ships from your squdron, for if it were
necessary to send away any morCj you would go with the Maria Teresa
and some others of the ships that are now abroad and are to be incor-
porated with the fleet. For the present we can count only on the
CoUm and Alfonso XIII^ although the latter is still under trials; but
I hope your flag will be better represented in the future. 1 have given
orders for the training school to be transferred to the Navarra^ and
you will transfer the second commander to any ship as you may think
best, because the ships that visit Cuban ports do so simply under the
representation of their commanders.

The division of destroyers and torpedo boats will assemble at Cadiz,
and will proceed to Cuba under the protection of the Giudad de Cadiz.
Upon the arrival of the destroyers that are still in England, they will
be incorporated in the squadron. As to the Golmiy I have an Italian
committee here, but shall decide nothing until 1 know the result of the

19

jnnta over which you preside. If they have any reasonable and equi-
table proposition to make I shall advise you immediately. I have told
them positively that guns Kos. 325 and 313 can not be accepted. I
have received your confidential letter, but I do not quite share your
pessimistic views as to the 5.5-inch £^uns, for the guaranty of Colonel
S&nchez and the firing trials held on board the Vizcaya have demon-
strated that our fear concerning them was greatly exaggerated, and
with the new cartridge cases I hope it will be dissipated entirely. There
will be 2,000 tons of coal left at Oartagena, in addition to the coal
ordered yesterday. .

As to the other matters you referred to, I will do what I possibly can
to remedy them. I should like to write more fully, but you will under-
stand that I have not a moment's time, with so many problems to solve
and so many vessels abroad that I want to bring back to Spain.

I believe the Americans will reenforce their European station,
although in my opinion their tendency will be rather toward the
Canaries.

Yours, etc, Seoismundo Bebmejo.

Cartagena, February P, 1898.
His Excellency Seghsmundo Bebmejo.

My Deab Admibal. and Fbibnd : I received yesterday your letters
of the 6th and 7kh and your cipher telegram instructing me to get the
Oqu^ido ready to be commissioned. As soon as I received the telegram
I sent one to my adjutants to hurry matters at the arsenal, and the
commissary of the fleet to buy the provisions, for as these can be had
right here I did not want to get them until the last hour, and without
having recourse to the departamento, for fear of the everlasting rounda-
bout way which delays everything. I hope, when the instructions
arrive, she will be in condition to have her fires lighted, if such should
be the order, and day after to-morrow she will be able to go out. But
if she is to leave the squadron, as would appear from the telegram giv-
ing the order to transfer the gunnery training school to the Navarraj
she must be supplied with money, for you know how little these ships
have left.

I shall wait for instructions and act in accordance therewith, in the
meantime using my best efiorts to do what may be necessary, or tele-
graphing to you in case my efl^brts should be futile. I am very grateful
to you for keeping me posted as to the political situation, which is very
critical indeed and troubles us all a great deal, owing to the lack of
means for opposing the United States in war. This is certainly no time
for lamentations, and therefore I will say nothing of the many things
that are in my mind, as I know them to be in yours. I thank you very
much for expressing satisfaction about what I have said relative to the
Vizcaya and for writing to Havana so that she may be kept in as good
condition as she leaves here. My departure is not quite what the news-

20

papers made it out to be, although this time they have not changed the
essence of the few words I said to them.

The boats of the Coldn are to be ready to-day. I note what you tell
me about the heavy artillery of the Coldn, and your instructions will be
carried out. It is very much to be regretted that there is always so
much underhand work about everything, and that there should be so
much of it now regarding the acceptance of the 9.6-inch guns, for, if we
finally take them, it will seem as though we are yielding to certain
disagreeable impositions, and if things should come to the worst — and
you are better able to judge of this than I — ^it seems to me we should
accept, as the proverb says, ''hard bread rather than none;^' and if we
have no other guns, and these can fire even 25 or 30 shots, we should
take them anyhow, even though they are expensive and inefficient, and
we should lose no time about it, in order that the vessel may be armed
and supplied with ammunition as soon as possible.

I neglected to tell you that the Oqvendo has only a little over 700 tons

of coal, because there is no more to be had here. I received a telegram

from Moret relative to the assignments, and I beg that you will not

drop this matter. As to the provisions, we shall do what you ordered

in your lett>er of the 7th. I believe I have forgotten nothing of interest

Yours, etc,,

Pascual Geryeba.

Cartagena, February 11, 1898.

His Excellency SEaiSMUNDO Bermejo.

My Dear Admiral and Friend : Soon after dispatching my two
cipher telegrauis to yoa yesterday, relative to the 5.5-inch guns of these
ships and the heavy guns of the Colony I re<!eived your letters of the
8th and 9th, which I now answer, giving you at the same time whatever
news there is since yesterday. The Oqxiendo is ready to go out, except
as to some things which are lacking, and which she will have to go
without. To give orders to light the fires I am only waiting for an
answer from you to the telegram which I sent you last night, asking
whether she is to receive the same authorization as the Vizoaya, and the
same amount of money as delivered to the latter vessel, for the Vizcaya
carried £0,000 and the February pay, and surely there are not funds
enough at this departamento to enable the Oquendo to leave under the
same conditions as the Vizcaya,

As soon as I finish this letter I shall go ashore and look after this
very interesting matter. If we are to take the Alfonso, although she
is of slow speed, it will be necessary to supply her with officers and
many things that I have had to take from her, owing to the scarcity of
everything here, in order to make her as useful as possible. The gun-
nery training school has been transferred to the Navarra. The second
commander is on board the Colon. • The telegram I sent you yesterday,
relative to the heavy artillery of the latter ship, is the result of my
conference with Guillen. The junta will meet to day, and I will at

21

once notify yon of the result of the session, but I believe it will not differ
essentially from my telegram of yesterday.

Guns numbers 325 and 313 are bad and should under ordinary cir-
cumstances be rejected; there is no doubt of it; but if the necessity is
really urgent and we have no others, there seems to be no remedy,
except either to compel the firm to change them, or, if that is not
possible, to take them, bad as they are. Yesterday the engineer of
the Greusot people said that the first two 9.46inch guns would not be
ready until the latter part of June, if they are to be delivered as planned,
but if they are to have trunnion hoops it will take longer. After they
have been delivered they will have to be tried at the Polygon proving
ground, transported to the harbor and mounted. When will all this
work be finished? It is safe to say that it will not be before September,
and that prospect seems worse than to take the guns they ofifer us.

Guillen went to see whether 7.87-inch guns could be mounted on
board, and found that it was impossible with the present turrets, and
so it seems there is no other remedy but to submit to the inevitable
law of necessity and make the best of it. We can either have them
exchanged for better ones later on, or we will pay less for them, or we
can simply rent them. If we do not accept a solution of the problem
in that direction, we will have to make up our minds that it will be six
or eight months at least before the ship can be ready. As long as we
use the 5.6-inch guns with the present extractors they seem to me
utterly worthless, even more so than the guns of the Col6n; and this
is not pessimism, but sad reality. But I use with regard to them the
same argument as with regard to the Goldn guns. If we have no
others, we must use these and fight with them, if the case should arise;
but it would be very much better if it did not arise.

Guns numbers 20 and 28 of this ship, which Guillen says are com-
pletely useless, can be changed at once; that would be choosing the
lesser of two evils. And when the Oquendo and Vizcwya return, the
guns that Guillen may point out in those ships can be exchanged; I
believe there are four of them, not six, as my telegram said yesterday*
This, and the new cartridge cases, is the best we can do for the present;
but as they are makeshifts, made necessary by the circumstances of the
moment, they must be done away with eventually, as has long been the
wish of all who have had anything to do with this vital matter. We
must take to heart the lesson we are experiencing now, and not expose
ourselves to another. You know that better than I do, as you have
had more to do with these matters, and for a longer time than I.

I always bear in mind what the press is in this country, and you will
have noticed that I avoid in my telegrams the use of phrases which
might cause alarm or stir up passion. With these private letters and
confidential communications it is quite different, and I believe that I
owe you ray frank opinion, without beating about the bush.

May God help us out of these perplexities.

Yours, etc., Pasoual Gebyeba.

22

OARTAGEIiAy February 12y 1898.
His Excellency Segismundo Bbbmejo.

My Dear Admiral and Friend: The Oquendo is ready and will
go oat this afternoon, after exchanging the large bills she has received
for smaller ones or silver. She takes with her a little more than the
10,000 pesetas mentioned in your telegram, not only because she would
actually not have enough^ but also in order to obviate the contrast in
comparison with the Vizcaya, which carried 150,000 pesetas in gold. She
lacks spare gear, and I liave authorized her to buy the most indispensa-
ble things in the Canaries, provided she can get them there. The lack
of everything at this arsenal is quite incomprehensible.

I am very anxious for this ship as well as the Vizcaya to complete
their voyages and be incorporated with the fleet, either at Uavana or
in Spain, without running into the mouth of the wolf. I oan not help
thinking of a possible war with the United States, and I believe it would
be expedient if I were given all possible information on the following
points :

1. The distribution and movements of the United States ships.

2. Where are their bases of supplies T

3. Charts, plans, and routes of what may become the scene of ox)er-
ations.

4. What will be the objective of the operations of this squadron —
the defense of the Peninsula and Balearic islands, that of the Canaries
or Cuba, or, finally, could their objective be the coasts of the United
States, which would seem possible only if we had some powerful ally t

5. What plans of campaign does the Government have in either
eventt 1 should like also to know the points where the squadron will
find some resources and the nature of these; for, strange to say, here,
for instance, we have not even found 4inch rope, nor boiler tubes, nor
other things equally simple. It would also be well for me to know
when the Pelayo, Carlos F, Vitoria, and Numancia may be expected
to be ready, and whether they will be incorporated with the squadron
or form an independent division, and in that event what will be its
connection with ours? If I had information on these matters I could
go ahead and study and see what is best to be done, and if the critical
day should arrive we could enter without vacillations upon the course
we are to follow. This is the more needful for us, as their squadron is
three or four times as strong as ours, and besides they count on the
alliance of the insurgents in Cuba, which will put them in x)ossession
of the splendid Cuban harbors, with the exception of Havana and one
or two others, perhaps. The best thing would be to avoid the war at
any price; but, on the other hand, it is necessary to put an end to the
present situation, because this nervous strain can not be borne much
longer.

By this time you have probably received the telegram I sent you
regarding the heavy artillery of the (7oWn, and I have nothing to add
to the report which goes by this mail. To day Guillen and I will look

23

into the matter of the 5.5-inGh guns of these ships. There are not sfx

useless ones, as I said in my telegnnn and as Guillen had told me, nor

four, as I said in my letter yesterday, but live, two of them on board

this ship, which can at once be exchanged for guns from the Princesa.

I have talked with Guillen about the frequent injuries to the 2.24-inch

Nordenfelt mounts, and it seems to me that it would perhaps be well to

substitute for these mounts some of the old type, provided the conditions

of resistance of the decks of these ships will admit of it.

Your^, etc.^

Pasoual Cerveea,

[Confldeotial— Private.]

The Minister of Marine,

Madrid, February 15^ 1898.
His Excellency Pascual Oervera.

My Dear Admiral and Friend: I will answer your esteemed
letters, in which you express your opinions with a sincerity and good
will for which I am truly grateful to you. Last night a meeting was
held of the council of ministers to discuss the serious Dupuy de Lome
matter. With the acceptance of his resignation (without the usual
formula, ^'Pleased with the zeal," etc.), and with some explanations,
this unpleasant incident will be disxK)Bed of satisfactorily.

The OoUn. — I have received the report of the Junta, which expresses
itself in favor of mounting at once on the Coldn 9.92-inch A. guns.
Numbers 325 and 313 can not be accepted ; to do so, even temporarily,
would cause trouble, as the opinion on this (question is final, and if it
were carried to the Cortes, through the excitement of the press, it
would place us in a very unfavorable position. I believe it could be
solved promptly by the delivery of two guns by the Ansaklo Company,
with whom alone we will have to settle this matter, and this can be
done by dint of tact and energy, a combination which is absolutely
necessary in order to obtain satisfaction under our contract.

In my interview with the Italian ambassador, in which he explained
the difficulties in which the Italian Government would be placed before
the Chambers if we were to refuse guns of the type which they have
accepted, I said to him : " It will not be difficult for me to prove to you
by technical data that the guns which are offered to us are not accept-
able. But the Italian navy, through the Ansaldo Company, can easily
propose two other guns which, after having been tried according to our
practice and found satisfactory, would be accepted." Through differ-
ent channels I know that this question will soon be solved to our satis-
faction— the 5.5-inch guns. I understand the defect of the extractors
and realize how it affects the rapid fire. This defect can not be
remedied for the present. You ordered some made by hand, and this
step was approved.

The two guns of the Maria Teresa will be changed, and as to the new

24

cartridge cases, I have very specially impressed this matter upon Faara,
who has gone to England. The decks of cards asked for are on the
way. Bustamente torpedoes will be furnished as far as possible, for 1
have to bear in mind the Philippines and Cabrera Island. As to the
squadron, I want to get it away from the departamento, but that is
difficult just at present until we see what is decided as to the Colon;
for it seems to me that the rear-admiral's flag should not show itself
with less than three ships. The Carlos F and Pelayo are to join the
squadron; when that is done, your force will be as large as is at pres-
ent within onr power to make it.

As to the war with the United States, I will tell you my ideas about
it. A division composed of the Numancia^ Vitoriay Alfonso XIII (or
Lepanto)j the destroyers Audaz^ Osado, and Proserpina, and three tor-
pedo boats would remain in Spain in the vicinity of Cadiz. In Cuba
the Carlos F, Pelayo, Col^n, Vizcaya, Oquendo, Maria Teresa, three
dejutroyers, and three torpedo boats, in conjnnction with the eight larger
vessels of the Havana Navy-Yard, would take up a position to cover
the channels between the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic and try to
destroy Key West, where the United States squadron has established
its principal base of provisions, ammunition, and coal.

If we succeed in this, and the season is favorable, the blockade could
be extended to the Atlantic coast, so as to cut otf' communications and
commerce with Europe — all this subject to the contingencies which may
arise from your becoming engaged in battles in which it will be decided
who is to hold empire of the sea. For your guidance in these matters,
you are acquainted with the preliminary plans of the start* of this min-
istry, which I placed at your disposal, including the attack upon Key
West. I will advise you as to the location of the Uuite^l States ships
and other data for which you ask.

I will also inform you that twelve or tifteen steamers will be equipped
as anxiliaries to our fleet, independent of privateering, and in confidence
I will till you that if any ship of real power can be found, either cruiser
or battle ship, we shall buy it, provided it can be ready by April. My
life is getting to be a burden, for to all that is already weighing upon
me under the circumstances are now added the elections and candidates
for representatives.

I believe, my dear Admiral, that all the energy and all the good will
of those who are wearing uniforms can do but very little toward
preparing for the events which may happen.
Yours, etc.,

Segismundo Bermejo.

Cartagena, Fehrvary 16^ 1898,
His Excellencv Segismundo Bermejo.

My Dear Admiral and Friend: I received your favor of yester-
day, which I hasten to answer, leaving my letter open until to morrow
in case there should be anything new by that time. To the grave

25

Dnpuy de Lome affair is added the news of the explosion of the Maine^
which has just been reported to me, and 1 am constantly thinking of
the Vizcaya, which should have arrived in New York to-day. God
grant that no attempt is made against her.

I shall be very glad if the matter of t1»e armament of the Coldn can
be settled satisfactorily. The letter fiom Perrone Ilijo which I sent
you may have contributed to this. As Guillen is going to Madrid, I
will say nothing to you concerning the 5.5 inch guns. I shall be very
glad if the two of this ship are changed. I do not know when the
Pelayo and the Carlos V will be able to join the fleet, but I suspect
that they will not arrive in time. Of the former I know nothing at all,
but 1 have received some news concerning the latter and certainly not
very satisfactory as regards the time it will take for her to be ready.

It seems to me that there is a mistake in the calculation of the
forces we may count upon in the sad event of a war with the United
States. In the Cadiz division I believe the Numancia will be lacking.
I do not think we can count on the Lepanto. Of the Carlos V and the
Pelayo I have already spoken. The Coldn has not yet received her
artillery, and if war comes she will be caught without her heavy guns.

The eight principal vessels of the Havana station, to which you
refer, have no military value whatever, and, besides, are badly worn-
out; therefore they can be of very little use. In saying this I am not
moved by a fault-finding spirit, but only by a desire to avoid illusions
that may cost us very dear. Taking things as they are, however sad
it may be, it is seen that our naval force when compared with that of
the United States is approximately in the proportion of 1 to 3. It
therefore seems to me a dream, almost a feverish fancy, to think that
with this force, attenuated by our long wars, we can establish the
blockade of any port of the United States. A campaign against that
country will have to be, at least for the present, a defensive or a disas-
trous one, unless we have some alliances, in which case the tables may
be turned.

As for the offensive, all we could do would be to make some raids
with our fast vessels, in order to do them as much harm as possible. It
is frightful to think of the results of a naval battle, even if it should
be a successful one for us, for how and where would we repair our dam-
ages! I, however, will not refuse to do what may be judged necessary,
but I think it proper to analyze the situation such as it is, without
cherishing illusions which may bring about terrible disappointments.

I will leave this painful subject and wait until to-morrow.

The 17th. — Nothing has happened since yesterday and I will trouble
you no further. The explosion of the Maine seems to have occurred
under circumstances which leave no doubts of its being due to the ves-
sel herself; nevertheless, I fear this may cause new 'complications and
a painful position for the Vizcayay which God forbid.
Yours, etc.,

Pascctal Obrveba.

26

[Private.]

The Minister op Marine,

Madrid^ February 23^ 1898.
His Excellency Pasoual Oervera.

Mv Dear admiral and Friend: Pardon me for not answering yonr
letters before. In spite of tbe Maine catastrophe — at least, so far — and
in spite of the pessimistic tenor of some newspapers, our relations with
the United States have in no manner changed. Enlate, who had to be
given new instructions so that he might judicioasly shorten his stay in
New York, and use every manner of precautions, especially in coaling,
has conducted himself with rare tact and refused to attend any festivi-
ties, alleging as an excuse that he considers himself in mourning.
But as usual there are other things that worry me. Sobral, whom I
have telegraphed to come home immediately, is making unfavorable
statements on the organization and discipline of the United States
Navy in his interviews with reporters of United States newspapers,
and remonstrances are beginning to arrive.

How anxious some peoi>le are, my dear Admiral, to make themselves
conspicuous and talk. It never occurs to military and paval attaches
at Madrid to have these interviews with reporters, and express their
opinions. Just think how this country would rise up in arms if the
United States attach^ should say that there was no discipline or organ-
ization in our navy, or things on that order. As to your squadron,
instructions have been sent to Cadiz for the delivery of the three 5.5-
inch guns, and I am in receipt of a-dvices from Loudon that the first
installment of cartridge cases will shortly be forwarded to Cadiz.

As for the two guns of the Coldn^ Ansaldo has been notified that Nos.
325 and 313 are not acceptable, and that he must, within a very short
time, submit two others for trial. He tells me that the Italian navy is
very kindly disposed toward us; so I am hoping for a favorable solu-
tion. However, you are aware that I am not a partisan of guns of that
caliber. I think their military value is imaginary rather than real.
Moreover, I have an idea that tliey might afiect the stability of the
Coldn. In my opinion the most desirable solution would be to take
7.87 inch guns instead, as I believe that there is great military value in
medium-caliber guns, owing to their rapidity of fire. Monstrous guns
and torpedoes are terrible weapons, but only on special occasions.

You will receive a less number of torpedoes than you asked for,
because I have to bear in mind Cabrera Island and the Philippines.
In reply to your questions relative to studies on the war with the
United States, I have sent you information on the location of their
ships in commission, bases of supplies, coaling stations, etc. They
really only have JKey West; the others are at San Luis (Atlantic),
and at their navy-yards on the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico.
Their ships, as far as the draft is concerned, are calculated for banks
extending a long distance into the sea, as at New Orleans, for instance.

27

Ton will realize what my Ritnation is. I am working as hard as I
can to assemble in Spain all the elements of power we have abroad. I
am also trying to develop our forces, especially as to speed. As I have
told you before, my idea, though perhaps somewhat optimistic, is to
establish two centers of resistance, one in Cuba, the other in the pen-
insula; and by the end of April our position will probably have changed.
We shall have to be very careful, and if possible avoid until then any
conflict with the United States; but we have to reckon with the excit-
able nature of our nation and the evil of a press which it is impossible
to control.

I should like to make dispositions relative to your ships, but the
Teresa is waiting for the 5.5-inch guns, and the Gol6n tor a solution of
the question as to her 9.84 inch armament. The Alfonso XIIL although
probably not permanently under your orders, must be included for the
present while her trials are going on. When you consider the Colon
ready for target practice let me know, and orders will be issued for her
to go to Santa Pola. I will close this letter and see what I can do
toward procuring funds for getting those ships ready — in this poor
country which has to send 16,000,000 pesos to Ouba every month.
Tours, etc.,

SEaTSMITNDO BEBMEJO.

I am also looking after provisions, coal, and extra guns*

[CoDfldential.]

Honored Sir: His excellency the chief of staff of the ministry sent me, with
the confidential letter of the 19th instant, two reports and two statements relative
to studies made with a view to a possible war with the United States. A careful
examination of these documents, followed by profound reflection, has suggested to
me the following considerations, which I respectfully submit to your excellency:

If we compare the Navy of the United States with oar own, counting only modern
vessels capable of active service, taking the data in reference to the Americans as
published in the December number of the Revista Generiil de Marina and in our
greneral statistics of the navy, we find that the United States have the battle shi])s
Iowa, Indianaf MassaohusetUy Oregon, and Texas ; the armored cruisers Brooklyn and
New York; the protected oruisers Atlanta, MinneapoliSf Baltimore, Charleston, Chicago,
Cineinnati, Columbia, Newark, San Francisco, Olympia, Philadelphia, and Raleigh, and
the rapid unprotected cruisers Detroit, Marhlehead, and Montgomery. Against this
we have, following the same classification, the battleships Pelayo, Infanta Maria
Teresa, Vizcaya, and Oquendo, armored cruiser Coldn, and protected cruisers Carlos V,
Alfonso XIII, and Lepanto; no fast unprotected cruisers; and all this, supposing the
Pelayo, Cdrlos V, and Lepanto to be ready in time, and giving the desired value to
the Alfonso XIII.

I do not mention the other vessels on account of their small military value, surely
inferior to that of the nine gunboats, from 1.000 to 1,600 tons each, six monitors still
in service, the ram Eatahdin, the Vesuvius, and the torpedo boats and destroyers,
which I do not count. I believe that in the present form the comparison is accurate
enough. Comparing the displacements, we find that in battle ships the United
States has 41,589 tons, against our 30,917 tons; in armored cruisers they have 17,471

28

tons, against onr 6,840; in protected crnisers, 51,098, against 18,887; and in fast
nnprotected cmisers tbey have 6,287 and we have none.

The total vessels good for all kinds of operations comprise 116,445 tons, against
oiir 56,644 tons, or something less than one-half. In speed onr battleships are
snperior to theirs, bnt not to their armored cruisers. In other vessels their speed is
superior to onrs. Comparing the artillery, and admitting that it is possible to fire
every ten minutes the number of shots stated in the respective reports, and that only
one-half of the pieces of less than 7.87 inch are fired, and supposing that the efiiciency
of each shot of the calibers 12.6, 11.8, 11, 9.84. 7.87, 6.3, 5.9, 5.5, 4.7, 3.94, 2.95, 2.24, 1.65,
and 1.45 inches be represented by the figures 328, 270, 220, 156, 80, 41, 33, 27, 17, 10, 4, 2,
and 1, which are the hundredths of the cubes of the numbers representing their cali-
bers expressed in inches C (^^^^^^^ in inches) ^ \ ^ ^^ ^^ ^j^^^ ^^^ artillery power of

the American battle ships is represented by 43,822, and that of ours by 29, 449; that
of the American armored cruisers by 13,550, and that of ours (Col6n) by 6,573; that
of the American protected cruisers by 62,725, and that of onrs by 14,600; that of the
American unprotected cruisers by 12,300.

Therefore, according to these figures the offensive power of the artillery of the
United States vessels will be represented by 132,397, and that of onrs by 50,622, or a
little less than two-fifths of the enemy's. To arrive at this appalling conclusion 1
have already said that it has been necessary to count the Pelayo and Carlos F,
which probably will not be ready in time; the Lepanio, which surely will not be
ready, and the Alfonso XII, whose speed renders her of a very doubtful utility.

Now, to cairy out any serions operations in a maritime war, the first thing neces-
sary is to secure control of the sea, which can only be done by defeating the enemy's
fieet, or rendering them powerless by blockading them in their military ports. Can
we do this with the United States f It is evident to me that we can not. And even
if God should grant us a great victory, against what may be reasonably expected,
where and how would we repair the damages sustained f Undoubtedly the port wonid
be Havana, but with what resonroesf I am not aware of the resources existing
there, but judging by this departamento, where there is absolutely nothing of all
that wo may need, it is to be assumed that the same condition exists everywhere,
and that the immediate consequences of the first great naval battle wonld be the
enforced inaction of the greater part of our fleet for the rest of the campaign, what-
ever might be the result of that great combat. In the meantime the enemy wonld
repair its damages inside of its fine rivers, aided by its powerful industries and
enormous resources.

This lack of industries and stores on onr part renders it impossible to carry on an
ofi'ensive campaign, which has been the subject of the two reports which his excel-
lency the chief of stafi^ has been kind enough to send mo. These two reports con-
stitute, in my judgment, a very thorough study of the operations considered, but
the principal foundation is lacking, namely, the control of the sea, a prime necessity
to their undertaking. For this reason they do not seem practicable to me, at any
rate not unless we may count upon alliances which will make our naval forces at
least equal to those of the United States, to attempt by a decisive blow the attain-
ment of such control.

If the control of the sea remains in the hands of our adversaries, they will imme-
diat<ely make themselves masters of any unfortified ports which they may want in
the island of Cuba, counting, as they do, on the insurgents, and will use it as a base
for their operations against us. The transportation of troops to Cuba would be
most difficult and the success very doubtful, and the insurrection, without the check
of our army, which would gradually give way, and with the aid of the Americans,
would rapidly increase aud become formidable.

These reflections are very sad; but I believe it to be my unavoidable duty to set
aside all personal considerations and loyally to represent to my country the resources
which I believe to exist, so that, without illusions, it may weigh the considerations

29

for and againsti and then, throagh the Government of His Majesty, which is the
country's legitimate organ, it may pronoance its decision. I am sure that this deci-
sion will find in all of as energetic, loyal, and decided executors, for we have but
one motto : " The f ul Qllment of duty.''

. Yours, etc., Pascual Cerveka,

Cartaobna, February S5, 1898.

Hia Exoellenoy the Muiister oir Mabikb.

Cartagena, Fehrvary 55, 1S98.
His Excellency Segtsmundo Beemejo.

My Dear Admiral and Friend : I am in receipt of your favor of
the 23d and will answer your questions. I am very glad to know that
our relations with the United States have not changed, for I believe a
rupture would mean a terrible catastrophe for poor Spain, who has
done all she can and is by no means ready for such a blow, which
would surely be fatal. The reports and statistics forwarded to me by
the staff of the ministry have suggested to me certain considerations,
which I shall send to-morrow or the day after, also officially, the same
as I received the reports that suggested them.

We must not indulge in any illusions relative to our situation,
although we are ready and willing to bear whatever trials God may be
pleased to send us. It is one thing to meet with energy and manliness
whatever may befall us, and another thing to indulge in illusions as to
the results to be expected. Eulate's conduct has aflbrded me much
pleasure, and I have written to him at Havana, congratulating him.
Sobral is disgusting. I can hardly believe that he could have been
guilty of such indiscretion; I should rather believe that our numerous
crafty enemies have invented all that.

According to a letter received from Cadiz the 5.5-inch guns need a
slight alteration in order to be installed in the mounts of this ship, and
it would perhaps be easier to have that done at Cadiz. It is very
important that the new 5.5-inch cartridge cases should arrive and be
charged, to replace those we now have. I am glad the C0I671 is ahnost
ready. I believe you are right; the ship would be worth more with
four 7.87-inch guns than with two 9.84-inch, which are about equivalent
in weight; but as she is built for the latter it can not be helped. 1
have received the royal order regarding the torpedoes, but the torpedoes
themselves have not yet arrived.

I realize how hard you must be working and how many disagreeable
things you have to contend with and as we all have who love our
country. I believe you are really optimistic in your views about a
rupture with the United States. You think that if we can hold off
until April our relative positions will be considerably changed. I
believe that is an illusion, for, from what I know, it is my opinion that
the Pelayo and Carlos V will not be ready by that time, and at the rate
we are now progressing it is very doubtful whether the Colon will be.

80

Nor will the Lepanto be ready, and the Alfonso XIII will never be
anything more than she is now. The Vitoria may perhaps be ready
for service, bnt the Numanda will not be. The Coldn can go oat lor
target practice whenever it may be desirable.
Tours, etc.,

PASGUAIi GEBYEBiu.

Cartagena, February 26^ 1898.
His Excellency Segismtjnbo Bermejo.

My Dear Admiral and Friend : When I received yesterday, the
letter in which, among other things, yon asked me if the Coldn could
go out for target practice, I answered that the vessel was ready, and at
the same time I took measures so that the cartridges cases which
might be used in that practice should be recharged, bnt it appears
that there is no furnace in which they can be reannealed, nor a machine
to re-form the cartridge cases. The extra charges which the vessel
brought (72 per gun) are therefore useless.

To obviate this, two ways are open, one a slow one, which is to bring
the appliances that are lacking and to construct a furnace in which to
recharge the cartridge cases; and the other, a rapid one, which is to
purchase cartridge cases for the charges on hand, and this could be
done at once, as the manufacturers have some on hand which they would
let us have. Moreu has asked them and they answered that they had,
and gave the prices, but those were unintelligible. For this reason I
telegraphed you suggesting the purchase of the cartridge cases compris-
ing 720 5.9 inch and 432 4.7 inch. I send today the official letter which
I announced yesterday. Its conclusions are indeed afiiictiug, but cau
we afiford to cherish illusions t

Do we not owe to our country not only our life, if necessary, but the
exposition of our beliefs t I am very uneasy about this. I ask myself
if it is right for me to keep silent, and thereby make myself an accom-
plice in adventures which will surely cause the tiOtal ruin of Spain. And
for what purpose! To defend an island which was ours, but belongs to
us no more, because even if we should not lose it by right in the war we
have lost it in fact, and with it all our wealth and an enormous number
of youhg men, victims of the climate and bullets, in the defense of what
is now no more than a romantic ideal. Furthermore, I believe that this
opinion of mine should be known by the Queen and by the whole council
of ministers.

Yours, etc., Pasoual Oeryera.

[PriTftto.]

The Minister of Marine,

Madrid^ February 28j 1898.
His Excellency Pasctjal Oervera.

My Dear Admiral and Friend : I am in receipt of your confi-
dential communication and letter, both on the same subject. I want

81

to wait tin I have somewhat recovered fl*oro the painful impression
caused by the reading of your letters before answering them. As to
the cartridge cases of the Ooldn, I am trying to find the means I lack
for solving the question you suggest.

Yours, etc., Segismundo Bbbmejo.

Oartaobna, March 5, 1898.
His Excellency SEGTSMimDO Bermejo.

My De ab Admibal and Fbiend : Yesterday I received your letter
of the 28th, and I regret very much the painful impression caused by
my remarks; but I am not surprised, because they are truly sad, and
still, perhaps, they fall beneath the mark, judging from everything one
sees. In your very letter we have another proof of this in the fact that
the difficulty of obtaining cartridge cases for the Ooldn arises from the
want of means (money), and this on the eve, perhaps, of a war against
the richest nation in the world. The question is to recharge the old
cases. This was asked for relative to some empty 5.5-inch cases which
it was ascertained are in this departameuto, and the answer is that they
c{^n not be recharged here.

I do not wish to dwell too much on this point, for no practical result
could be obtained. But every detail points out either our lack of means
or our defective organization, and, above all, our utter lack of prepara.
tion. I have deemed it my duty to express my opinions to the proper
authorities — that is, to you and to the whole Government through
you — clearly and without beating around the bush. Now, let orders be
given to me; I will carry them out with energy and decision. I am
ready for the worst.

Yours, etc., Pasoual Oebveba.

[Private and confidontlal.]

The Ministeb op Mabine,

Madrid, March 4, 1898.
His Excellency Pasoual Debveba.

My Deab Admibal and Fbiend : I notifie<l you that, when I should
have recovered somewhat from the painful impression caused by the
reading of your confidential letter, I should answer it, and I now do so,
and will first take up the comparative study of the United States naval
forces and ours, which, taken absolutely as you have done, omitting
some of our vessels at Havana, which are available for a conflict with
the United States, show a difference of tonnage, but not so excessive
as would appear from your lines.

In my opinion, the matter should be studied from the standpoint of
the present distribution of the United States forces, remembering that
it will be to their interest to maintain the ships now in the Pacific for
the protection of San Francisco and the San Diego arsenal, as also

32

their costly trans-Pacific liners plying between the former city and
Australia and Ohina, and also to protect the Hawaiian Islands, about
to be annexed to the United States, for which reason naval forces are
being maintained there.

With your good judgment you will understand that the long and
difficult voyage which these forces, among them the Oregony would have
to make in order to join the Atlantic forces, leaving the Pacific region
unprotected, could not be effected without the knowledge of others,
and so far all such knowledge is absolutely lacking. I must therefore
refer you to the inclosed statement. While it shows deficiencies, which
the Government is endeavoring to remedy at any cost by the acquisi-
tion of new elements, if only in the matter of speed, they do not exist
to such an extent as stated in comparison with the United States*
Atlantic Squadron. There is no doubt that, in order to concentrate
our nucleus of forces, we shall require some time— the whole month of
April, in my estimation.

Since I have been in charge of this department His Majesty's Gov-
ernment has known the situation of the great nucleus of our naval
forces, which are being remodeled or repaired abroad, and in conformity
with such knowledge the Government has endeavored, and is endeavor-
ing by every possible means, with a view also to the general interests
of the country, to pursue in its relations with the United States a policy
of perfect friendship, although at times points have come up which were
not easv of solution.

But with your good judgment you will understand, and I want there-
fore to remove some misapprehensions regarding the island of Cuba.
Our flag is still flying there, and the Government, to meet the senti-
ments of the people, even at the cost of many sacrifices, desires that
this Spanish colony should not be separated from our territory, and is
trying by every possible means — political, international, and military —
to solve satisfactorily the Cuban problem. That is the prevailing
opinion of the country, and it conforms its actions thereto. As already
stated, the Government is acquainted with our situation, and for that
reason is endeavoring to collect all possible.resources at Havana har-
bor, fortifying it so that it may serve as a base for our naval forces,
equipping it with a dock, already in Operation, where our ships will be
able to repair slight damages, for it is my opinion that it will not be
possible, either on our side or the enemy's, to repair those injuries which
may be caused by the action of a battle in the short period of time in
which international military campaigns are enacted, compared with the
material interests they affect.

The other harbors of the island, such as Oienfuegos, Santiago de
Cuba, etc., are prepared to be closed by means of torpedoes. In your
estimate you do not count for anything the effect of homogeneous
troops, well trained and disciplined, as against the United States crews
of mercenaries (mercenarias), and you might find historical facts, evok-

33

ing sad memories for as, to confirm what I say. I will close, never
doabting for one moment that you and all of as will falfiU the sacred
duty which our country imposes upon us, and in giving you my opinions
ill answer to yours there is nothing that I desire more than peace.
Yours, etc.,

Segismundo Bebmejo.

North Atlaniio Squadron — Posaihle formation.

United States.

New York

IndiaDa

Massaciiasetts.

Texag

Brooklyn

Iowa

Tons.

Mont^omei^

MarbleheadT.

Detroil

Kashville

Terror

Yorktown, dispatch boat

Total tonnage

Five torpedo boats; average speed, 21
knots.

8,200

1«,288

10,288

6,315

9, 271

11,410

2,000

2,000

2,094

1,071

3,000

86,537

Spain.

Visoaya

Pelayo

Carlos V

Maria Teresa...,

Oqueudo

Col6n

Alfonso Xin . . .

M. Ensenada

Alfonso XII...

Venadito

Reina Mercedes .
Infanta Isabel...

Tot-al tonnage

Three destroyers and three torpedo
boats; average speed, 25 kLota.

Tons.

7,000

9,900

9,250

7,000

7,000

6,800

4,826

1,064

3,000

1,189

3,900

1,188

a 62, 818

a 63,018.

[Private.]

The Minister of MABims,

March 5, 189S.
His Excellency Pascual Cebvera.

My Dear A.dmiral ai^d Friend : I am in receipt of a telegram

from Ansaldo, in which he says : '' We yesterday repeated oar request

to Messrs. Armstrong, of Elswick. They telegraphed would order

ammunition for guns by letter, which we shall communicate to you.

The constructing firm uses great diligence, but can not furnish cartridge

cases before August. We make another request of the Italian navy. —

G. Ansaldo."

Yours, etcy Segismundo Bermejo.

[Confidential.]

Cartagena, March 7, 1898.
His Excellency Segismundo Bermejo.

My Dear Admiral and Friend : Yesterday I received your per-
sonal letter of the 4th, to which I am about to reply, but you must first
permit me to give you a general idea of our situation as I see it. That
it is the intention of the United States to engage us in a war appears
beyond all doubt, and it therefore becomes more important each day to
10742 3

34

examine into the advantages and disadvantages which such a war may
have for ns.

Inspired by these ideas, I deemed it my duty as a patriot to reply to
the official comninnication throngh which I was advised of the distri-
bution of the American vessels and the condition of certain points on
the United States coasts, and I did so in my confidential letter of Feb-
ruary 26 last. To-day, feeling at liberty to express my ideas more
freely in a confidential letter, I will reply to your communication.

An examination of our forces, based upon what 1 already knew and
upon recent information and observation, not only confirms what I
said, but shows it to be still worse. I have visited the Vitoria^ on
which I counted, and from my examination of her I have drawn the
conviction that we can not count on her for the present conflicts
Neither does my information permit me to count on the Pelayo, Carlos F,
nor Nnmanda} And yet, as this opinion is not based upon personal
observation, I include them in the inclosed statement, solely because
you have included them in yours.

Whatever may be the direction given to the conflict — either war,
negotiations direct or through a third party, an arbitrator, or other-
wise— the longer the decision is delayed the worse it will be for us. If
it is war, the longer it takes to come the more exhausted we will be. If
it is negotiation of any kind, the longer it is postponed the greater will
be the demands, each time more irritating, which will be presented by
the United States, and to which we will have to yield in order to gain
time in the vain hope of improving our military position. And as our
position can not be improved, let us see what we can expect from a war

under such conditions.
It would be foolish to deny that what we may reasonably expect is

defeat, which may be glorious, but all the same defeat, which would
cause us to lose the island in the worst i)ossible manner. But even sup-
posing an improbability — that is, that we should obtain a victory — that
would not change the final result of the campaign. The enemy would
not declare h^oiself defeated, and it would be foolish for us to pretend
to overcome the United States in wealth and production.. The latter
would recover easily, while we would die of exhaustion, although victo-
rious, and the ultimate result would always be a disaster.

Only in case we could count on some powerful ally could we aspire
to obtain a satisfactory result. But, besides having to discount the
high price to be paid for such an alliance, even then we would only be
post|)oning the present conflict for a few years, when it would become

1 This pre<1iction was actually fulfilled, since, after the signing cf the peace pro-
tocol, it was necessary to send the Pelayo back to La Seyne to be completed, and
even before the signing the 3.94-inch guns of the Carlos F had to be dismounted.
The Xiunancia is in the arsenal at L^ Carraca receiving her artillery, and it can not
be said when this will be ready. None of these vesselB, therefore, were ready at the
declaration of war.

35

graver than it is to-day, as is the present insuri'ection in comparison
with the last. Even admitting the possibility of retaining Cuba, this
island woald cost us enormous sacrifices by the necessity of being con-
stantly armed to the teeth. And here the problem, already pointed out
by somebody, arises, Is the island worth the ruin of Spain f (Silvela,
in Burgos.)

I do not speak on the subject of privateering, because it seems to nie
that no man acquainted with history can attach any value to privateer-
ing enterprises, which nowadays are almost impossible on account of
the character of modern vessels. Although I do not attach much
importance to certain details which can have but little influence on the
general events, I shall nevertheless speak of some upon which you
touch, in order to set forth my point of view in answering your letter.
The accompanying statement, which appears to me to be more correct
than the one inclosed with your letter, shows that our forces in the
Atlantic are, approximately, one-half of those of the United States,
both as regards tonnage and artillery power.

I have never thought of the forces which the United States have in
the Pacific and Asia in connection with the development of events in
the West Indies; but I have always considered these forces a great
danger for the Philippines, which have not even a shadow of a resist-
ance to oppose them. And as regards the American coasts of the
Pacific, the United States has no anxiety about them. I think you are
mistaken in believing that during the mouth of April our situation
win change. As I have said above, I am sure that neither tbe Carlos
F, the Pelayo^ the Vitoria^ nor the Numancia will be ready, and nobody
knows how we will be as regards 5.5 inch ammunition.

It seems sure that by the end of April the 10-inch guns of the Col6n
will not be mounted. Even if I were mistaken, then our available
forces in the West Indies would be 49 per cent of those of the Amer-
icans in tonnage and 47 per cent in artillery. Our only superiority
would be in torpedo boats and destroyers provided all of them arrive
there in good order. I do not know exactly what are the sentiments
of the people concerning Cuba, bat I am inclined to believe that the
immense majority of Spaniards wish for peace above all things. But
those who so think are the ones who sufifer and weep inside of their
own houses, and do not talk so loud as the minority, who profit by the
continuation of this state of afi'airs. However, this is a subject which
is not for me to analyze.

Our want of means is such that some days ago three men went over-
board while manning the rail for saluting, through the breaking of an
old ridge rope. A new line had been asked for fifty days ago, but it
has not yet been replaced. More than one official letter has been writ-
ten on this interesting subject. In times past, forty-three days after
the Herman Cortes was laid down, the vessel was at sea. It is now fifty-
one days since I requested the changing of certain tubes in the boilers

36

of a steam launch of the Teresa, and I do not yet know when it will be
finished. This will probably be the proportion between us and the
United States in the repair of damages, in spite of our having the
Havana dock, which is the principal tbing, but not all.

As for the crews, I do not know them, but I may say that, the crews
that defeated our predecessors at Trafalgar had been recruited in the
same way. I beg that you will not consider this an argument against
yours, for that would be accusing me of great presumption in speaking^
of what 1 do not know. It is simply a thought that occurs to me.
These are my.loyal opinions, and for the sake of the nation I express
them to you with the request that you will transmit them to the Gov-
ernment. If you should deem it advisable for me to express them per-
sonally, I am ready to do so at the first intimation. After I have done
this, thus relieving my conscience of a heavy weight, I am quite ready
to fulfill the comparatively easy duty of conducting our forces wherever
I may be ordered, being sure that all of them will do their duty.
Yours, etc.,

Pascual Oerveea.

NoBTH Atlantic Squadron. — Comparison with the United States Fleet.

Vessels more or less protected now composing the squadron, or unprotected^ but icith a speed

of over 15 kn4)ts.

Spain.

Vizcaya

Oqiiendo

M. de 1a Euseuada.

To these may be positively
added :

Infanta Maria Teresa

Cristobal C'ol6n

Alfonso XIII

7,000
7,000
1,064

15,064

23 per
cent.

6,130
6,130
1, 100

13,360

23 p e r
cent.

7,000
6.840
4.826

6,130

a 8, 490
4,340

Doubtful additionn :

Pelayo

Carloe V

18,666

9,917
9. 250

19, 167

18,960

6,987
5,620

12,607

United States.

New York

Indiana

1 Massachusetts.
' Texas

Brookljoi —

Iowa

Monteomenr.
MarbfHhuaa. .

Detroit

Tercor

Minneapolis
Columbia...

Atlanta

Charleston...

Chicajio

Newark

Philadelphia.

Dolphin

York town ...

Displace-

Arma-

ment.

moBt.

8,200

6.400

10.288

9,304

10,283

9,:{04

6. 315

4.550

9,271

7,880

11,410

8,360

2,089

4,100

2,089

4,100

2, Of 9

4,100

3,600

2,896

65,639

60,994

7,376

4.790

7,375

4.790

14,750

9.580

3.000

4.270

3.730

4,570

4.500

4,470

4.098

6.740

4,324

7,640

1,485

700

1,703

3,320

22,840

31, 710

a Without the 9.84-inch guns, tho value of which is represented by 1,248.
In the South Atlantic they have the Cincinnati, 3,200 displacement; 4,795 armament.

All the otber vessels have very little military value, with the excep-
tion of the torpedo boats and destroyers, not mentioned in this state-
ment, and also the Katahdin and Vcsuviun.

37

[Private.]

The Minister of Marine,

Madrid, March 13, 1898.
His Excellency Pascual Oervera.

My Dear Admiral and Friend: I take advantage of tliis being
Sunday to write to you in answer to your cpniideutial lines on our
respective opinions relative to the events which may develop in Cuba,
if it should come to the worst. I have informed the Government of our
deficiencies, and I repeat to you what I have said before, namely, that
the Government will act prudently in order to maintain friendly rela-
tions with the United States, and try by every means to ward off any
conflict, since the opinion as to our unfavorable situation is unanimous.

I will now speak of matters relative to your squadron and the reen-
forcement which it may receive. I have a telegram from Ansaldo,
saying that the question of the 9.84-inch armament of the CoUn will
be solved this month, by means of two new guns at Spezia. He also
tells me that he has applied to the Italian navy for 5.9 and 4.7 inch
cartridge cases. The first installment of 5.5-inch cartridge cases is now
on its way to Cadiz, and others will soon follow.

By letters from Ferrandiz I am advised that the engines will be tried
by the 15th, and that the ship will be ready to go out by the beginning
of April. The Carlos V, I am told, will also be ready by the middle of
that month.

What the newspapers say as to the purchase of ships is true, although
I deny it. I do so because it is owing to publicity that the negotiations
for the two Brazilian cruisers,^ which were commenced under favorable
auspices, came to naught. My efforts are bent on cruisers, torpedo
boats, and even steamers of over 1,000 tons displacement and 20 knots
speed to serve as dispatch boats. The squadron is being kept at Car-
tagena, because it has not been decided what course it is to follow.
It will probably go to Cadiz, but the CoUin, if her armament can be
completed, which is to be hoped, will have to go to Genoa, and that
will leave only the Maria Teresa, Alfonso XIII, which has not yet
completed her endless trials, and the Destructor,

Arrangements have been made to send the testing and recharging
machinery to Cartagena.

I will close now. I leave it to you how arduous my work is. To-day,
Sunday, which the Lord has set aside as a sacred day of rest, I com-
tnenced my work at 8 o'clock in the morning and close it at 9 o'clock
at night with these lines.

Tours, etc., Sbgismundo Bermejo.

* The two cruisers referred to are the Almirante Abreu and the Amizofuu, which
were purcbased by the United States while bpain was negotiating for them. They
are now the ^010 Orleani and the Albanjf, — O. N. I.

38

[Confideiitifkl.]

Cartagena, March 16^ 1898.
His Excellency Sbgismunbo Bebme.to.

My Deab Admiral and Friend : Yesterday I received your favor
of the day before, by which I see that our opinions agree coDcerrring
the conflict which threatens our unfortunate country. As both of us
are animated by the best desires, such agreement was sure to come. It
also appears that the whole Government participates in this opinion,
but I am afraid that there may be some minister who, while believing
that we are not in favorable conditions, may have been dazzled by the
names of the vessels appearing in the general statement, and may not
realize how crushing a disproportion really exists, especially if he is not
thoroughly aware of our lack of everything that is necessary for a
naval war, such as supplies, ammunition, coal, provisions, eto. We
have nothing at all.

If this fear of mine is well founded, I think it is of the greatest
importance that the whole council of ministers, without exception, be
fully and clearly informed of our terrible position, so that there may
not remain the least doubt that the war will simply lead us to a terrible
disaster, followed by a humiliating peace and the most frightful ruin ;
for which reason it is necessary not only to avoid the war, but to find
some solution which will render it impossible in the future. If this is
not done, the more time is spent the worse will be the final result,
whether it is peace or war.

From this reasoning, as clear as daylight to me, it appears that since
we can not go to war without meeting with a certain and frightftil dis-
aster, and since we can not treat directly with the United States, whose
bad faith is notorious, perhaps there is nothing left for us to do but to
settle the dispute through arbitration or mediation, provided the enemy
accepts. However, this order of consideration does not come within
my sphere of duty, which, as the chief of the squadron, is limited to
reporting the state of military affairs and then carrying out the orders
of the Government. The latter, however, must be fully informed of
the situation. Before dropping this subject to answer the other points
of your letter, permit me to repeat what I said in my last communica-
tion, and to which no reply has been made in yours.

Perhaps it would be well for me to inform the members of the cab-
inet myself. If this is deemed expedient I am ready to start at the first
intimation. Concerning the avaihible forces and what may be expected
of them, I will be very glad if Ansaldo carries out his promise about
the 10-inch guns of the Colon. He has disappointed us so many times
already. The 5.5inch cartridge cases are absolutely necessary. You
know that this vessel has only 30, and it is to be supposed that the
stores of the Oqtiendo and Vizcaya are not better supplied. For the
present the firm is supplying only 100 per week, and supposing that
the first ones have already arrived or will arrive in Cadiz in the near
future, at this rate we will not have finished until October. Then tbey

39

have to be charged, etc.; therefore they can never be ready in time for
the present conflict. I thought I would have the Urst ones by January,
and I will not have them until April.

The engines of the Pelayo are ready and the vessel can sail, but how
about the secondary battery and the armored redoubt f These will not
be ready. If the old battery could be mounted temporarily! But I
doubt it; the ports will not permit it. I have heard it said that the
crew which brought the Pelayo was taken from the Vitoriay which is
another proof of our excessive poverty. I shall be very glad if the
Carlos V is soon ready, but I understand that the 3.94-inch battery has
not yet been mounted, and then the trials are to be made. I never
had great confidence in the purchasing of vessels.

Too much ftiss is made over every detail by ignorant people. It was
through this that we lost the Oaribaldij and now we have lost the Bra-
zilian cruisers. In fact, we have only secured the Goldn^ an excellent
ship, but which has not yet been equipped, and the Vald^. And sup-
posing that we had everything our own way and that Providence should
grant us a victory, which is highly improbable, we would then find
ourselves in the condition explained in my last and which it is not nec-
essary to repeat. It only rests for me now to be informed of the desti-
nation of the fleet.

I believe the Teresa ought to be in Cadiz, where the cartridge oases
are to be recharged, and she could sail as soon as all her guns were
mounted. Eeally, if the Coldn goes to Italy, the admiral's flag will not
be very well represented, but this consideration should not be placed
above the requirements of the service, and if the dissolution of the fleet
should make it advisable I could lower my flag and leave the ship, and
hoist it again when the ships now scattered were united again in a body,
unless the reunion should be for a few days only. I say this to you to
remove all idea of personal considerations, which I have always made
subject to the interests of the service. Moreover, the flag is the same
here as at Cadiz.

When the English fleet arrived there were three ships in the harbor —
the Navarra^ with the flag of the Captain-General; this ship (Teresa)^
with my flag, and the Colony with that of Paredes. I will trouble you
no more; believe me, I regret having troubled you so much, but the
voice of my conscience, which, animated by love for my country, tells
me that I thus fulfill a high duty, is what impels me to do so in order
to aid, in this way also, the old and cherished friend to whose lot it has
fallen to bear this heavy cross.

Yours, etc., Pasodal Cbbveea.

Cartagena, March 19j 1898.

His Excellency Segtsmundo Betimejo.

My Dear Admiral and Friend: When I received your cipher
telegram night before last, I asked for rectification of the name of the
ship to be fitted out, but with a strong presentiment that it was the

40

Col6n. I had her enter the dock yesterday morning, and at once com-
menced coaling, which I hope to complete to-day, although over 500
tons are required to replenish her bnnkers. When I received your
other cipher telegram this evening, I answered at once, and will now
add that this ship {Maria Teresa) is already in the dock, and we are
about to begin putting in the 180 tons of coal which she needs. Tbe
gun that is ready will be mounted in a little while. It is a pity that
we do not have the other two; they will not be ready for ten or twelve
days.

In the way of 5.5-inch ammunition we carry 78 rounds per gun, bot
of these only 30 cartridges have been pronounced serviceable by
Guillen. I saw Pedro Aguirre yesterday and asked him concerning'
the ships at Havana. He says that there is but one ship ready,
namely, the Venadito. I had him repeat this statement several times.
He also told me that the dock did not work. If the defects can not be
remedied we will have to do something about the Vizcaya, as she has
not had her bottom cleaned for eight months. As I know nothing
further than what your telegrams tell me, I am very much perplexed
and do not know what orders to issue relative to the berthing of petty
officers. Could you make any suggestions, I should be greatiy obliged
to you. 1 presume you have received my letter of the 15th, which I
hereby confirm.

Tours, etc, Pascual Gebveba.

[Private.]

The Minister op Marine,

Madrid, March 31, 189S.
His Excellency Pasoual Cervera.

My Dear Admiral and Friend : You ask me about the commis-
sion of the Colon. It is as follows: Since it is desirable to shorten the
itinerary laid down for the torpedo-boat flotilla there is some idea of
having the Gol6n accompany it to Puerto Rico. As this ship can not
enter there, she would have go to St. Thomas for coal and return to
Spain to complete her armament. As two captains will take part in
this expedition, the second in command of the squadron is to go. I do
not know yet whether this will be carried out. As it is posssible that
she may go to Cadiz when she has finished mounting her guns, she can
get her charts there and begin to take on the cartridge cases.
Yours, etc.,

Segismundo Bermejo.

Cartagena, March 27 , 1898.
His Excellency Segismundo Bermejo.

My Dear Admiral and Friend: Your favor of the 24th was
received yesterday. I am ready and waiting for orders to proceed to
Cadiz.

41

As I stated in one of my former letters, I take with me all of tlie
5.5-inch projectiles which are in this departamento, namely:

Ball cartridges 500

Ordinary Bhells of English msmifactare 883

Ordinary shells made at Cartagena 216

Segmental shells of English manufacture 67

Segmental shells made at Cartagena 112

Total nnmberof projectiles ■ 1,228

The Cadiz Departamento, which I asked on the 21st for a statement
of the projectiles on hand, answered that they have: Ball cartridges,
27; ordinary shells, 460; segmental shells, 150; steel shells, 40; total
number of projectiles, 677, which, added to those now on board, shipped
from this Departamento, namely, 1,228, make a total of 1,905; bnt
as the number of cartridge cases contracted for is, I believe, 4,500, we
are short 2,595. Even if we use all the shells that we have, some of
which, of English manufacture, are quite defective. Moreover, we
should have spare ones for those that are fired. The shell workshop
here is not in operation, and if you think well of it, an order might be
issued to resume work. I think the Coldn should have target practice,
but at anchor, not under way. It would be worth while to stop a day
to that end, or have her go out from Cadiz expressly for that purpose.
Yours, etc.,

Pasoual Oerveea.

Puerto Eeal, April 2^ 1898.
His Excellency Segtsmundo Bermejo.

My Dear Admiral and Friend: It seems hardly credible that
since my arrival here I have not had time to write to you, as I have
been wanting to do. But owing to long distances and many things to
be done I have not been able to write. In spite of the heavy weather
we arrived safe and sound, and the injuries of the Coldn were of much
less importance than I thought at first. Only a few tubes were dis-
abled, and for that reason I asked you by telegram to procure from
Niclausse the 50 tubes which he has ready. I have made requests for
the coal and lubricating material, in order that we may always be ready
for any emergency. My fears are realized, for the conflict is approach-
ing at a rapid rate, and the CoUm does not have her heavy guns; the
Carlos V has not been delivered, and her 3.94-inch armament is not
mounted; on the Pelayo the redoubt is not completed, and I believe she
lacks her secondary battery ; the Vitoria is without her armament, and
of the Numancia we had better not speak.

But after all, it is well that the end is coming; the country can not
stand this state of affairs any longer, and any arrangement will be
good, however bad it may seem, if it can save us from lamenting a
great disaster, which we may expect if we go to war with ships half

42

armed, and only a few of them, and with want of means and excess of

incumbrances. I shall take along all the ammunition that is ready, so

that these two ships, such as they are, can be counted upon at any

moment. The circumstance that the Vizcaya and Oquendo are so far

away is very unfortunate, because if they are not incorporated soon

they may be separated from the squadron.

Yours, etc.,

Pascual Cerveba.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo),

Cadiz, Jpril 4, 1S98,
I believe it very daTii^orous for torpedo-boat flotilla to continue voyajre. As I have
no instrnctions, deem it expedient to go to Madrid to receive tbem and form plan of
campaign. The Canaries troable me; they are in dangerous situation. If daring
my absence it should be necessary for squadron to go oat, it coald do so under second
in command.

^

The Miniater (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cerrera),

Madrid, April 4, 1898,
Tour cipher telegram received. In these moments of international crisis no defi-
nite plans can be formulated.

[Private.]

The Ministee of Makinb,

April 4, 1898.
His Excellency Pascual Ceevbra.

My Dear Admiral and Friend: I am in receipt of your telegrani
and letter. In these moments of an international crisis, while diplo-
macy is exerting its influence and while a truce is being discussed, and
even the situation of the respective naval forces, nothing can be for-
mulated or decided. Next time I shall write you more fully.

Yours, etc.,

Segismtjndo Berhejo.

Cadiz, ApHl 6j 1898.
His Excellency Segismundo Beume.to.

My Dear Admiral and Friend: In last night's mail I received
your letter of the 4th, having previously received your telegram con-
cerning the same matter. It is precisely on account of the general
anxiety prevailing that it is very important to think of what is to be
done, so that, if the case arises, we may act ra])idly and with some
chance of efficiency and not be groping about in the dark, or, like Don
Quixote, go out to fight windmills and come back with broken heads.
If our naval forces were superior to those of the United States theques-
tioQ would be an easy oue; all we would have to do would be to bar
their way*

43

Bat as our forces, on tbe coutrary, are very inferior to theirs, it would
be the greatest of follies to attempt to bar their way, which could ouly
be done by giving them a decisive naval battle. That would simply
mean a sure defeat, which would leave us at the mercy of the enemy,
who could easily take a good position in the Canaries, and by estab-
lishing there a base of operations crush our commerce and safely bom-
bard our maritime cities. It is therefore absolutely necessary to decide
what we are going to do, and, without disclosing our proposed move-
ments, be in a position to act when the time comes.

This was the substance of my telegram, and my ideas have not

changed since then. If we are caught without a plan of war, there

will be vacillations and doubts, and after defeat there may be some

humiliation and shame. You will understand these frank and loyal

statements of an old friend and comrade, who desires nothing more

than to help the Governmeat and act with circumspection.

Yours, etc.,

Pascual Cerveba.

The Qovemor- General of Cuba {Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies {R. Gir6n),

Havana, April 7, 1S98.
Pnblio opinion remains dignified and quiet, though somewhat excited by reports
of impending war. Some dissatisfaction expressed over lack of ships in island.
Those now here not in condition to render service. Detention of flotilla at Cape
Verde leaves our coasts unprotected. You know international situation better than
I under present oircumstances, and will realize expediency of sending ships.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera),

Madrid, April 7, 1898.
Squadron must go out to-morrow. Proceed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde. Imme-
diately upon arrival take coal and water. Communicate with seniaplioro Canaries
to notify you of anything new. Instmctions, which will be amplified, are in sub-
stance to protect torpedo-boat flotilla, which is placed under your orders, Amazonas
and San Francisco being in Europe. These are the only American ships there at
present.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo),

Cadiz, ApHl 7, 1898.

These battle ships are ready for any dnty. Beg that you will permit mo to insist
on having general plan of campaign to obviate fatal vacillations. No doubt Covern-
meut has formed its plan ; I must know it without fail if I am to cooperate with it
intelligently.

The Admiral {Cervera) to tlie Minister {Bermejo),

Cadiz, April 7, 1898.

Will leave to-morrow evening for Cape Verde, where torpedo-boat flotilla is
placed under my orders. Not knowing plan of government, and not having been
told what to do next, I shall await instructions, protecting the Canaries.

44

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera).

Madrid, April 7, 1898.
Hurry of departure prevents for the moment making you acquainted with plan
you ask for, but you will receive it in detail a few days after arrival at Cape Verde,
as steamer loaded with coal is following in your wake.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

Cadiz, April 8, 1898.

Your cipher telegram of yesterday received. Shall await instructions at Cape
Verde.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

Cadiz, April 8, 1898.
It is 5 o'olock p. m., aud I am about to leave with Teresa and Col&n.

Cadiz, April 8, 1898.
His Excellency Segismundo Beriviejo.

My Deab Admiral and Friend: I have received all your tele-
grams. The ships are ready and I expect to go out this eveuing. I
have just sent the paymaster to San Fernando for the money, as the
Captain-General advises me that it has been received there. At
Cape Verde I shall await the instructjious which you are to send me.
The reproduction of the cipher telegram differs in one word; it says
that the instructions se ampliardn (will be amplified), while the first
telegram received said se empleardn (will be used). That is the reason
why I indicated my idea of protecting the Canaries, and now, as pre-
viously stated, I shall wait.

1 regret very much to have to sail without having agreed upon some
plan, even on general lines, for which purpose I repeatedly requested
permission to go to Madrid. From the bulk of the telegrams received
I think I see that the Government persists in the idea of sending the
flotilla to Cuba. That seems to me a very risky adventure, which may
cost us very dear, for the loss of our flotilla and the defeat of our
squadron in the Caribbean Sea may entail a great danger for the Cana-
ries and perhaps the bombardment of our coast cities. I do not men-
tion the fate of the island of Cuba, because I have anticipated it long
ago.

I believe a naval defeat would only precipitate its ultimate loss, while
if left to defend itself with its present means perhaps it would give
the Americans some annoyance. We must not deceive ourselves con-
cerning the strength of our fleet. If you will look over our corre-
spondence of the last two months you will see, not that T have been
a prophet, but that I have fallen short of the true mark. Let us not
have any illusions as to what we can do which will be in proportion to
the means available. Without troubling you any further,
Yours, etc.,

Pascual Cebveba.

45

[Private.]

The MmiSTBB of Marine,

Madrid, April 7, 1898.

His Excellency Pasoxjal Oeeveea.

My Dear Admiral and Friend : We are in the midst of a serious
international crisis. While I have not yet lost all hope of a peaceable
solution, it being the wish of the Government to avoid war at any cost,
we have now reached the utmost limits of concessions by using the in-
tfiience of foreign powers; but the President of the United States is
surrounded by the waves which he himself has raised and which he is
now trying to appease. It devolves upon you as the Admiral of the
squadron, and owing to the prestige which you are enjoying in the
navy — or God himself has singled you out for that purpose — to carry
out the plans which will be formulated and intrusted to your intelli-
gence and valor.

I believe that I have done all that you asked me to do, as far as it

was in my power; if I have not done more it is because I have not had

the necessary means at my disposal. In this, as in everything else,

my conscience is entirely clear. In the instructions which you will

receive a general idea is outlined, which you will work out with your

captains. I will close, begging that you will express my regards to

the personnel under your orders and confirming the confidence which

His Majesty and the Government place in your high ability.

Yours, etc.,

Segismundo Bermejo.

INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED AT THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS.

The MiniBter of Marine {Bermejo) to the Commander in Chief of tlui Squadron {Cervera).

[Confidential.]

Honored Sir : Although ap to date the friendly relations existing between Spain
and the United States of North America have not changed, yet, in anticipation of
possible complications, and in view of the probable presence in European waters of
the United States cruisers San Francisco and Amazonas, it becomes necessary to pro-
tect the first torpedo-boat division, which has recently reached the Qape Verde
Islands, whether it be deemed expedient for such division to proceed to the West
Indies, or whether it be necessary for it to return to the Canaries.

Immediately upon receipt of this order you will therefore proceed with the flagship
and the Cristdbal Coldn to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, where the division referred to is
to join your fleet and remain for the present under your orders, together with the
trans-Atlantic steamer Ciudad de Cadiz, which accompanies it. At St. Vincent you
will awnit instructions, which will be forwarded in good season, and if the exigen-
cies of the service should make it advisable for the squadron aud torpedo boat divi-
sion to proceed to Puerto Rico you will do so, bearing in mind that if prior to your
departure the situation should have become aggravated the battle ships Vizcaya aud
Oqueudo will join you at Cape Verde or meet you at 18^ 30' north latitude and 53^
30^ west longitude. This point has been determined from the general Spanish chart
of the Atlantic Ocean, and you will stand for that point for the purpose indicated.

The protection given the torpedo boats by you will place the division in much

46

better condition from a military standpoint, as each battle ship, as well as the trans •
Atlantic steamer, can take charge of two of the torpedo boats for the purpose of
provisioning them and lending them such other aid as may be necessary during the
Yoyage, which under these circumstances can be made in less time und with greater
safety. As far as the contingencies feared make it possible to determine the objec-
tive of the expedition, it will be the defense of the island of Puerto Rico. In this
operation you will take charge of the naval part, in cooperation with the army,
with the concurrence of the Qovernor-General of the island, without forgetting,
however, that the plan rests with you alone, in view of your incontestable ability,
in your capacity as admiral, to measure the forces of our probable enemy, estimate
the significance of their movements, as well as the best purposes to which the shi^
under your command can be put.

If the case in question should arise, you will deploy the squadron so that the
different tactical units composing it will sustain each other, supported by tlie
destroyers and torpedo boats, and not pre8ent a compact mass to the enemy, unless
the hostile forces should be equal or inferior, in which case it will be expedient for
you to take the offensive. It is on these bases that your plau must rest, considering
as the principal factor the speed of our ships, which, as a general rule, is superior
to that of the enemy's ships, and taking into account that the hostile forces which,
if the case should arise, will operate iu Puerto Rico will probably not exceed 7 ships,
including 3 auxiliary vessels.

As it may become necessary to give yon further orders during your voyage from
Cadiz to the Cape Verde Islands, you will pass within sight of the semaphore of
the Canaries (Puutn Anaga). As to the provisioning of your ships at St. Vincent,
the necessary instructions have been given to the commander of the torpedo-boat
division; and in Puerto Rico, in case it should be necessary to go there, you will
find every kind of supplies, including ammunition.

In everything compatible with these instructions you will observe the orders
transmitted to the commander of the torpedo-boat division, as far as relates thereto.
The foregoing is communicated to you by royal order, and at the same time I beg to
tell you that, in view of the grave circumstances through which the nation is pass-
ing at present, the Government of His Majesty places full confidence in your excel-
lency's zeal, skill, and patriotism, and in the inoontestable valor of all who are
subject to and will obey your efficient orders.

Yours, etc., Segismundo Bkrmejo.

Madkid, April 8, 1S98,

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister (Benuejo).

Capk Verde, April Uy 1898,
Arrived here safely. Am anxious to know instrnctions. I beg for daily telegram.
Need 1,000 tons of coal tiO refill bunkers.

The Minister {Bermejo) to the Admiral {Cervera), Cape Verde,

Madrid, April t4, 1898.
Serious news. Transatlantic San Francisco leaves for Cape Verde with instruc-
tions and 2,000 tons of coal. But begin coaling anyhow from the coal ordered to be
purchased by commander of flotilla. Vizoaya and Oquendo under way since 9th to
join yon.

The Minister {Bermejo) to the Admiral {Cervera), Cape Verde,

Madrid, April 15, 1898,
Situation continues to be grave. Violent and humiliating speeches against our
country iu United States Congress. Great powers appear desirous of peace. Con-

47

fidential information received from Washington that flying squadron, composecl of
yew York, Texa$, CoJumhia, Minneapolis^ and Massachusetts, put to sea the 13th to
prevent our battle ships from joining you. Doubt this to be true, war not having
been declared, but you should nevertheless be warned. Provide yourself with
everything necessary, and upon arrival of battle ships refit them immediately.

Commander in Chief of the Sqitadron {Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Bermefo),

Captainct General of the Squadron, Staff.

Honored Sir: In compliance with the orders of your excellency, and as I have
had the honor of telegraphing you, I sailed from Cadiz on the evening of the 8th
with the Coldn and Teresa, shaping my course for Punta Anaga, island of Teneriffe,
where I commnnicated with semaphore on the morning of the 11th, and received
your order to proceed, and the information that indications were more favorable. I
advised you that the squadron had arrived there safely.

The Coldn was waiting for nie off the city of Santa Cruz. A tug had brought her
an official letter from the commandant of marine, transmitting to me said telegram
from the semaphore, adding that on the previous evening a steamer had been wait-
ing for me at Punta Anaga, to commuuicate the telegram to me. At 9 o'clock a. m.
of the 11th I shaped my course for St. Vincent, Cape Verde, casting anchor at Puerto
Grande on the 14th at 10 o'clock a. m. Here 1 found the first division of torpedo
boats, whose commander placed himself under my orders and advised me that noth-
ing of importance had occurred.

We had a good voyage, with wind and sea in the first quadrant (from northward
and eastward), calming down as we reached a lower latitude. Our usual speed was
12 knots, at times reduced to 11 knots, so as to arrive in daytime and have no trouble
in reconnoitering. The coal consumption of the Coldn has been enormous, and that of
the Teresa also quite large. During the voyage of 1,570 miles, with the speed above
mentioned, the CoUn has used about 500 tons and the Teresa about 400. The consump-
tion, therefore, of the Coldn has been 3,738 pounds per horsepower per hour, at 12 knots
speed, and 3,919 pounds at 11 knots, and that of tho Teresa 2,546 and 2,969 pounds,
respectively. Upon arrival here the Coldn had only 550 and the Teresa 570 tons left.
1 wish to call your excellency's attention to another point, also of great importance.
Thinking about this extravagant consumption of fuel, I attribute that of the Coldn
to the type of her boilers and lack of experience in managing them, and that of the
Teresa to the very low pressure in the boilers, considering that the engine is of the
triple- expansion type. When I gave an order to raise the pressure from 100 to 150
pounds the first engineer in chief made certain explanations to me, which I impart
to your excellency under separate cover, and as I fear that his objections are well
founded I have decided not to raise the pressure in the boilers of this ship, except
in peremptory cases.'

Upon arrival here I dispatched to you the following telegram: "Arrived here
safely. Am anxious to know iuHtructious. I beg for daily telegram. Need 1,000
tons of coal to refill bunkers/' This evening fche captain of the ('iudad dc Cadiz

^The engineer in chief says that he has noticed that whenever the pressure in tho
boilers has been raised above 115 pounds there has been some iujnry, especially in
the joints of the auxiliary steam piping, which ho attributcH to the lack of expan-
sion joints, in conjunction with the facts that tho boiler tubes have lost much of
their resistance, and that there are a few slight leaks in the sonnis where the furnaces
are joined to the boilers, which might become serious if the pressure were raised in
the latter, and lie therefore advises not to do so under ordinary circumstances,
because the saving in fncJ would not compensate for the expense of repairs and
interference with the service.

48

Dotified me that he had received the followiag telesram, dated at Cadiz the 14th, at
5.05 o'clock p. m. : '^Steamer San Francisco has sailed from I^as Palmas with 1,000'
tons of coal for the fleet. Notify the admiral.'' This morning I received your excel-
lency's telegram of the same date (7.50 p.m.) referring to the same matter and to
the battle ships Vizcaya and Oquendo, After consulting with the second in command
and the captains, I answered as follows : ^' For coal they ask 51 shillings per ton paid
in London. As it is much needed I have ordered it to be bought. Nothing new.''
Just as 1 am about to close this letter, which is to go by a steamer leaving to-night,
I received your other telegram, dated to-day (12.50 p. m.), referring to the movements
of American ships.

Yours, etc., Pascual Ceuveua.

On Board Infanta Maria Teresa,

8t, Vincent, Cape Verde^ April 15, 1898.

The Admiral (Cervei-a) to the Minister (Bermefo).

Cape Verde, April 16, 1898,
Nothing new. Owing to last report of yonr cipher telegram concerning flying
squadron, the torpedo boat flotilla is fltting for battle, lightening the coal which
hampers it.

The Admiral {Cenera) to the Minister {Bermefo).

Cape Verde, April 17, 1898,
Owing to heavy weather, have been unable to complete taking on coal purchased.
8an Frandsoo has not arrived. Am impatiently awaiting her arrival.

jSian Frandsoo has arrived.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister {Bermefo),

Cape Verde, April 18, 1898.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo),

Cape Verde, April 19, 1898.

Oquendo and Viecaya have safely arrived.

St. Vincent, Gape Verde, April 19, 1898.
His Excellency Segismundo Bermejo.

My Deab Admiral and Friend : The San Francisco, and with it
your instructions and lett'er, arrived yesterday. If the Oquendo and
Vizcaya have really sailed for here, they have now been out ten days
and must arrive to-day or to-morrow, for that is all the time they would
require to make the voyage of 2,400 miles from Puerto Rico. But I am
thinking that perhaps the date stated, the 9th, is that of the cablegram
issuing the order, and not the date of sailing, in which case they will
arrive later.

The boilers of the Ariete are practically unserviceable, so that this
vessel, instead of being an element of power, is the nightmare of the

* Telegram from minister to Cervera says 2,000.

49

fleet She could only be used for local defense. The boiler of the A.zor
is 11 years old and is of the locomotive type, and that tells the whole
story. As for the destroyers Furor and Terror^ their bow plates give
as soon as they are in a sea way, and some of their frames have been
broken. Yiliaamil has had this remedied as far as he has been able.
The Plutdn had an accident of this kind when coming from England^
and had her bows strengthened at Ferrol.

I do not know whether the port of San Juan de Puerto Rico affords
good protection for the ileet. If it does not, and if the port of
Mayaguez can not be effectively closed, the fleet would be in a most
unfavorable position. However, before forming a judgment, I shall
await the arrival of the Vizeaya, whose captain, Eulate, is thoroughly
acquainted with Puerto Eico. I am constantly preoccupied about the
Canaries.

It will be necessary to close and fortify the port of Graciosa Island,
as well as the small island commanding the port of La Luz in Gran
Canary. From your instructions it seems that the idea of sending the
fleet to Cuba has been abandoned, I believe very wisely. Concerning
Puerto Kico, I have often wondered whether it would be wise to accumu-
late there all our forces, and I do not think so. If Puerto Rico is loyal,
it will not be such an easy task for the Yankees; and if it is not loyal,
it will inevitably follow the fate of Cuba, at least as far as we are
concerned.

On the other hand, I am very much afraid for the Philippines, and,
as I have already said, for the Canaries; and above all I fejir the possi-
bility of a bombardment of our coast, which is not unlikely, considering
the audacity of the Yankees, and counting, as they do, with four or
five vessels of higher speed than our own.

For all these reasons, I am doubtful as to what it would be best for
me to do, and I will not take any decision without your opinion and that
of the council of captains, as indicated in your letter. I leave this
letter open until to-morrow, in case anything should happen.

I was here interrupted by the information that the Vizcaya and
Oquendo were in sight, and I have had the pleasure of seeing them
come in and of greeting their captains. The crews are in the best of
health and spirits, but the Vizcaya needs docking badly.

During the trip from Puerto Rico she burned 200 tons more coal than
the Oquendo, which means a diminution of her speed of from 3 to 5 knots
according to my recKoning, and a diminution of her radius of action of
from 25 to 30 per cent, thus losing the advantage of speed to which you
called special attention in your instructions. Both are now coaling,
but it is slow work, for, unfortunately, we do not feel at home here.
We are indeed unlucky! Until to-morrow. The mail has come in
and will shortly go out again, I will therefore close this.

Yours, etc.,

Pascual Cerveba.

10742 1

60

The Oovernar- General of Puerto Rieo {Macia$) to the Minister of Coloniee (S. (Hr&my^

[Extract.]

PuKRTO Rico, April 20, 1898.
Your excellency and the miniBter of war know scant resoarcea at my disposal.
I should know what oar naval forces are doing. Do not know sitaation of our
squadron.

Caftaincy-Gknrral of thb Squadron, Staff.

Honored Sir: Upon reaching this harhor I had the honor of notifying yoar
excellency of my arrival under date of the 15th. Agreeable to your orders I acquired
and distributed between the CoUn and Teresa the 700 tons of coal, which was all I
could obtain here at the exorbitant price of 61 shillings per ton. I also purchased
all the lubricating oil I could iind (about 125 gallons of olive and 132 of minerml
oil), so as to be able to supply the CoUn, Oquendo, and Vizoaya, At the same time I
made eiforts to get boats for unloading the coal of the San Franeieoo, and succeeded,
though not in as large number as desired.

The San Francisco arrived on the 18th at noon, and at daybreak of the 19th the
unloading of the coal was commenced. Her captain delivered to me the instructions
which you mentioned. The custom-house raised some difficulty and wanted to col-
lect duty on the coal landed ; but the matter was settled by the governor of these
islands, after conferring with the government by telephone.

On the 19th, at 11 o'clock in the morning, the Oquendo and Vizoaya arrived; the
latter at once commenced to coal, working all night. The Oquendo, which has about
200 tons left, could not begin to coal until the following morning. The fitting ont
of the vessels will be continued with all possible speed. The battle ships had nothing
special to report. In the torpedo-boat division slight defects have been noticed in
the joints of the bow plates of the Terror and Furor, which we have remedied tem-
porarily. (The Plutdn had these same repairs made at Ferrol.)

The boilers of the Ariete are in poor condition, so that this torpedo boat, far from
being of use, is an impediment. Her engines are very delicate. In a separate letter
I confirmed to your excellency all the telegrams which I have dispatched since my
last communication. The sanitary condition of the fleet is good.
Yours, etc.,

Pasgual Gkrvera..

On Board Infanta Maria Teresa,

St. Vineent, Cape Verde, April SO, 1898.

The Commander in Chief of ike Squadron {Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Bermefo).

Captainoy-Gknkral of the Squadron, Staff.

Honored Sir : I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of the proceedings of
the meeting of the captains which I called to-day at your suggestion. As the mail
is about to go out I do not have time to speak about it fully, but will do so in my
next letter.

Yours, etc., Pascual Cervera.

St. Vincent, Cape Verde, April £0, 1898.

PR0GEEDIN08.

The second in command of the naval forces and the captains of the vessels, having
met on board the cruiser Cristobal Colon, by order of his excellency the commander

51

in ohiof of the squadroD^ and under hiB presidency, the president 8nl>mltted for dis-
cassion the following question: ''Under the present circumstances of the mother
country, is it expedient that this fleet should go at once to America, or should it
stay to protect our coasts and the Canaries and provide from here for any contin-
gency f" Several opinions were exchanged concemin;; the probable consequences
of our campaign in the West Indies; the great deficiencies of our fleet compared with
that of the enemy were made manifest, as well as the very scanty resources which
the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico are at present able to ofi'er for the purpose of
establishing bases of operations.

In consideration of this and the grave consequences for the nation of a defeat of
our fleet in Cuba, thus permitting the enemy to proceed with impunity against the
Peninsula and adjacent islands, it was unanimously agreed to call the attention of
the Government to these matters by means of a telegram, as follows :

Gommandrr-in-Chibf of the Squadron to the Minister of Marine:

In agreement with the second in command and the commanders of the vessels, I
suggest going to the Canaries. Ariete has boilers in bad condition; boiler of Azor
is very old. Fizcaya must be docked and have her bottom painted if she is to pre-
serve her speed. Canaries would be protected from a rapid descent of the enemy,
and all the forces would be in a position, if necessary, to hasten to the defense of the
mother country.

Pascual Cbrvera.

Josf^ DE Paredes.

Juan B. Lazaga.

Emilio Df az Morbu.

VfcTOR M. Congas.

Antonio Eulatb.

JOAQUfN BuSTAMRNTB.

Fbrnando Villaamil.
On Board Cruiser Col6n, April 90, 1898.

The Mini8ier {Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde.

Madrid, April €0, 1898,
Both Houses of United States Congress have approved armed intervention, declar-
ing Cuba free and independent. It is thought President will sign resolution to-day.
Urgent to complete fitting out.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

Cape Verde, April gO, 1898.
If you approve going to Canaries, I beg you will send at once all the torpedoes to
that point.

[Ooofideiitial.]

Honored Bm: For lack of time I could not tell you yesterday
about the council which met on board the GoldUy and only sent you a
copy of the proceedings. The council lasted nearly four hours. The
prevailing spirit was that of purest discipline, characterized by the
high spirit which animates the whole fleet, and especially the distin-
guished commanders, who are an honor to Spain and the navy, and

52

whom it is my good fortune to have for companions in these critical
and solemn circumstances.

The first and natural desire expressed by all was to go resolutely in
quest of the enemy and surrender their lives on the altar of the mother
country ; but the vision of the same mother country abandoned, insnlted,
and trod upon by the enemy, proud of our defeat — for nothing else could
be expected by going to meet them on their own ground with our inferior
forces — compelled them to see that such sacrifice would not only be
useless but harmful, since it would place Spain in the hands of an
insolent and proud enemy, and God only knows what the consequences
might be. I could see the struggle in their minds between these con-
flicting considerations. All of them loathe the idea of not going imme-
diately in search of the enemy and finishing once for all.

fiut, as I said before, the vision of the country trampled upon by the
enemy rose above all other considerations, and inspired with that
courage which consists in braving criticism and perhaps the sarcasm
and accusations of the ignorant masses, which know nothing about
war in general and naval warfare in particular and believe that the
Alfonso XII OT the Oristina can be pitted against the Iowa or Massa-
chusetts, they expressly and energetically declare that the interests of
the mother country demanded this sacrifice from us.

One of the captains had certain scruples about expressing his opin-
ion, saying that he would do what the Government of His Majesty
should be pleased to order; but as all of us, absolutely all, shared these
sentiments, it is hardly necessary to say his scruples were soon over-
come. My only reason for mentioning this is to give you an exact
report of everything that happened. Another of the captains, certainly
not the most enthusiastic, but who may be said to have represented
the average opinion prevailing in the council, has, by my order, written
down his ideas and I send you a copy of his statement which reflects
better than 1 could express them the opinions of all.

This document represents exactly the sentiment which prevailed in
the meeting. Believing that I have fulfilled my duty in giving yonr
excellency an accurate account of all that happened, I reiterate the
assurance of the excellent spirit of all.

Yours, etc., Pasoual Oebveba.

His Excellency the Ministeb of Mabinb.

Apbil 21, 1898.

[Docameiit referred to.]
Oapt. ViCTOB M. OONOAS,

Commander of the Battle Ship Infanta Maria Teresa :
Concerning the subjects presented for discussion by the Admiral of

the fleet at the council of war held on board the battle ship Cristobal

Colon^ my opinion is as follows :
(1) The naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior

53

to oar own in number and class of vessels, armor, and armament, and
ill preparations made, besides the advantage given the enemy by the
insarrection in Cuba, the possible one in Puerto Bico, and the latent
iusarrection in the East, that they have sufficient forces to attack us in
the West Indies, in the Peninsula and adjacent islands, and in the
Philippines.

Since no attention has been paid to that archipelago, where it was,
perhaps, most urgent to reduce our vulnerable points, which could
have been done with a single battle ship, any division of our limited
forces at this time and any separation from European waters would
involve a strategic mistake which would carry the war to the Penin-
sula, and that would mean frightful disaster to our coasts, the payment
of large ransoms, and, perhaps, the loss of some island.

As soon as this fleet leaves for the West Indies it is evident that the
American Flying Squadron will sail for Europe, and even if its purpose
were only to make a raid or a demonstration against our coasts the just
alarm of all Spain would cause the enforced return of this fleet, although
too late to prevent the enemy from reaping the fruits of an easy victory.
The only three vessels of war remaining for the defense of the Penin-
sula— the Carlos F, the Pelayo, whose repairs are not yet finished, and
the Alfonso XIII, of very little speed, and even that not certain — are
not sufficient for the defense of the Spanish coasts, and in no manner
for that of the Canaries.

The yacht Oiralda and the steamers Oermania and Normania, of the
acquisition of which official notice has been received, are not vessels of
fighting qualities and add no strength to our navy.

(2) The plan of defending the island of Puerto Eico, abandoning
Ouba to its fate, is absolutely impracticable, because, if the American
fleet purposely destroys a city of the last-named island, in spite of all
the plans of the Goverament on the subject, and even though it would
be the maddest thing in the world, the Government itself would be
forced by x)ublic opinion to send this fleet against the Americans,
under the conditions and at the point which the latter might choose.

(3) Even deciding upon the defense of Puerto Kico alone, the trip
across at this time, after the practical declaration of war, without a
military port where the fleet might refit on its arrival, and without an
auxiliary fleet to keep the enemy busy — who, I suppose, will make St.
Thomas his base of operations — is a strategic error, the more deplorable
because there have been months and even years in which to accumulate
the necessary forces in the West Indies. It seems probable, judging
from the information acquired, that the supplies accumulated at St.
Thomas are intended by the enemy to establish a base of operations in
the vicinity of our unprotected Vieques (Crab Island). For all these
reasons the responsibility of the voyage must remain entirely with the
Government.

(4) Adding these three battle ships and the Oristdbal Odlon^ with-

54

oat her big gaBS, to the two remaining in the Peninsula and to the few
old torpedo boats which we have left, it is possible to defend oar coast
from the Ouadiana to Gape Grens, induding the Balearic Islands and
the Ganaries, thanks to the distance of the enemy from his base of
operations. This defense, however, will have to be a very energ^etic
one if the enemy brings his best ships to bear on us, and it will not be
possible to save the coasts of Galicia and of the north of Spain from
suffering more or less if the enemy should bring along a light division,
nor even the protected coasts from an attack here and there, as our
ships are too few in number to be divided.

(5) It is very regrettable that there are not enough vessels to cover
all points at one time; but duty and patriotism compel us to present
clearly the resources which the country gave us, and the needs which
present circumstances bring on the country in danger.

(6) Lastly, I believe, with due respect, that the military situation
should be laid before the minister of marine, while I reiterate our pro-
foundest subordination to his orders, and our firm purpose most ener-
getically to carry out the plans of operations he may communicate to
these forces. But, after pointing out the probable consequences, the
responsibility must remain with the Government.

ViOTOB M. GONOAS.

St. Vincent, Gape Vbbdb, April 20^ 1898.

Ike Mini9ier {Bermejo) to ike Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde,

Madrid, April 21, 1898.
Torpedo boat Ariete may return to Spain, towed by Sam Framoieoo, lasae such
instrnotions as yoa may deem neoessary.

The Admiral (Cervera) to ih^ Afinister {Bermejo).

Caps Verdb, April £1, 1899,
The more I think about it I am convinced ^ that to continue voyage to Puerto Rico
will be disastrous. I can leave for the Canaries to-morrow. The coaling is proceed-
ing slowly, there being a lack of appliances. The captains of the ships are of same
opinion as I, some more emphatically. I need instructions.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde,

Madrid, April 21, 1898,
As Canaries are perfectly safe, and you are aware of telegrams on impending sail-
ing of flying squadron, you will go out with all the forces to protect Puerto Kico,
which is menaced, following the route which your excellency has traced, bearing in
mind the ftee scope wluch the instructions give you, and which I hereby renew.
The phrase Am going north will advise me that you have sailed. Absolute secrecy
must be maintained as to your movements.^

^ This is the text in the pamphlet referred to, but the telegram as sent by me from
Cape Verde says : '* The more I think about it the more I am convinced.^'

^In the pamphlet the last part of this telegram has been suppressed. It says:
"The nation, in these extreme moments of the declaration of war, follows your
squadron in its expedition, and sends to it its enthusiastic greetings."

55

The Jdmiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

Capb Verde, April ff , 1898.
Have received cipher message concerning the Ariete. San Francisco will not finish
nnloading coal for at least five days. As the Ariete can cooperate in the defense
of Canaries, I beg that you will recall the order for her to return to Spain. Her
boilers would not hold out for long trips, but will do for local defense. I reiterate
my request of cipher telegram for further destiny of fleet.

Govemar-Oeneral (^Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa),

[Extract.]

Havana, April ge, 1898,
Public spirit very high ; great enthnsiasm among all classes. But I must not con-
ceal from your excellency that if people should become convinced that squadron iH
not coming, disappointment will be great, and an nnpleasant reaction is possible.
Beg that your excellency will advise me whether I can give them any hope of more
or less immediate arrival of squadron.

The Minister (Berm^o) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde,

Madrid, April B$, 1898.

The Government is inquiring constantly about your sailing. It is absolutely

necessary to go out as soon as posssble. Have Ariete towed to Canaries by San

Francisco.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

Cape Verde, April 22, 1898.
Have received cipher telegram with instructions to proceed to Puerto Rico. Though
I persist in my opinion, which is also the opinion of the captains of the ships, I shall
do all I can to hasten our departure, disclaiming all responsibility for the conse-
quences.^

The Admiral {Oervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

Gape Vbbdb, April 22^ 1898.
I do not know location of hostile ships, nor on what the instructions
are based. Beg your excellency to send me all possible information.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister {Bermejo)*

Cape Verde, April 22, 1898
I do not know officially whether war has been declared. It is absolutely neces-
sary that I should know in order to treat the American flag as an enemy.

^ In the pamphlet the last part of this telegram is omitted, which is as follows :
''We are grateful for the greeting of the nation, whose happiness is our only wish,
aud in the name of aU I express our profound love for our country."

66

The Minister {Berm^o) to the Admiral (Cervera).

Madrid, April gg, 1898,
If war had been declared I sbonld have advised yoa; bat^ as a matter of fact, a
state of war exists, since the United States fleet will begin to-morrow the blockade
of Cnba. The ships of the flying squadron, which I mentioned to yonr excellency,
and about which I have had no further in formation, are to blockade Pnerto Rico, but
have not yet left Hampton Roads. The foundation of the instractions is to intrnst to
your excellency the naval defense of Puerto Kico. I have no special news to commu-
^ nicate to you to-day.

The Admiral (Cervera) to ike Minister (Bermejo).

Capk Verdk, April SB, 1898.
I need precise InstrnctionB by which I can shape my conduct in case war has been
declared officially by the time I sail.

The Minister {Bermejo) to the Admiral {Cef'vera), Cape Verde.

Madrid, April Sg, 1898.
Have received yonr second telegram. Can not give yon more definite instructions
than yon have, leaving yon free to choose the rente to be followed, eluding, if
possible, an encounter with the hostile fleet, and reaching some point on the coast
of Pnerto Rico. The Ciudad de Cadiz will accompany you with as much coal as
possible.

St. Vinceijt, Cape Verde, April 22^ 1898.

His Excellency Segismundo Ber^iejo.

My DEAit Admiral and Friend: I have not yet answered your let-
ter of the 7th, which the San Francisco brought me, because, though I
have written you since, I did not have it before ine. It is impossible
for me to give you an idea of the surprise and consternation expe-
rienced by all on the receipt of the order to sail. Indeed, that surprise
is well justified, tor nothing can be expected of this expedition except
the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and demoralized return,
while in Spain it might be the safeguard of the nation.

It is a mistake to believe that the Canaries are safe, which is only
the case with reference to Santa Cruz, Las Palmas, and one or two
other places. But is Graciosa Island safe, for instance! If the Yan-
kees should take possession of it and fortify the port they would have
a base for any operations they might wish to undertake against Spain,
and surely the battalions will not be able to eject them from there.
Such a thing will not be possible at present, with the squadron at the
Canaries, but it will be inevitable when the squadron has been destroyed.

You talk about plans and in spite of all efforts to have some laid out,
as would have been wise and prudent, my desires have been disap
pointed to such an extent that if the circumstaiices had been different
I should have applied to be placed on the retired list, and I shall ask
tor it. if God spares my life, just as soon as the danger is over. I should

67

even apply for it to day, without oaring a straw for being accused of
cowardice, if it were not for the fact that my retirement would produce
among the squadron the deplorable effect of a desertion of its admiral
before the enemy. How can it be said that I have been supplied with
everything I asked for?

The Col4n does not yet have her big guns^ and I asked for the poor
ones if there were no others. The 5.5-inch annnunition, with the
exception of about 300 rounds, is bad. The dereotive guns of the
Yizcaya and Oquendo have not been changed. The cartridge cases of
the Goldn can not be recharged. We have not a single Bustamente
torpedo. There is no plan nor concert, which I so much desired and
have suggested in vain. The repairs of the servomotors of my vessels
were only made in the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Vizcaya after they
had left Spain.

In short, it is a disaster already, and it is to be feared that it will be
a more frightful one before long. And perhaps everything could be
changed yet. But I suppose it is too late now for anything that is not
the ruin and desolation of our country. I can understand that your
conscience is clear, as you state in your letter, because you are a good
man and your course is clear before you, but think of what I tell you
and you will see that I am right. I assembled my captains, as you told
me, and sent you by telegraph an extract of their opinions.

I have since forwarded you a copy of the proceedings, and by this
mail I send you an official letter commenting thereon. I have nothing
further to add. The Yizcaya can no longer steam, and she is only a
boil in the body of the fleet. But I will trouble you no more. I con-
sider it an accomplished fact^ and will try to find the best way out of
this direful enterprise.

Yours, etc, Pasoual Oebteba.

Th« Admiral {Cenoera) to the Minister {Bermefo),

Capk Verde, April ff , 1898.
I heg yonr ezoellency to permit me to insist that the result of our voyage to
America must be disastrous for the future of our country. That is the opinion of
all men of honor. I beg yonr excellency to read this telegram and my whole official
and confidential correspondence to the president of the council, in order to ease my
conscience.

The Minister {Bermejo) to the Admiral {Oervera).

M ADEID, April 2^ J 1898—6 o'clock p. m.

As result of heavy seas, Audaz had bow bent at right angles to port
as far as second bulkhead. 1 notify you so that you may have bows
of destroyers strengthened as much as possible.

58

The Minister {Bermejo) to tits Admiral (Ceroera).

Pal,AOB, Madrid^ April 23^ 1898— noon.
I call meeting of general officers. Awaiting their decision. Advise
me immediately whether torpedo boats are ready.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister {Bermejo),

Cape Vkbvir, April gS, 1898,
At principal ports West Indies, where these ships are likely to touch, we should
have confidential agents to give me authentic information, and credits should be
opened.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minieter {Bermejo),

Caps Vbrdb, April BS, 1898.
Received cipher message last evening. We are working night and day to fill
bunkers. Have telegraphed already that appliances are lacking. Eight hundred
tons still remain and it will take three days longer. Before sailing I must know
whether war has been declared.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister (Berm^o.)

Cape Vebde, April iS, 1898.
Torpedo boats ready for war; destroyers likewise, except 2.95*inch guns. They
carry coal instead. Guns can be mounted in a few hours.

Proceedings of meeting of general officers of the navy, held at the ministry of marine, under
the presidefwy of the minister of marine, Bear-Admiral Segismundo Bermejo, on April
gS, 1898,

Present : Admiral Gnillermo Chac6n y Maldonado ; Vice-Admirais Carlos Valc^cel,
Jos^ M. Ber^nger, Eduardo Butler, and Fernando Martinez ; Rear- Admirals Manuel
Pasqufn, Jos^ Navarro, Antonio de la Rocha, Ismael Warleta, Manuel Mozo, Manuel
de la Cumara, Eduardo Reinoso, and Jos6 de Guzm(in ; and Captains Jos^ Gdmez
Imaz, Antonio Terry, Joaquin Lazaga. Joaquin Cinctinegui, and Ram6n Au!16n.

The session opens at 3 o'clock p. m.

The Minister explains the situation of the country relative to the state of war with
the United States of North America, the distribution of the Spanish ships, and the
information he has concerning the enemy, and reads to them the instructions which
he has issued to the admiral of the fleet for his departure from Cadiz, which
instruction tf he did not receive until he arrived at Cape Verde, his departure having
been hastened by subsequent l^elegraphic orders.

Mr, Berdnger says that if the explanation made by the minister has no other object
than to inform them of what has happened, he thanks him and takes notice thereof.
But if the object is to ask for opinions on the subject, he should abstain from every-
thing not conformable to discipline, reserving judgment thereon until such time
when he will have a right to express it.

The Minister replies that so far he has simply explained the situation. But now
that the general officers are acquainted with it he begs them to assist him with
their advice as to what they deem most expedient for the plan of campaign to be
followed.

59

Mr, Pasquin says that the members have a right, without prejudice to disoipline,
to express their opinions, since they have been convened for that purpose; that the
question is not a technical one, but appertains to the Government, and it is for the
latter to form the plans of campaign ) that that is no reason why each one of them, if
the minister so desires, should not express his opinion ; but before doing so they
should be informed whether it is the Goyemment which convenes then as a council
of war or whelher the minister simply asks them as comrades for their private
opinions; because in the former case each one is responsible for the opinions he
expresses, while in the latter case they have no other value but that of friendly
advice; and that, in any event, since they have been convened without being
informed of the object of the meeting, they have not been able to prepare for setting
forth plans of the importance and gravity of the one about which they are being
consulted.

The Minister explains that the plan of the Government was to send the squadron
now at Cape Verde, together with the first torpedo boat division, to Puerto Hico,
and intrust to the admiral the defense of that island, which he (the minister) con-
siders in great danger from hostile attacks, being poorly defended, having very open
coasts, and inadequate garrisons in case of an uprising; that it was further intended
to keep in Spain all other available ships, so as to be able to send them at the proper
time wherever it might be necessary ; but that the instructions issued to the admiral
and received by him at Cape Verde had not yet been carried out, for the reason that
the admiral made certain objections to the plan, which he did not consider expedient.

A short controversy followed between Messrs. BerrSnger and Butler, the former
maintaining the possibility that certain opinions to which he attributes great
weight might get out, and the. latter asserting that the discretion of the members is
a complete guaranty for the secrecy of whatever might be discussed.

Mr, Chaodn asks whether the squadron had already received the order to start
from Cape Verde, as has been reported, since, if the squadron had actually sailed,
there was no need of discussing the point.

The Minieter replies that the order to start has been issued, but has not yet been
carried out, because the Admiral's remonstrances, reenforced by the opinions of the
captains of the ships, has given him much to consider, and since then he has not
reiterated the order, deeming it proper that the president of the council should be
made acquainted with such remonstrances.

Mr, Berdnger calls attention to the fact that they are being consulted after the
breaking out of hostilities, which is hardly a time for asking advice; that he should
never have advised the assembling of the squadron at Cape Verde, nor the forma-
tion of a flotilla of heterogeneous vessels, some of which impede the march of others,
for which reason the destroyers can not do what they might be able to do by them-
selves; that he should have preferred the formation of a comparatively numerous
squadron, letting the ships go separately or in small divisions, so as to enable them
to operate with greater freedom in seeking or refusing battle, as may be best ; *^iat
the idea of going back now could not be entertained, because the advance toward
Puerto Rico could be made by the fleet either as a whole or in divisions by different
routes^ some of the vessels might even be sent to the Bermudas, in order to compel
the enemy to divide his forces; that, whatever plan might be adopted, lie harbored
the hope that the victory would be on the side of Spain, owing to the good qualities
of her ships, the skill of those who commanded them, and the valor of the crews,
citing in support of his belief the fact that during the war of Independence of the
United States it happened that eleven English ships, after maintaining a blockade
for forty-two days, during which time they were constantly attacked by gunboats
manned by valiant crews, had to return to England without attaining their object.

Ths Miniiter replies that the flotilla was foimed while peace was reigning and in
ample time to reach Puerto Rico, and that the stop at Cape Verde was not part of the
Government's plan, but was due to subsequent unfortunate oausea.

60

Mr, Gdmez Tmaz saya that tbere is no use in losing time over the discnssion of
what has happened, or had to happen, but that a resolution should be adopted as to
what the squadron is to do in the future.

Mr. Mozo states that when the minister convened the general offloere of the min-
istry on Holy Thursday, April 6, for a similar purpose as the present, a majority of
thorn expressed themselves in favor of concentration at Cape Verde; that the
speaker was still of opinion that ail possible forces should have been assembled and
concentrated at a port in the Canaries; that the war should be carried on in the
nature of an active defense, placing every available resource at the disposal of the
admiral of the fleet, since it was he whp would be held responsible hereafter.

Mr. Berdnger says that his opinion is diametrically opposed to that of Mr. Mozo,
because an unfortunate encounter of the united fleet would be the ruin of the coun-
try ; that the concentration should never have taken place at any port abroad, but
that since such had been the case it was imperative for the fleet to start at* once for
the West Indies, together with the destroyers, leaving the torpedo boats at Cape
Yerde to return to the Canaries.

Ths Minister says that he deems it important for the discussion to make the mem- ,
bers acquainted with the last telegram received from the Governor-General of Cuba,
stating that all the Spanish of that island were animated by the very best spirit for
resistence; but that this was due to a great extent to the hope they harbored that
the fleet would promptly return to Cuban waters, and if the return was delayed, or
the hope lost, the Spanish population might at the same time lose the spirit ani-
mating it.

Mr. Aundn says that, although he is the youngest of the members and oan shed no
light on the discussion, he deems it nevertheless proper that he should take part in
it, if not to formulate plans of campaign, which could not be done without the
knowledge of iurther data than had so far been brought out in the discussion, yet to
particularize the debate so that it might produce some good result and fix on the
minds the value of the opinions expressed; that the first remarks of the minister
might be divided into two parts — the exposition of what has already occurred, and
a request for advice for the future.

Relative to the fir^t, he coincided with Mr. Berdnger in believing that they had
not been consulted on what had already been done and could not be helped, bad
though it might appear, and that all they could do was to take up matters from the
present moment, inquiring carefully into the future, and not deny the minister nor
the comrade the advice for which he asks, since anyone occupying his high position
under the present circumstances would need advisers to keep up his courage and
spirit to carry him through the critical period, as to which everyone would demand
explanations and require responsibilities to be fixed in one manner or another.

As to the question of forming plans of campaign, though on a forced basis and
under the pressure of present circumstances, it was not an easy undertaking and
without a knowledge of all the antecedents which is indispensable for the purpose
of formulating opinions as to possible contingencies; that the superficial knowledge
of matters derived from the press, so often erroneous, can not be taken as a basis.
For that purpose he wished to call upon the minister to explain to them the condi-
tion of the ships composing the nucletls assembled at Cape Verde and the time
required before those still in the Peninsula would be in condition for active service.

As to the iustructions to be issued to the admiral, they were probably not definite,
except as to the objective which the Government had in view, leaving him free to
develop the same as the circumstances of the moment might require, since instruc-
tions to bo complied with two weeks after they were issued, and at a distance of
2,000 miles from where they emanated, had the disadvantage that they either must
be followed blindly, or must be violated, leaving it for the outcome of events to
decide whether the man following the latter course would be hailed as a hero or
court-martialed for disobedience.

61

Finally, in view of the gravity of the situation, he called upon the esteemed
admirals and comrades, if need be, to examine the future calmly and dispassion-
ately, leaving the past out of the question, and giving the benefit of their opinions
for the good of the coantry and the assistance of their comrades, upon whom are
fixed Just now the eyes of the natioui which is not well informed as to the true cir-
cumstances under which fate has driven the country into the disaster of a war so
unequal, as far as material resources are concerned.

I'he MinUter thanks Mr. Aundn for the sentiments which have inspired his words,
and offers to exhibit whatever data may be necessary to found thereon an opinion
as to the future. He says that the two battle ships coming from Puerto Kico carry
provisions for forty-five days, and those coming from Spain for thirty days; that he
had sent them 2,000 tons of coal by a trans-Atlantic steamer and instructed the
admiral to get at Cape Verde whatever he might need, and that he therefore con-
sidered the battle ships in perfect condition to engage in a naval campaign ; that the
three destroyers were in similar condition, but of the torpedo boats only two were
able to put to sea, because the Ariete had arrived with her boilers disabled.

The fitting out of the Carlos Foould not be completed until the beginning of May,
the Pelayo would be ready before that time, and the Alfonso was ready now, but
the greater part of the supply of ammunition for the Carlos V was on the way and
he could not tell exactly when it would arrive. The Pelayo had so limited a radius
of action that she could hardly go from the Canaries to Puerto Rico without being
embarrassed, and the speed of the Alfonso XIII was so low that she might prove
an impediment to the movements of the fleet. As to the Vitoria, he did not con-
sider her fit to join the squadron on account of her slow speed, and as to the Numan-
Ota, although she would return to Spanish waters in a short time, the remodeling of
this ship was not completed, owing to strikes which had interrupted the work.

Mr, Pasqvin asks that the communications from the admiral of the squadron, in
which he speaks of the dangers he fears for the expedition to Puerto Rico, be read.

The Minister reads a telegram f^om the Admiral in which he expresses a desire to
have it plainly understood that it is his opinion and the opinion of the captains of
the ships that the voyage to Puerto Rico may mean a disaster for the future of the
country ; but that, obedient to instructions, he is hastening all the preparations, so
as to carry out the order the moment it is received. He also reads his reply advis-
ing the Admiral that he submits the resolution to the assembly of general officers of
the navy.

Mr, Bordnger states that the telegram read by the Minister is of such importance
that, in his opinion, it should not have been read, but now that it is known, he in-
sisted that the squadron at Cape Yerde shoald at once start for the West Indies, no
matter what risks it might run, the same as Tegetthoff, when he was ordered to
attack a superior Austrian^ squadron at Lissa.

Mr. Lazaga says that he has given some thought to the plan of campaign, and he
submits his plan, such as it is, to the consideration of all. At first he was in favor
of scattering the forces, but since reading the cablegram from the Governor-General
he has modified his opinion. The Carlos V should go out immediately to join the
squadron, taking workmen along to complete the electrical installation for operat-
ing the turrets. The Pelayo should complete the work of fitting out, working night
and day, and purchasing without delay whatever might be required. At Cadiz tbey
should join the Alfonso XIII and the two destroyers now in Spain and go in search
of the squadron, after first agreeing on a geographical point of rendezvous 100 miles
west of Cape Verde.

The united forces should then proceed to Puerto Rico and fight a battle there under
regular conditions, after which they should xiontinue their course south of Santo
Domingo and Cuba, appear off Havana from the west, and enter that harbor, or, if
necessary, engage in another battle with the blockading forces. The torpedo boats

* Italian. — o. N. T.

62

shoald return to Ihe Canaries or to Spain with the transatlantic steamers. The
oraisers Patriota and Bdpido should be detached and sent to the Bermadas to divert
some of the hostile forces to that vicinity and prey upon the enemy's commerce.

Mr. Cinounegui expresses the opinion that to compel the squadron to remain at
Cape Verde or on the sea until the arrival of the ships to be concentrated at Cadiz
would mean a further delay in the appearance of the Spanish naval forces in Cnba;
but that the squadron now at Cape Verde could be sent to the West Indies at once
and the Cadiz ships could be ordered later to the United States coasts for the purpoee
of causing alarm, attracting some of the hostile forces in that direction, and perhaps
carrying out some bold operation on hostile cities. He adds that the departure frona
Cape Verde is absolutely necessary, because if the squadron should remain there an j
longer it would probably be requested to leave by the Portuguese Government, in
virtue of the law of neutrality.

The Minister says that for operations on the United States coast speed is an impor-
tant factor; that the Alfonso XII I has very little speed, the Peluyo a very limited
radius of action, and that neither the latter vessel nor the Carlos V can enter and
refit in the harbor of San Juan, Puerto Rico, by reason of their draft.

Mr, Butler states that, while he realizes the necessity for the squadron to start at
once from Cape Verde, he thinks that it should be notified of the Government's
intention to reinforce it with the ships now in Spain, as an encouragement in the
difficult task upon which it is about to embark; that the Admiral should be given
every possible facility for shaping his actions according to circumstances ; for, while
it is deemed necessary for the ships to go to the West Indies, they should not be led
to a useless sacrifice, especially as there are not in Puerto Bico the necessary facili-
ties for repairing injuries.

Mr. Chaodn speaks of the difficulty of harmonizing so many different opinions, and
states that they can be only in the nature of advice and not of precepts. He believes
that public opinion is greatly mistaken in its estimate of the value and efficiency of
the Spanish squadron, but that it is, nevertheless, necessary to satisfy it within rea-
sonable bounds. He deems the departure from Cape Verde necessary, not only in
view of the considerations deduced from the cablegram from the Governor-General
of Cuba, but also for the reason pointed out by Mr. Cinctinegui, namely, that the
fleet can remain no longer in a neutral port; that it is reasonable to calculate that
it will take from ten to fifteen days to complete fitting out the ships now in Spain,
and that the departure of the squadron from Cape Verde can not be delayed so long,
and therefore it should start at once for the West Indies, even at the risk of having
to face the results of an unfortunate encounter. If tho fleet blockading Puerto Rico
should retreat or be defeated, the Spanish squadron should there await the reinforce*
ments to be sent to it before proceeding to Cuba. As to future operations, he thinks, '
it is hazardous to say anything before knowing the result of the first operations.

Mr. Valcdroel says that, in view of the situation and the gravity of the question,
he thinks that the squadron at Cape Verde should leave for the West Indies. He
does not think that there is any hope of reenforcing it with the ships fitting out in
Spain, since from what the minister has said they would reiiuire a number of days
before they could undertake the trip.

Mr. Au^dn wishes to state that, when the minister first spoke of the opinions
expressed by the admiral of the fleet, he did not read the whole cablegram, which
might cause an unfavorable impression among those present; but that from its
whole context it was clear that Admiral Cervera had acted wisely in setting forth
his opinion, while at the same time declaring himself ready to use all possible dili-
gence in doing the very thing which in his conscience he believed to be prejudicial
to subsequent operations ; that his declaration could have no other object than to
set down his opinion, fearing perhaps that in case of his death — a glorious death,
no doubt — ^his far-seeing advice would remain forever unknown.

Relative to the answer that the minister had sent him, he believed it pro}>er to
call attention to the phrase, ** submit to the rcHolution of an assembly,'' since the

68

assembly oonld not and should not adopt resolutions, but only give advice, leaving
it wholly to the Qovernment to dictate resolutions and accept the responsibility
therefor, whether in conformity with the advice received or not.

Mr, G6mez Imaz insists on his opinion that the squadrons should be united before
exposing them to an encounter, because the result of a delay of ten days could not
be as serious as a possible disaster.

The Minister, deeming the matter sufficiently discussed, suggests that each mem-
ber present express his opinion in a concise form, not in the shape of votes and reso-
lutions, which are inherent in the Government, but by condensing their opinions for
the purpose of ascertaining which is the prevailing opinion among the many
expressed.

The Minister's suggestion was adopted, and the following r^>sum6 was the result:
E48um4 of ihe opinions expressed by the general officers of the navy upon ike question which

the Minister addressed to them, in the nature of a consultation, on the 2Sd day of Aprils

189S, after explaining to said officers the situation of our naval forces and acquainting

them with the last cablegrams from the Governor-General of Cuba and the commander in

ehirf of ihe squadron at Cape Verde,

QUBSTION.

In view of the present state of war and the situation of our naval forces in Europe
and at Cape Verde, what orders should be issued to said forces relative to their
movements?

ANSWEBS OF OFFICERS IN THE ORDER FROM THE JUNIOR TO THE SENIOR.

Capi. Ramdn Ann6n y Villain, The four battle ships and three destroyers now
at Gape Verde should start immediately for West Indian waters, and after the
imperative necessity of defending the island of Puerto Rico has been pointed out to
the admiral, he should be g^ven entire freedom of action as to the route, port to be
entered, and as to the cases and circumstances in which battles should be sought or
eluded, according to the condition in which the ships arrive, the strength of the
' hostile forces, and the information which the admiral may acquire or which may
be transmitted to him prior to his arrival.

The three torpedo boats now at Cape Verde should return to the Canaries when
and as best they can under conditions of comparative safety. The ships Pelayo, Car-
los V, Alfonso XIII, Vitoria, Patricia, and Rdpido, the destroyers which are in Europe,
and other available ships which may be purchased or fitted out should be con-
centrated at Cadiz and speedily equipped; but the final destiny of these vessels
should not be determined a priori, but according to the situation of the war at the
time when these vessels are ready.

Capi, Joaquin dncunegui y Marco expresses the same opinion as Mr. Aufidn, adding
that the cruisers Patriota and Bdpido should simultaneously be -sent to the coasts of
the United States in order to create alarm, call the enemy's attention to other points,
compel him to divide his forces, and thereby enable the Spanish squadron to seek a
port under more favorable conditions.

Captain Joaquin Lazaga y Garay maintains the opinion he expressed in the course
of the debate; but if nevertheless the opinion in favor of the immediate departure
of the squadron from Cape Verde should prevail, at least the Alfonso XIII and the
destroyers now in Spain should be incori)orated with the squadron, and simul-
taneously the cruisers Patricia and Bdpido should go to the United States coasts,
provided they are in condition to do so.

Capi. Antonio Terry y Bivas. Same opinion as Mr. Aufi6n.

Capi. Jos4 G6mez Imaz, presents his answer in writing as follows: " The squadron
assembled at Cape Verde should not go out immediately, but only when the Cdrlos V,
Pelayo, and other available vessels are ready to reenforce the s<|uadron, either
directly or, preferably, by strategic maneuvers (similar to the one mentioned by

64

Captain Lazaga), so that the battle, if inevitable, may take place nnder more
favorable circunistauoes. When the forces are united, Admiral Cervera should be
permitted to operate with the freedom of action inherent in an admiral/'

Bear-Admiral Jos4 Guzmdn y Galtier, Same opinion as Mr. Aufiun.

Bear-Admiral Eduardo lieinoso y JJiez de Tejada. Same opinion as Mr. Anfidn.

Rear-Admiral Manuel de la Cdmara y Lihermoore, Same opinion as Mr. Au&on.

Eear-Admiral Manuel Mozo y Diez-Rohles formulated his opinion in writing as fol-
lows: ''If His Majesty's Governmeniy. for reasons of the country's highest interestn,
thinks best that the squadron should start immediately for Puerto Rico, the under-
signed rear-admiral is of the same opinion. If not, he thinks that the squadrou
should be reenforced, because, like the admiral of the fleet, he is convinced that a
disaster is impending, and such a disaster within sight of Puerto Rico would surely
not contribute toward raising the spirits of the inhabitants of that island nor of
the island of Cuba."

Bear- Admiral Ismael Warleta y Ordovae, Same opinion as Mr. Aundn.

Rear-Admiral Antonio de la Rocha y Aranda. Same opinion as Mr. Aufldiu

Bear'Admiral Jo%4 Navarro y Ferndndez. Same opinion as Mr. Aundn.

Rear Admiral Manuel Pasquin y de Juan, Same opinion as Mr. Aufldn.

Vice- Admiral Fernando Martinez de Eepinosa. Same opinion as Mr. AuHdn.

Fice- Admiral Eduardo Butler y Anguita. The four battle ships and three destroyers
now at Cape Verde should start immediately for the West Indies, with instructions
to accept or elude battle as may be necessary. But being convinced that in union
is strength, he is of Captain Lazaga's opinion relative to the increase of the ships
and reinforcement of the Cape Verde squadron by all available vessels, in such man-
ner and at such point as the Government may deem expedient; but he believes that
this can not be done without prejudice to the immediate departure for the West
Indies.

Vice- Admiral Joei Berdnger y Ruiz de Apodaea confirms what he has stated at the
beginning of the debate, namely, that the squadron now at Cape Verde should under
no oircumstances return to the Canaries, and still less to Spain, but should start
immediately for the West Indies, using the destroyers as scouts to procure informa>
tion prior to going into port.

Vice- Admiral Carlos Valcdrcel y Useel de Ouinibarda, Same opinion as Mr. Aufidn.

Admiral Guillermo Chacdn y Maldonado thiuks that the squadron now at Cape
Verde should start immediately for the West Indies, before being compelled by inter-
national order to leave the neutral port where it is now. Its admiral should have
full authority to proceed according to the requirements of war and the exigencies of
national honor. The ships remaining in Spain should be concentrated at Cadiz and
completed and equipped as speedily as possible, so as to be in readiness to comply
instantly with any instructions which the Government may see fit to issue to them, as
the situation of the country may demand.

In virtue whereof and by order of the minister of marine the foregoing proceed-
ings have been drawn up and signed by the gentlemen taking part therein.

Segismundo Bermejo, Guillermo Chac6n, Carlos Valctirce], Jos^ Maria
Ber^ugor, Eduardo Butler, Fernando Martinez, Manuel Pasquin, Joq6
Navarro, Antonio de la Rocha, Ismaol Warleta, Manuel Mozo, Manuel
de la Camara, £duardo Relnoso, Jos^ de Guzman, Jos6 G6mez Imaz,
Antonio Terry, Joaquin Lazaga, Joaquin Cincunegniy Ram5n Aufidn.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral {Cervera), Cape Verde,

Madrid, April $4, 189S,
Assembled general officers of the navy. Opinion is that the four battle ships and
three destroyers should start immediately for West Indies. Have submitted thiq

65

opiDion to His Majesty's Government, which ratifies it, ordering that your excel-
lency be given complete freedom o^ action in proceeding to West Indies, trusting in
your skilly knowledge, and valor. You can obtain information in West Indian
waters before entering port in Puerto Kico, or in Cuba, if deemed more expedient in
view of information received. You are given entire freedom of action ae to route,
port, and oases and circumstances in which battle should be sought or eluded. Fif-
teen thousand pounds are . it your disposal in London. The torpedo boats are to
return to Canaries with auxiliary vessels. You will prescribe their route. The
United States flag is hostile. ^

^ In the pamphlet so many times referred to the last sentence of this telegram is
omitted, which says: "I renew the enthusiastic greeting of the nation and Govern-
ment."

The Admiral (Cervera) to the MinUter (Bermejo),

Cape Verde, April 24, 1898,
Hope to finish coaling to-morrow. After turret Oquendo does uot obey horizontal
training. Have been trying in vain for two weeks to ascertain cause. We continue
to work inoessHutly.

St. Vincent, Cape Vebde,

April M, 1898.
His Excellency Segismundo Bermejo.

My Deab Admiral and Friend : The telegram ordering us to start
has jast arrived, and I have given orders to tranship irom the Cadiz to
these vessels coal, supplies, crews, and the artillery of the destroyers,
which was on board the Cadiz, I intended to sail without finishing
the x)rovisioning of the ships, but since the Cadiz is to remain here I
have decide<l to ship as much coal as possible. I will try to sail
tomorrow. As the act has been consummated, I will not insist upon
my opinion concerning it. May God grant that I be mistaken!

You see I was right when I told you that by the end of April the
Pelayoy Carlos F, Vitoria^ and Numanoia would not be finished; that the
Colon would iFot have her big guns unless we took the defective ones;
that we should not have the 5.5-inoh ammunition for the new guns, etc.
With a dear conscience I go to the sacrifice, but I can not understand
the unanimous' decision of the general officers of the navy indicating
disapprobation and censure of my opinions, which implies that some
one of them should have relieved me.

1 have been informed of the sailing of a cargo of 5,7()Q tons of coal
for Puerto Kico, where it is expected to arrive on the 11th or 12th of
May, but I am much afraid that it may fall into the hands of the
enemy. It is a mistake to suppose that I can accept or avoid a naval
battle at will. The Vizcaya^ on account of her stay in Havana and not
having had her bottom cleaned for nine months, is nothing more than
a buoy, and I can not abandon her.

Yours, etc., Pascjual Oervbra.

* At that time I tliouglit the vote unanimous. It will bo seen from tlie proceedings
of the meeting of the goneial officers that this was uot the case.
10742 5

66

P. S., 27tb. — I am almost in despair at the slowness of the 0€tdiz.
Slie is well prepared lor a voyage, but very poorly for loading and
unloading. 1 think we can start tomorrow.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Permejo),

Cape Verde, April 24, 189S,
TakinjBT advantage of delay, am having boiler tubes of Ariete repaired. If rejuly
ahaU take her along.

The Minister (Bei-mejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde,

Madrid, April U, 1898.
The Gaceta to-day publishes decree that neutral flag covers merchandise, except
contraband of war. Neutral mercliandise, except contraband of war, is not sabject
to confiscation under hostile Aug. The Goverummt reserves the right to issue let-
ters of marque and reprisal, although for the present it will use only the auxiliary
cruisers of the navy. In compliance with foregoing, warships and auxiliaries will
exercise right of search on the high seas and in waters within jurisdiction of enemy.

The Admiral (Cei-vera) to the Minister (Bemiejo).

Cape Verde, April 24, 1898.
Have received urgent telegram ordering departure of squadron. To-morrow, after
oompleting coaling, filling vacancies from crew of Cadiz, and transshipping arma-
ment of destroyers, will comply with your excelleucy's instructions.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

Cape Verde, April 25, 1898.
.Is it certain that San Francisco and Amazonas arc at Madeira? Answer direct to
captain of Cadiz in case I should start before re])ly is received.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Adiniral (Cervera), Cape Verde.

Madrid, April 25, 1898.
The ships mentioned are at Hampton Koads. Columhia and Minneapolis believed
to have sailed for Europe. I am told there are numerous spies among coal trimmers.
Immediate departure imperative. Maintain absolute secrecy as to route.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

Cape Verde, April 25, 1898.
Much swell prevents transshijiping coal and supplies from Cadiz to-day.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cei%'era), Cape Verde.

Madrid, April ^5, 189S.
Situation unchanged. Flying Sfpiadron has not yet left Hampton Roads. The
£15,000 will be deposited in England, and to that extent you can draw on London

67

for what you need. San Juan, Puerto Bioo, will he advised of eignal agreed upon with
pilot.^

The Spanish Minister at Lisbon (Jyerhe) to the Minister of State ( GulUn).

Madrid, April £6^ 1898.
Minister foreign affairs asks me confidentially to inquire of your excellency
whether you can state time that squadron will remain at Gape Verde. Same request
made of Portuguese minister at Madrid in case United States should lemonstrate,
as stated in a newspaper to-day.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo),

, Cape Yerde, April B6, 1898,

Work continues night and day shipping coal and cartridges of destroyers, hut pro-
gresses slowly, as hatchways of trans- Atlantic do not permit rapid work ; 400 tons
still lacking. The hattle ships have engines all ready, so as not to delay departure.
Yillaamil follows with squadron.

2^ Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

Cape Verde, April g6, 1898.
In view of departure of fast hostile cruisers, of which you notify me, and slow
speed of Cadiz and San Francisco, helieve it expedient that you should issue instruc-
tions direct to commander of Azor, in charge of expedition.

The Minister (Berm^o) to the Admiral {Cervera), Cape Verde,

Madrid, April 26, 1898.
Have given orders London send 5,000 tons of coal to Curasao at disposal of your
excellency and commandant of Porto Rico.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister {Bermefo),

Cape Verde, April S7, 1898,
Transshipping progresses slowly. Am in despair, but impossible to work more
rapidly. Three hundred tons of coal remain to be shipped.

T^ Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister {Bermejo),

Cape Verde, April g7, 1898.
I go out to-morrow evening. Before that I wish last reports of war and situation
in Spain.

The Minister {Bermejo) to the Admiral {Cervera), Cape Verde.

Madrid, April iS8, 1898.
Hope this will arrive in time. Havana and north of Cuba still blockaded. San
Juan, Puerto Kico, so far free. No hostile ships in European waters. Quiet and har-
mony reigning in Spain. Reiterate enthusiastic greeting of nation,^ Great activity
displayed in fittiug other ships.

^The sentence in italics is omitted in pamphlet.
*The sentence in italics is omitted in the pamphlet.

68 ^

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister {Bermtjo),

Cape Verde, April 98, 1898,
In spite of every eftbii) made working at night, can not go oat until morning. Not-
withstanding hard work can not do all that is desired. Turret of Oquendo ready.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo),

Caps Vbrdb, April S9, 1898,

Am going north.^

« [GoBfldential.]

The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine {Bermefo}.

Captaincy- General of the Squadron, Staff.

Honored Sir: Under date of the 20th I had the honor of sending yon a report on
the squadron up to that date. The unloading of the San Francisco was oontinnedy
working day and night, and completed on the 24th. As I told yonr excellency in a
separate communication, the coal was 180 tons short of the 2,000 she was to hrin^,
owing no douht to the hurry with which the steamer shipped the coal and the loss
from coal dropped in the water during the work of unloading, espeoially at night.
This must also have been the case with the Cadiz. I purclmsed all the lubricating
oil I was able to find at Cape Verde, and the ships are well supplied in that respect.

In this connection I wish to point out to your excellency the expediency of always
accompanying supplies of coal with a corresponding quantity of lubricating mate-
rial. On the evening of the 24th I received your telegraphic instructions to start
for the West Indies and detach from the fleet the three torpedo boats and the Ciudmd
de CadiZj and as these vessels were also short of ooal, and I deemed it necessary that
they should carry as large quantities as possible, I gave orders at once for them to
take 625 tons of the coal on board the Cadiz^ also engine supplies and provisions;
and the 2.95-inch guns and ammunition of the three destroyers which are to follow
me were transshipped.

Owing to the conditions of the hold of the Cadiz , the lack of transshipping appli-
ances, and the heavy swell, this work was very arduous and slow; but I thought it
was better to lose these few days than to reach our destination badly provisioned.
The ships of the Teresa type leave with 1,080 tons each, and the Coldn with 1,270 tons.
The latter ship consumes considerably more coal than the others, owing to the type
of her boilers. The destroyers carry about 140 tons each, which is 34 in excess of
their bnnker capacity. With this supply they liave theoretically an approximate
radius of action of 2,8(X) miles at the rate of 10 knots an hour. But I feel sure I shall
have to resnpply them before reaching our destination, in case the state of the sea
should not permit me to tow them. The great weakness of their construction will
have to be taken into con.sidoration in this connection.

The Vizcayaj as I advised you, is very much fouled. During her ten days* run &om
Puerto Rico here she burned 200 tons more than the Oquendo. This is a weak point,
but as I see no remedy for it at present, I contracted here for having her cleaned by
divers, but this could only be done to a limited extent. I had the divers of the fleet
clean her screws and soa cocks. Owing to pressure of time and lack of space on
board the battle sh^ips, already much overloaded, I left 1,500 spare boiler tubes of
the destroyers with the Cadiz,

If your excellency thinks that the campaign will last long enough and that there
will be chances for changing boiler tubes, I beg that you will send these wherever

*The phrase agreed upon in telegram from minister dated April 21,

69

yon may deem best. I also repeat my request for Bustamente torpedoes, which
wonld Barely be of great service. I take with me to-day the torpedoes brought by
the Ciudad de 'Cadiz and San Francisco. The expedition, as I have already told yonr
excellency, will go in command of the oldest lieutenant, Claudio Alvargonz^lez, com-
mander of the Azar.

In a separate letter I confirm to your excellency the telegrams I have sent since my
former communication. There only remains for me to tell you that there is nothing
special to report relative to the crews of the fleet, and that they are all firmly
resolved to sacrifice their lives in the fulfillment of their duty. May Qod grant our
forces the success worthy of the justice of our cause.

On board flagship, St. Vincent, Cape Verde, April 28, 1898.
Yonrs, etc.,

Pascual Curvbra.

The Commander in Chief of the Squadron {Cerrera) to the Minister of Maniie (Bermejo).

[Confidential.]

Captaincy-Gknkral op the Squadron, Staff.

Honored Sir: Under this date I issue the following instructions to the commander
of the first division of torpedo boats: ''About 450 miles from the port of Fort de
France, Martinique, you will, upon signal made, detach your division from the squad-
ron, with .the torpedo-boat destroyers Furor and Terror, and proceed to the last-
named port, at the rate of 20 knots an hour, and will there obtain information on the
points I have stated to you and return at once to communicate such information to
me, bearing in mind that the squadron will run parallel to the southern point of
Martinique at the rate of about 8 knots an hour. Being acquainted with my plans
you will operate within the limits of the same with complete freedom of action.

** Signals of recognition during the night will be the letter R of the Morse alphabet,
made with a searchlight, it being understood that the point is to be represented by
maintaining the luminous ray for a certain length of time at an elevation of 45
degrees and flash it for a greater length of time at the same elevation. Between
one R and the next, three horizontal movements are to be made with the luminous
ray ; the first, for instance, firom left to right, the second from right to left, and the
third again from left to right, or vice versa. The answer on the part of the flagship
will be the letter A, made in the same manner, and three horizontal movements.
To enable you to communicate speedily any information you may have, I inclose
herewith a sheet of conventional signals to be used on this occasion only.

" You may also communicate information by using key A B 0755. In the unlikely
case that in the performance of this mission you should meet hostile forces, you
will act as you may deem expedient, according to circumstances, bearing in mind
that your principal mission is to communicate to me the information referred toJ'
I have the honor of advising your excellency of the foregoing for your knowledge
and approval.

On board Teresa, on the sea, May 1, 1898.

Yoursy etc., Pascual Cervera.

At Sea, May 5, 1898.
Dear Juan: To complete our collection of documeuts, I think proi)er
that you should have the inclosed copy of a telegram from Yillaamil to
Sagasta. 1 forward this letter by two destroyers, which 1 am sending
to Martinique in search of news. All is well on board and the spirit
is excellent. We shall see what God has in store for us. The final

70

resnlt is not donbtful, but if we could only start with a good lucky-
stroke. God be with us. Good-bye. Regards to your family, etc

Pascuai*.

[Telefrram.— To be deciphered by naval key.— Key OD 4S98.]

Madrid, April 22^ 1898.
PrAxedbs Sagasta:

In view of the importance to the country of the destination of this
fleet, I deem it expedient that you should know, through a Mend who
does not fear censure, that, while as seamen we are all ready to die with
honor in the fulfillment of our duty, I think it undoubted that the sacri-
fice of these naval forces will be as certain as it will be fruitless and
useless for the termination of the war if the representations repeatedly
made by the admiral to the minister of marine are not taken into

consideration.

Fernando Villa a mil.

[Private.]

•

The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cerrera) to the MinUt^ of Marine (Bermefoy,

Captaincy-(;enkral of the Squadbon, Staff.

HONOKKD Sir: As I had the honor of advising your excellency in my commnnica-
tioQ of the 28th ultimo, dated at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, I left that port on the day
following with the four battle ships and three destroyers, leaving instructions behind
for the departure of tibe three torpedo boats and the steamers Ctidiz and San I^an-
oieco. Upon starting I issued to the second iu command and the captains of the
ships certain instructions, of which I herewith inclose a copy, as also of my address
to the crews, which was read to them after we had left the harbor and reoelTed with
great enthusiasm by all.

After mature consideration and in view of the wide' scope of the instructions
received and the unusual situation in which these forces will be placed, I foimulated
a plan (which I did not announce until after we had left) of shapiug my course for
Fort de France, Martinique, there to obtain information, and, if possible, coal and
provisions, which would permit me greater freedom of action. To that end I shall
detach to-morrow morning, about 470 miles from the port referred to, the Terror and
Furor, under the commander of the first torpedo-boat division, who will take with
him this letter and the following cipher telegram :

''AH well in the squadron. Spirit excellent. Yillaamil is to obtain information on
which the future operations of the squadron will depend. Five hundred and
seventy thousand pesetas are required for the pay now due. The funds on board
and those deposited in London amount to 675,000. I do not wish to exhanst resources
completely. It is therefore necessary to increase credit.''

In confirming this telegram I have the honor of impressing upon yonr ezceUenoy
the necessity of increasing the credit placed at my disposal, so that these crews who
have received only a small advance for their families and for messes may get their
pay for May, which they would already have received if they were in Spain. So far
our voyage has progressed without anything worthy of mention. We have encoun-
tered fair weather, as is usual in this season and latitude. Although with some
misgivings, 1 had the three destroyers taken in tow the day of our departure, and
started out at the rate of 10 knots an hour.

As I feared that these frail vesaels might be ii^jnred by yawing, I had the speed

71

reduced to 7.2 knots, and we continued at that rate until yesterday, when I incrensed
it to 8 knots. In doing this I have taken into consideration not only the trouble and
delay it would cause if we had torecoal them on the sea before reaching onr destina-
tiotty but also the advantage of their crews arriving fresh and in condition to render
services at once and the saving of coal by the battle ships at this rate of speed.

I also inclose herewith copy of a proclamation, addressed principally to the sub-
altern classes, and which I distribute to the ships to-day, embodying instructions
which I have drawn up for the exercise of the right of search; also copy of the
instructions which I gave to VillaAmil. I can tell nothing as yet as to my future
plans. I only repeat that I place my trust in God, and being animated by the most
ardent desire to serve my country I shall do so to the best of my ability and strength.

On board the Infanta MaHa Teresa, on the sea, 14^ 42' nortl^ latitude and 44° 26'
west longitude, May 8, 18d8.

Yoars,etc., Pascual Cervera.

instructions refrrrrd to.

Captaincy-General of tiie Squadron, Staff.

Honored Sir: Under date of April 27 last, I issued the following instructions to
the captains of the nhips of this squadron :

During the voyage the squadron will proceed in the order and at the respective
distances indicated in sketch No. 1, hereto annexed.

(The sketch referred to as No. 1 shows the squadron forming a square, the length
of the side of which being 5 ciU>les, with the Teresa at the forward left-hand comer,
the Vizeaya in the center of the square, the CoUn at the forward right-hand comer.
Two of the torpedo boats fill the remaining corners of the square, and the third
torpedo boat is in line with them, but 5 cables on the left flank of the square. The
Oquendo's station is on the left flank of the square midway between the Teresa and
the third torpedo boat. )

"The above order will be adopted immediately upon starting, without further
signal, but subject to the provisions of evolution No. 15 (for order with ships dis-
persed) of the Tactical I'^volutions, which are to remain in force. This order has
been adopted so that each destroyer may be in easy contact with the battle ship to
which she is assigned. When so ordered (which will probably not be the case until
near destination or in sight of the enemy) the formation shown in sketch No. 2 will
be adopted; that is to say, the battle ships in line ahead, with the Teresa leading and
the Vizeaya forming the rear, at the distances indicated, and the destroyers in
another line ahead, each destroyer between two battle ships, observing between
themselves the same distances as the latter, and the two lines 6 cables apart, unless
otherwise ordered.

(Sketch No. 2 shows the ships in double column, the left column consisting of the
Teresa, Oquendo, Coldn, and Vizcayat and the right column consisting of the three
torpedo boats.)

"When this order in line ahead is adopted, the commander of the division of
destroyers will go on board one of them, and if it should become necessary to fight
he will remove the destroyers to a distance, out of the range of hostile projectiles,
if possible, closely observing the phases of the battle for the purpose of descending
upon the enrmy when a favorable opportunity oft'ers.

"The commander of the division is given entire freedom of movements, as also the
captains, in case for some reason or other they can not be directed by their com-
mander in chief, who enjoins each one of them not to allow their zeal to lead them
into firing before the proper time. For passing ftom the order of the voyage to the
order of lino ahead, evolutions Nos. 10 and 11 of the Instructions will be observed,
it being understood that the Teresa and Oquendo will form one group and the Coldn
and Viscaya another.

72

''The destroyers, in a oonntermoveinent, will follow the movemeDts of the head of
the line. If sigDal Z 96 is made (take in tow, et«.), the hattle ships will gradually
slow down, after hoisting pennant Z, to the slowest speed (unless otherwise
instrnct^d), and each destroyer will proceed at once to take the tow of her respective
hattle ship. When the flagship orders the destroyers to be supplied with provisions^
she will make the sifi^nal Q 02, and the destroyers will manenver accordingly, after
hoisting pennant of execution.

''If the speed is to be moderated, it will he indicated by signals, bat the captains
of the battle ships are authorized to do so without signal, if, in their opinion, it
should become necessary. If the destroyers themselves ask for provisions, they will
make signal Q 11, and with that signal hoisted they will at once stand for their
respective battle ships. If water is wanted in place of provisions, signals Q 61 and
Q 65, respectively, will bo made, and in case of coal the signals will be J 76 and
J 84. When standing inshore, the order of occupations of the crews will be changed
as follows :

'' 1. The reveille will be sonnded early enongh so that all the men can be at quarters
and the ship in battle trim one hour before sunrise, and everything will remain in
this condition until full daylight and until it has been ascertained, after careful
reconnoitering, that a surprise is improbable.

''2. The crews will then breakfast.

''3. After breakftist such exercises will be had as may be deemed necessary for a
desired length of time, and the different apparatus which it may be necessary to use
in battle shall be carefully examined.

''4. The men will then rest until 10 o'clock, at which time the cleaning shall take
place.

'' 5. After dinner the men will rest until 2 or 3, after which such work as the ship
may require will be done. Supper at 6 o'clock, and immediately after supper clear-
ing for action, everything being left in position for battle as far as it involves no risk.
The partitions of the bunks shall remain in position and the bunks made up, but
without the blankets, as each roan will have his own, while one bunk serves for two.

''These instructions shall go into effect once for all upon signal A5 2 being made
(hang out nets. etc.).

"I have the honor of advising yon of the foregoing for yonr information and
approval.

"Yours, etc., "Pascual Crrvrra.

On Boahd Maui a Tkkksa, On the Sea, May 8, 1898."

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister (Bermefo).

Martinique, May 12, 1898.
Squadron arrived safely. Spirit excellent. Villumil in to obtain information
on which the future operations will depend. Five hundred and seventy thousand
pesetas are re(juired for the pay now due. The funds on board and those deposited in Lon-
don amount to 67f),O00. I do not wish to exhaust resources completely. It u therefore
necessary to increase the ci*edit. >

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Martinique.*

Madrid, May 12, 1898.

Government is pleased to hear of yonr arrival at Martinique. Nothing now in the
Peninsula. Telogram received to-day announcing attack San Juan, Puerto Rico, by
hostile fleet composed of New York, Indiana, Terror. Puritan, two cruisers, one torpedo

^The part in italics is omitted in the pamphlet.

2 1 did not know of any of these three telegrams until I returned to Spain. I sus-
pected the last one at Santiago de Cuba.

78

boat, and two colliers. IslaTid of Puerto Rico is watched by anxiliaries Paris and
New York. Admiral at Havana says fonr hostile ships in sight yesterday, one at
Mantauzas and several off Cienfnegos. News of bombardment of Cardenas by a
battle ship, monitor, and another vessel ; enemy repulsed.

Credit increased; another £15,000 on same honse London. Steamer J Zican/e mnst
have arrived at Martinique, and an English steamer with 3,000 tons is to make that
harbor under orders of captain of Alicante. Both vessels at your disposal.

The Minister (lirrmejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Martinique.^

Madkid, May 1^, 1898,
According to late information battle ship Oregon y accompanied by Marietta and
another similar ship, are on the way from Rio Janeiro to West Indies.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Martinique,^

Madkid, May IS, 1898.
Situation changed since yonr departure. Tour instructions amplified so that if you
do not believe that your squadron can operate there successfully may return to
Peninsula, choosing route and destination, preferably Cadiz. Acknowledge receipt
and indicate decision.

PHOCKRDINGS.

[Document No. 2, referred to, p. 114.]

The second in commanihDt' the squadron, the captains of the battle ships, the chief
of staff, and the commander of the first torpedo-boat division* being assembled in
the admiral's cabin on the 12th day of May, the admiral acquainted them with
the information obtained on the day previous at Fort de France by the commander
of the torpedo-boat division.

Having carefully studied the situation of the squadron, which is extremely criti-
cal, owing to the scant supply of coal, the governor of Martiuique having refused
to give aid in that direction, and it having been learned that there is no coal in San
Joan, nor probably at Santiago, and in view of the bad condition of the boilers of
the destroyers, those of the Ten'or being practically unserviceable, so that it became
necessary to send her back to Fort de France this morning to await orders from the
Government, these officers seeing no other solution — on penalty of placing the squad-
ron in a position where it will be unable to move and will hence become an easy prey
for the enemy— except to go to C'ura^ao, in hopes of finding there the coal announced
by the minister of marine in his telegram of April 26.

In witness whereof they sigu the foregoing, on the sea, off Fort de France,

Martiuique.

Pascual Cervera.

Jos^: DE Pakedks.

Emilio DfAZ More a.

Juan B. Lazaga.

Antonio Eula*^.

Victor M. Concas.

JoAgufN Bttstamenits.

FeI{ NANDO ViLLAMlL.

A true copy!

Criivera.

^I did not know of any of these three telegrams until I returned "to Spalu. I sus-
pected the last one at Suiitiago de Cuba.

74

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo),

Curasao, May 14, 1S98,
After consnlting with the second in command of the squadron and the captains of
the ships, I came here in hopes of finding the coal announced in your telegram of
April 26. Collier has not arrived, and I have not heen ahle to obtain here the coal I
need. There is a controversy about it, and I must see what I can do. Only tvro
ships have been allowed to enter, and their stay has been limited to forty- eight
hours.

The Governor- General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of Colonie$ (/?. GirSn^,

Havana, May 14, 1898.
I beg your excellency that you will tell me truly whether the squadron is coming.
Telegrams denying this are arriving and I stop them on the way. 1 must positively
know the truth, so as to be able to act accordingly. I assure your excellency that
absolutely no one besides myself shall know your reply.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cvra^ao,^

Madrid, May 15, 1898.
Tour telegram received. Transatlantic Alicante anchored at Martinique (with
ooal)^ has been ordered to leave immediately for Curasao. If yon can not wait, tele-
graph immediately to captain (of Terror) where you want the coal. In view of yonr
going to Martinique, steamer sent to Curasao was ordered to go to Martinique. I>o
not know whether latter has arrived.

The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Curasao.*

Madrid, May IS, 1898.
If you can not await trans- Atlantic Alicante leave orders at Curasao, so that said
steamer may go in;mediately upon arrival wherever yon order; likewise English
steamer Taickhand, which also carries coal.

Tl\c Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Curafao,^

Madrid, May 15, 1898,
Our minister from Toronto communicates to-day, 15th, the following telegram:
'* It is reported that hostile squadron under command of Sampson was at Puerto
Plata yesterday."

The Minister (Bermejo) to the First Commandant Puerto Rico (Vallarino).

Madrid, May 15, 1898.
Use every means possible to get to Admiral of squadron, who is at Curasao, the

> This telegram was not known to me until I arrived at Santiago de Cuba, where I
received it.

2 The words in parentliesos did not appear in the telegram as received.

3 Thid telegram was not known to me until I arrived at Santiago de Cuba, where I
received it.

75

telcl^i^Tftms yon have for him, as also information on situation hostile sqnadron, and
arrange for immediate departure of English steamer Boatkf if she has coal on board
fdr squadron.^

[Conflrlential.]
Tke Commander in Chief of the Sqttadron {Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

Captaincy-General of the Squadron.

Honored Sir: Through my official letter of the 8th, written on the sea, yonr
excellency knows of the few incidents of onr monotouons voyage across the Atlantic,
daring which I sacrificed everything in order that onr frail torpedo-boat destroyers
might arrive fresh and in condition to render nsefnl service. Bnt my efforts were
in vain, for hardly had the Furor and Terror been made for twenty ^our honrs to
maintain two- thirds of their trial speed, when the boilers of the latter became dis-
abled, putting US to the necessity of losing stUi farther time, and finally leaving the
Terror in the nentral port of Fort de France in the island of Martinique.

The accompanying copy of the official report of her captain, marked '' Document
No. 1," will give yonr excellency farther details as to what has occurred. It was a
great and very unpleasant surprise to me when I saw our two destroyers at day-
break of the 11th, the Terror nothing bat a buoy, and the Furor guarding her, so that
she might not be abandoned in the midst of the ocean until she was sure of being
seen by the squadron. When we reached her I took her in tow, and we had to pro-
ceed even more slowly than at the beginning, as the destroyer no longer had the
protection of the swifter with which the commander of the flotilla had pi^ovided
her.

I will say nothing further of this accident, since it has occurred to a ship under
very efficient command, and with an engineer in chief who enjoys the highest repu-
tation. It only proves the frailness of these ships. They have another defect,
almost worse, namely, the temperature which develops in them and which is unbear-
able for all, bnt especially for the engineers and firemen, who are frequently over-
oome by the heat.

The commander of the flotilla, who, as your excellency is aware, went to Marti-
nique in search of information, went out with the Furor at daybreak of the 11th, and
at midnight of the 11th he rejoined the squadron, brimful of news, but all bad, and,
among other obstacles encountered, having had to contend with a chase by a hostile
cruiser. The commander, Captain Villamil, has once more demonstrated in this
enterprise the rare intelligence, energy, and presence of mind with which he is gifted.
The information he brought me, in answer to the questions I gave him upon trusting
the mission to him, is as follows : That the hostile ships are blockading the western
part of Cuba, from Cardenas to Cienfuegos, with the nucleus of their fleet; that just
now, according to secret information which, however, is not entirely reliable, they
are off San Juan de Puerto Rico, with their Admiral, and bombarded the capital on
the 11th ; that San Juan appears to be blockaded and Santiago free ; that two of the
enemy's auxiliary cruisers, the Harvard and St, LouiSf are at Guadeloupe and Marti-
nique, respectively ; that the Americans have taken possession of Puerto Plata and, it
is believed, also of Samana; that the war of insurrection in Cuba is still going on,
and the last news is of a fierce battle at Sierra Maestra; that Spain is passing through
a ministerial crisis ; that we should not be permitted to take coal in Martinique, but
that we could get provisions there; and finally, that there was no special news from
the far East.

He also brought me a bundle of press telegrams containing a great deal of news ;
among others, of the destruction of our poor fleet in the Philippiues, which, glorious
though it may be, is nevertheless a great disaster. In view of the very serious

U did not know of this telegram until long after my return to 8pain«

76

news, and althon;]^]) my opinions on the subject bave been manifested (too franlcly,
perhaps) in my correBpondence with the Government, by telegrams as well as official
letters, and in my confidential comniunications to the minister of marine, I con-
sidered it my duty to assemble the captains and second in command of the sqaadron,
whom I acqudinted with the situation and consulted as to what, in their opinion,
was best to be done.

After discussing this very serious question, it was decided that there was no advan-
tage iu going to Martinique, since we would gain nothing thereby and only consume
coal. To go to San Jnan wonld be madness, as we wonld only be preparing an easy
triumph for tlie enemy. And as we have hardly coal enough to reach Santiago de
Cuba, with the speed necessary on the sea of operations, and as our destroyers wonld
probiibly not be able to withstand the trip, it wa-s the unanimous opinion of the offi>
cers that we should go to Curasao in search of the coal which was promised ns by
telegram of April 26. Proceedings were drawn up to that effect, a copy of which,
marked ''Document No. 2," accompanies this letter.^ As I was of the same opinion,
wo proceeded to thnt island, adopting at firHt a wrong course in the direction of Santo
Domingo, until at a distance of 30 miles from Martinique. Permit me here to make
a few observations to explain and justify my operations.

There is not the least doubt that a sacrifice, such as made by our comrades in the
Philippines, is worthy of the highest honor, and I take pleasure in expreasing to
them from hero uiy enthusiasm and admiration. But is there any practical result in
such sacrifice? Kvidently not, and from pitting vessels like the Caatilia and Chris-
Una against modern ships no other result than the one obtained can possibly be
expected. The result will always be the same where there is great disparity between
the opposing forces, whether iu the number of ships, their efficiency, or the stores
they carry.

This painful rewult therefore justifies the crude ideas I have expressed in my cor-
respondence above referred to, upon whi-h I insist no further, as I do not want to
be a bore, which is always a bad thing, especially when addressing a superior. I
therefore proceed with the report of our voyage. The run from the waters of Mar-
tinique to those of Curasao offered nothing worth mentioning. At 7 o'clock a. m. of
the 14th, about 5 miles from Little Curasao, I gave orders to the destroyers to enter
the port first; but at 8.30 I saw them off the entrance. The Pluton signaled:
"Awaiting permission of governor." The squadron stopped and soon after the Plu-
ton signaled that only two ships were permitted to go in. This was confirmed by
the pilot, who arrived soon after, demanding to know the names of the ships, their
complements and armament, and the amount of coal required. I selected the Teresa
and Vizcayay whose coal suj)ply was lower than that of the others. I gave the
information asked for, stating that each ship needed 700 tons, and the pilot went
back.

I gave instructions that the Furor should be recoaled from the Coldn, and that the
latter ship, together with the Oqnendo and Pluton, should remain outside. The pilot
returned, accompanied by the Spanish consul, who told me that the stay in the
harbor must be limited to forty-eight hours. At 12.30 we cast anchor inside, after
whieh I had an interview with the governor, who told me that this was a necessity
imposed upon his Government by both belligerents. I accepted the 600 tons of coal,
which was all that could be had in the town, and ordered the purchase of provisions
so as to supply each ship for thirty days, from the captain down to the cabin boy.

At 5 o'clock p. m. I dispatched to your excellency the following cipher message,
which I hereby confirm: ''After consulting with the second in command of the
squadron and the captains of the ships, I came here in hopes of finding the coal
announced in your telegram of April 26. Collier has not arrived, and I have not
been able to obtain here the coal I need. There is a controversy about it, and I must

^ The document referred to is given on a preceding page.

77

see what I can do. Only two ships have been allowed to enter, and their stay has
been limited to forty-eight hours/-

I tell your excellency nothing of my plans, as I do not wish to intrust them to
paper, and furthermore, when this letter reaches you, you will certainly have received
telegraphic news froin'me. The coaling proceeds slowly owing to laclc of means for
shipping it, but I intend to go out by any means this evening, no matter what quan-
tity I may have on board, for while the question of coal is of the utmost importance
to me, I do not want to speud another night with the squadron divided.

On board Infanta Maria Teresa, St. Ann Harbor, Curasao, May 15, 1898.
Yours, eto.,

Pascual Cervera.

DOCUMENT REFERRED TO (NO. 1).

Honored Sir: Agreeable to the orders of your excellency, we left the sqnadron
on the morning of the 9th instant, together with the Furor, having on board the
commander in chief of the division. We had three boilers in operation, and pro-
ceeded at the rate of 18 knots. About 1.30 several tubes of the forward boilers
bnrst. They were therefore discounected and the fires put out. We lighted the
fourth boiler, and as soon as the injured boilers were cold we examined them and
proceeded to repair No. 2, which had suffered the least.

By daylight the injured tubes had been stopped up, the fire was relighted, and by
8.30 a. m. we had steam up. By 10.30 the three boilers had neither water nor steam,
the fires were put out, and we called the Furop to take us in tow. After reconnoiter-
ing, we commenced once more to repair No. 2, and had steam up by 7 o'clock a. m.,
when we stood for the squadron, which was sighted at that moment. In conformity
with my duty, I have the honor of reporting the foregoiug to your excellency for
your information.

Yours, etc., Francisco de la Kucha.

On Board Terror, On the Sea, May 11, 1S98,

A true copy*

Joaquin Bustamente,

Chief of Staff,

[Confidential.]
2%« Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister (Beitnejo).

Cai»taincy-General of the Squadron, Staff.

Honored Sir: I believe it to bo my duty, in view of the change of government,
to call your excellency's attention to the main deficiencies with which this squadron
went out to war. The principal deficiency, not of this ship alone, but of the whole
sqnadron, is in the lack of reliable 5.5-inch auinmnition, of which all the ships
together have only about 620 rounds out of the whole 3,000. Moreover, the Visvaya
has two 5.5-inch guns and the Oquendo one which <^an not be relied upon and which
had been ordered to be chauged for others. Among the fuses there are a large num-
ber which are not safe, owing to defects of original construction.

The sqnadron has not a single one of tbe 60 Bustamente torpedoes which it was
to have. The Colon does not have her heavy guns, nor apparatus for re-forming and
charging the cartridge cases of the 5.9 and 4.7 inch guns. The Vizcaya has not been
cleaned since July, and she lias consequently lost her speed to such an extent that
she can not now make more than 13 or 14 knots an hour. By reason of this fact the
squadron has lost the only advantage which it might have hud over the liostile fieet,

78

for io important a ship can not be abandoned. And bore I close, not becanee there
are not many other things, bat becanse they are of less importance in connection
with the campaign, and it is not my object to trouble your excellency, but only to
acquaint you with the true condition of our forces.

Yours, etc., Pascual Ckkvera.

On lioAUI> Terssa, St. Ann, Curasao, May 15, 1898,

The Governor-General of Cuba {Blanco) to ihs Minister of Colonies (B, CHrdn),

Havana, May 17, 1898,

(To be deciphered by your excellency personally.)

Have asked commandant navy whether he has received news on situation of oar
squadron. He tells me received firom San Juan confidential cipher message saying
that telegram has been sent to commander in chief of squadron at Fort de France
that his instructions are amplified, and if he can not operate there suooessfuUy may
return to Peninsula. If this should happen, situation here would be wholly unten-
able, and I could not prevent bloody revolution in this capital and whole island,
feelings being already overmuch excited by delay in arrival of our squadron.
Therefore, beg your excellency to tell me whether it is true that order has been
issued to squadron to return to Peninsula, and if so does Qovernmeut realize the sig^-
nificance of such a decision, which might be the cause of a bloody page staining oar
history, and of final loss of this island and the honor of Spain t If our squadron is
defeated, it would increase here determination to vanquish or die; but if it floee,
panio and revolution are certain.

The Governor-General, Puerto Eico (Macias), to the Minister of Colonies {B, (Hr6n).

Puerto Bico, May 18, 1898.
Order fur scpiadron to return to Peninsula will end enthusiasm and high spirit
iu island. Inhabitants will say Spain abandons them and situation may become very
critical. Consider it my sacred -duty to tell you so.

The Governor-General of Cuba {Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies {B, Gir6n),

Havana, May 19, 1S98—9 a. m.
Our s(iuadron has just entered Santiago de Cuba. Congratulate its Admiral on his
Arrival and skillful voyage.

The Minister of State {GuU6n) to the Minister of Marine {Aun6n),

Ministry of State.

HoNORKD Sir: The Spanish minister at Caracas, in dispatch No. 79, dated May 18,
advises this ministry as follows:

*'0n Friday, the 13th instant, a report was circulated iu this city that the Spanish
squadron was in the port of Higuerote, in this Hepublic. The origin of the rumor
could not be ascertained becanse, owing to the revolution which is still devastating
this country, there is no telegraphic communication with that point. Troubled by
this report, I received on Saturday, the 14th, a telegram from our intelligent and
energetic vice-consul in chargo of the Spanish consulate at Curasao, Mr. Morris £.
Curiel, telling me that the S])aui8h squadron, comi)osed of six ships, was sighted iu
that harbor. I telegraphed immediately, asking for frequent information, and at

79

the same time dispatched to yonr excellency a cipher telegram as follows, * [Span-
ish] 8(inadron [in] sight to-day [oft'] Curasao/ in order that the Goverument might
know as early as possible the whereabouts of the squadron.

Mr. Morris tele^i^raphed me the same day, the 14th, at 6.45 p. m., that the Infanta
Maria Teresa and Vizcaya had entered the harbor, the Oquendo, Crisidhal Colon, an*d
destroyers Plui6n and Furor remaining outside. Sunday, the 15th, I learned that
the squadron was in search of coal, and that 500 tons, all there was in that i>ort, had
been sold it by Captain Smith, United States consul. The latter being severely
reprimauded by the United States minister here, replied that the coal did not belong
to him, bat to a friend, upon whom he had prevailed not to sell any more than had
already been shipped at the time he made complaint to him, namely, about 300 tons.

I am waiting for the mail from Curasao to confirm or coirect this and other infor-
mation which I have received and from which it would appear that the squadron
pnrchused a large amount of provisions and that the destroyers had their bunkers
full of coal. I was also informed' that the United States minister had telegraphed
to Washington and to the American dispatch boat at St. Thomas that the United
States fleet was awaiting ours in Mona Passage, between Santo Domingo and Puerto
Rico. I at once telegraphed to Curasao, and the consul answered at 5.30 p. m. that
he had given warning and that the squadron was going out.

'*As I kuew that the United States fleet was expected at Curasao, where two tele-
grams have been waiting for Admiral Sampson since the 13th, and knowing further
that the French Cable Company has telegraphed its agents at La Gnayra, Puerto
Cabello, and Curayao, opening unlimited credits to said admiral for telegraphing
purposes, I sent a trustworthy person with precise instructions to our consnl at
La Guayra, Mr. Perera, and urged him to have one of the pilots of the port, all of
whom happened to be Spanish, in readiness in case our squadron should be sighted,
to start immediately and notify Admiral Cervera of all this, as also of the fact that
there is coal available in the port of Guantu, near Barcelona, in this Republic.

"By secret information I learned that same day, the 15th, that the correspondent
here of the New York Herald had received a telegram from that paper asking him
to telegraph whether the Spanish squadron was at Farranquilla, United States of
Colombia, which shows that it is believed in the United States that our ships are off
the Leeward Islands and Colon. All this strictly confidential information I have
received from different persons who are desirous of proving to me their loyalty to
Spain, and none of this information has cost this legation a single cent. On the 16 th
the consul at Curasao telegraphed me that the Spani&h vice-consul at Puerto Plata,
Santo Domingo, had informed him of the arrival of the United States fleet.

''On the same day 1 dispatched to you a cipher telegram, saying: ' Spanish sqnad-
ron composed ^of) six ships has obtained (at) Curasao only 300 tons (of) coal, weigh-
ing anchor yesterday, notified by me (that) United States fleet is awaiting (them in)
Mona Passage.' ' United States fleet is in Puerto Plata (and is) expected (at) Curayao
and Venezuela. Coal available at Guauta.'

"To-day the consnl at CuraQao has transmitted to me a telegram from our consul
at Santo Domingo in key 74, and as I do not have this it was deciphered by the
secretary of the Spanish legation, who, fortunately, has an excellent knowledge of
the cipher keys of your ministry. The telegram said: 'Hostile fleet went out
Saturday Samana.' I do not know whether this telegram has reference to a move-
ment prior to the arrival of said fleet at Puerto Plata, Monday the 16th. 1 have also
received a telegram from the Governor-General of Puerto Rico, asking me whether I
had cipher key 74, and, trusting to the cryptographic knowledge of the secretary of
this legation, Mr. Mariategui, 1 answered that 1 had.

"llie consnl at Curayao has received and forwarded to me a telegram from the
commandant-general at Havana, Rear- Admiral Manterola, and one from the oom-
mandant-goneral of Puerto Rico, one yesterday and the other to-day, both in the
naval key, which neither he nor I have been able to make out. I have asked both

•80

to tele^aph to me in the key of the miuistry of state, bat have so far received no
reply.

''About a week ago a United States officer arrived here as military attaches t4> the
legation, and be and his minister are working hard, the former makin^frec|aent trips
to the port of La Guaira. But I do not lose sight of them, and shall d^ whatever I
can to frustrate their plans/'

Obedient to royal order from the minister of state, I transmit the above to your
excellency, for your information and to such ends as may be deemed expedient.

Palace, June 17, 1898.

L. Polo de Bernab^/

Assistant Secreiarjt'

The Minister (Aundn) to the Captain of the Terror j at Martinique, and Naval Commandant

at Santiago de Cuba.*

Madrid, May 19, 1808,
If possible to communicate with Admiral our squadron, notify him that Govern-
ment cancels telegram as to return to Spain.

The Spanish Minister at The Hague to the Minister of State (GulUn),*

The Hague, May 19, 1S9S.
Minister plenipotentiary United States has called attention Dutch Government to
quantity of coal furnished Spanish squadrou at C^uravao, believing it to bo more
than 400 tons. Has insisted on the island not being converted into a base of opera-
tions.

The Admiral {Ccrrera) to the Minister (Aunon).

SANTiA(io DK Cuba, May 19, 1898.
The sfpiadron entered the harbor this morning. Imperative to clean engines and
boilers, which will make it necesHary for mo to remain here several days. Moreover,
I need more coal tlian I have.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captam- General of Cuba {Blanco).

Santiago de Cuba, May 19^ 1S98.

Have cast anchor to-day iu this harbor, whence whole sqaadron

sends you greeting, desirous of coo])erating in the defense of the
country.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant- Qeneral of the Navy-Yard

(Manterola).

Santiago de Cuba, May 19^ 1898.
Cast anchor in this harbor this morning, and have the pleasure of
placing myself at your disposal.

'I did not learn of this communication and three preceding telegrams until long
after my return to Spain.
■-^I learned of this telegram at Santiago on the 20th.
^I did not know of this telegram until long after my return. to Spain,

81

The Minister {Aundn) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago de Cuba,

Madrid, May 19, 1898,
Ministry congratulates your excellency and squadron on skillful maneuver.
Have ordered commandant navy-yard to supply you with whatever you require.
Act in cooperation with the Governor-General and give me frequent news.

Oaptadn-Oeneral of Cuba {Blanco) to General Linares^ Santiago*

Havana, May 19^ 1898.
Eandly advise Admiral Cervera that I congratalate him on safe
arrival and skillful voyage, and offer him my cooperation in everything.
Need hardly tell your excellency that I am always at your service. My
last information is: Sampson's fleet at Samana and Puerto Plata.
Flying Squadron on the way from Charleston to Key West, where it is
expected to arrive to-day.

The Commandant Navy-Yard^ Havana [Manterola)^ to the Admiral

(Cervera)^ Santiago,

Havana, May 19, 1898.
Tour telegram received. Learning of your arrival through com-
mandant, navy, hasten to congratulate you in name of all on safe
arrival. From information received United States squadron of evolu-
tion was to sail for Key West, unite with Sampson's, and seek ours. A
transport, two cruisers, and a gunboat are blockading this harbor.

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanoo) to the Minister of War (Correa),^

Havana, May £0, 1898,
As I notified yonr excellency, Cervera's squadron arrived at Santiago minus
Terrorj which was left at Martinique with Alicante, both blockaded by hostile ships.
Squadron without provisions and coal. Taking coal at Santiago where it can not
remain long; danger of being blockaded and entirely cut oil'; resources of place
limited. If PelayOy Carlos V, and torpedo-boat flotilla had come with them might
attempt some action and lend powerful assistance in defense of islands. But
reduced as it is, squadron must elude encounter and contiue itself to maneuvers
which will not compromise it and which can not have great results. Has brought
no transports with coal and provisions which would have helped so much, nor
weapons and ammunition.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister (AunSn),

Santiago de Cuba, May 20, 1898.
Intend to refit ships in shortest possible time, because, in my opinion, Santiago
will soon be in difficult situation if it does not receive aid.

^ I learned of this telegram long after my return to Spain.
10742 6

82

The Minister (Au^n) to the Admiral (Cervera), SanHago.

Madrid, Majf $0, ISSS.
It is reported that island of Caba will be iavaded latter part of next week bj
28,000 men. Hostile ships stationed soath of Santiago and St. Thomas and near
Martinique to capture Terror and Alicante, (The enemy supposes defensive power
of Puerto Rico very slight.) ^

The Commandant- Oeneral of Navy-Yard {Manterola) to the Admiral

{Oervera)j Santiago.

Havana, May 20, 1898.
Necessary to notify admiral of squadron that English steamer with
3y000 Cardiff coal leaves for Gura9ao to-day, by superior order, car-
rying urgent telegram from minister marine. Consul St. Thomas says
hostile squadron, reenforced by another Key West, has gone out to
meet ours in direction Martinique.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant- Oeneral of Navy -Yard

(Manterola).

Santiago be Cuba, May 20, 1898.
These ships must have engines repaired. I do not know comi>osition
of hostile squadrons nor distribution of their other naval forces.
Would be grateful to you for this information. Also beg you will
advise me whether 5.5-inch ammunition and other stores have been
received for this squadron, and whether Cienfuegos has resources and
communication by land with Havana. Deem it absolutely necessary
to send coal and large quantity provisions here at once. We are very
grateful to your excellency and personnel of navy-yard for congratu-
lations.

The Captain of Terror to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

FOBT DE Fbanoe, May 20j 1898.
Bepair of boilers completed.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain of the Terror.

Santiago db Cuba, May 20, 1898.
Congratulate you on repairing boilers. When you can proceed to
Puerto Rico in comparative safety, start. But I understand at present
hostile ships stationed at St. Thomas to capture you and Alicante.
Notify Alicante,

^ The seuteiice in pareuthesed was not transmitted to Santiago.

83

The Minister (Aufidn) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago,

Madrid, May 21, 1898,
Tour telegram received. Advise me whether yoa have received saffioient coal and
whether you have news of Terror.^ Thirty thousand pounds at your disposal in
London*

The Minister (Aun6n) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago,

Madrid, May 21, 1898,
Ora transports in Martinique and Puerto Rico are urged to carry coal to yon and to
the naval officer assigned to Kingston, Jamaica, who is instructed to place himself
under your orders.

The Minister (Au^dn) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago,

Madrid, May 21, 1898,
BeoeiYed information that Sampson's fleet left Key West last night.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Atmdn),

Santiago db Cuba, May 21, 1898.
Congratulate your excellency on elevation to ministry, of which we hope great
results. Santiago de Cuba very short of provisions, and if it does not receive any it
must succumb. As this squadron is greatly inferior to American, we can not aooept
decisive battle, which would mean certain defeat, and if we are blockaded before we
finish taking coal, which is (scarce) difficult,^ we shall succumb with the city. If
provisions are received, resistance will be possible as long as they last.

The Minister {Aundn) to the Admiral {Cervera)^ Santiago.

Madrid, May 21^ 1898.
Her Majesty charges me to congratulate your excellency in her name
on your skill and sends greeting to crews of squadron, whose movements
she follows with interest.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister {Aun6n).

Santiago de Cuba, May 21^ 1898.
Received telegram from Terror yesterday, notifjring me boilers
repaired. Have instructed her to go to Puerto Rico if opportunity
offers, notifying her that enemies are at present watching for her.

^The part in italics omitted iu pamphlet.

^ In the pamphlet the word in italics is omitted and the word in parentheses; which
does not occur in the original, is inserted.

84

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aundn),

Santiago db Cuba, May 21^ 1898.
Beg yoar excellency will express to iler Majesty our profound grati-
tude and loyalty, hoping only to render ourselves worthy of distinction
shown us.

The Oaptain- General of Ouba {Blanco) to the General (Linares) j Santiago.

Havana, May J21, 1898.
Tell Admiral Oervera that English ship with coal has left Oiira9ao
for Santiago. You can afterwards use said vessel for provisions.

Commandant-General of Navy- Yard {Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera)^

Santiago.

Havana, May 21 j 1898.
Guantanamo, Mulata, Cardenas, Matanzas, Mariel, and Nipe have
Bustamente torpedoes; latter place doubtful. Oienfnegos and Havana,
electric torpedoes.

The Commandant- General of Navy- Yard {Manterola) to the Admiral {Oer-
vera).

Havana, May 21, 1898.
Gienfuegos has resources and communications by land with this
capital. I send this now and will answer other questions to-morrow.

The Commandant-General of Navy- Yard {Manterola) to the Admiral

{Cervera).

Havana, May 21, 1898.

The hostile forces are composed of seven cruisers, namely: Brooklyn,
Massachusetts, Minneapolis, Columbia, New York, Indiana, Iowa, and
Oregon. Two of 6,000 tons, Texa^ and Puritan, expected in the near
future. Five of from :i,000 to 4,000, seven of from 1,000 to 2,000, six
torpedo boats of from 127 to 180, and another cruiser have been sighted
off Havana and Gienfuegos. Also large number of tugs and trans-
ports, more or less well armed, but of high speed; number rei)orted to
exceed sixty, which I can neither deny nor confirm.

At present there are off the harbor cruiser New York, Indiana,
Puritan, and five other cruisers, six gunboats, and two dispatch boats.
Have in store only 150 rounds for 5.5-iuch guns, twenty-five rounds for
11-inch, three boxes fuses for Vizcaya. On April 1 1 reported to minisier

85

in Key AB 0553: "Of the fifty-five vessels composing this fleet thirty,
two are auxiliary launches of little usefulness, even for police service
on the coast, being intended only for service against filibustering
expeditions. The two cruisers are wholly useless,

" Engines of Alfonso XII totally disabled. Reina Mercedes^ seven of
the ten boilers useless and three almost so. Of Marques de la Ense-
nadaj Isabel Ily and VenaditOj the latter is the only one in condition to
put to sea; all others will not be able to move for a month. Magallanes
can not light fires, either. Gunboats converted into cruisers, for which
purpose they were not constructed, have lost their speed, which consti-
tutes their principal defense. Transport Legazpi, highest speed 7 knots.
Of the small English gunboats I believe I need say nothing."

A look at the Reina Mercedes will give an idea of what my forces are.
Infanta- Isabel and Marquis de la Ensenada will soon be ready. Tor-
pedo gunboats Martin A, Pinz&n^ Nueva Espana, MarquSs de Molins^
and Vicente Y. Pinzdn can be used, or at least are able to move. Pro-
visions for two months for this fleet and the one under your excellency's
command. Our coal, 9,000 tons ; an embargo on private stores prob-
ably about 20,000. I had counted on your arrival with your squadron
and numerous convoy of provisions and stores of every kind, and
torpedo boat flotilla.

Your arrival, as it is, compels me to tell you that it is necessary for
me to know and inform captain-general if more ships and convoys are
coming, so that, if we can count on nothing more than what we have,
we may agree with your excellency upon a plan for uniting all we have
in the most efficacious manner according to circumstances. We have
not a single fast vessel for that purpose, neither government nor private,
and the fastest one we have, the Santo Domingo^ is in dock. I await
your answer.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minieter (Auiidn).

Santiago de Cuba, May €9, 1898.
Have been compelled to engage firemen to increase oomplemente inadequate for
this service.

The Minister (Aundn) to the Admiral {Cervera)^ Santidgo.

Madrid, May 22^ 1898
I rex)eat my telegrams of April 26 and May 12, advising you that you
have at your disposal in London, banking house Mildred Goyoneche,
£15,000.

The Admiral {Oervera) to the Minister (Aun6n). .

Santiago de Cuba, May 22^ 1898.
We are still cleaning engines and boilers, which is absolutely neces-
sary* We are taking coal, but there is not enough to refill bunkers;

84

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister {Aun&n).

Sai^tiago db Cuba, May 21^ 1898.
Beg yoar excellency will express to ller Mi^esty our profoond grati-
tude and loyalty, hoping only to render ourselves worthy of distinction
shown us.

The Oaptain- General of Ouba {Blanco) to the Oeneral {Linares)^ Santiago,

Havana, May 21^ 1898.
Tell Admiral Oervera that English ship with coal has left Gara9ao
for Santiago. You can afterwards use said vessel for provisions.

OmMnanda/ntrOeneral of Navy- Yard {Manterola) to the Admiral {Cervera)^

Santiago.

Havana, May 2ly 1898.
Quantanamo, Mulata, Cardenas, Matanzas, Mariel, and Nipe have
Bustamente torpedoes; latter place doubtful. Cienfiiegos and Havana,
electric torpedoes.

The Commandant' Oeneral of Navy- Yard {Manterola) to the Admiral {Cer-
vera),

Havana, May 21, 1898.
Gienftiegos has resources and communications by land with this
capital. I send this now and will answer other questions to-morrow.

The Commandant' Oeneral of Navy Yard {Manterola) to the Admiral

{Cervera).

Havana, May 21, 1898.

The hostile forces are composed of seven cruisers, namely: Brooklyn,
Massa^htisettSj Minneapolis, Columbia, New York, Indiana, Iowa, and
Oregon. Two of 6,000 tons, Texa^ and Puritan, expected in the near
future. Five of from 3,000 to 4,000, seven of from 1,000 to 2,000, six
torpedo boats of from 127 to 180, and another cruiser have been sighted
off Havana and Cienfuegos. Also large number of tugs and trans-
ports, more or less well armed, but of high speed; number reported to
exceed sixty, which I can neither deny nor confirm.

At present there are ott' the harbor cruiser New York, Indiana,
Puritan, and five other cruisers, six gunboats, and two dispatch boats.
Have in store only 150 rounds for 5.5-iuch guns, twenty-five rounds for
11-iuch, three boxes fuses for Vizcaya. On April 1 1 reported to miuisier

85

in Key AB 0553: "Of the fifty- tive vessels composing this fleet thirty,
two are auxiliary laniiches of little usefulness, even for police service
on the coast, being intended only for service against filibustering
expeditions. The two cruisers are wholly useless.

" Engines of A Ifonso XII totally disabled. Reina Mercedes^ seven of
the ten boilers useless and three almost so. Of Marques de la JEnse-
naday Isabel IIj and VenaditOy the latter is the only one in condition to
put to sea; all others will not be able to move for a month. Magallanes
can not light fires, either. Gunboats converted into cruisers, for which
purpose they were not constructed, have lost their speed, which consti-
tutes their principal defense. Transport Legazpi^ highest speed 7 knots.
Of the small English gunboats I believe I need say nothing."

A look at the Reina Mercedes will give an idea of what my forces are.
Infanta- Isabel and Marquh de la Ensenada will soon be ready. Tor-
pedo gunboats Martin A, Pinzdn, Nueva Espana, MarquSs de MolinSy
and Vicente Y, Pinzdn can be used, or at least are able to move. Pro-
visions for two months for this fleet and the one under your excellency's
command. Our coal, 9,000 tons; an embargo on private stores prob-
ably about 20,000. I had counted on your arrival with your squadron
and numerous convoy of provisions and stores of every kind, and
torpedo boat flotilla.

Your arrival, as it is, compels me to tell you that it is necessary for
me to know and inform captain-general if more ships and convoys are
coming, so that, if we can count on nothing more than what we have,
we may agree with your excellency upon a plan for uniting all we have
in the most efficacious manner according to circumstances. We have
not a single fast vessel for that purpose, neither government nor private,
and the fastest one we have, the Santo Domingo^ is in dock. I await
your answer.

The AdmiSral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auii6n).

Santiago dk Cuba, May t9, 1898.
Have been compelled to engage firemen to inorease complements inadequate for
this service.

2%6 Minister (AuMn) to the Ad^niral {Cervera)y Santidgo.

Madrid, May 22^ 1898
I repeat my telegrams of April 26 and May 12, advising you that you
have at your disposal in London, banking house Mildred Goyoneche,
j&15,000.

The Admiral {Oervera) to the Minister (Aundn). ,

Santiago de Cuba, May 22^ 1898.
We are still cleaning engines and boilers, which is absolutely neces-
sary* We are taking coal, but there is not enough to refill bunkers;

84

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aundn).

Saiytiago de Cuba, May 21, 1898.
Beg yoar excellency will express to Her Majesty our profoand grati-
tnde and loyalty, hoping only to render ourselves worthy of distinction
shown us.

The Captain- General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), SanHoffo.

Havana, May 21, 1898.
Tell Admiral Oervera that English ship with coal has left Gara9ao
for Santiago. You can afterwards use said vessel for provisions.

OommanAanUOeneral of Navy- Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cerr-era)j

8anti€^o.

Havana, May 21, 1898.
Guantanamo, Mulata, Cardenas, Matanzas, Mariel, and Nipe have
Bustamente torpedoes ; latter place doubtful. Gienfuegos and HavaDa,
electric torpedoes.

The Commandant- General of Navy- Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cer-
vera).

Havana, May 21, 1898.
Gienfuegos has resources and communications by land with this
capital. I send this now and will answer other questions to-morrow.

The Commandant- General of Navy- Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral

(Cervera).

Havana, May 21, 1898.

The hostile forces are composed of seven cruisers, namely: Brooklyn,
MOrSsachusettSj Minneapolis^ Columbia^ New Yorky Indiana, lowa^ and
Oregon. Two of 6,000 tons, Texas and Puritan, expected in the near
future. Five of from 3,000 to 4,000, seven of from 1,000 to 2,000, six
torpedo boats of from 127 to 180, and another cruiser have been sighted
ofif Havana and Gienfuegos. Also large number of tugs and trans-
ports, more or less well armed, but of high speed ; number reported to
exceed sixty, which I can neither deny nor confirm.

At present there are ott* the harbor cruiser New YorJe, Indiana,
Puritan, and five other cruisers, six gunboats, and two dispatch boats.
Have in store only 150 rounds for 5.5-iuch guns, twenty-five rounds for
11-inch, three boxes fuses for Vizcaya. On April 1 1 reported to minister

i

85

in Key AB 0553: "Of the fifty- tive vessels composing this fleet thirty-
two are auxiliary launches of little usefulness, even for police service
on the coast, being intended only for service against filibustering
expeditions. The two cruisers are wholly useless.

'' Engines of Alfonso XII totally disabled. Reina Mercedes^ seven of
the ten boilers useless and three almost so. Of Marques de la JSnse-
nadaj Isabel II, and VenaditOy the latter is the only one in condition to
put to sea; all others will not be able to move for a month. Magallanes
can not light fires, either. Gunboats converted into cruisers, for which
purpose they were not constructed, have lost their speed, which consti-
tutes their principal defense. Transport Legazpi, highest speed 7 knots.
Of the small English gunboats I believe I need say nothing."

A look at the Beina Mercedes will give an idea of what my forces are.
Infanta- Isabel and Marquis de la Ensenada will soon be ready. Tor-
pedo gunboats Martin A. PinzdUj Nueva Espana, Marquis de MolinSy
and Vicente Y. Pinzdn Ccin be used, or at leaBt are able to move. Pro-
visions for two months for this fleet and the one under your excellency's
command. Our coal, 9,000 tons; an embargo on private stores prob-
ably about 20,000. 1 had counted on your arrival with your squadron
and numerous convoy of provisions and stores of every kind, and
torpedo boat flotilla.

Your arrival, as it is, compels me to tell you that it is necessary for
me to know and inform captain-general if more ships and convoys are
coming, so that, if we can count on nothing more than what we have^
we may agree with your excellency upon a plan for uniting all we have
ID the most efficacious manner according to circumstances. We have
not a single fast vessel for that purpose, neither government nor private,
and the fastest one we have, the 8anto Domingo^ is in dock. I await
your answer.

The Adtniral (Cervera) to the Minister (AufM).

Santiago dk Cuba, May t$, 1898.
Have been oompelled to engage ftreDien to inorease complements inadequate for
this servioe.

The Minister (Aufidn) to the Adiniral (Oervera)^ Santidgo.

Madrid, May 22, 1898
I repeat my telegrams of April 26 and May 12, advising you that you
have at your disposal in London, banking house Mildred Goyoneche,

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister (Aun6n). ,

SANTiAao DB Cuba, May 22, 1898.
We are still cleaning engines and boilers, which is absolutely neces-
sary* We are taking coal, but there is not enough to refill bunkers;

84

The Admiral (Oervera) to the Minister {Aundn).

Santiago db Cuba, May 21^ 1898.
Beg yoar excellency will express to Her Majesty our profoond grati-
tnde and loyalty, hoping only to render ourselves worthy of distinction
shown us.

The Captain- General of Ouba (Blanco) to the General {lAnares)^ Santiago,

Havana, May 2lj 1898.
Tell Admiral Oervera that English ship with coal has left Gnragao
for Santiago. You can afterwards use said vessel for provisions.

Oomma/ndanUQeneral of Navy- Yard {Manterola) to the Admiral {Cervera)j

Santiago.

Havana, May 21 j 1898.
Ouantanamo, Mnlata, Cardenas, Matanzas, Mariel, and Nipe have
Bustamente torpedoes; latter place doubtful. Gienfuegos and Havana,
electric torpedoes.

The Commandant- Oeneral of Navy- Yard [Manterola) to the Admiral (Cer-

vera).

Havana, May 21^ 1898.
Gienfuegos has resources and communications by land with this
capital. I send this now and will answer other questions to-morrow.

The Commandant' Oeneral of Navy -Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral

(Cervera),

Havana, May 21, 1898.

The hostile forces are composed of seven cruisers, namely: Brooklyn^
Massachusetts^ Minneapolis^ Columbia^ New Yorlc, Indiana, Iowa, and
Oregon. Two of 6,000 tons, Texas and Puritan, expected in the near
future. Five of from 3,000 to 4,000, seven of from 1,000 to 2,000, six
torpedo boats of from 127 to 180, and another cruiser have been sighted
off Havana and Gienfuegos. Also large number of tugs and trans-
ports, more or less well armed, but of high speed; number reported to
exceed sixty, which I can neither deny nor confirm.

At present there are off the harbor cruiser New York, Indiana,
Puritan, and five other cruisers, six gunboats, and two dispatch boats.
Have in store only 150 rounds for 5.5-iuch guns, twenty-five rounds for
11-inch, three boxes fuses for Vizcaya, On April 1 1 reported to minister

85

in Key AB 0553: "Of the fifty-live vessels composing this fleet thirty-
two are auxiliary launches of little usefulness, even for police service
on the coast, being intended only for service against filibustering
expeditions. The two cruisers are wholly useless.

'* Engines of Alfoiiso XII totally disabled. Beina Mercedes^ seven of
the ten boilers useless and three almost so. Of Marquis de la JEnse-
naday Isabel 11, and VenaditOj the latter is the only one in condition to
put to sea; all others will not be able to move for a month. Ma^allanes
can not light fires, either. Gunboats converted into cruisers, for which
purpose they were not constructed, have lost their speed, which consti-
tutes their principal defense. Transport Legazpi, highest speed 7 knots.
Of the small English gunboats I believe I need say nothing."

A look at the Beina Mercedes will give an idea of what my forces are.
Infanta- Isabel and Marquis de la Unsefiada will soon be ready. Tor-
pedo gunboats Martin A, Finzdn, Ifueva Hspana, Marquis de MolinSy
and Vicente Y. Pinzdn can be used, or at least are able to move. Pro-
visions for two months for this fleet and the one under your excellency's
command. Our coal, 9,000 tons; an embargo on private stores prob-
ably about 20,000. I had counted on your arrival with your squadron
and numerous convoy of provisions and stores of every kind, and
torpedo boat flotilla.

Your arrival, as it is, compels me to tell you that it is necessary for
me to know and inform captain-general if more ships and convoys are
coming, so that, if we can count on nothing more than what we have,
we may agree with your excellency upon a plan for uniting all we have
in the most efficacious manner according to circumstances. We have
not a single fast vessel for thatpurpose, neither government nor private,
and the fastest one we have^ the Santo Domingoj is in dock. I await
your answer.

The Admiral (Cervera) to ike Minisier (Aufl6n).

Santiago dr Cuba, May 99, 1898,
Have been compelled to engage firemen to increase complements inadequate for
this service.

The Minist'Cr (Aun&n) to the Admiral {Cervera)^ Santidgo,

MadeH), May 22, 1898
I repeat my telegrams of April 26 and May 12, advising you that you
have at your disposal in London, banking house Mildred Goyoneche,
£16,000.

The Admiral (Oervera) to the Minister {Aundn). .

SANTiAao DE Cuba, May 22, 1898.
We are still cleaning engines and boilers, which is absolutely neces-
sary* We are taking coal, but there is not enough to refill bunkers;

86

bat if collier arrives firom Gnra9ao we can refill, and there will be some
left over. Sent you information about Terror by telegraph yesterday.

The Admiral {Oervera) to the Oommanda/nt' General of Navy-Yard

(Manterola).

Santiago db Cuba, May 22^ 1898.
Have received your cipher telegram advising me of pitiful condition
of your naval forces. Believe no more can come from Spain, as none
were available except Carlos Vj Alfonso XIII ^ and a few destroyers
and torpedo boats. Pelayo has not, I believe, her secondary battery
installed. Possibly some of the trans- Atlantics purchased may come
with stores. I believe there are four; speed good. My coming here
has been somewhat fortuitous; according to instructions I was to go to
Puerto Eico. Do not believe convoys have been thought of at all, since
I have always been told that I should find everything here. These
ideas may perhaps have changed with ministerial crisis.

Captain of Alicante (Oenis) to the Admiral (Cervera).

FoBT DB France, May 22j 1898.
Marquis Gomillas tells me to go to Santiago and leave coal. Captain
of destroyer advises on the part of your excellency that hostile ships
are stationed to capture me. Beg that you will give me instructions.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain of Alicante {Oenis).

Santiago db Ouba, May 22j 1898.
Do not go out for the present.

The Commandant- Oeneral of Puerto Bico ( Villarino) to the Commandant,

Na/vy^ Santiago de Cuba.

San Juan, May 22j 1898.
English steamer Bestormelj 3,000 tons Oardiff coal ibr squadron, left
Guragao yesterday for Santiago. Speed, 7 knots.

The MiniBier (Awfidn) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

Madrid, May tS, 1898,

I approve increase of firemen. Coal left San Jnan for Santiago. There are 3,000

tons at Cieufaegoe. Hostile squadron, Admiral Sohley, left Key West for soath

Cnba on night 20th, and afterwards Sampson *s. It is believed [4] monitors and

several cruisers watching Yucatan Channel. If trans- Atlantic Alfanw XIII, armed,

87

arriv^es with coal and proviBions, yoa may, if deeired, incorporate her in sqnadron.
I notify commandant-general of navy-yard. If impossible to pass throagh channels,
may go roundabont way or create diversion on hostile coast, bat not considered
necessary.

The Captain-Oeneral (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

Havana, May SS, 1898,
Yesterday enemy reenforced blockading line to 21 yessels, among them 3 battle
ships; to-day there are only 6; 3 battle ships off Cienfnegos.

The Captain- General of Cuba {Blanco) to the General {Linares) j Santiago.

Havana, May 23, 1898.
To-day 12 hostile ships off Gienitiegos.

The Captain-General of Cuba {Blanco) to the General {Linares)^ Santiago.

Havana, May 23^ 1898.
Of the ships off Havana yesterday, the battle ship Indiana^ cruiser
New Yorky cruiser Montgomery, dispatch boat Bolphiny large gunboat
Wilmington, and other cruisers have gone to windward*

The Captain- General of Cuba {Blanco) to the General {Idnares), Santiago.

Havana, May 23 j 1898.
Since 10 o'clock this morning almost the entire horizon Havana
free from hostile ships, only four insignificant gunboats remaining to
windward. The others have gone out with course to windward.

The Captain- General of Cuba {Blanco) to the General {Linares), Santiago.

Havana, May 23, 1898.
Secret information from Montreal that Schley's fleet goes to south of
Cuba (afterwards Sampson's), and that four monitors and several
cruisers are watching Yucatan Channel. Nothing new from Puerto
Rico. English cruiser with coal sailed yesterday from Curagao for
Santiago. Have already advised you of ships off Havana this evening.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Commandant Puerto Rico {Yillarino).

Santiago de Cuba, May 23, 1898.
The trans- Atlantic steamer is not to go out for the present.

88

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (AiMn).

Santiago dk Cuba, May t4, 1898.
Squadron being ready to leave anchorage in search of stores it needs, have aiisem-
bled captains of shipSi which are unanimously^ of following opinion : In view maximum
speed this squadron rednced to 14 knots, account of Vizoaya bottom fouled, lack of
coal, location of hostile fleets, and condition of harbor, certain danger of sortie
greater than advantages gained by reaching San Juan, only (near) harbor where we
could go. Proceedings drawn up signed by me. Shall await more favorable oppor-
tunity. Meanwhile will get all possible supplies, and in conjunction with com-
mander in chief of army division aid in defense of harbor and city. To supply city,
necessary to mn blockade with fast vessels 20 knots at nighty after agreeing on day
and hour to send (a boat) out of harbor (with) pilot and keep channel clear. Have
instructed trans- Atlantic steamers Havana and Martinique not to go oat becaoae
(according to information) would certainly be captured.

PBOOEBDINGS.

The second in oommand of the sqiiadroiiy the captains of the battle
ships, the chief of staff, and the commander of the first torpedo boat
division having been convened by the admiral, assembled in the latter's
cabin on the 24th day of May, 1898.

The Admiral acquainted the officers present with the information
received since the preceding evening, from the Governor-General of the
island, the commandant- general of the navy-yard, and Her Majesty's
Government, to the effect that Admiral Schley's fleet had left Key
West on the 20th instant, bound for the south of the island of Cuba,
and that Admiral Sampson's fleet had been sighted off Oienfuegos
yesterday. As these forces are each far superior to this squadron,
and as the truth of such information was confirmed by the fact that
four ships remained in front of the harbor entrance all day yesterday,
the Admiral desired to hear the opinions of said officers as to what was
best to be done by the squadron under the circumstances.

It had been decided yesterday that the best plan was to start at day-
break for San Juan, Puerto Bico, where the necessary telegrams had
been sent to detain there the collier and tbe trans- Atlantic steamer
AlfofUfo XIITy which the Government had, by telegraph, placed at the
disposal of the squadron.

Owing to the location of the hostile forces and their number and
strength, it was unanimously considered impossible to carry out said
plan, as the maximum speed of this squadron is calculated to be 14
knots, which is the speed of the Vizcaya as the result of the fouled
condition of her bottom. Taking into consideration that the ships had
not been able to get more than one third of their coal supply, that the
conditions of the harbor make it necessary for the sortie to be effected
by the ships one by one, at slow speed, which might make it necessary
for the first ship, or ships, that go out to return, though only for the

1 WordR and praises in italics are omitted in the pamphlet; those in parenthesea
were not in tbe telegram as dispatched.

89

purpose of reconnoitering, with a conseqaent loss of moral strength,
all the officers present were of opinion that the certain danger of the
squadron was mnch greater than the few advantages which might be
derived from reaching the harbor of San Juan de Puerto Hico, and that
it was therefore necessary to abandon this plan and remain at Santiago,
refit as far as possible from the stores to be had here, and take advan-
tage of the first good opportunity for leaving the harbor, at present
blockaded by superior forces.

All the officers present were also of opinion that the present situa-
tion of the squadron compels it to remain in this harbor.

Pascual Oervera, Jos6 de Paredes, Juan B. Lazaga, Victor M.

Ooncas, Fernando Yillamil, Joaquin Bustamente, Antonio

Eulate, Emelio Diaz Moreu.

The Captain- General of Cuba {Blanco) to the General {Linare8\ Santiago.

Havana, May 24^ 1898.
Oregon has reached Key West. Flying Squadron proceeding to San-
tiago, where Sampson also intends to arrive to-morrow, unless notified
of departure of Oervera's squadron. If latter does not go out, may be
closed in.

The Captain of Terror to the Admiral (Cervera).

FOBT BE FbaNOE, Ma/ji 24j 1898m
I go out early to-morrow morning.

[Frivmto.]

Advisoey Boaed (Obnteo Consxtltivo) of the Navy,

Madridy May 24, 1898.
His Excellency Pasoual Ceeveea.

My Dear Admiral and Feiend: I send you these few lines to
express to you my best wishes on your arrival in Santiago Harbor with
the squadron under your able command. I assure you I was very
happy to know of your safety, as I had thought it unavoidable that
you would meet one of the two hostile fleets cruising in those waters,
and as each of them is superior in strength to the squadron under your
command, it was feared that the latter, though gloriously, would be
defeated and destroyed.

Thanks to your skillful seamanship and efficient management, and
above all to Divine Providence, we do not have to lament to-day the
lives of many victims and the loss of the best ships of our small navy.

90

Upon this I congratulate yoa with a]l my heart, as also the crews

under your orders, and I pray that God may further be with you.

Keep well ; give my love to your son Angel, and believe always in the

affection of your devoted friend,

Antonio de la Bogha«

Madbid (La Oonobpoi6n), Ifovemher 16^ 1898.
His Excellency Antonio de la Booha.

My Dbab Admibal and Fbiend : Upon my return from the island
of Guba I received day before yesterday your affectionate letter of
May 24, which £ appreciate very much, and which has given me a great
deal of pleasure, as it is a document of value to myself, first of all,
but also to you and all the officers who at the meeting of general
officers voted in favor of the squadron going to the West Indies.

I went to the ministry yesterday to thank you and talk with you of
these matters, but did not find you and was sorry to hear of the cause
of your absence. I therefore write to you, as it will be impossible for
me to go to your house either to-day or to-morrow to express my sym-
pathy and tell you what I think of your letter and what I expect to do
with it. The letter is of the greatest importance to me, because your
saying that you had thought it unavoidable that I would meet one of
the two hostile fleets cruising in those waters, and as each of them
was far superior in strength to the squadron under my command, it
was feared that the latter, though gloriously, would be defeated and
destroyed, shows that it was not my opinion alone, but that of my
comrades, and it removes all doubt of the fact that we were forced on
to certain destruction, and it is of the greatest importance to me to
make this point clear.

For yourself and the comrades who voted with you the letter is of
importance because, in showing that in spite of your belief that the
squadron was going out to defeat, you voted that it should go out, it
demonstrates that it was neither ignorance nor laek of consideration,
but much higher motives that impelled you, and although I believe that
such motives should not have altered your opinions, it is comforting
to see iu the service that spirit of sacrifice, even though the sacrifice
had to be made by others than those who did the voting.

I have not told you what I intend to do; simply this, I am going to
preserve your letter like a precious jewel and let its contents appear in
my statement.

Beiterating to yoa my sympathy, I remain your affectionate friend
and comradOi

Pasoual Oebveba.

91

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aun6n).

Santiago de Cuba, May 25^ 1898.
We are blockaded. I qualified our coining here as disastrous for
interests of country. Events begin to show I was right. With disparity
of forces any effective operation absolutely impossible. We have pro-
visions for one mouth.

The Minister (Aundn) to the Admiral {Cervera)^ Santiago.

Madbid, May 25^ 1898.
Eeceived your message A D 0391. I approve your determination
and reiterate your freedom of action as well as confidence of Govern-
ment. Squadron must not be sacrificed in vain. Am studying to
attract hostile ships to their own coasts. We have no vessels 20 knots,
but if you know of any you are authorized to take any steps to carry
out operation you propose. Do you know whereabouts of destroyer
Furor t^

[Urgent.]

The Captain- General of Cuba (Bla/nco) to the General {IAnares)y Santiago.

Havana, May 25 j 1898.
Private telegrams from the United States say it is intended to close
in squadron Santiago. Entrance should be watched to prevent carry-
ing out of this plan.

[Confidential.]

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Commander in Chief of the Army, Division

of Santiago (Id^iares).

Honored Sib: I have the honor of acknowledging the receipt of
your two official and confidential letters on the movements of the hos-
tile fleets, for which I thank you very much. It is much to be regret-
ted that the squadron did not go out yesterday while it had all the
fires lighted. But information received from the Government confirmed
the report that Schley's fleet had started for Santiago on the night of
the 20th and that^ Sampson was following with his fleet, and for that
reason all the captains of this squadron were unanimously of opinion
that the sortie was impracticable, and, owing to the scarcity of our
coal, I ordered three-fifths of the fires to be put out.

As these ships require a number of hours to get up steam, they would
not be ready before night, and that would be too late, especially in view

1 This telegram, which is an answer to mine of the 24th; was completely omitted
in the pamphlet.

92

of the rapid coDBiimption of coal. For tbese reasons there is no other
course open at present but to take up positions, as we agreed yesterday,
to defend the harbor and city in ca^e an attempt should be made to
force the entrance. The Coldn is already at her post and the Teresa
will be there shortly; the others will not be there until tonight or
to-morrow, as they have to get water for their boilers. If another
opportunity presents itself, I intend to try and take advantage of it,
but as I can not hope with these scant forces to attempt any definite
operations, it will only be a matter of changing this harbor for another
where we would also be blockaded. '

It is to be regretted that bad luck brought me to this harbor, which
is so short of everything we need, and I had chosen it in preference
because, not having been blockaded, I supposed it to be well supplied
with provisions, coal, and stores of every kind. Although I always
thought that it would be blockaded, I flattered myself that I could keep
the greater part of the hostile fleet busy here, which is the only effective
service that can be expected of this small and and poorly equipped squad-
ron. I beg that you will transmit these explanations to his excellency
the Captain-General, as the highest representative of the nation in this
island, so that he may know the causes of my apparent inaction.
Yours, etc.,

Pasoual Gebvesa.
Santiago db Cuba, May 25^ 1898.

[GonfidoDtiaJ.]

The Oommander in Chief of the Army division {Linares) to the Admiral

(Oervera),

HoNOBED Sib: I am in receipt of your favor in which you acknowl-
edge the receipt of my former two letters and express the desire that
his excellency the Captain-General of the island should be advised of
the reasons which have kept your excellency from weighing anchor
from this harbor with the squadron under your efficient command. I
have transmitted this information to the Captain-General by cable,
making accurate extracts from your letter. I have the honor of for-
warding you herewith a copy of the telegram dispatched.
Yours, etc.

Absenio Linabes.
Santiago de Cuba, May 25^ 1898.

[Copy of cablegram referred to.]

Santiago de Cuba, May 25^ 1898.
The Captain-General, Havana:

Have transmitted to Cervera information from your excellency of
yesterday and this morning relative to location United States fleets.

93

His ofScial answer for your information is, in substance, as follows:
Regrets extremely not having gone oat early yesterday morning.
Opinion unanimous to remain, owing to direct information from Gov-
ernment that Schley's fleet had gone out night of 20th for Santiago, fol-
lowed by Sampson. Scarcity of coal made it necessary to put out
three-fifths of boilers. Lighting fires again and taking water would
not permit going out before night, which he considers too late.

Decided to remain here for the present, changing anchoring pLace,
putting ships in position to repulse enemy if he attempts to force
entrance. Eegrets bad luck brought him to this harbor lacking every-
thing necessary, which he selected account of not being blockaded,
believing abundantly supplied with provisions, coal, and stores of every
kind. Though subsequently blockaded, flattered himself with keeping
busy greater part hostile fleet, only eflective service he can render with
small and poorly equipped squadron. Adds he will try to take advan-
tage of opportunity for sortie, if possible, changing for another harbor
where he will also be blockaded, being unable to attempt any other
kind of operations. He makes the above explanations to you as the
highest representative of nation^ so thatij^ou may know causes of
apparent inaction.

LiNABES.

The above is a copy.

Lin ABES.

[Bxtraot.]

Tke Captain-General of Cuba {Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa),

Havana, May 96, 1898,
An English steamer oarrymg coal oar squadron appears to have been captured
near Santiago yesterday. Terror eluded American ships at Martinique. Is now at
San Joan.

The Captain-Oeneral of Cuba {Blanco) to the Minister of War {Correa).

Havana, May 26, 1898.
Admiral Cervera decided to remain in Santiago for present, in view superiority
enemy, lack of coal, and inadequate armament of ships. Report of another squad-
ron fitting at Cadiz. If true, absolutely necessary to be accompanied by transports
with provisions and coal, and the guns, small arms, and ammunition requested of
your excellency.

The Minister of Marine {Auii&n) to the Admiral {Cervera), Santiago.

Madrid, May 26, 1898.
Kindly transmit to commander army, Santiago (Linares), following
telegram from minister war: "Advise me for how long you have provi-
sions and whether you can receive any by land, indicating in that case
to what nearest port they can be sent. Have asked Captain-General

94

whether city blockaded by land also, but he has not answered. I mast
know to take measures for provisioning. Let me know whether yoa
have received war key to commanicate with this ministry. Answer
in that or through commander in chief squadron if you do not have
key."

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister {Aun4n).

Santiago, May 26^ 1898.

Kindly transmit the following to the minister of war: '^ Santiago can
hold out until middle July. Three hundred and fifty thousand rations
used by personnel per month; 20,000 corn, 5 pounds each, for horses
and mules. Guantanamo brigade provisioned until middle June; uses
200,000 rations for personnel, 9,000 corn for horses and cattle. Baracoa
and Sagua Tanamo, ports northern coast, provisioned until end August,
have garrisons 900 and 700 respectively; no horses or mules; also need
drugs for hospitals, especially quinine and bismuth; men received Apiil
pay last year in January this year.

^< Generals, captains, regular ofQcers, nine months' pay due with extra
allowances, three in one consignment received in bills not current here.
Blockade by land broken by troops every time they go out, but rations
can only be received at ports referred to for respective forces. Have
not received key to communicate with your excellency. Making eftbrts
to get for Santiago and Guantdnamo two months' provisions from Hali-
fax, Canada, and cattle from South American republics. Have no
hopes they will succeed running blockade; very strict since arrival of
squadron. Absolutely necessary to send sandals, 1,800 pair Baracoa,
1,400 Sagua Tanamo, 24,000 Santiago, and 16,000 Guant&namo.

" Linares.*^

The Oaptain- General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General {Linares) j Santiago.

Havana, May J26, 1898.

Communicate to Admiral Cervera: "Have received your communi-
cation through General Linares. Thank you very much for your cour-
tesy. It seems to me if I had been permitted assistance in case of such
importance result might have been better, as no one better than I could
have given you information on condition of island and location hostile
fleets daily, which might have been of great service to you in carrying
out your plans. But no one notified me of your route and points to be
touched, and I could not communicate with your excellency, although
I tried the 13th at San Juan de Puerto Rico, in case you should touch
there, advising you of position hostile ships, as I have done since your
arrival at Santiago.

" Regret with your excellency tliat these causes and inadequate
armament ships have placed you in unenviable position. Great ]nty

95

you were not accompanied by fast trans- Atlan tics with provisions and
coal, which in my opiniou you need most, since without them it will be
impossible for you to attempt any operation, which your well-known
skill and valor must surely make you wish for. Report of another
squadron being ready at Cadiz, which might solve problem, but I
doubt it, and if it also comes without coal and provisions better it
should not come. In any event I have great confidence in you, and
hope everything ft*om your ability and patriotism. Your task, like
mine, is very difficult, as we have to do it all with scant means.
Always count on me and Linares, who is very efficient, and let us trust
in God. Have received information arrival Terror at San Juan, elud-
ing every difficulty.'^

The Admiral (Gervera) to the Minister of Marine {Aun&n),

Santiago db Cuba, May 26^ 1898.

Kindly transmit minister war following: ^<In addition to former

cable, I beg you will send 12,000 cotton suits Santiago, 7,000 Guan-

tanamo, 1,000 Sagua Tauamo, with necessary underwear, shirts and

drawers.

" Lin ABES,"

PBOOEEDINGS.

The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the battle
ships, the chief of staff, and the commander of the torpedo-boat flotilla,
being convened by the Admiral, assembled in his cabin on the 26th day
of May, 1898.

The Admiral acquainted the officers with recent information received
relative to the movements of the hostile fleets, and asked for their
opinions as to the expediency of going out that day, taking advantage
of the bad weather prevailing. It was unanimously decided that the
squadron should proceed to San Juan, and orders were issued to spread
the fires of all the boilers and be ready by 5 o'clock p. m.

At 2 o'clock the semaphore sigualed the presence of three hostile
ships. In view of this fact, in connection with the circumstance that
the weather was clearing, the admiral again convened the officers afore-
said. Doubts as to whether the prevailing swell would permit the
going out of the ships were expressed more forcibly than at the meet-
ing in the morning.

To settle this question. Pilot Miguel was called, who had piloted in
the flagship, and who, in the opiniou of the captain of the harbor, is
the most intelligent of the pilots (with the exception of the chief pilot,
who is ill).

Miguel stated that with the weather prevailing there would be no
trouble whatever about taking out the Teresa^ Vizcaya^ and Oquendo

96

any time, day or nigbt, their draft being only from 23.3 to 23.6 feet, bat
that the going out of the Coldn. whose draft is 24.9 feet, might present
difficulties on account of a flat rock in the water oft Point Monillo,
where the water is only 27^ English feet deep.

The pilot was sent to the harbor entrance to form a more exact opin-
ion on the state of the sea, and returned, saying that he thought it very
probable that, owing to the swell, the Col6n might touch bottom on the
flat rock referred to. Under these circumstances the admiral pro-
pounded the followiug question, on the assumption that the whole
squadron should go out together, leaving only the torpedo-boat destroy-
ers in the harbor: Is it expedient to risk the Colon being injured, or
should the sortie not be effected, awaiting more favorable circumstances f

The question being put in this form. Captains Goncas and Basta-
mente were in favor of the sortie, for reasons hereinafter set forth, and
all the other officers were in favor of not going out, with the exception
of the admiral, who reserved his opinion. Upon his instructions the
ibregoiug proceedings were drawn up.

Josjg D£ Pasedes.
Antonio Eulatb,
Juan B. Lazaga.

EMILIO DfAZ MOBEU.

Fernando YiLLAAMiii.

BEP ABATE OPINIONS.

Hy reasons for expressing the opinion that the squadron should go
out immediately, in spite of the statement of Pilot Miguel, are as fol-
lows : My impression on the probable situation of the hostile squad-
rons is the same as that formulated by the admiral. Today we are cer-
tain that they are not off this harbor; they are almost sure to be there
to-morrow. On this basis, which I believe well founded, I reason as
follows: Our squadron, blockaded by far superior forces, has very-
little prospect of going out united by forcing the blockade. For each
ship to go out alone, at a venture, does not seem practicable in my
opinion, and would expose us to the loss of one or more ships.

To go out openly and accept battle seems to me almost inhuman,
because our defeat would be certain, and unwise, because it would be
preparing an e<'\sy triumph for the enemy. Outside of this there seems
to me no other recourse than to capitulate with the city when, in a
month from now or little more, we shall And ourselves without provi-
sions, since we are completely cut off' by laud and sea. This last solu-
tion is to iny mind even more inadmissible than any of the former.

Thisr'isj in my opinion, the situation of the squadrou at the present
time, arid in view of its terrible gravity, I am in favor of saving three
of the ships, even at the risk of losing the fourth ship, as I do not believe
such loss very probable, since pilots always leave a margin of safety,
and so do hydrographers. The Golon^s draft, according to her captain,

97

is 7.60 meters, that is to say, 24.93 English feet. The rock, according
to the pilot, has 27.60 feet of water and is of very lifctle extent (he says
considjBrably less than the width of the admiral's cabin. Hence
there would be a margin of 2^ English feet, and the swell did not seem
excessive to me this morning, when I was at the month of the harbor
and the wind was blowing harder than it is now. Moreover, the Goldn
might pass over the rock without being struck by any sea, and even if
she should be struck it would not be at all certain that the resulting
injury would disable her from continuing the voyage.

Above all, I repeat, within the range of possibilities, I believe it
preferable for the Goldn (which, in my mind, should be the last to go
out) to remain disabled at the harbor entrance than for us to await
what I fear is in store for us. This is my opinion. I sincerely hope
that I may be mistaken, but my conscience dictates it to me, and I can
not hold it back.

JOAQTXfN BTTSTAMENTE.

Concurring entirely in the opinion of Captain Bustamente, I wish to
add that the hostile squadron which is coming from Cienfuegos and
which we expected this morning, having probably been detained by
the storm, may be here at daybreak, and the blockade we should have
to run in that case would be immensely superior even without counting
the other squadron which is reported to be coming by way of the Old
Channel.

In order to realize the seriousness of the situation of the city, it
should be remembered that eleven months' pay is due the army as well
as the navy; that the army owes for its provisions for almost the same
length of time, and that commercial enterprise does not care to increase
the debt, there being back in the minds of all the thought that with
the autonomy of the island the treasury will pass out of our hands.
Consequently the city of Santiago de Cuba, being blockaded by land
and sea, is besieged by itself, which is the most effective kind of block-
ade, for there are no provisions and no one is doing anything to supply
any. Therefore the capitulation will become necessary in a very short
space of time, and will drag the squadron along with it.

The same as Captain Bustamente, I do not believe the loss of the
Oristdbal Coldn at all probable, and while under ordinary circumstances
we should not go out and probably should not have entered, to-day cir-
cumstances demand our running the risk even of total loss, which I
consider very remote, however. A delay of twenty or twenty-five
days, which is all that remains to us, is not sufficient to warrant a
hope of a favorable opportunity or a change of circumstances.

Santiago de Cuba, May 26, 1898.

VfOTOB M. CONOAS.

I do not consider the circumstances so extreme as to make it neces-
sary to risk the loss of the Ooldn at the rock where the Oeronay of lesQ
10742 7

98

draft than tlie former, lost part of her false keel, and in hopes that the

sea will calm down and that another opportunity will present itself

the sortie is deferred.

Oebyeba.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister (JuHdn).

Santiago db Cuba, Mtujf 57, 1S9S.
I intended yesterday to ran the blockade, taking advantage of storm, bnt the best
pilot was of opinion that CoUn would run great risk of touching bottom on a rock
in the entrance of the harbor where Qerona lost false keel. Do not feel justified in
running this risk and deferred sortie, second in command and captains being of same
opinion except chief of staff and captain of Infanta Maria Teresa, who were of the
contrary opinion. There are not at this harbor sufficiently fast Tessels to ran the
blockade.

The Minister (AufiM) to the Admiral (Cervera).

Madrid, May 98, 1898,
Tomr telegram of S7th reo^ved.^ Notify you that enemy intends to sink hnlks in
entrance to harbor.

[Extinct.]
The Captain-Oenerdl (Blaneo) to the Minister of War (Correa).

Havana, Maff i8, 1898.

Although your excellency already has direct news from Santiago de Caba, believe
proper to tell you that that province is the one I have tried to make best provisions
for on account of distance Havana and probable attack or blockade Americans and
insurgents. Have reenforoed it to 4 battalions, 3 squadrons, 1 Kmpp mountain
battery, 4 companies engineers, 10 field guns, 47 siege guns and corresponding aux-
iliary troops. Besides provisions paid for here by drafts on ministry have sent there
166,000 pesetas gold, 10,000 silver, 100,000 notes, and placed 100,000 pesos at Madrid
and £10,000 at Birmingham. Of all this and other details referring to defense I
send your excellency detailed official statement.'

Where provisions are most needed is at Gibara and Nuevitas. Appearance Cer-
vera's squadron much impression on Americans, who have stationed 7 ships off San-
tiago de Cuba.

The Captain-Qeneral of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

Havana, May $8, 1898,
General Linares says twelve hostile ships arrived off Santiago yesterday^ about
15 miles, disappearing to westward except one.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (AulM).

Santiago db Cuba, May 98, 1898.
The harbor is blockaded by hostile squadron more powerful than ours, and we are
on lookout for opportunity to run the blockade. Meanwhile we are vigilant to

1 The words in italics are omitted in the pamphlet.

*It is certain that very much less than stated in this telegram reached Santiago.

99

fmstrate enemy's plans. Under these conditions the battle wonld he nneqnal.
Shall therefore try to elude it if possible. Coal is being shipped slowly.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Commander in Chief of the Army Division

at Santiago (Linares).

HoNOBBD Sib: I am in receipt of yoar official letter of the 26th,
in which you transmit to me the ideas of the Oaptain-Oeneral, to whom
I heg yon will extend in my name many thanks for everything. I must
try to get oat of this dilemma, bat am in despair over the slowness of
coaling, and withoat a reason (ible amount of coal nothing can be
attempted. We are constantly watching the mouth of the harbor and
I believe any enterprise against us will be prevented by yoar disposi-
tions and our cooperation. If we only had what we need.
Yours, etc.,

Pasgual Gebveba.
Santiago de Cuba, May 28^ 1898.

The Captain-General of Cuba {Blanco) to ihe MinieUr of War {Correa),

Havana, May £9, 1898,
Aecording to information brought by exchanged prisoners, arrival onr squadron
at Santiago de Cuba has caused sensation. United States and their admirals are
being charged with lack of ability. Twelve vessels off Santiago yesterday; thii
morning the majority have disappeared in a westerly direction.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aufidn).

Santiago db Cuba, May SI, 1898.
Hostile ships have fired about 60 shots, apparently for purpose of reconnoitering.
Firing was done by Brooklynf Iowa, Maseachueetts, Texae, Amazonas, and auxiliary
cruiser. Batteries and Criatdbal CoUn answered. Auxiliary cruiser retreated| prob-
ably with ii^juries. From shore it seems two projectiles were seen hitting the
Iowa* Nothing new from squadron.

The Minister of Marine (Aufidn) to the Admiral (Cervera).

Madrid, May 31j 1898.
DepntieS; senators, and officers, Andalasia ask me to send yoar excel-
lency and squadron affectionate greeting.^

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister (Aundn),

Santiago de Cuba, Jwne 1, 1898,
Blockading fleet has received large reenforcements. To make successful running
of blockade possible attempt should be made to draw off armored cruisers Brooklyn
and New York, calling their attention somewhere else.

^ This telegram is suppressed in the pamphlet.

100

The Minister (Aun6n) to the Admiral (Cerrera),

Madrid^ June 5, 1S99.
** Received B C 5448 (telegram May 31). Her majesty bids me congratulate yottr
excellency and rombatants of squadron; Government also congratulates you. Report car-
rent of intention of lauding near Santiago.'"

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister {Aun6n).

Santiago, June 2, 189S.
I beg Your Excellency to extend our deep gratitude to Her Majesty. Blocka<ling fleet
has 21 ships, 6 of theui armored. The city lacks modern artillery; have therefore
ofiered two 2.95-iuoh guns which Terror has on board.^

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aun6n),

Santiago de Cuba, June S, 1898,
Early this morning a battle ship and merchant steamer tried to force harbor
entrance. Destroyers and scouts which are at mouth of harbor opened fire, fol-
lowed by Reina Mercedes and batteries of Socapa where guns of said vessel have been
mounted. Merchant steamer was sunk ; battle ship repulsed. A lieutenant and 6
sailors taken prisoners. No casualties on our side from hostile fire; slight injuries
to installations of 2.95-inch guns of destroyers.

The Minister of War {Gorrea) to the Oovernor- General (Blanco),

Madrid, June 5, 1898.
Very serioas sitaation in Philippines compels ns to send there ships
and reenforcements of troops as early as possible. . To be able to cope
with hostile sqaadron at Manila it will be indispensable to send an
equally strong fleet there. At present only two warships there and one
of them I believe can not pass through canal. The only thing we can
do is to send all the ships of Oervera's squadron that can get out of
Santiago. But before deciding, the Government wishes to know your
opinion as to effect the withdrawal of Oervera's fleet might produce
in Cuba. This movement would be only temporary, and as soon as
object is attained in Philippines the squadron would return to Ouba
without loss of time and strougly reenforced.^

The Governor- General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War {Correa)»

Havana, June 4, 1898,
I would bo failing in my duty if I concealed from your excellency that departure
of Cervera's squadron at this time would be of fatal effect on public opinion. Doubt

^ The part in italics does not appear in the pamphlet.
<The part in italics omitted in pamphlet.

3 The wording of this telegram is not literal, as 1 do not have the original; but it
has been published and has appeared in the Diario de Sesioues.

101

^^hether the situation that would surely result oould be controlled. Volunteers
already much exercised over inadequacy Cervera's squadron, and only kept up from
one moment to another by hope arrival second squadron. Would rise in body upon
learning that instead of reenforcemeuts the few ships here are withdrawing. The
repression would necessarily be bloody. Attitude of army in that case doubtful.
Loss of island certain, in view of horrible contlagratLou it would kindle here.

The Admiral (Cerrera) to the Minister (Auiidn

Santiago de Cuba, June 6, 1898,
Hostile squadron, 10 ships strong, has bombarded this harbor for three hours,
being answered by batteries at mouth of harbor, among which are guns of lieina
Mercedes. Our casualties: Killed, executive officer lieina Mercedes and 5 other (sail-
ors) ; wounded, Ensign Molins (ftnd) 11 other (sailors) and 5 bruised. Army has 1
dead; wounded, a colonel (of artillery), 4 officers and 17 privates. I do not know
loss of enemy. Reina Mercedes has suffered much. Vizcaya received two shells,
Furor one shell (in the) bunker without serious injury. Works of defense have suf-
fered slight injuries of no military importance. Subsequently hostile fleet bom-
barded other points on coast. ^

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minister {Awi&n),

»

Santiago, June ff, 1898.
Fear enemy will succeed in obstructing harbor entrance. We can not prevent
them with their great superiority. Beg your excellency to give me instructions.

The Commandant- Oeneral of Navy-Yard {Manterola) to the Admiral

{Cervera),

Havana, June 6>, 1698.
Eeceived from minister marine following cablegram: "Received
telegrams. Her Majesty bids me in her royal name to congratulate
defenders Santiago de Cuba."

The Minister {Aun6n) to the Admiral (Cervera),

Madrid, June 8, 1898.
As it is impossible to foresee and properly solve from here all cases that may arise
in the campaign, the Government, which knows the moans at your disposal, your own
high qualities, and the wide scope given you, is confident that you will make of them
best possible use in every case, and will consider that you have fulfilled your diffi-
cult mission if yon satisfy the letter and spirit of our ordinances.^

> Words and phrases in parentheses are not in the original; those in italics occur
in the original, but were omitted in the pamphlet.

'^General Ordinances of the Navy, part 3, Chap. I, art. 153: " You will fight as far
as lies in your power against any superior forces, so that, even though necessary to
surrender, your defense will be considered honorable by the enemy. If possible, you
w^ill run your ship aground on own or hostile coast rather than surrender, if there is
no immediate risk of tlie crew perishing in the shipwreck; and even after running
aground, it will be your duty to defend the ship and iinally burn it, if there is no
other way of preventing the enemy from taking possession of it.''

102

PBOCEEDINC^^S.

Ou the 8th day of June the Admiral convened in his cabin the cap-
tains of the sqnadron to hear their opinions relative to the situation of
said squadron. Being requested to express their opinions, they did so
in the fbllowing order and manner:

Bustamentej taking into account all the circumstances of the existence
of provisions, error in superiority of hostile forces, etc., is of opinion
that the squadron should take advantage of the present dark of the
moon and resolutely effect the sortie, and as the situation of the hostile
fleet at night and thedifQculties of the sortie make it impossible for the
squadron to go out in a body, the sortie should be effected as follows:
The torpedo-boat destroyers should go out first, shaping their course to
the south and passing at their utmost speed by the Tex<i8 and the three
large battle ships.

Shortly after the Ool6n^ the fastest of the four ships, should go out
with a west-southwesterly course, heading straight for the Brooklyn^
whose position is usually in that wing of the blockading line. Then
should follow the Teresa to the east-southeast, and finally the Vizcaya
and Oqu^ndo. He believes that this would create confusion in the
hostile fleet and permit us to save at least 50 per cent of our squadren,
which' solution, in his opinion, is vastly preferable to that other solution
which he foresees and which he does not wish to admit as possible,
namely, of the fleet being compelled to surrender ^om lack of provisions.

He is also of opinion that the squadron should prepare for this step
by resting a few days, especially the. destroyers, upon whose crews
such severe demands are being made night after night that it is a
wonder they withstand the fatigues of their service. He also deems it
of advantage from every point of view (one of them being to wear oat
the enemy) to keep firing, especially on the searchlights, which explore
the vicinity of the harbor entrance during the hours of darkness. And
finally, not being conversant with the means adopted by the admiral,
he is of opinion that, before attempting the extreme step which he sug-
gests, the Government should be given an accurate idea of the very
serious situation of the squadron. In view of the manner in which
the ships would go out, he believes that the point of rendezvous should
be Havana rather than San Juan, which latter point he would prefer if
the squadron went out in a body.

Captain Concaa is of opinion that in case one of the rapid cruisers,
Brooklyn or New Yorkj should at any time disappear, the sortie should
be attempted immediately; if not it should be attempted about the
time of the new moon; but in that event with the whole squadron
united and all the ships following the same course provided the nucleus
of hostile forces is stationed, as at the present time, 5 or 6 miles from
the harbor entrance.

The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the OoZdn,
Oquendo, and Vizcayay and the commander of the first torpedo-boat
division, in view of the impunity with which the blockading fleet

103

approaches to within a mile of the harbor entrance, connting on
the inadequate defenses of the harbor^ and in view of the present
conditions of the harbor, the sortie having been rendered more diffi-
cult by the position of the Merrim^iCj so that it would require a cer-
tain length of time to effect it, thus giving the enemy aa opportunity to
concentrate still superior forces off the entrance, even if they should
not discover the going out of the first ship that undertook the sortie,
are of opinion that the sortie should not be attempted as long as the
present situation continues, and in the meantime every military means
should be used to reenforce the defenses at the harbor entrance, so as to
guard against an attack of torpedo boats and small craft which might
appear in the entrance protected by one or more battle ships, the squad-
ron in this harbor making the best possible resistance, keeping in front
of it the greater part of the hostile naval forces, this being the most
important service the squadron can render toward the general defense
of the island.

They also deem it expedient to shelter the torpedo-boat destroyers,
not only to permit them to rest their crews, but also to prevent their
being boarded by a coup de main in a night attack by small craft.

JOS]£ DE Pabbdes.

Juan B. Lazaoa.

VfOTOB M. OONOAS.
EMH^IG DfAZ MOBBU.

Antonio Eulate.
Febnando Villamil.
joaquin bustahbntb. •

I
The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (AuSidn).

Santiago db Cuba, June 9, 1898.
I called a meeting of captains for the pnrpoee of hearing their opinions on fntnre
operations. Second in command, captains of Coldn, Oquendo, and Vizeaya, and com-
mander of torpedo division were of opinion that we should not go out, owing to superior
forces blockading fleet. Captain Teresa was of the opinion that, in case of detach-
ment or withdrawal of the Brooklyn and New York, we should go out immediately,
and, in any eyent, at the new moon, even though hostile fleet should remain
together. Chief of staff was in favor of effecting sortie immediately, scattering our
squadron. The flres of the ships remained lighted so as to take advantage of first
opportunity, but as the blockade is very strict and the hostile fleet four times
superior, I doubt (much) ^ that opportunity will present itself.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commander in Chief of the Army of Santiago

{Linares).

HoNOBBD Sib : Last evening I made personal observations from the
high battery of the Socapa on the position of the hostile squadron, and

^ The word much is omitted in the pamphlet.

104

have come to the conclasion that it will be absolutely impossible for
the squadron ander my command to go oat without being seen, taking
advantage of the darkness of the night, as long as the coast defenses
do not succeed in removing the hostile ships to a greater distance, as
they constantly illuminate the whole harbor entrance with their electric
searchlights.
Santiago de Cuba, June 11, 1898.

Yours, etc., Pasoual Gebv^ba.

The Commander in Chief of the Army of Santiago de Cuba (Linares) to

the Admiral (Cervera).

HoNOBED SiB: Since you made personal observations last night on
the position of the hostile squadron^ and have come to the conclasion
that it will be absolutely impossible for your squadron to leave the
harbor without being seen by the enemy, as long as the coast defenses
do not succeed in removing the hostile ships to a greater distance, as
they constantly illuminate the whole harbor entrance with their search
lights, I beg that you will advise me whether you deem the fire of the
6.3-inch Hontoria guns, which have the longest range of all the guns
installed in the coast batteries, suitable for the purpose stated, so that
I may give the necessary instructions to the captain of the high bat
tery of the Socapa.

But as it is not advisable to cause unnecessary alarm in the city
and to waste ammunition, nor to let our enemies see how limited are
our means of defense and attack in case we should not succeed in facili-
tating the sortie of the squadron, I beg to represent to your excellency,
in order that you may take this fact into account, if you deem proper,
that the rays of the search lights are clearly seen over the city, and it
would therefore be necessary to add to the distance at which the United
States vessels are usually stationed at least the distance which sepa-
rates the city of Santiago from the coast, namely, 4.35 or 4.97 miles,
the total being the distance to which the squadron would have to
retreat in order that its search lights may no longer illuminate the

harbor entrance.

Arsenic Linabss.
SANTiAao DE Cuba, June llj 1898.

The Commander in Chief of the Army of Santiago ( Linares) to the A dmiral

(Cervera).

HoNOBED Sib : The Captain-General, in a cablegram dated to-day
at 11.25 a. m., says:

I reiuiud your excellency that in case of an altaok on land you may find a power-
ful auxiliary for repulfling the enemy in the landing companies of the squadron with
their excellent field guns, which Admiral Ccrvera would no doubt be willing to fur-

105

nish for the defensOi which I am snre will be glorioasi and the army and navy
united will triumph over Americans.

The foregoing telegram I transmit to your excellency for yoar

information, advising you that I have ans^vered the Captain-General

that your excellency had already offered the landing forces. At the

same time I beg your excellency, if the case should arise, to permit

that one landing company be stationed at the Socapa, one at Punta

Gorda, another at Las Gruces Pier, and the remaining one at Punta

Blanca, all with such number of suitable guns as you may deem

necessary,

Santiago de Cuba, June 12, 1898.

Absenio Linabes.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Commander in Chief of the Army of Santiago

{Linares).

HoNOBED Sib : I am in receipt of your communication dated yester-
day relative to the landing columns of this squadron, and I take pleas-
ure in again assuring your excellency of my entire willingness to lend
whatever aid may be necessary for the defense of the city.

Pascual Gebveba.

SANTiAao DB Cuba, Jane 13 j 1898.

The AdndraX {Cervera) to the Minister {Aufidn,)

Santiago de Cuba^ June 14, 1898.
The enemy fired several shots last night. This morning they again hom])arded
the defeusee at harbor entrance for thirty minutes. Ensign Bruquetas and two
others in Socapa battery slij^htly wounded. Vizcaya hit by shell without serious
results. Army hoe three elightly wounded.^

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aufl6n).

Santiago de Cuba, June 16, 1898.
During night projectile, apparently dynamite, burst on the water near Plutdn,
causing injuries which are being examined. At daybreak the enemy kept up galling
fire for an hour and slower fire thirty minnteS; then withdrawing. Ensign Bruquetas
and 8 men wounded, 2 killed ; army, 1 officer and 8 men wounded, 1 killed. Venh
viui fired during night. Eight ships in sigh^ this morning.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (AuHdn).

Santiago de Cuba, June 16, 1898.
I have a suspicion that the enemy has planted torpedoes in (this) the etitrance to the
harbor.^ Have therefore ordered careful investigation in charge of Bustamente.
Have purchased provisions, though expensive and bad, which will last until end of
July at least.

' The words in itaJics were omitted in the pamphlet.

^The word in parentheses was not in original; the words in italics were sup-
pressed in the pamphlet.

106

Ths Capiaii^General of Cuba {Blanoo) to the Minister of War (Correa).

Havana, June gO, 1899,
It is to be regretted independenoe which Cerveia's squadron enjoys has prevented
me from aiding in his operations, altboagh the results are weighing on my mind,
because the entrance and stay of the squadron at Santiago has completely changed
the objective and aspect of the campaign, the existence of provisions and coal, and
provisioning of certain places. If an attempt had at least been made of consaltiii.g^
with me, General Linares, and the commandant-general of the navy-yard, perhaps
between us we might in the beginning have found a better solution than those now
Awaiting the squadron, namely, either to await the result of nnequal battle in the
harbor, or break hostile line to go to some other harbor, Haiti or Jamaica, where i^
would again be closed in. It would perhaps be preferable to go to Cienfaegos or
Havana, which is still possible; or, if not, reinforce and proceed to Spain, which
would be the best; anything rather than remain closed in at Santiago with the
prospect of having to surrender from starvation.

The situation is extremely serious, and I have no doubt that the Gktvemment
under these critical circumstances would order what is best for the good of the
country and the honor of our arms. I therefore respectfully suggest the expediency
of uniting military action in the present war under one head, ordering that I be
invested with the command in chief of all the land and naval forces assigned to
these waters.

Tke Captain-Oeneral of Cuba (Blanoo) to the Minister of War (Correa).

Havana, June ISO, 1898.
I am much troubled, as your excellency may imagine, over situation of divlsiou
Santiago, against which is principally directed action of enemy, attracted to that
harbor by presence Cervera's squadron, whose sortie it is intended to prevent. It is
there that is engaged honor of our arms and fate of our best ships, which must be
saved at any price. To counteract their efforts, have prepared for every possible
lud. Have organized convoy of ammunition to Manzanillo, where every imaginable
effort will be made to get it to Santiago. I reinforce Linares by brigade from this
province, which will march through interior in coig unction with forces of said con-
voy of provisions and ammunition, forming with both divisions Fourth Army Corps,
under the command of said geueral, who will thus have 19 battalions, 5 squadrons,
7 companies engineers, mounted artillery, mobilized guerrillas, and other factors, to
be used as the general deems best against enemy within and without. Hoi>e by
these measures to sustain war successfully in that region without stripping Center,
Matanzas, and West, which are also constantly menaced.^

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanoo) to ihe Minister of War (Correa),

Havana, June tO^ 1898.
Seventy American' vessels with landing corps off Santiago. General Linares states
if Government does not have means to help them by sending a squadron against
United States coasts, object to draw off part of United States fleet which attacks
them, so that our squadron can go out, or squadron to arrive from Spain run the
blockade in cooperation with Cervera*s sortie, circumstances will take care of solv>

^ It should not be forgotten that Santiago received no aid whatever from the out>
side except Escario's column, which arrived without provisions.

107

lug oonfliot. I have done and shall do everything within hnman power to aid him —
a difficult undertaking, on accoant of his being entirely cat off, enemy being in com-
plete control of the sea.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aundn),

Santiago i>k Cvba^ June SO, 1898.
Lookont adyises me there are 70 hostile vessels in sight, auioug them 7 modem
battle ships.

The Commandant' General of Navy-Yard {Manterola) to the Admiral

{Cervera),

Havana, June 22^ 1898.
The minister tells me to order ammanition by number, class, and
caliber. I advise yoa so that yon may let me know what you reqaire.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Commandant of Navy-Yard (Manterola).

Santiago db Ouba^ June 22^ 1898.
The sqaadron being blockaded and the city invested, it is too late to
order ammuDitloii, for which I have sent many requests to Spain. It
can not arrive in time, since the question must be solved within next
few days. Six-sevenths of the 5.5-inch ammunition is useless, the fuses
not reliable, and we have no torpedoes. These are the main deflcien>
cies. If the Government could send supplies so that they could arrive
this week, it might still be time.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Minxeter (Aun&n).

Santiago de Cuba, June gg, 1898.
Ae enemy (has landed) ^ is landing at Pnnta Berracos. Ah the queHtion is to be
decided on land, I am going to send ashore the crews of the squadron as far as the
rifles vfill hold out. The situation is very critical.

The Minister (Aun6n) to fh^ Admiral (Cervera),

Madrid, June 93, 1898.
Upon return from departamentos received D C 8041, D C 9948, C D 4892, C D
4890.* The Government approves plan of sortie (taking advantage) of first favorahle
opportunity which presents itself. Provisions have reached Cienfuegos. Expedi-
tion to he sent overland to Santiago, and auxiliary cruisers will be sent to hostile
coast.' '- •

1 Words in parentheses did not occur in the original text, while those in italics did.
*The four telegrams referred to are the four precedin<7 ones, but it will be noted
that no news had been received from Madrid since June 8.
*The auxiliary cruisers never went to the hostile coast.

108

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auiidn),

Santiago dk Cuba, June fS, 1898.

The enemy took possession of Daiquiri yesterday. Will surely occupy Siboney
to-day, in spite of brilliant defense. The course of events is very painful, though
not unexpected. Have disembarked crews squadron to aid army. Yesterday five bat-
talions went out from Manzanillo. If they arrive in time agony will be prolonged,
but I doubt much whether they will save city (from catastrophe).

As it is dbnolutely impossible for squadron to escape (doubting if squadron can go ont)
under these circumstances, intend to resist as long as possible and destroy ships as
last extreme. Although others are responsible for this untenable situation into
which we were forced In spite of my opposition, it is very painful to be a (shackled)
actor therein.^

The Commandant- General of Navy- Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral

{Cervera).

Havana, June 23j 1898.

Captain-General states that yonr squadron and the city are very
short of provisions, the rations of sailors being reduced to hard-tack and
those of soldiers to rice, and even this for only short time longer. This
being the case, the serious situation might become even worse in case
city should surrender from lack of provisions or the garrisons abandon
it and go west, in which case your squadron, being without provisions,
the harbor blockaded, and the city in hands of enemy, your situation
would be extremely grave.

In view of this I wanted to understand situation blockade at night
and inquired of commandant navy. Have learned it to be so strict
that I see but one chance in a hundred to elude vigilance, but some-
thing must be done. Intend to send three or four small vessels, hoping
one or other may succeed. But, as you must see matters more clearly
than I, do not want to act without consulting you. In case you should
know of anything else to be done to change situation, beg you will let
me know your opinion.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Commandant- General of Navy-Yard {Man-
terola).

Santiago db Cuba, June 24^ 1898.
Believe it impossible for any vessel to run present blockade of this
harbor. With provisions we have can hold out until end of July, but
believe the siege will be terminated before that time. Bustamente tor-
pedoes have been planted, but entrance west of Cay Smith is free. We
congratulate on brilliant battle Isabel II.

^The orij^inal text does not contain the words in parentheses, but, on the other
hand, dues cuutain those in italics^ which considerably chauge the meaning.

109

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Miuiater {Aun6n).

Santiago de Cuba, June S4, 1898,
Received C D 4898 (of 23d). Immediately convened second in command, captains
battle ships, and commander torpedo division, to ask their opinions on what could
be done nnder circamstances. Opinion unanimous that sortie has not been and is
not now possible. I then read them my telegram of yesterday, in which they con-
curred and which I hereby confirm. Have little news of enemy, but our forces
continue to fall back upon city.^

PBOCEEDINGS.

On the 24t1i day of Jane in the Admiral's cabin assembled the second
in command of the squadron and the undersigned captains. The chief
of staff was not present, being ashore with landing forces. The admiral
read a telegram from the minister of marine dated yesterday (received
to-day) in which he says that the Government approves of plan of sortie
at the first opportunity. When each officer had stated his opinion on
the present situation, it was unanimously agreed that the sortie is now,
and has been ever since the 8th instant, absolutely impossible.

The Admiral then read the telegram which he dispatched yesterday
to the minister, notifying him of the above fact and of the possibility
of its becoming necessary in a very few days to destroy the ships, in
which all present concurred as being an accurate expression of the
painful situation in which these forces are placed.

In virtue whereof they signed the foregoing proceedings on board

the cruiser Infanta Maria Teresa.

Jos^ DE Pabedes.

Juan B. Lazaga.

Feknando Villamil.

EMELIO DfAZ MOREU.

Antonio Eulatb.
Victor M. Oonoas,
Secretary J Acting Chief of Staff.
SANTiAao DB Cuba, June 24, 1898.

The Minister of War (Correa) to the Captain- General of Cuba (Blanco).

MADRID, June H, 1898.
With consent of Gk>yernment, minlBter marine wiU notify Admiral Cervera that
squadron under his command, hitherto without definite destination, will cooperate
in that island to its defease, and in that case your excellency will exercise over it,
as over the other naval forces operating in the territory under your command, the
powers with which you are invested by the ordinances of the army and navy, con-
firmed by royal order of October 29, 1872.

^The words in itaVice were suppressed in the pamphlet.

110

The MinUter (Aundn) to ike Admiral (Cerwra),

Madrid, June S4, 1898.
To glTe perfect nnity to condnot of war in island, yonr excellency, while operating
in Cnban waters, will consider yoniself commander in chief of the sqnadioii of
operations, and in yonr relations with the Captain-General yon will ohaenre royal
order of November 13, 1872, dictated by this ministry, and the articles of ordinance
therein referred to. You may at once enter into direct communication with the
Captain-General and cooperate with the squadron toward the execution of his
plans.

The Admiral (Cervera) to ike Minisior (AuHSn),

Santtaqo db CUBAf June 25, 1898,
Although I have always considered myself under the orders of the Captain-
General, I thank your excellency for instructions which give legal force to the rela-
tions already established, and by giving nnity to the military operations (relieve
me) yfill relieve me from taking on my own responsibility extreme measures of the
utmost importance.^

The Commander in Chief of the Army {Linares) to the Admiral {Cerveray

Honored Sib: I have returned to the city. Namerons American
troops, in conjunction with rebel parties, attacked the column under
my orders twice yesterday and once this morning with artillery, and
were repulsed with many casualties, as we could see, since they were
unprotected. We had 7 killed, 20 seriously wounded, among them 3
officers, and several slightly wounded and bruised. We took posses-
sion of ammunition and a cloth cape with metal button with eagle.
On the march to-day they did not trouble us, in spite of good positions
they might have occupied. By reason of the rain and the troops being
wholly without shelter, there is much sickness among them, and as it is
impossible to assume the offensive until reenforcements arrive, I have
decided to have the defense fall back on the outer precinct of the city.
Tours, etc.,

ABSENIO LINABE&

SANTiAao DE OUBA, June 24^ 1898.

The Admiral (Cervera) to ike Captain-General (Blanco),

Santiago db Cuba, June fS5, 1898,
Hinister of marine commands me to place myself under orders of your excellency
in conformity with regulations of royal order of November 13, 1872, which I do
with the greatest pleasure. I belieye it my duty to set forth condition of siiuad-
ron. Out of 3,000 rounds for 5.5-inch Hontoria guns, only 620 reliable, rest have
been pronounced useless, and w.ere not replaced by others for lack of stores when we
left. Two 5.5-inch Hontoria guns of Vizoaya and one of Oquendo defective, and had
been ordered to be changed for others. Majority of fuses not serviceable. We lack

^ The original text contains the words in iialioe but not those in parentheses.

Ill

Bnstamente torpedoes. CoUn is without heavy armaraent. VUtcaya is badly fouled
and has lost her speed. Teresa does not have landing guns, and those of Vizcaya and
Oquendo are unservioeahle. We have little ooal; provisions enough for month of
July. Blockading fleet is four times superior; hence our sortie would he positively
certain destruction.

I have a number of men ashore reenforcing garrison, of which I consider myself a
part. Believe it my duty to tell your excellency that on the 23d I addressed to
Government the following telegram: ''The enemy took possession of Daiquiri
yesterday. Will surely occupy Siboney to-day, in spite of brilliant defense. The
eourse of events is very painful, though not unexpected. Have disembarked crews
squadron to aid army. Yesterday five battalions went out from Manzanillo. If
they arrive in time, agony will be prolonged, but I doubt much whether they will
save city. As it is absolutely impossible for squadron to escape under these cir-
cumstances, intend to resist as long as possible and destroy ships as last extreme."
The foregoing telegram expresses my opinion as well as that of the captains of the
ships. I await instructions from your excellency.

The Oommandbb in Chief

op the asmy of santiago,

June 25^ 1898.
His Excellency PASOUAii Obbyeba.

My Dear Admibal and Fbiend : In a cipher cable received last'

night the Oaptain-General says, among other things, as follows: ^' I beg

that yonr excellency will tell Admiral Gervera that I should like to

know his opinion and plans. It is my opinion that h6 should go out

from Santiago as early as i)ossible whenever he may deem best, for the

situation in that harbor is, in my judgment, the most dangerous of alL

Last night there were only 7 warships there, 3 at Oienfiiegos, and 9

here, yet the Santo Domingo and Montevideo had no trouble in running

the blockade, going out at 2 o'clock a. m. If we should lose the sqaad-

ron without fighting, the moral effect would be terrible, both in Spain

and abroad."

Yours, etc^ Absenio Linabes.

Santiago db Cuba, June 25^ 1898.
His Excellency Absenio Linabes.

My Deab Gbnebal aKb Fbiend : I am in receipt of your interest-
ing letter of this date, which I hasten to answer. The Captain-General
is kind enough to want to know my opinion, and I am goiug to give it
as explicitly as I ought to, but wiU confine myself to the squadron, as
I believe that is what he asks for. I have considered the squadron lost
ever since it left Cape Verde, for to think anything else seems madness
to me, in view of the enormous disparity which exists between our own
forces and those of the enemy. For that reason I energetically opposed
the sailing of the squadron from Cape Yerde, and I even thought that
I would be relieved by some one of those whose opinions were opposed
tominOi

112

I did not ask to be relieved, because it seems to me that no military
man sbonld do so when he receives instructions to march against the
enemy. You are familiar with the history of the squadron since its
arrival here. If I had gone to San Juan de Puerto Eico when a tele-
gram from the Government cansed me to change, my situation would
be the same, only the scene would have been a different one and the
avalanche which has fallen upon this island would have come down
upon Puerto Kico instead. I believe the mistake was made in sending
the squadron out at all. The Captain-General says that the blockade
at Havana has been run, and I will add that I myself with a 7-knot
vessel entered Escombreras and remained there an hour and a half,
although it was occupied by the provincial (cantonal) squadron.

But is there any similarity to the present situation? Certainly not.
The sortie from here must be made by the ships, one by one. There is
no possibility of stratagem nor disguise, and the absolutely certain
result will be the ruin of each and all of the ships and the death of the
greater part of their crews. If I had thought there was even the
remotest chance of success I should have made the attempt, although,
as I have said before, it would only have amounted to a change of the
scene of action unless we had gone to Havana, where things might,
perhaps, have been different. For these reasons, and in order that my
forces might make themselves useful in some manner, I proposed to
you to send them ashore, just at the time when the Captain-General
made the same suggestion.

To-day I consider the squadron lost as much as ever, and the dilemma
is whether to lose it by destroying it, if Santiago is not able to resist,
after having coi^tributed to its defense, or whether to lose it by sacri-
ficing to vanity the majority of its crews and depriving Santiago of
their cooperation, thereby precipitating its fall. What is best to be
done? I, who am. a man without ambitions, without mad passions,
believe that whatever is most expedient should be done, and I state
most emphatically that I shall never be the one to decree the horrible
and useless hecatomb which wiU be the only possible result of the sor-
tie from here by main force, for I should consider myself responsible
before God and history for the lives sacrificed on the altar of vanity,
and not in the true defense of the country.

As far as I am concerned, the situation has been changed to-day from
a moral standpoint, for I received a telegram this morning which places
me under the orders of the Captain- General in everything relating to
the operations of the war. It is therefore for him to decide whether I
am to go out to suicide, dragging along with me those 2,000 sons of
Spain. I believe I have answered your letter, and trust you will see
in this letter only the true and loyal expression of the opinion of an
honorable old man who for forty-six years has served his country to
the best of his ability.

Yours, etc., Pasoual Cebveba.

113

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

Santiago be Cuba, June 26 ^ 1898,
Since dispatching my last telegram received letter General Linares transmitting
telegram from your excellency wanting to know my opinion. Have already
expressed it in former telegram and give it more fnlly to-day. It is incorrect that
the blockading fleet has ever been reduced to seven vessels. The six principal ships
alone represent more than three times the power of my fonr. On account of the
lack of batteries to keep the hostile squadron at a distance, it remains constantly
near harbor entrance, illuminatinig it, which makes any sortie except by main force
altogether impossible.

In my opinion the sortie will entail the certain loss of the squadron and majority
of its crews. I shall never take this step on my own account, but if your excellency
BO orders I shall carry it out. The loss of the squadron was, in my jndgment,
decreed when it was ordered to come here. Therefore its painful situation is not a
surprise to me. Your excellency will give instructions whether we are to go out to
this sacrifice, which I believe fruitless.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera),

Havana, June 26, 1898,

Tour two telegrams receiyed. I thank yon for the satisfaction yon express over
being under my orders. I consider myself greatly honored thereby and tmst that
yon will see in me a comrade rather than a superior. It seems to me yon somewhat
exaggerate difficulties of sortie. It is not a question of lighting, but of escaping
from that prison in which the squadron is unfortunately shut in, and I do not believe
it impossible, by taking advantage of favorable circumstances in dark night and
bad weather, to elude enemy's vigilance and escape in whichever direction you deem
beet. Even in case you are discovered, fire is very uncertain at night, and although
it may cause injuries it would mean nothing compared with safety of the ships.

Yon say that loss of Santiago is certain, in which case yon would destroy ships,
and this is an additional reason for attempting the sortie, since it is preferable for
the honor of arms to succumb in battle, where there may be many chances of safety.
Moreover, the destruction of the ships is not certain, for the same thing might hap-
pen that occurred at Havana last century when the English included in the capitu-
lation the surrender of the squadron which was inclosed in the harbor.

For my part, I repeat I do not believe that the hostile fleet, no matter how strong,
can do so very much damage if our squadron, choosing a dark night and favorable
opportunity while part of enemy's ships are withdrawn, steams out at full power in
a direction agreed upon, even if discovered. This is shown by the running ont of
the Santo Domingo and Montevideo from this harbor with nine ships in the blockad-
ing line, the Purisima from Casilda with three, and the entering of the Beina Cristina
into Cienfnegos, also blockaded by three ships. I am very well aware that the
situation of your squadron is a very difficult one. Still, the preceding cases bear
comparison.

If your cruisers are in some manner captured in Santiago Harbor, the effect in the
whole world will be disastrous and the war may be considered terminated in favor
of the enemy. The eyes of every nation are at present fixed on your squadron, on
which the honor of our country depends, as I am snre your excellency realizes. The
Government is of the same opinion, and to my mind there can be no doubt as to the
solution of the dilemma, especially as I have great confidence in the success.

I leave entirely to the discretion of your excellency, who are so hiirhly gifted, the
route to be followed and the decision as to whether any of the ships should be left
behind on account of slow speed. As a favorable item, I will tell your excellency
that the captain of German cruiser Oder has expressed the opiniim that the sortie of
the squadron can be effected without running great risks.
10742 8

114

The Minister {AuMn) to ike Admiral (Cervera).

Madrid, JitiM f J, ISS8.

GoTemment thinks in extreme case referred to in oablegram of the 23d, before
ourselves destroying oar sqaadron in harbor, shoald attempt to save it, in whole or
part, by sortie at night, as was opinion of some of the officers of yonr equadion in
meeting May 26 and June 10,^ and as you stated on May 28. Advise me whether
landing of crews was at request military authority and whether they were reembarked
after rendering assistanoe.

The object of my cablegram of the 24th, for which you thanked me. Is not per-
sonal consideration, but the best service of the nation. Avoid comments (wkidi
eaose) to tBhioh are attributed ' unfavorable interpretations.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (AuMdn).

•

Santiago dk Cuba, June £7, 1898.

Have received 0 D 4097 (preceding telegram). Very sorry I incurred displeasure
of Government by opinion expressed long time ago, and to your excellenoy in cipher
telegram dated May 21. With the harbor entrance blockaded, as it now is, the
sortie at night is more perilous than in daytime, on account of ships being oloser
inshore.

Landing of crews was at request of military authority, through Captain-Gener&L
1 have asked for reembarkation, but doubt much if it can be effected before reen-
forcements arrive. Your A D 0491 (telegram of the 24th), the same as all acts of
your excellency, have for object the best service, but inure, nevertheless, to my
benefit, because (it will not be to me that will be due) I toill not he ihe one to decide
icpon the useless hecatomb which is being prepared.'

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanoo).

SAKTiAao DB Cuba, June 37, 1898.
I am in receipt of your cable, and thank your excellency very much for kind
words in my behalf. I have to respect your excellency's opinions without discussing
them, especially after having given you my own opinion formed after mature con-
sideration. I have always believed that there are many sailors more able than 1 am,
and it is a pity that one of them can not come to take command of the squadron,
and under whose orders I would be placed. I construe your excellency's telegram
as an order to go out, and therefore ask General Linares for reembarkation of forces
which were landed at your excellency's suggestion. I beg that you will confirm the
order of sortie, because it is not explicit, and I should feel very sorry if I did not
interpret your excellency's orders correctly.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Commander of the Army at Santiago (Linares),

[Bztraot.]

Havana, Junef7, 1898,

Tell me candidly your opinion on squadron, whether you believe it can go out and

what solution seems best to you.

> Although June 10 is the date as it appears in the original telegram, it refers to
the meeting of the 8th, as no meeting was held on the 10th.

■The words in parentheses are not in the original ; in place thereof the words in
italiee occur.

'The words and phranes in italioe are the ones that occur in the original text;
those in parentheses do not.

116

2^0 Admiral {Ctrvwa) to ike Captain- General (Blanco).

Santiago db Cuba, June 28, 1898,
General Linares answers me that it is not possible to reembark my forcos until
troops arri ve from Manzanillo.

The Captain-Oenei'al (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago.

[Personal asd confldeiitial.]

Havana, June 28, 1898.

Yonr telegram received last evening. Being desirous of improving as much as
possible situation Santiago, am making every effort to forward rations to yon. If
I succeed (and can send) I shall he able to send ^ more reenforoements, thus pro-
longing the defense, perhaps raising siege, salvation squadron. If I do not succeed
it is necessary, as you will realize, for squadron to leave that harbor in spite of
difficulties, which I appreciate.

Therefore my plan, which I desire your excellency to carry out, is as follows : The
squadron will remain in harbor, and without precipitation, provided it has provisions
left, it will watch for a favorable opportunity to go out in whatever direction your
excellency may deem best. But in case the situation should become aggravated, so
that the fall of Santiago is believed near, the squadron will go ont immediately as
beat it can, intrusting its fate to the valor and ability of your excellency and the
distinguished captains commanding it, who no doubt will confirm by their actions
the reputation they enjoy. Acknowledge receipt.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

Santiago dk Cuba, June 29, 1898.
Tour telegram received. Beg for repetition from the words ** become aggravated ^
to the end of sentence, this being unintelligible. The rest I shall carry out as far as
possible, the scant supply of coal rendering it difficult. It takes these ships twelve
hours to get up steam, and if the fires are kept going and the ships in readiness to
take advantage of opportunity each uses 15 tons a day. But I think I understand
meaning your order : If favorable opportunity presents itself, to avail ourselves of
it; and if not, to go out at the last hour, even though loss of squadron be certain.
Difficulties might also arise by enemy taking possession of harbor entrance.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of Marine (Aun6n),

Havana, June SO, 1898.
In conformity with terms of your excellency's telegram of 24th instant have dic-
tated to admiral the following instructions: ''The squadron will remain in harbor,
and without precipitation, provided it has provisions left, it will watch for a favora-
ble opportunity to go out in whatever direction your excellency may deem best.
But in case the sitaution should become aggravated, so that the fall of Santiago is
believed near, the squadron will go out immediately as best it can, intrusting its
fate to the valor and ability of your excellency and the distinguished captains com-
manding it, who no doubt will confirm by their actions the reputation they enjoy."
I tell yonr excellency of this for your information, and beg that you will advise me
whether the foregoing instructions meet with Government's approval.

' The telegram as received contains the words in italics and not those in parentheses.

116

The Minister (Auiion) to the Commandant- General of Navy- Yard (Manterola).

Madrid, July /, 1899,
Advise Captain-General that Goyemment approves his instruotions to Admiral
Cervera.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Lieutenant- General, Commander in Chief of
the Fourth Army Corps of Santiago de Cuba {lAnares)^.

Honored Sib : I have the honor of notifying your excellency of a
cablegram which I have received from the Captain-General and which
is as follows: '^Tour telegram received last night. Being desirous of
improving as much as possible situation Santiago * * • will con-
firm by their actions the reputation they enjoy." I therefore beg that,
if at any time you think that the unfortunate situation referred to in
the telegram may arise, you will kindly advise me in time, so that 1
may be able to reembark the men I have ashore and put to sea, in com-
pliance with the instructions.

Yours, etc., Pascual Cebveba.

Santiago db Cuba, June 30, 1898,

The Commander in, Chief of the Fourth Army Corps {Linares) to the

Admiral (Cervera).

HoNOBED SiB: In reply to your official favor transmitting to me a
cable from his excellency the Captain-General, in virtue of which you
ask me to advise you when the city may be in danger of falling into
the hands of the enemy, I have the honor to state that this being an
open city, for whose defense earthworks have been thrown up on the
heights and lines of trenches dug along its wire inclosure, it is not
possible to determine the moment when to notify your excellency, for
as soon as an attack is commenced there is danger that the powerfdl
column will break through the outer line, along which all my scant
forces are deployed, without reserves to be sent to the points which
may be threatened the most. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to keep
your excellency posted as to the course of the battle, although, if the
battle should be unfavorable, the moment would not be propitious for
effecting the reembarkation of your forces.

Yours, etc., Absenio Linabes.

Santiago de Cuba, July i, 18D8,

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Captain- General (Blanco),

Santiago de Cuba. Jtily 1, 1898,
In addition to my cablegram of yesterday I advise yonr excellency that General
Linares replies that, as the city is open, having only earthworks and wire inclosore,

^ This new title was conferred upon General Linares abont that time.

117

it will not be possible to determine the moment for notifying me, as there is danger
of the powerful colamn breaking the line along which all his scant forces are
deployed, without reserves to be sent to the most advanced points, bat that he will,
nevertheless, keep me posted as to the course of the battle, although, if the battle
should be unfavorable, the moment would not be propitious for effecting the reem-
barkation of my forces. As these ships can not go out without the forces, since
they must expect a fierce battle at the sortie, and will, in my judgment, be destroyed
or captured, as I have already advised you, the case might arise that I could not
carry out your orders. I therefore notify you accordingly and beg for instructions.

PEOOBBDINaS.

The undersigned officers being convened by the Admiral on the Ist
day of July, at 7 o'clock p. m., said Admiral read to them the telegrams
exchanged with the Captain-General at Havana, in which the latter
states, in spite of the observations made as to the disaster awaiting
the squadron at the harbor entrance, that the sortie should be effected
by main force, especially if the loss of Santiago de Cuba is impending.
The admiral then gave an account of the military operations that have
taken place this day, in which the enemy took possession of the town
of El Oaney and'San Juan Hill.

Upon being asked for their opinions as to whether they thought that
the case had arisen in which the Oaptain-Geueral had ordered the
sortie, the officers assembled stated unanimously that they thought the
case had arisen in which the Captain-General ordered the sortie, but
that it is absolutely impossible to effect it without the reembarkation
of the men now ashore for the defense of the city, being at present
more than two-thirds of the total forces of the squadron, and that at
the same time the chief of the array corps, in an official communica-
tion, has stated that he can not do without their aid, being absolutely
without reserves and forces with which to relieve the men on the exten-
sive lines to be defended. As the result of the foregoing, it is the
opinion of the undersigned that, in order to cooperate in the most effect-
ive manner and with some prospect of success in the defense of the
city, it would be necessary to obstruct the harbor entrance.

JOS]^ DB Pabedbs.

Juan 6. Lazaoa.
Fernando Villamil.

VfOTOB M. GONOAS,

Antonio Bulatb.

EMILIO DIAZ'MOBBIT.

Tfte Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain- Getieral {Blanco),

Santiago db Cuba, July 1, 1898 — At night.
Through Gen oral Toral your excellency knows of the events of this day. He
believes it certain that the withdrawal of my landing forces wiU entail the imnie-

I

118

diate Iobs of the city. Withoat them the sortie can not be attempted. My opinion
is the same as Toral's, and our sortie wonld look like flighty which is repugnant to
all. My captains are of the same opinion. I entreat you will send instrnctiona I
have asked for.

j The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auiidn),

Santiago de Cuba, Juljf 1, 1898.
The enemy to-day made fierce attack on city with overwhelming forces. Has not
accomplished much, as the defense has been brilliant. Bat we have 600 casnalties,
among them commander in chief army seriously wounded, and general of brigade
killed; captain of navy, Bnstamente, seriously wounded. Crews have not been
reembarked because it would entail immediate loss of city. Have asked Captain-
General for instructions.

The Captain-General {Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera),

[Very arf^ent.— Key L.] .

Havana, July 1, 1898'-10.S0 p, «•
In view of hostile progress in spite of heroic defense garrison, and in conformity
with opinion Government, you will reembark crews, take advantage of first op-
portuuity, and go out with the ships of your squadron, following route you doom
best. You are authorized to leave behind any which on account of slow speed or
circumstances have no chance of escaping. I will tell your excellency for your in-
formation only, not in the nature of Instructions, that there are only three ships at
Cieuf uegos and nine here, none of them of great power.

The Captain- General (Blanoo) to the Admiral (Cervera).

[Urgent.— Key O.]

Havana, July /, ISiOS— 10.4^ p.m.
In addition to my former telegram of this evening, ask you to hiuiten sortie from
harbor as much as possible before enemy can take possession o^ eutrauce.

The Captain- General (Blanco) to the Commander of Army at Santiago (Torol).

[Extract.]

Havana, July 1, 1898—10.66 p, m.
It is absolutely necessary to concentrate forces and prolong defense as much as
possible, by every means preventing enemy from taking possession of harbor
entrance before sortie of squadron, which is to go out as early as possible, so as not
to have to surrender nor destroy ships.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

Havana, July 1, 1898.
Admiral Cervera is troubled about leaving the harbor, fearing squadron will be
destroyed in the operation, and asks for new instructions. Have answered, in con-
formity with your excellency's telegram No. 90, that he is to leave the harbor, taking
advantage of first opportunity before enemy occupies entrance.

119

The Minister (Aun^) to the Admiral {Cervera),

Madrid, Julff 1, 1898,
Notify yoa that onr ooUiers Alicante and liernembranoe are at Martiniqae; Marie
and Burton at Guadeloupe. •

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain- General {Blanoo),

[Urgent.]

Santiaoo db Cuba, July S, 1898 (at daybreak).
Tout urgent telegrams of last night received. Have sent my chief of staff to
show them to General Toral, and have given orders to light fires, so as to go out as
soon as my forces are reembarked.

The Captain-Oeueral {Blanoo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Samtiag^

[Vary nrsent.]

Havana, July g, 1898-^,10 a, m.
In view of exhausted and serious condition of Santiago, as stated by General Toral,
your excellency will reembark landing troops of si^uadron as fast as possible, and go
out immediateley.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Acting Oommander in Chief of the Fourth

Army Corps of Santiago de Cuba ( Toral).

Honored Bib: Since the receipt of the telegrams from his excel-
lency the Gaptain-General, which my chief of staff showed yon this
morning, I have received the following:

" In view of exhausted condition • • * go out immediately.'^

I notify your excellency of this in order that you may give the nec-
essary orders for immmediately carrying out the instructions of the
Oaptain-GeneraL

Yours, etc., Pasouai^ Gebyeba.

Santiago de Ouba, July 2, 1898.

The Acting Commander in Chief of the Fourth Army Corps (Toral) to the

Admiral {Cervera).

HoNOBED Sib: Upon being informed of the cablegram from the
Oaptain-General to your excellency, ordering the reembarkation of the
forces of the squadron, I immediately issued instructions tor the com-
pany at San Miguel de Parada to proceed to San Jos^ for reembarka-
tion; the company at Mazamorra to go to tiie Socapa; that at Las
Gruces to the pier of that name; the company between the forts of the
gasometer and furnaces to go to Punta Blanca, and the remainder of

120

the landed naval forces to the Boyal Pier. I have the honor of advis-
ing yon of the foregoing for your information and in order that meaa-
ares be taken for the reembarkation of the companies referred to.
Yours, etc., •

JOS£ TOBAL.

Santiago de Cuba, July 5, 1898.

The Captain- General {Blanco) to ike Commander in Chief of ike Army Corps of Santiago

(Toral).

Havana, Julff By 1898.

Tonr cablegram of l.SO a. m. reoeiyed, and I reiterate the instmctioiis which I
gaye your excellency in my last telegram of this morning. It is absolntely neces-
eary to concentrate the forces and prolong the defense as much as possible, preyent-
ing the enemy from taking possession of the harbor entrance before sortie of squad-
ron, for which orders haye been issned to Admiral Geryera, in yiew situation of city
as reported by yon, to obviate surrender or destruction of ships.

If your excellency and yaliant troops can hold out until arriyal of Escario or
Pareja brigade, situation would be much improved; but if it is so critical as to
make continuation of defense impossible, you will gather all troops and loyal citi-
zens, try to open a path, and fall back upon Hoiguin or Manzanillo, destroying what
can not be taken along and burning eyerything left behind, so that not the least
trophy of victory will fall into the enemy's hands. At all events, I trust to yoor
excellency to adapt compliance with my instructions to condition, city, and forces.

TheCommander in Chief of Army Corps Santiago ( Toral) to the Captain-General {Blanco).

Santiago de Cuba, July g, 1898.
At daybreak the enemy renewed attack upon city, which is still going on, simul-
taneously with attacks upon Cuebitas, railroad line, and £1 Cobre, the latter being
made to belieye that Escario's column has been held up by landing forces at Aserra-
dero. At request Admiral Cervera have ordered immediate reembarkation troops of
squadron, thereby weakening defense by 1,000 men, as Asia battalion, arrived this
morning, and remnant of Battalion Constituci^n are hardly sufficient to fill places of
klUed and wounded yesterday. Situation becoming more and more untenable.

The Captain- General {Blanco) to Commander in Chief of the Army Corps, Santiago {Toral).

Havana, July f , 1898.
Tour telegram of 1.30 a. m. received. I understand situation difficult, but not
desperate. Would be much improved by iu corporation Escario or Pareja. In any
event maintain city at any price, and before capitulation make attempt to join
either of said forces, leaving wounded and sick at hospitals with assistance Bed
Cross. City must not be destroyed, in spite of what I said last night. Main thing
is that squadron go out at once, for if Americans take possession of it Spain will be
moraUy defeated and must ask for peace at mercy of enemy. A city lost can be
recovered; the loss of the squadron under these circumstances is final, and can not
be recovered. Be sure to telegraph and keep me advised of events and your opinions.

121

The Captain- General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa),

[Extract.]

Havana, July g, 1898.
Uave ordered immediate sortie of squadron, for if enemy takes possession of har-
bor entrance it is lost.

The Commandant-Oeneral of Navy- Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Aufi^n),

Havana, July S, 1898.
Commandant-general navy, Santiago, telegraphs : " Onr squadron went oat, keep-
ing np galling fire, which conld hardly be heard for hostile fire. Has apparently
sacceeded in running blockade, taking westerly coarse."

The Commander in Chief of the Army Corps, Santiago (Toral), to the Captain-General

(Blanco).

Santiago de Cuba, July S, 1898.

Esoario column arrived last night. Enemy attacked our forces several times this
morning, killing Bam6n Escobar, captain Asia Brigade, and wounding 7 men.
Several shipwrecked from destroyers and a sailor from Maria Teresa^ appearing at
Socapa this morning, stated that latter ship was lost when out of sight of harbor,
and that Oquendo was on fire. Other men from Maria Teresa have since arrived.
Whereabouts of Admiral Cervera unknown. Will give your excellency farther
details as soon as I ascertain.

According to torpedo officer, the electric torpedoes of the first line do not work, and
only four of the second line, and as two of the seven Bustamente torpedoes have
become unserviceable and two others are defective, he thinks it will be easy for
enemy to force the harbor entrance and close it, as I told your excellency. Com-
mandant navy states that no merchant vessel could ^nter, and advises sinking of
cruiser Reina Mercedes, though he says it will not obstruct navigation for ships 9 to
13 feet draft. I consult your excellency whether operation may be effected.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-Oeneral (Blanco).^

Plata del Este, July 4, 1898.
In compliance with your excellency's orders, I went out from Santiago yesterday
morning with the whole squadron, and after an unequal battle against forces more
than three times as large as mine my whole squadron was destroyed. Teresa,
Oquendo, and Vizcaya, all with fire on board, ran ashore. Coldn, according to infor-
mation from Americans, ran ashore and surrendered. The destroyers were sunk. Do
not know as yet loss of men, but surely 600 killed and many wounded (proportion
of latter not so large). The survivors are United States prisoners. Gallantry of
all the crews has earned most enthusiastic congratulations of enemy. Captain of
Vizcaya was allowed to retain his sword. I feel very gratefnl for generosity and
courtesy with which they treat us. Among dead is Villamil, and, I believe, Lazaga;
Concas and Eulate wounded. We have lost everything, and I shall need funds.

^ I sent this telegram through Admiral Sampson, begging him to dispatch it, and
for this reason it was not received by the Captain-General until the day following.

122

The Captain-General (Blaneo) to the Minieter of War (Correa).

Havana, July 6,1898,
Admiral Cervera under tbia date telegraphs as follows from Playa del Este: "I
went out from Santiago yesterday morning with the whole squadron, eto. (see
foregoing telegram)."

The Commandant-General of Navy- Yard {Manterola) to the Minister (Aunon),

Havana, July 3, 1898.
At last report transmitted commandant navy, Santiago, news was nnoeriain.
This morning I received the following two items : Sailors from Maria Tereea are
arriving, and report that said ship and Oquendo, Plutdn, and Furor ran aground with
fire on board; that Coldn an Visoaya were lost ftom sight without being pursned by
enemy. So far 106 have arrived from Plutdn, Furor , and Teresa, among them officers;
no captain. Do not have certain information concerning admiral; have asked for
it, 1)11 1 so far not received. Was advised unofficially last night that he was prisoner
on board hostile ship. Shall transmit as usual whatever official information I
receive.

The Commandant-General Navy-Yard {Manterola) to the Minister {Aun6n).

Havana, July 6, 1898,
No communication with Santiago. Last cables received are the two forwarded
yesterday. By request, Captain-General gave me the following, with proviso that
he did not order Cervera to go out of Santiago at 9.45 a. m., the time when he
effected the sortie. In compliance with your excellency's orders, I went out from
Santiago yesterday morning, eto. (The balance of telegram has already been given.)

The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard {Manterola) to the Minister (AuM^),

Havana, July 8, 1898.

Commandant navy, Santiago, states as follows : ^'According to apparently tnist-
worthy information the four battle ships and two torpedo boats succumbed in battle
of 8d. Killed, captain of Oquendo, sailors, and soldiers ; wounded, captain of Teresa
and offiCsrs; slightly wounded, both commanders in chief; many prisoners; latter
all on the way to United States. It is believed enemy will use Coldn. This oi%j
threatened with immediate bombardment by land and sea unless it capitulates.
Enemy has cut our aqueduct.

I am told that, while we shall not be very short of provisions, we shall be of
ammunition. Families are fleeing; city deserted. We are surrounded by land and
sea. I think decisive events, serious and bloody, must soon follow. Joaquin Bns-
tamente much better.' Twenty-four hostile ships. Total of crews squadron hitherto
arrived, 153, among them Manuel Bustamente and Jos6 Caballero, only officers; Mid-
shipman Ramdn Navia. Furor was sunk ; the other ships ran ashore with fire on
board, caused probably by hostile shell. Cable communication was interrupted —
reason for my not sending more news. Shall communicate all information as I
receive it.

* Capt. Joaqufn Bustamente, chief of staff of the squadron, was in charge of the
naval forces that went ashore to assist in the defense of Santiago de Cilba. In the
battle of July 1 he was at the head of his forces, when his horse was killed under
him; on foot he continued his command with a spirit and heroism extolled by all,
until he was struck in the abdomen by a bullet. He died on July 19 at the Santiago
hospital. His remains were buried in the Pantedn de Marines Ilnstres at San
Fernando.

123

REPORT OF THE BATTLE.
Tk0 Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-Oeneral (Blanco),

Honored Sir : In oomplianoe with your ezoellenoy's orders, aware of what had to
happen, as I had so many times told yon, I went oat £rom Santiago Harbor with the
whole squadron under my command on the morning of the 3d day of July.

The instmctions given for the sortie were as follows : The Infanta Maria Teresa,
my flagship, was to go out ilrst, followed by the Vizcaya, Coldn, Oquendo, and
destroyers, in the order named. The ships had all their fires spread and steam up.
Upon going out the Teresa was to engage the nearest hostile ship and the vessels
following were to take a westerly course at full speed, with the Vieoaya at their
head. The torpedo-boat destroyers were to keep out of the fire as much as possible,
watching for a favorable opportunity, acting if it presented itself, and try to escape
at their highest speed if the battle was against as. The ships left the harbor in
such perfect order as to surprise our enemy, from whom we have since received many
enthusiastic compliments on this point.

As soon as the Teresa ^ent out, at 9.35, she opened fire on the nearest hostile ship,
but shaping her course straight for the Brooklyn, which was to the southwest, for it
was of the utmost importance tons to place this ship in a condition where she woald
not be able to make use of her superior speed. The rest of our ships engaged in
battle with the other hostile ships, which at once came from the different points
where they were stationed. The hostile squadron that day was composed of the
following ships off Santiago Harbor: The New York, Admiral Sampson's flagship ; the
Brooklyn, Commodore Schley's flagship ; the Iowa, Oregon, Indiana, Texas, and other
smaller ships, or rather transatlantic steamers and converted yachts.

Immediately after leaving the harbor entrance the squadron took the course pre-
scribed and a general battle ensued, in which we were at a great disadvautage, not
only owing to our inferior number, bat to the condition of our armament and 5.5-
inch ammunition, of which I notified your excellency in the telegram I sent you
when placing myself under your orders. There was no doubt in my mind as to the
outcome, although I did not think that our destruction would be so sudden.

One of the first projectiles burst an auxiliary steam pipe on board the Maria
Teresa. A great deal of steam escaped, which made us lose the speed on which we
had counted. About the same time another shell burst one of the fire mains. The
ship made a valiant defense against the galling hostile fire. Among the first
wounded was our gallant commander, Capt. Victor M. Concas, who had to withdraw,
and -as we could not afford to lose a single moment, I myself took direct command
of the ship, waiting for an opportunity when the executive officer could be* called.
But this opportunity never arrived, as the battle became more and more fierce and
the dead and wounded fell all around us, and all we could think of was to fire as
much as pos^ble.

In this critical situation fire broke out in my cabin, where some of the 2.24-inoh
projectiles stored there must have exploded. At the same time I was informed that
the after deck and chart house were burning, while the fire that had commenced in
my cabin was spreading with great rapidity to the center of the ship, and, as we
had no water, it made rapid headway, and we were powerless to fight it. I realized
that the ship was doomed, and cast about for a place where I could run her aground
without losing many lives and continue the battle as long as possible.

Unfortunately the fire was gaining ground with great rapidity and voracity. I
therefore sent one of my aides with instructions to fiood the after magazines, but it
was found impossible to penetrate into the passages owing to the dense clouds of
smoke and on account of the steam escaping from the engine hatch, and it was
impossible to breathe in that suffocating atmosphere. I therefore steered for a small
beach went of Punta Cabrera, where we ran aground just as the engines stopped.
It was impossible to get down the ammunition and other things below the armored
deck, especially aft of the boilers, and under these circomstanoes all we could do was

124

to save as many as possible of the ore w. This was also the opinion of the officers whom
I was able to convene, and who, when I asked them whether they thonght the battle
could be continued, answered no.

In this painful situation, when explosions commenced to be heard in the amma-
nition rooms, I gave orders to lower the flag and flood all the magazines. The first
order could not be carried out on account of the terrible conflagration on the poop,
which was soon completely burned. The fire was gaining rapidly. When it had
reached the forward deck we hardly had time to leave the burning ship, assisted by
two United States boats, which arrived about three-quarters of an hour after we
had run ashore.

Among the wounded are Lieut. Antonio Ldpez Cerdn and Ensign Angel Carrasco.
The following are missing: Higinio Rodrfguez, captain of naval artillery, who is
believed to have been killed by a projectile; Ensign Francisco Linares; Second Sur-
geon Julio Diaz de Rio; Chief Machinist (first class) Juan Montero, and Machinist
(second class) Jos6 Melgares, whose body has been washed up on the beach. The res-
cue had been efiected by those who could swim jumping into the water and tiying
three times to carry a line ashore, succeeding only at the last moment, assisted by
the two United States boats above mentioned.

We had lowered a boat that was apparently in good condition, but it sank at
once. A steam launch was then lowered, but it was able to make only one trip;
when it attempted to return to the ship a second time it sank, a^ the result of irgu-
ries received. Of the three or four men on board, one saved his life by swimming
and the others were picked up by one of the United States boats.

The captain of the Vizoaya, assisted by two good swimmers, had gone ashore.
The executive and third officers were directing the rescue from on board ship, and
as it was also necessary to direct it from the shore after the United States boats
had arrived, I swam ashore with the assistance of two seamen, Juan Llorea and
Andr^ Sequeiro, and my son and aide, Lieut. Angel Cervera.

When all the men had been landed I was notified by the United States officer who
was in command of the boats to follow him to his ship, which was the converted
yacht Gloucester. I was accompanied by my flag captain, who was wounded, my son
and aide, and the executive officer of the ship, who had been the last one to leave
her.

During this time the burning ship offered an awe-inspiring aspect. The explo-
sions following each other in rapid succession were enough to appall even the calmest
soul. I do not believe it will be possible to save a single thing from the ship. We
have lost everything, the majority of us reaching the shore absolutely naked. A
few mmutes after the Tereia, the Oquendo ran aground on a beach about half a
league farther west, with Are on board similar to that of the Teresa, and the Viseajfa
and CoUn disappeared from sight to the westward pursued by the hostile fleet.
From the paymaster of the Oquendo, the only one of her officers on board the same
ship with me, I have since learned the history of that ill-fated ship and her heroic
crew. This history, which may perhaps be corrected as to some details but not as
to the main facts, is as follows :

The unequal and deadly battle sustained by the Oquendo became even more
unequal when shortly after it had commenced a hostile projectile entered the for-
ward turret, killing the whole personnel of the same with the exception of one gun-
ner, who was badly wounded. The 5.5-inch battery, which had been swept by the
hoHtile fire from the beginning, had only two serviceable guns left, with whioh the
defense was continued with incomparable energy. The after turret also lost its cap-
tain who was killed by a hostile shell that struck him as he opened the door of the
turret, almost asphyxiated by the stifling air within. The paymaster does not know
the history of the rapid-fire battery ; he only knows that it kept firing the same as
the rest of the valiant crew. There were two contiagations — the first, whioh was
controlled, occurred in the forward hold; the other, 'which originated aft, could not

125

be controlled as the pamps were nnable to famish water, probably for the same
reasoDs as on board the Teresa,

The 5.5-inch ammunition hoists refused to work from the very beginning, but there
was no lack of ammunition in the battery while the light could be continued, as extra
stores had been put on board all the ships as a precautionary measure. When the
valiant captain of the Oquendo saw that he could not control the fire, and when he
found that he did not have a single serviceable gun left, he decided to run aground,
aft(T first issuing orders to discharge all the torpedoes, except the two after oneS;
in case any hostile ship should approach before the last moment arrived. He also
ordered the flag to be lowered a few minutes after the Tereea did, and after consul-
tation with the officers who were present. The executive and third oflifcers and three
lieutenants had been killed.

The rescue of the survivors was organized by her captain, who lost his life in
saving those of his subordinates. They ma<le a raft and lowered two launches, the
only serviceable boats they had left, and were finally assisted by United States boats,
and, according to the statement of an insurgent with whom I talked on the beach,
also by an insurgent boat. It was a sublime spectacle that these two ships presented.
The explosions that followed each other incessantly did not frighten those valiant
sailors, who defended their ship to such an extent that not even a single enemy has
been able to set his foot on her.

When I was asked by the United States officer to follow him, as stated above, I
first gave instructions for the reembarkation to the third officer, Juan Aznar, whom
I have not seen since. When the United States ship, the converted yacht Qlouoester,
arrived I found on board about 20 wounded men belonging mostly to the destroyers,
the captains of the latter, three officers of the Tereea, and the paymaster of the
Oquendo, There were in all 93 men belonging to the crews of the squadron.

The captain and officers of the yacht received us with great courtesy, vying with
each other in supplying our wants, which were manifold, for we arrived abso-
lutely naked and half starved. The captain said to me that as his ship was so small
he could not receive so many and he was going to look for a larger ship to take us.
The insurgents with whom I had talked had told me that they had 200 men, among
whom there were five or six wounded, and added, on tho part of their captain, that
if we wanted to go with them we should follow them and they would help us as
best they could. I told them to thank their captain for us, and tell him that we had
surrendered to the Americans; but if they had a surgeon I should be grateful to
them if they would look after some of our wounded on the beach, some of whom
were very seriously wounded.

I told the captain of the yacht of this conversation with the insurgests and
begged him to reclaim our men, which he promised to do, and he at once sent out a
detachment with a flag. He also sent some provisions, of which those on the beach
were so much in need.

We then started westerly and met the nucleus of the squadron, from which the
auxiliary cruiser Paris was detached, and our yacht proceeded until we were off
Santiago, where we received instructions, according to which some were trans-
shipped to the Iowa and the rest to other vessels, while the wounded were taken to
the hospital ship.

During my stay on board the yacht I inquired of the captains of the destroyers as
to the fate of their ships, as I was anxious to hear of their sad end. The history of
the Furor your excellency will learn in detail firom the inclosed copy of her captain's
report. Capt. Fernando Villamil met a glorious death, and the number of casualties
on board bear testimony to the valiant conduct of this little ship, whose captain also
was slightly wounded.

I likewise inclose to your excellency a copy of the report from the captain of the
Plutdn, who was also slightly wounded, and whose ship has as glorious a history as
her companion.

126

When^ I reftched the Iowa, where I was received with all maimer of honoia and
marks of respect, I had the pleasure of seeing on the gangway the gallant captain
of the Vi2caya, who came out and greeted me, wearing his sword, which the captain
of the Iowa did not want him to give up, in testimony of his brilliant defense. A
copy of his report is also inclosed, from which your excellency will see that the his-
tory of the Visfoaya is very similar to that of her sister ships, the Teresa and the
Oquendo, which proves that the same defects had produced the same anfortonate
results/ and that it was all but a question of time.

I remained on board the lotca until 4 o'clock p. m., when I was transferred to the
St. Louis, where I met the second in command of the squadron and the captain of
the CoUn.

While still on board the Iowa, Admiral Sampson came up, and I asked him for per-
mission to telegraph to your excellency, which I did, as follows:

''In compliance with your excellency's orders, I went out from Santiago yesterday
morning with the whole squadron, and, after an unequal battle against forces mtve
than three times as large as mine, my whole squadron was destroyed. Tereaa,
Oquendo, and Vizcaya, all with fire on board, ran ashore; Coldn, according to infor-
mation from Americans, ran ashore and surrendered; the destroyers were sunk. Do
not know as yet loss of men, but surely 600 killed and many wounded (proportion of
latter not so large). The survivors are United States prisoners. Gallantry of all
the crews has earned most enthusiastic congratulations of enemy. Captain of
Viscaya was allowed to retain his sword. I feel very grateful for generosity and
courtesy with which they treat ns. Among dead is Villamil and, I believe,
Lazaga; Concas and Eolate wounded. We have lost everything, and I shall need
funds. Cervera. July 4, 1898."

I wish to make a correction as to the fate of the Plutdn, which was not sunk, but
which, unable to maintain herself afloat, succeeded in running ashore, as your
excellency will see from the report of her gallant captain.

On board the St, Louie the second in command of the squadron and the captain of
the Colon told me of that ship's sad fate, the former handing me a report, a copy of
which is inclosed. I refrain from any conmients on a report by this distinguished
officer on events of which he was an eyewitness.

In order to complete the outline of the history of this mournful day, there only
remains for me to tell your excellency that our enemies have treated and are treat-
ing us with the utmost chivalry and kindness. They have clothed us as best they
could, giving us not only articles furnished by the Government, but their own per-
sonal property. They have even suppressed almost entirely the usual hurrahs out
of respect for our bitter grief. We have been and are still receiving enthusiastio
congratulations upon our action, and all are vying in making our captivity as light
as possible.

I do not yet know our loss of men, being distributed to the different ships, but it
is in the neighborhood of my estimates stated in the cablegram despatched to^on.

To sum up, the 3d of July has been an appalling disaster, as I had foreseen. The
number of dead, however, is less than I feared. Our country has been defended
with honor, and the satisfaction of duty well done leaves our consciences clear,
though we bitterly mourn the loss of our beloved companions and the misfortunes
of our country.

On board this ship there are, besides the second in command of the squadron and
myself, with our aides, 1 captain, 4 officers, and 32 men from the Infanta Maria
Teresa; the paymaster and 35 men from the Oquendo; the 3 commanding officers, 14
other officers, and 191 men from the Coldn; the captain, chief engineer, and 10 men
from the Furor; the captain, 1 officer, and 19 men from the Plutdn, and Lient.
£nrique Capriles, whom I took on board the Vizcaya as a passenger from Santiago.

Of all of these I se^id your excellency a list and shall send further lists as I receive
news of the others.

127

I also send yonr excellenoy a list of the captains, offlcere, and midshipmen who
were killed or wonnded or who are missing, as also a list of all the wounded other
than officers who are on board this ship. The minority of the wounded are on board
the hospital ship Solace,

As I realize that yonr excellency might have difflcnlties in forwarding this com-
mnnication, I take the liberty of sending a copy of the same to his excellency the
minister of marine.

Of special facts worthy of mention which do not affect the general action I shall
send separate reports as I learn of them.

TonrSy etc., Pascual Cekvbra.

On thb Sba, on Board the St. Louis, July 9, 1898,

REPORT OF THE C0I>6N.

The Second in Command of the Squadron (Paredea) to the Admiral (Cervera),

Honored Sir : I have the honor of submitting to yonr excellency a report on the
battle and the fate of the battle ship Coldn on the 3d instant, as communicated to
me by her gallant captain, as follows :

''In compliance with orders received, I went out of Santiago Harbor with the ship
under my command, taking the position assigned to her. At 9.45 o'clock a. m.,
when abreast of the Morrillo, I opened fire on the Iowa, which was the nearest ship
at the moment of the sortie.

"Five minutes later, wnen the Brooklyn was at the head of the hostile line, I gave
orders to concentrate all the fire upon her and so far as possible upon the Oregon,
which was on the port quarter, and to which we could not give special attention
for lack of bow and stem guns. Our ship fired 184 rounds with 5.9-inch guns and
117 rounds with the 4.7-inch battery, 10 per cent of which are believed to have hit
the target. I saw at once that neither the Brooklyn nor the Oregon, which were
chasing the Coldn, could overtake us, the former falling behind more than the latter,
and I proceeded, shaping my course for Cape Cruz, hugging the shore.

''At 1 o'clock p. m. the pressure in the boilers began to go down, decreasing the
revolutions from 85 to 80, and the Oregon commenced to gain on us, and soon after
opened fire with her heavy bow guns, which I could answer only with gun No. 2 of
the battery, while the distance between us grew constantly shorter. In view of
this fact, and the absolute certainty of being captured by the enemy, I acted with
your excellency's sanction, as it was not expedient to call any of the officers from
their posts, which, in view of the structure and arrangement of the hatohwaysi
would have meant a loss of very precious time.

"Animated by the desire to take advantage to the last moment of any opportunity
to fire that might present itself, and in order to obviate being captured, I decided to
run ashore and lose the ship rather than sacrifice in vain the lives of all these men
who, as yonr excellency is aware, had fought with brilliant heroism and great dis-
cipline and coolness. I therefore shaped our course for the mouth of the Tarquino
River and ran aground on the beach at 2 o'clock p. m., at a speed of 13 knots. After
the ship had been beached I convened the officers, all of whom expressed themselves
satisfied with the course taken, realizing that if we had kept on even for a few minutes
longer we should have been in the greatest danger of falling into the hands of the
enemy and becoming a trophy of victory, which was to be avoided at any cost.

"Soon after we became prisoners of war on the Brooklyn, whose captain came on
board shortly after. During the battle we had one man killed and twenty-five
wonnded. I herewith inclose a list of these casualties. Thongh a great many of
the enemy's projectiles struck vlb, they did not cause much damage in the protected
part of the ship.

128

''The foregoing I have the honor of snbmitting to yoar excellency for your b
mation, expressing at the same time my conviction that each and all did their duty
nnder the difficult circumstances under which the sortie was effected and the disad-
yantages of the battle, owing to the superiority of the enemy and the great defi-
ciencies of our means of attack."

As a witness of what occurred, I wish to state to your excellency that, in the
midst of our sorrow over the loss of the ship and the gallant and heroic men, I feel
great satisfaction in knowing that all have done their sacred duty in the defense of
their flag and their country, proving once more that the Spanish navy may be
defeated, but never with dishonor.

All on board the CoUn have shown themselves worthy of their ancestois. It is
hardly possible to'recommend any one of her noble crew in particular, as all have
distinguished themselves alike by their heroism. But I should be failing in a saered
duty if I did not tell your excellency that her valiant captain rose to a height which
words can not express; I can only say that he is an honor to the corps in which he
serves.

JOSE DB PABEDBS.

On tub bka, on board the St. Louis, July 6, 1898,

REPORT OF the OQURNDO.

Hentenant Calandria to the Admiral (Cervera),

Honored Sir: The officer who has the honor of addressing your exoeHenoy Is the
senior officer of the battle ship Almirants Oquendo who survived the battle of Jnly3,
and he therefore considers it his duty to give your excellency an account of what
occurred on said ship during the battle.

When the signal for battle was given, the undersigned officer went to occupy his
post, which was the conning tower of the after deck, from where I observed the
movements of the hostile fleet, which, as this ship came out of the harbor, was
steering in a westerly direction in line ahead, with the cruiser Brooklyn in the lead.
As soon as we had cleared the channel we followed in the wake of the ship ahead of
us and opened fire on the port side while constantly firod upon by the hostile ships,
especially the battle ship Iowa and cruiser Brooklyn, and it was on thcvse two that
we mainly concentrated our fire; passing, in the opinion of the undersigned, at a
distance of less than 3,826 yards from them.

We continued to steam until wo left the Iowa somewhat behind on the port quar-
ter, but within range of her artillery, while the Brooklyn was on the bow of the same
side and the other ships at a distance astern of the Iowa This was the situation of
the hostile fleet when I was notifled through the speaking tube that fire had broken
out in the after torpedo rooms, and ae I came out I saw flames issuing forth from the
officers' hatchway in the poop. Realizing at once that it would be impossible to con-
trol the fire, owing to the proportions it had assumed, I went to the forward deck to
report to the captain, and found him preparing to beach the ship with the helm to
starboard.

As I was afraid that the bow torpedoes might explode when the ship ran aground
in case there should be a violent shock, these torpedoes being all ready to be launched
the same as the other torpedoes, I suggested to the captain the expediency of dis-
charging them, and this was done in the forward torpedo room by Ensign Alfredo
Nardiz and the personnel under his orders.

At the moment when the ship ran ashore, enveloped in flames, her deck covered
with dead and wounded, her guns disabled, the captain gave the undersigned the
order to lower the flag, but owing partly to the listlessness with which the order
was given and partly to the natural vacillation of those who were to fulfill it, the

129

distreBSing order was not carried out. The fire, which by this time had assnmod
gigantic proportions, caught the lanyard and the flag fell into the flames.

The foregoing is all that the undersigned had a chance to witness of the battle, as
he was Isolated from the rest of the ship. The details which follow have been com-
piled from information and data acquired subsequently.

The orders given the two batteries and turrets were to set the sights for distances
varying from 2,625 t<o 8,496 yards. At the fourth round of gun No. 6 (5.5-inch) the
breech burst, killing and wounding the crew and blinding the gunner. By this time
there were so many casualties in the upper battery — among them the captain of the
same. Lieutenant Enrique Marra-Ldpez, and Ensign Juan Dfaz Escribano, both
wounded — that there was only personnel enough left to serve guns Nos. 2 and 4, which
bontinued to fire until both the ammunition hoists broke; and as it was impossible
to bring up projectiles, owing to the fires that had broken out in the central ammu-
nition rooms both forward and aft, the firing was continued with the projectiles
that were on deck, which, for lack of other means, were carried to the guns by Lieu-
tenant Enrique Marra-L6pez, Midshipman Quirino Gutierrez, and Third Gunner
Antonio Serrano Facio.

The greater part of the rapid-fire battery had been destroyed, several guns having
been dismounted, and nearly all the personnel killed or wounded, among them the
executive and third officers.

When the third round was about to be fired in the forward turret a projectile
entered between the gun and gun port, tearing a piece from the upper edge of the
latter and killing the captain of the tnrre.t, Eugenie Rodriguez Bilrcena, and Third
Gunner Francisco Garcia Pueyo, and badly wounding First-class Gunner Jos^ Arenosa
Sixto, also breaking the tubing and apparatus. In the after turret the captain of
the same. Lieutenant Alfonso Pulanco y Navarro, was also killed by a fragment. A
shell which entered the after torpedo room put the whole personnel of the same out
of action. A few moments later another shell, exploding in the central room aft,
killed and wounded a number of men, among them Ensign Emilio Fascualdel Pobil,
who was wounded.

When the captain gave instructiona to flood the magazines on account of the
fires, the order was transmitted by Lieut. Tom^s Calvar to First Machinist Juan
Pan tin, who wont to the central compartment forward for that purpose, where the
men's lockers were burning, and succeeded in flooding the forward compartment, bat
was unable, on account of the furious fire, to flood the after compartments; and the
officers' mess room and cabins and the pantries became a prey of the flames. The
Are spread to the after deck as the result of burning wood from the officers' mess
room falling through the hatch of the ammunition hoist. This would have caused
the explosion of the 5.5-inch ammunition room if Third Gunner German Montero and
Sailor Lnis Dfaz had not stopped up the hatches, first with wooden gratings and
then with wet bedding, and as, in spite of their efi'orts, they did not succeed in dis-
mounting the hoist to lower the cover of the hatch, they left the deck when it be-
came impossible for them to remain there, after first closing up the 11-inch ammu-
nition rooms.

After beaching the ship, the engines were stopped by orders of the captain, the
safety valves were opened, and the^engines and boilers dismounted. The work of
rescue was then commenced. We had to give up the large boats, as the fire made it
impossible to lower them, and some of them were disabled. We succeeded in lo^rer-
lug the yawl, but it sank. The two launches wore used successfully. Great acts of
heroism were performed in the work of rescue as well as in the battle. Of these I
give your excellency a separate account.

When the undersigned jumped into the water there were left on the forecastle the

captain, Ensign Alfredo Nardiz, several men. First Boatswain Luis Rodriguez, and

First Machinist Juan Pantfn. The latter told me that after I had gone the captain,

who refused to leave, fell suddenly to the deck, raising his hands to his breast, taken

10742 9

130

apparently with an attack of heart failure. They attended him, and when they
knew that he was dead^ covered his hody with a flag. This I learned on board the
Sarvard.

The ship was beached about 10 or 12 miles from the entrance of Santiago hftrbor.

In the fulflllment of my duty, I subqiit the foregoing for yonr excellency's infor-
mation.

Adolfo Calakdria.

Camp LonGi Portsmoutu Navy-Yaud, July BO, 1S9S.

THK REPORT OF THK VIZCAVA.

Tlie Captain (Eulaie) to tht Admiral (Cerrera),

Honored Sir: In compliance with tlie instractions received from yoor excellency,
I got my ship ready on the morning of the 2d instant, to go out at 4 p. m. Hiit as
the reembarkation of the first company did not begin until that time, it was 6.30
p. m. before the ship was ready to pat to sea. At that moment the battle flag was
hoisted by the officeray whom I addressed, reminding them of the obligations imposed
upon them by the Ordinances, and the heroic deeds of our ancestors in our honorable
career. After a prayer, we received, kneeling, the benediction of the chaplain.

With the flag hoisted we were awaiting your excellency's last orders, and at 9
o'clock a. m. of the day following, July 3, the ship was ready to follow in the wake
of the flagship. At 9 o'clock (true time) she started up, following the Teresa, and at
9.30, after passing Punta Socapa, we went full speed ahead, steering in conformity
with the instructions previously issued by your excellency. At the same moment
we opened fire on the hostile ships, very heavy at first, but gradually decreasing in
the 5.5- inch battery, owing to the defects of the guns and ammunition, of which yoor
excellency is aware.

In spite of these defects, the enthusiasm and intelligence of the officers in charge
of the battery and the excellent discipline of their crews made it possible to fire
during the battle, which lasted two hours and a half, 150 rounds with the port bat-
tery, one of the guns alone firing 40 rounds, the others 25 and above, with the excep-
tion of one, which only fired 8 rounds. The deficiencies of thescgnns were nnmeroua,
chief among them, as you already know, the fact that the breech could not be closed,
the projectiles janmied, and the firing pins failed to act.

One of the guns had to try seven shells before a serviceable one conld be found,
another gun even eight, and it was only by dint of hard work that this latter gun
oould be broaght into firing position. In the lower battery the firing was very
heavy during the first two hours ; after that the number of hostile shells striking
and injuring the port guns was such as to disable every one of them and dismount
the mfyority.

In the high battery there were so many casualties that, although there was but
one gun left that could be fired, tliere were not men enough to serve it. . In the
lower battery there were no men left either to serve the guns or to conduct the
firing. It therefore became necessary to decrease the crew assigned to extinguish-
ing the fires that were constantly breaking out everywhere, and as a result of this
fact, in conjunction with the circumstance that the fire mains had become useleiss
through hostile fire, the conflagration increased to such an extent that it was no
longer possible to control it. It is safe to say that the number of victims in the two
batteries two hours after the beginning of the battle was between 70 and 80, most
of them killed, among them the captain of the lower battery, Lieut. Julian Ristory
y Torres, who for his gallantry deserves a place of honor in the annals of the history
of our navy.

Owing to the valiant attack which the flagship made on the enemy at the begin-
ning of the battle, we did not at first have so much to suffer from hostile projectiles^

131

as only two battle ships were firing npon qs. But daring the second hoar we were
tho target of foar, the Brooklyn to port, the Oregon on the port qaarter, the /oira on
the stem, and the Xew York on the starboard qnarter, bat the last two very close, so
that only the after 11 -inch gnn coald answer the lire of the Iowa and New York,
The guns of the starboard turrets forward and aft were able to lire four or live
rounds against the Xew Yorkj but the lire was very uncertain because the latter ship;
after firing from her port broadside, yawed at the stern.

It was at 9.35 o'clock, after we had come oat of the harbor and were shaping oar
oonrse for Pnnta Cabrera, that we first received the enemy's fire, and at 11.50, when
we oould no longer fire with a single gun, I wanted to try whether we could ram the
Brooklyn, which was the ship that harassed as most on the port side and which was
pearest to us. To that end I put to port, but the Brooklyn did the same, indicating
that she was going to use only her gnns. The undersigned, with his head and
shonlder wounded, was obliged to withdraw to have his wounds dressed. Almost
faint from the loss of blood, he resigned his command for the time being to the exec-
utive ofiQcer, with clear and positive instructions not to surrender the ship, but
rather beach or burn her. In the sick bay I met Ensign Luis Fajardo, who was hav-
ing a very serious wound in one of his arms dressed. When I asked him what was
the matter with him he answered that they had wounded him in one arm, but that
he still had one left for his country.

When the flow of blood of my wounds had been checked, I went back on deck
and saw that the executive officer had issae<l orders to steer for the coast in order to
run ashore, for we had no serviceable guns left and the tire at the stem had assumed
such dimensions that it was utterly impossible to control it. This sad situation was
still further complicated by a fire breaking out on the forward deck as the result of
the bursting of a steam pipe and the explosion of one or more boilers of the for-
ward group. Although the executive officer. Commander Manuel Rolditn y Torres,
had acted in accordance with instructions, without exceeding them, I immediately
convened the officers who were nearest, among them Lieut. Commander Enrique
Capriles, and asked them whether there was anyone among them who thought we
could do anything more in the defense of our country and our honor, and the unani-
mous reply was that nothing more could be done.

In order that the battle flag might not become a trophy of the enemy, I at once
gave orders to Ensign Luis Castro to hoist another and lower the former and buru
it, which order was promptly carried out. At 12.15, under the galling fire of the four
battle ships mentioned above, the cruiser Vizcaya ran ashore on the shoals of Aserra-
dero under circumstances which made it impossible to save the ship, not only on
account of her position on the shoals and the nature of the latter, but also because I
knew that all the magazines must necessarily explode, though there would be time
for the rescue, and that was indeed what occurred.

As so(m as the ship had been beached, the executive officer gave instructions to
make all arrangements for the immediate rescue of the crows. Attempts were at
once made to lower the bonts. When I found that only one was in serviceable con-
dition, I ordered that it be nsed mainly for the transportation of the wounded, and
I authorized all those who could swim or who hnd life-preservers or anything else
sufficiently buoyant to keep them above water to jump in and try to gain the reefs
of the shoal, which was about 98 yards from tho how.

The rescue was effect'Od in perfect order, in spite of the awe-inspiring aspect of the
ship on fire, with the ammunition rooms exploding, the flames rising above the fight-
ing tops and smokestacks, and with the side <armor red-hot. I was taken ashore by
the officers in the last boat that carried wounded, and was subsequently picked
up by a United States boat, which carried me to the loxica. The executive officer
told mo afterwards that only the dead were left on board, as he had at the last
moment directed tho rescue of those who had taken refuge aft, and whom he had
ordered to jump into the water and hold on to ropes which had previously been
made fast, and there he and the others waited until they were picked up by our

132

boat. The oonduot of the captaiu, officers, and crew of the Iohhi, the ship to whicb
the United States boats carried us, was extremely considerate. I was received with
the guard drawn up. When I wanted to surrender my sword and revolver to the
captain, he refused to receive them, saying that I had not surrendered to Lis ship,
but to fonr battle ships, and that he had no right to accejit them.

The conduct of our officers and crew has been truly brilliant, and many deeds of
heroism which have been recorded will in due season form the subject of a special
recommendation, if your excellency should so order.

Of the wounded taken to the Iowa five died soon after arriving there, and were
buried with the same honors with which the Americans bury their own dead, with
the guard drawn up and with the discharge of three volleys of musketry. All the
prisoners were present at these ceremonies, which were conducted by the chaplain of
the late Vizoaya.

The foregoing is all I have the honor of reporting to your excellency upon the loss
of my ship in a battle against four far superior ships without striking her coIoph nor
permitting the enemy to set foot upon her deck, not even for the rescue. There are
98 men missing of her crew.

Antonio Eui^atk
(Prisoner of war).

On THE Sea, on Board tuk Auxiltary Cruiser St. Louis,

July 6, 1808.

RKPOUT OF TIIK I'UUOR.

LieHt. Commander Carlier to the Admiral (Cervera),

Honored Sir: At half pust 9 o'clock on the morning of July 3, upon onlers
received from the com m under in chief of the torpedo boat flotilla, who came on
board this ship, we sheered off from Las Cruces Pier, Santiago, and followed in the
wake of tbe Oquendo, Before reaching Punta Gorda we commenced to hear the fire
of the battle between the vanguard of our squadron and the enemy, and several
shells struck near us.

Soon after, in the harbor entrance, the commander g^ve orders to put to starboard
and follow at full speed in the wake of the squadron in a westerly direction, open-
ing fire upon the enemy. From the very first we received an enormous amount of
fire from the majority uf the hostile ships and were struck by shells of every caliber.

We soon commeuced to have casualties from the galling tire and many injuries to
the ship, which occurred in the following order: Bursting of the steam pipe of the
engine; dedtrnction of the starboard intermediate cylinder; flooding and submer-
sion of the stern; bursting of a boiler; farther injuries to the engine; destrnction
of the three remaining boilers; tires in different parts of the ship, one of great
intensity in the engine room, below which was the shell room, and finally, breaking;
of the servomotor of the helm and tiller. All these accidents occurred one after
another in a very short space of time, but we never ceased firing, although the deck
was already strewn with a largo number of wounded and some dead.

About 10.45 the commander of the flotilla, in view of the foregoing facts, which
he had either witnessed or which had been reported to him, gave orders to run
ashore, which could not be carried out. As the ship was known to be doomed, hav-
ing neither rudder nor engine left, the fire, no longer controllable, having invaded
the stern and waist, and more than one-half of the crew having been put' out of
action, the commander ordered tho flag and the boats to be lowered, and the men
who could do so to get ashore in the boats or with the assistance of life-preservers.
I transmitted this order to the executive officer. Several projectiles struck the men
who were swimming ashore.

When the hostile fire had ceased, two United States boats came alongside, and

133

tbe few of ns who still reniaiued on board got in. The enemy did no more than Jnstf
step on deck, and upon realizing the situation, returned hastily to the boats, fearing
an explosion, which, indeed, occurred soon after we had sheered off from the ship,
aud she sank about a mile from the shore.

Of the crew, which was composed of 75 men, 11 are unhurt ; 8 of the dead have
been identified; 10 of the wounded have been picked up; the remaining 45 figure in
the list as missing, though some of them were left on deck dead and could liot be
identified; others were drowned, but I have hopes, which I trust I may see fulfilled,
that some of these 45 men have gained the shore. .

It is with deep sorrow that I have to report to your excellency that among the
dead who were identified is our worthy chief, the noble and brilliant Capt. Fernando
Yillaamil.

All of the foregoing I report to your excellency for your information, in com-
pliance with my duty.

Diego Carlikr.

On Board the St. Louis, July 8, 1898.

REPORT OF THE PLUT^N.

Lieutenant-Commander Vdzquez to the Admiral (Cercera).

Honored Sir: In compliance with the orders received from the commander in
ehief of the torpedo-boat division, I sheered off from Las Cruces pier at 9.30 in the
morning of the 3d instant and steered straight toward the entrance of Santiago
Harbor.

I was off the little town of Cinco Eeales when I commenced to notice the falling
of shells, the natural result of the battle that was being fought between the van-
guard of our squadron and the Americans. I followed closely in the wake of the
Fm-OTy .according to instructions received, and when about to leave the harbor
entrance I opened fire upon the nearest hostile ship and went ahead at full speed.
After I emerged from the harbor steering in a westerly direction I was greeted by a
hail of projectiles. This was the beginning of the battle, and the fire increased as I
advanced and got into the midst of the hostile fleet.

About 10.45 a large caliber shell entered the orlop, which rapidly filled with water
and the ship pitched forward. Almost at the same time other projectiles hit the for-
ward boilers, which burst. Another entered the aminuuition room of my cabin, and
besides causing a leak, started a fire in that quarter.

But we steamed on, though at a slower speed, and constantly fired upon by the
Americans, whose fire we kept answering. But when I saw that the ship commenced
to sink, owing to the water entering at the bow, in the boiler room, and my cabin, I
concluded that she could not remain afloat much longer, and tried to run ashore on a
small beach near by. I ordered the helm to be put to starboard (portf — O. N. T.) but
the rudder no longer responded, the servomotor having been disabled, and one of the
tiller ropes broken. The ship was still going ahead and struck on the rocks, com-
pletely destroying her bow. Upon instructions from nie part of the crew jumped
to the ground, others into the water to starboar«l, some of them gaining the shore.

I then left the deck, wont to my cabin, took the package of confidential letters
received from your excellency and the commander in chief of the torpedo-boat divi-
sion, and threw it into the water, together with signal code \o. .32 and the Perea
signal code and key. I then lowered the flag. After that 1 went forward, but it
was no longer possible to gain the shore from there, as the ship had changed hei
position. I therefore hailed the boat which had gone ashore with Kome of the mec
and, entering it, I was able to gain the rocks. Soon after I heard an exploBion and
the ship went down as far as the deck.

The hostile fire having ceased, I had a white flag hoisted. A United States boat
thou came to pick us up and took us to one of their ships.

134

There were 21 of the crew left, among them 5 woanded ; the rest are Comprised in

the list of dead and missing which I had the honor of handing to yonr excellency.

The foregoing is all I have the honor of reporting to yonr excellency for yoor

information, in compliance with my duty.

Pedro VizQui

On tub Ska, on Board the St. Louis,

July 0, 1S08.

The Captain- Oeneral (Blanco) to the Admiral [Cervera).

[Eooeived at Portsmouth, K. H.. 1.52 p. m., July 11, 1898. Dated Waahingtoo, D. C]

Admiral Oervera, Portsmouth, N^. H.:

The following telegram has been received for yoa from the Captain-
General of Caba :

Being very desirous of alleviating the lot of those heroic defenders of onr country
who so Talinntly snccumhed in uneqnal hattle, and to whom, as to yourself, I offer
a tribute of admiration, I beg that you will advise me of the amount you require
and where you wish it placed. In order to gain time I also address the French eon-
Bul at New York on this subject.

The following is a copy of the first part of the manifesto in this connection which
I addressed to the people of Cuba on the 4th day of July: ''Inhabitants of the
island of Cuba: Fortune does not always favor the brave. The Spanish squadron,
under the command of Rear- Admiral Cervera, has just performed the greatest deed
of heroism that is perhaps recorded in the annals of the navy in the present cen-
tnry, fighting American forces three times as large. It succumbed gloriously, just
when we considered it safe from the peril threatening it within the harbor of San-
tiago de Cuba. It is a hard blow, but it would be unworthy of Spanish hearts to
despair,'' etc. Blanco.

Long, Secretary of the Nav^y,

TJie Admiral {Cervera) to the Captain- General (Blanco).

Portsmouth, N. H., July 11, 1898.
YouT excellency's cable received, for which we are very graterul.
The men will remain here where they were landed, having with them 5
army officers, 2 surgeons, 2 chaplains, and 1 midshipman. We officers
are to go to Annapolis, where we shall all be together. As we have
lost absolutely everything, we need about $70,000 gold for the present

The Captain- General (Blanco) to the Minister of Marine (Aun6n),

Havana, July 11 , 1898.
The consul of Jamaica says that your excellency is waiting for particulars of loss
of squadron. In cablofj^ram dated 3d instant I told your excellency and minister
w:ir of its sortie from Santiago in same terms in which it was reported to me by
commander of navy and general of division. Subsequently, on the 5th, I forwarded
to minister war communication from Rear- Admiral Cervera, of same date, reporting
destruction squadron. Have received no further official information on this unfortu*
nate event, which saddens the heart of every good Spaniard, and am therefore

135

unable to give yonr excellency the particulars yoa desire. I do not believe that the
reports circulating through the American press are trustworthy. Everything indi-
cates, however, that the disaster has not been as great as at first supposed as far as
casualties are concerned, especially as to the number of killed.

The Minister (Aun6n) to the Commandant-General of Navy-Vard {Manterola),

Madrid, July 11, 1898.
To clear up doubts, examine and transmit literally first few words of telegram
addressed by Admiral Cervera to Captain-General from Play a del Este.

Tlis Captain- General {Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).

[From Playa del Bste to Admiral Cervera, care of commandant naval station, Portemonth. K. H.]

Flagship New York,

Off Santiago, July 12, 1898.
The following telegram was received from General Blanco for you:

Am deeply impressed by your excellency's telegram of yesterday and greatly

a<lmire conduct of commanders, officers, and crews. Perhaps if another time had

been chosen for sortie result would have been different. Sampson states in his

report he sustained only three casualties. Is that possible? Advise me how mnch

money is required and where to place it, and I beg that yon and all officers and men

under your orders will believe in my deepest interest and a desire to better their

situation as mnch as lies in my power.

Blanco.

Admiral Sampson.^

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain- General (Blanco).

Portsmouth, N. H., July 13, 1898.
I am ill receipt of telegram which your excellency sent me at Playa
del Este, from where it was forwarded to me here. Am deeply grieved
that all my actions meet with yoar excellency's censare. Trast I may
be able to justify tbem when time comes, as the facts have taken care
of showing that there was no exaggeration in my opinions expressed
to yoar excellency, which you also censared. The sortie at night would
not have obviated loss of squadron, and surely the number of dead
would have been tripled, provided the sortie could have been effected
at all, which pilots doubted. Many thanks for your offers. In my for-
mer telegram I have already asked for $70,000 gold.

The Admiral (Cervei'a) to the Minister {Auiidn).

Annapolis, Md., July 16, 1898,
Have Just arrived here, second in command of squadron and total of 43 captains,
officers, and midshipmen. Petty officers and men, with 4 army officers, 2 surgeons,
2 chaplains, and 1 midshipman, remain at Portsmouth. At the Norfolk hospital
there are 48 wounded.

^This telegram was to have been sent from Havana on the 5th or 6th.

136

The Minuter (Aundn) to the Admiral (Cervera),

Madrid, July IS, 1898.
The minister of marine sends respectful greeting to Spanish prisoners. Mooey
sent you from Havana.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minieter (Aundn).

Annapolis, Md., August 12, 1898.^
Preenme when peace protocol is signed we shall at once be restored to liberty.
If we do not previously receive Instructions I intend to contract for passage, draw-
ing for necessary funds upon your excellency or Loudon committee.

The Commandant-General of Napy-Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Aun&n).

Havana, August 17, 1898.
In oomplianoe (with) orders (from) your exeelleney. In reply to your cable (of July
11).

The Minister (Aundn) to the Admiral (Certfora),

Madrid, August 17, 1898,
If prisoners are granted unconditional liberty you may contract for passage home«
preferring, terms being equal, national flag. If possible one ship bound for Ferrol
and one for Cadiz and Cartagena. Draw for necessary funds.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (AuHdn).

Annapolis, Md., August 18, 1898.
Dfas Moren has obtained permission from United States Government and leaves
for Madrid; also Surgeon Jorado, serionsly ill, accompanied by Chaplain Riera.

3%e United States Admiral (MoNair) to the Admiral (Cervera).

Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md,, August BO, 1898.
Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera.

Sir: I have the honor of advising you that the Government of the United States
will grant Admiral Cervera and the oflScers under his orders their liberty upon con-
dition that they pledge their word of honor in the usual form. The admiral's word
will suffice as to the troops and crews. Liberty can be granted on this condition
only. I call your excellency's attention to the fact that upon pledging their word
in the manner indicated about 20,000 men have been restored to liberty, some of _i

whom have already returned to Spain. This was the mode of procednro followed
by fhe commander in chief of the United States troops which operated in Santiago
de Cuba.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the f'wited States Admiral (McNair),

Honored Sir: The penal code of the Spanish navy defines ns crime and provides
pcnnltics for the acceptance of liberty npou promise not to take up arms during the

> Received at Madrid the 16th.

r

137

continuation of the war. We can, therefore, not accept, and I have the honor of so
informing yonr excellency.

I report the matter to my Government.

Paschal Cervera.

Annapolis, August SO, 1898,

The Admiral {Cerrera) to the Minister (Aufidn),

Annapolis, Md., August SO, 1898.
I have been officially advised that the United States Government will grant ns
liberty if we pledge our word not to take up arms during the continuation of the
war, as the 20,000 men of Santiago have done. Have replied that we can not do so,
because our penal code considers such action criminal. I beg yonr excellency for
instructions.

IMuienant'Commander Capriles to the Minister (Aun6n),

A^fNAPOLis, Md., August SO, 1898.
I shall not accept liberty upon word of honor, even if authorized by yonr excel-
lency.

The Minister (Aun6n) to the Admiral (Cervera),

Madrid, August SS, 1898.
I approve refusal of officers prisoners to accept liberty upon promise not to take
np arms. Advise Lieutenant-Commander Capriles that although his intention may
be different, it is considered disrespect on his part to admit possibility of Govern-
ment authorizing what the penal code forbids.

The Minister (Aundn) to the Admiral (Cervera).

Madrid, August S8, 1898.
Advise me on what terms Dfaz Moreu, Jnrado, and Riera are returning.

' The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aundn).

Annapolis, Md., August S9, 1898.
Jnrado returns sick ; Riera to take care of him. Particulars official letter IStk
instant.^ I did not mediate in Moreu's liberty.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aundn).

Annapolis, Md., August SI, 1898.
United States Government grants us unconditional liberty. Shall at once look for
transport in compliance with your excellency's instructions.

The Minister (Aundn) to the Admiral (Cervera).

Madrid, September 1, 1898.
You may contract for steamers necessary for return prisoners. But for sanitary
reasons, if only one ship, to go to Sautander; if two, one to Sautander and one to
Vigo.

^The sentence in italics is not in the pamphlet.

138

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Mimisler KAun6n),

Annapolis, Md., September S, 1S9S.
Committee T sent to New York has contracted for transportation of men for
£11,185, payable at sight in London, order Krajewski, Pesant &. Co. Draft apon
committee navy. Will notify of departure.

The Minister {Auii6n) to ike Admiral (Cervera).

Madrid, September 4^ 1898,
I approve of arrangements. There being only one ship, go to Santander and
notify me of departure.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (AuHdn),

Nkw York, S^iember 8^ 2898,
Wounded (from) Norfolk have arrived (in) City (of) Rome. To-morrow officers
from Annapolis will arrive. The day after steamer leaves for Portsmouth to embark
nucleus of men. I leave now to arrange for embarkation. ^

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aun6n),

Portsmouth, September It, 1898.
We are about to leave. Probable arrival 2l8t. 1 beg that commandant navy be
-instructed to issue passports to captains and officers for respective homesy except
those mentioned by me, in immediate charge of expedition.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the CaptainOeneral (Blanco).

Portsmouth, N. H., Septefnber 12^ 1898,
We are about to leave for Spiiiu.

The Rear-Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Aun6n).

Honored Sir: As I tread once more the soil of our beloved country I deem it my
duty to give you in the shortest possible form an account of events from the day
of the disaster of July 3 to the present date. I will not weary your excellency with
the many transfers we had to make during the first few days, and will cohfine myself
to stating that all the prisoners were divided into three groups. The one to which
I belonged was assigned to the auxiliary cruiser St. Louis; another, the most numer-
ous, to the auxiliary cruiser Harvard, and a third, the least numerous, but composed
of the most seriously wounded and sick, to the hospital ship Solace.

ill my report of the ill-fated battle of July 3, I had the honor of telling your
excellency of the kindness and courtesy with which we were treated by the enemy,
with the exception of one unfortunate incident which occurred on board the Bar"

' Words in parentheses were not in the original, but appeared in the pamphlet;
those in italics vice versa.

139

vardf and of which I shnll speak in a separate letter/ and some friction at Ports-
mouth, N. H., which does not deserve special mention.

The United States Government had prepared on Seavey Island a camp composed
of wooden barracks for the petty officers, crews, and troops ; that is to say, for all
except the active officers, who were assij^ned to the Naval Academy at Annapolis,
Md., with the exception of the seriously wounded and sick, who were sent to the
Naval Hospital at Norfolk, Ya. The first expedition to arrive was that of the SL
LottiSf of which I formed part. We were landed at Portsmouth, N. H., on July 10,
at which time I learned of the different points to which we had been assigned.

I requested Captain Goodrich of the St. Louis that a few officers be permitted to
remain with the men who were to camp at Seavey Island, and that we be allowed
to take with us to Annapolis a few sailors in the capacity of servants, which was
granted by the United States Government. I therefore appointed Lieuts. Antonio
Magaz, formerly of the crew of the Vizcayaj Fernando Bruquetas, of the Teresa^
Adolfo Calandria, of the OquendOt and Antonio Cal, of the CoUn] Ensign Carlos
Boado, of the Pinion; and Midshipman Enrique Morris to serve as interpreter on
account of his knowledge of English. All these officers remained at Portsmouth
with the exception of Calandria, who was not on the SU Louis, but on the Harvard.
Surgs. Salvador Guinea and Alejandro Lallemand, Assistant Gabriel Montesinos, and
Chaplains Matfas Biesa and Antonio Granero also remained to attend to the many
sick and to the spiritual welfare of all.

During our stay at Portsmouth we received a visit from the bishop of Portland
and the curate of Portsmouth. Words fail me to give an idea of their kindness.
We remained at Portsmouth until the 14th, when we left for Annapolis, where we
arrived on the 16th. The same day the Solace arrived at Norfolk and landed the sick
and wounded, a list of whom I sent your excellency by cable. During the night of
July 4, there occurred on board the Harvard the incident above referred to. This
latter vessel reached Portsmouth on the I5th, landing Lieutenant Calandria, Surg.
Adolfo Nu&ez and the men, and on the evening of the 20th she arrived at Annapolis,
where the captains and officers were landed.

At Annapolis I was received with the honors due my rank. J was given a well-
furnished house, where I remained during the whole time of our captivity with Capt.
3o^6. de Paredes and one of my aides and a sufficient number of servants to make us
very comfortable. The captains and officers were also given comfortable quarters
and were always treated with the greatest courtesy. The United States Government
was kind enough to appoint Kear-Admiral McNair, superintendent of the Naval
Academy, so that I might not be under the orders of an officer of inferior rank to
mine. In a word, we were treated at Annapolis with a kindness and courtesy that
have probably no equal in history in the treatment of prisoners.

When we were settled and I had the necessary clothes, I wanted to visit our men
at Norfolk. I asked the United States Government for permission to do so, which
was granted, and left Annapolis on August 4, arriving at Norfolk on the morning of
the 5th, where I was received with the greatest courtesy, by express orders, I believe,
of the United States Government. I spent the day with the sick and wounded and
went back at night, reaching Annapolis the next morning. At the hospital I found
every one well treated and carefully attended, and had the pleasure of making the
acquaintance of Mr. Arthur C. Humphreys, who was our vice-consul until the war
broke out, and who has been a friend and comfort to our wounded. He has since
rendered us great service in the transportation of the sick to New York, to embark
them on the Cily of Rome, which was accomplished by his disinterested efforts in a

* The letter referred to is omitted, as I do not deem it necessary. It is contained
in the pamphlet mentioned. The incident to which reference is had was the death
of six sailors and the wounding of many others, some of whom have subsequently
died, caused by the United States watch at daybreak of July 5.

140

more economical mnnner than I would have thought possible. I recommend him
especially to your excoUency.

While yet at Annapolis I asked for permission to go to Portsmouth, and the Gov-
ernment hastened to grant it and to issue instructions accordingly. I left Annapolis
on August 12, arriving at Portsmouth at 11 o'clock a. m. of the 13th. I was met at
the station by a naval lieutenant by orders of Mr. C. A. Carpenter, superintendent
of the navy-yard, who invited me to his house, together with my aide, a paymaster
whom I had taken along to distribute a month's pay, and Ensign Narciso Dfez, who
had gone with me to relieve Carlos Boado, whose health was very delicat«.

I found conditions different here from what they were at Annapolis. There was
not the same material comfort nor the same courtesy; on tlie contrary, it was notice-
able at once that there was a lack of material welfare, and in the relations with our
enemies I thought I could see friction, and on the part of some of them a desire to
make especially the officers feel that they were prisoners, and make them suffer the
bitterness of their sad lot. While it never came to open insults, there is no doubt
that the people there did not act according to the desires and certainly not the spirit
that prevailed in the higher Qovernment spheres.

As to the material care I will state that for lodging the men ten barracks had been
built, each 100 feet long and 15 feet wide, so that the ground covered was 15,000
square feet. As we had over 1,500 men, 150 had to be put into each barrack, which
gave each man only 10 square feet of space. The officers had only one barrack, the
dimensions of which I do not remember, but it had all along the walls miserable
oots (I could not call them beds) and in the middle was a table lengthened by
boards and disreputable looking remnants of chairs. As politely as I knew how, I
commented on this to Admiral Carpenter, and in honor to truth I must say that
when I left Portsmouth two days later the officere had chairs and another barrack
was being built for a diuing room, and inBtrnctions bad been issued to stop up every
crack of the old barrack.

1 lefb Portsmouth on August 16, arriving at Annapolis on the evening of the next
day. On August 20 Admiral McNair handed me the letter which I inclose to yoor
excellency, marked No. 1, as also my reply thereto, marked No. 2. I notified yon
of the substance of these letters by telegram, and your excellency approved of my
reply. In view of the decision of the United States Government that we sbonld
promise not again to take up arms and the fact that we could not do so under our
laws, I deemed it necessary to write Admiral McNair letters Nos. 3 and 4,^ of which
I inclose a rough draft, referring respectively to the invalids and the firemen engaged
in Cuba entitled to be sent back.

Admiral McNair also advised me, in letter marked No. 5, that we were to be pre-
pared to leave the academy. Aside from the above there were no further incidents,
except the deaths which have occurred since we landed, of which I sent you a list,
and the return to Spain of Capt. Emilio Diaz Moreu, Surg. Antonio Jnrado, and
Chaplain Jos6 Riera, of which I notified your excellency at the time. On August
31 Admiral McNair wrote me a lettt^r stating that the United States Government
granted us unconditional liberty, and I at once appointed a committee, composed of
Lieut. Commander Juan B. Aznar and Paymaster Ednardo Urdapilleta, to go to New
York and make arrangements for passage, in accordance with your excellency's
instructions; and I also sent a surgeon to New York to purchase such medicines as
the steamer did not carry and as might be needed, and I and my aides got ready to
go at the last hour to settle minor difficulties that might present themselves.

Before proceeding, I wish to state that wherever we went there were demonstrations
of the greatest sympathy with our misfortune. I have received many visits and
many kind services from prominent people, some of very high rank, and at Annapolis
the whole population was very kind toward us. Admiral McNair and the whole

*Some of the docunieiits referred to have not been included in this collection
because it was not deemed necessary.

141

persoDnel under his orders lave distinguished theroselves by their exquisite courtesy,
for which I considered it my duty to thank him in a letter of which I inclose memo-
randum. To take charge of the expedition I appointed Lieut. Commanders Juan B.
Aznar and Carlos Gonzalez Llanos, Lieuts. Jos^ Butr6u and Lorenzo M'M, Captain
of Artillery Manuel Hermida, Ensign Enrique de la Cierva, and Midshipman Juan
Mnnoz, and Kaintnndo Torres. I have granted permission to all the other captains
and officers who have asked to be allowed to return to Spain, without giving them
.any further assistance. I inclose a list of these.

When everything was in readiness at Annapolis, I thought it best to take a trip to
Norfolk, New York, and Portsmouth, before the steamer was ready, and I am glad I
did so, as I had a chance to settle several small difficulties which might perhaps
have delayed the steamer, which would have increased the expense. Of the firemen
engaged in Cuba, 20 asked for permission to go with us, and only the 19 mentioned in
the inclosed list took passage for Havana, and I wrote to the commandant-general of
the navy-yard, asking him to send them on to Santiago.

We had with us 29 prisoners of the army, among them 8 officers. I asked the
Captain-General for instructions relaj;ive to these, and in accordance with his orders
have gone to Havana, while the others have come with us. All of them have
received some aid, of which they stood much in need. I was obliged to leave Seaman
Job6 Maria Vilar Toimil at Portsmouth, as the physicians stated that it would
endanger his life to take him on board. I left with Commodore George C. Remoy
$50 for his expenses and a letter, of which I inclose memorandum.

The committee appointed to charter the steamer did so on the terms stated in the
contract, of which I forward a copy to your excellency. In accordance with the
terms provided, with the efficient assistance of the United States authorities, the
whole embarkation was accomplished without trouble of any kind; no one was
absent, and by noon of the 12th we were on our way home, and every face on board
expressed the joy that filled every heart. The trip was made with the most beauti-
ful weather and has benefited everyone, especially the sick. There were 300 when
I wont to Portsmouth, but their number has been reduced to 180, and even these are
much improved, so that very few will have to be carried out on stretchers, and I am
happy to say no death occurred while we were on the sea; nor has there been any
disaster, and it has not been necessary to admonish a single man. Four members of
the Red Cross Society came with us, and their conduct has been of the very best.
Theif names are given in the inclosed report.

I also inclose a list of all the personnel that came home with nie, amounting in all
to 2 fiag officers, 8 captains, 70 officers and midshipmen, and 1,574 petty officers,
sailors, and naval troops, and 2 officers and 21 men belonging to the army.

Before closing this long history permit me to say that the officers who were at
Portsmouth, with the men, have conducted themselves with the greatest tact, patience,
and prudence. In my official letter of August 11 1 have already told your excellency
of the merits of the medical corps and chaplains, which I hereby confirm. As to tlie
special merits of some of the others your excellency will be advised by the inclosed
copy of the official letter from Lieut. Antonio Magaz, who was the oldest officer
there. Lieut. Commnndcr .hian B. Aznar and Paymaster Eduardo Urdapilleta
accomplished their mission of chartering the steamer in the best possible manner,
taking into account the state of the market. Paymaster Urdapilleta has shown
himself to be one of the best officers of the service^ which I take great pleasure in
stating.

Yours, etc., jf AbCUAL ClCKVEIlA.

Santandkr, Sejitcmhty iO, 18^.

142

Tlie Captain General {Blanco) to the Admiral (Oervera),^

Aemy of Operations in Cuba, Stafv,
Honored Sir: I am just in receipt of the report which you were
kiud enough to address to me, dated on the sea, July 9 last, on the bat-
tle sustained by the squadron under your orders in the waters of Safi-
tiago de Cuba, on July 3, against the United States naval forces. I
transmit the report to-day to the minister of war for the iuformatiou of
the Government, accompanied by the following letter:

"Honored Sir: I have to-day received from Admiral Pascual
Cervera the official report, of which I inclose a copy to your excellency,
on the battle he sustained in the waters of Santiago de Cuba on July
3 last, said report being dated on the sea, July 9. If the accounts
published as to this event should not be sufficient to make you appre-
ciate the gallant conduct of our sailors on that day, the reading of
this document will certainly suffice to make anyone realize the valor,
presence of mind, and self sacrifice shown in this fierce battle against
far su[)erior forces, not only by the flag-officers, captains, and officers,
but also by the crews of the ships. Though victory has not crowned
their gallant efforts, they have demonstrated once more the military
virtues that grace the Spanish navy by giving the noblest example of
heroism. In view of these facts, it is my opinion that Kear- Admiral
Cervera, the captains of the ships composing the squadron, and all
those who took part in the battle are entitled to signal rewards for
their valiant conduct, and I beg your excellency to use your best
endeavors with Her IVIajesty the Queen to grant them such reward.^

1 have nothing to add to the foregoing, except again to express my
admiration for the gallant conduct of your excellency and the squadron
under your command, and to lament with the army here and the whole
nation the sacrifice of so many lives on the altar of the nation's honor.
But, as in the first paragraph of your report you expressed an idea
upon which I can not help but comment, though only in a few words, I
wish to state that, if it is intended thereby to make me responsible for
the results of that ill-fated operation, I accept beforehand every resi>onsi-
bility that can be laid to me as the result of the orders which, guided
by the most patriotic intentions, I deemed expedient to dictate to your
excellency, since I had the^honor of having the squadron under your

worthy command placed under my orders.

Ram6n Blanco.

His Excellency Rear- Admiral Pascual Cervera.

Havana, August 7, 1898.

The Admiral {Cervera) to the Captain General {Blanco).

Honored Sir: Not until this morning did I receive your excel-
lency's letter dated August 7, w^hich, though not signed, I know to be

^ This letter was received by me at Madrid shortly after my rettirn from the Uaited
States.

143

genuine, as it came to me with yonr confidential letter of September
15, in which you notify me that you sent it in case your former letter
sent to the United States had been lost.

I thank your excellency many times, not in my name alone, but in
the name of those who were under my orders, for the kind words which
yoa addressed to the minister of war in our behalf when you sent him
my report of the ill-fated battle of July 3.

Kelative to the matter that concerns me alone, I wish to explain to
your excellency the object and motives that impelled me to place at the
beginning of my report the words that gave rise to your remarks.
Permit me first of all to say that it was not my desire to incriminate
anyone, nor to throw responsibility upon anyone, but simply to disclaim
any responsibility which a priori might be laid to me and which does
not belong to me. ^

It is certain that we accepted a war with the United States for which
we were not prepared, as we had no fleet such as would have been
necessary to defend the colonies. This matter was the subject of an
interesting correspondence, both official and confidential, which I had
with the Government before the war became inevitable.

It is also certain that when this war did become inevitable I wanted
to formulate a plan of campaign and the Government refused me per-
mission to go to Madrid with that end in view.

My ideas on this subject were that we should have to lose Cuba in
any event, and if my squadron, the only naval forces of any value that
we possessed, were destroyed, that a humiliating peace entailing many
other losses was sure to follow the destruction of my squadron. Sub-
sequent events have shown that I was right on this point.

In order to save the squadron it would have beeh necessary to draw
the enemy away from their base of operations to some point where tliey
would not be able to take all their forces. We should have had all of
onrs united where we had better resources. But I never could msike
these ideas clear, which explains why I was so energetically and obsti-
nately opposed to the squadron going to the West Indies.

It was this departure for the West Indies that was the signal for our
loss, as I had the honor of telling your excellency in a telegram. After
that nothing that happened could surprise me. Hence the introductory
words of my report.

Perhaps if I had not gone out Shafter would have reembarked his
foroes. I was told so in the United States, and I believed it then,
although this would only have prolonged the agon}'' of Sc^ntiago de
Cuba for a few days; for I considered the city lost from the moment
when I arrived there, and told the Government so in my telegram of
May 21, two days after I entered.

Having explained to you that it was not the object of the introduc-
tion to my report to throw responsibilities upon anyone, but simply to
disclaim such responsibility as does not belong to me, there only remains

144

for me to reiterate to your excellency my tlinnks for the kind words
addressed to as all.

Yours, etc., Pascual Gerysra.

His excellency the CAPTAm-GENEBAL of the Abmt of OPBttA-
TiONS IN Cuba, Uava^m.

Madrid, October 8, 1898.

The Captain- General of the Anny of the Inland of Cuba.

rPrivato.]

Havana, September 15. 1898,
His Excellency Pasoual Oebyeba.

My Dear Sir and Honored Admiral : As soon as T received,
your telegram advising me that you were about to leave Portsmouth,
I replied, wishing you a safe voyage. But you had already embarked,
as you will see from the inclosed Aispatch,^ and I, therefore, take the
liberty of writing to you to fulfill that duty of courtesy.

I do not know whether you will finally receive my communication
dated August 7, in which I acknowledge the receipt of the report you
were kind enough to address to me on the 9th of July. In case you
should not receive it, I send you herewith a copy of the communication
referred to.

And while I hold the pen in my hand, permit me also to answer a
remark which occurred in one of your telegrams and which I thought
better not to answer by telegram, especially at that time.

You said that your actions met with nothing but censure on my part.
I have never censured you, my dear Admiral ; on the contrary, I have
always been lavish with praise, as you deserve, both before and after
your arrival in Santiago. You will remember that as soon as you arrived
I congratulated you on your skillful seamanship. Since then there may
have been differences of opinion between us, but never censure, at least
not on my part, for I can not believe that you would so construe a
phrase in one of my letters, written in a moment of the greatest bitter-
ness I have ever experienced in my life, under the impression of that
great national misfortune, and in which I only expressed doubt.'

In any event, although you do not need my support, which moreover
could not be of any help to you, as the blow has struck me harder than
you, be sure that I shall always be on your side and on the side of the
navy, whatever maybe the vicissitudes of these unhappy times through
which we are passing, and the attitude which you assume toward me.

Wishing you sincerely all manner of happiness, I remain as ever^

yours, etc.,

Eam6n Blanco.

^Thk International Ocean Telegraph Company,
Hon. General Blanco: SeptmherlS, 1898,

We are advised from Portsraouth that your telegram of this data to Admiral
Cervera could not be delivered, the person addressed having left for K^opci qu %\m
steamer C%ty of Rome before the receipt of the cable.

^The letter referred to never reached me.

145

Madrid, October 7, 189S.
His ExcelleDcy Bam6n Blanoo.

My Dbab Fbiend and Bespeoted General: Last evening I
received your favor of September 16, together with the official letter of
Augnst 7, which, probably through an oversight, had not been submit-
ted to your excellency for signature. Today I answer both.

It was not necessary for you to forward to me the note from the Inter-
national Ocean Telegraph Company, for how could I ever doubt your
exquisite courtesy? Thiit would not be possible.

I am not the only one who has seen censure in some of your telegrams,
especially the one you sent to Santiago, and which I do not have before
me, as I have not yet received the documents which, in anticipation of
the disaster, 1 left in that city. In this telegram you said that you be-
lieved I exaggerated, and other things which I do not wish to repeat
from memory and in order not to make this letter too long; but I regret
I shall not be able to make it short, though I do not wish to trouble you.

You will remember that I answered that I had to respect your opin-
ions and not discuss them, because to my mind that is all a subaltern
should do, and if I subsequently pointed out to you in another tele-
gram the impossibility of going out at night, it was only by way of
information, which I must now give you more in full.

As Santiago was short of artillery in the modern sense of the word
(for, aside from the guns of the Mercedes^ which were mounted at the
Socapa and Punta Gorda, there were only two d.54-inch Krupp guns,
which were of no use against the ships, and some howitzers and abso-
lutely useless guns), the enemy was not afraid to approach the harbor
entrance, especially at night, when they remained in the immediate
vicinity of the same.

At night they always had one ship, relieved every three or four
hours, less than a mile from the harbor entrance, maintaining the latter
constantly illuminated, and, as though this were not enough, they had
other smaller vessels still nearer, and steamboats close to the headlands
of the entrance. Once in a while these latter boats would exchange
musketry fire with our forces.

Under these circumstances it was absolutely impossible to go out at
night, because in this narrow channel, illuminated by a dazzling light,
we could not have followed the channel and would have lost the
ships, some by running aground, others by colliding with their own
companions.

But even supposing that we had succeeded in going out, before the
first ship was outside we should have been seen and covered from the
very first with the concentrated fire of the whole squadron. Of the effi-
ciency of that fire an idea may be gained from what happened to the
Eeina Mercedes during the night of July 3.

In daytime, on the other hand, the hostile squadron was more
scattered and some of the ships were usually absent, as was the case
with the Massachusetts on July 3.
10742 10

146

Feeling sure, as I did, that the disaster was inevitable, all T could do
was to see that we had the least possible naniber of men killed and to
prevent the ships from falling into the enemy's hands, thereby com-
plying, as we literally did comply, with an article of the Ordinances of
the Navy which the minister of marine cited in a cablegram to me.

If Santiago de Cuba had been even reasonably well armed, the hos-
tile ships would always have kept at a distance of five or six miles at
least, in which case they could not have lighted up the harbor entrance
so effectively, and we could then have maneuvered with some remote
prospect of success.

In your letter you alluded to a phrase from another letter of yoars
which I never received, and my telegram from Portsmouth was only in
answer to the one which you sent me in reply to mine of July 4. In
this telegram you say about as follows:

If the sortie had been made at another time, perhaps the result woald hare been
different.

I repeat that I do not have the telegram before me and shall correct
such words as may not have been employed.

I confess that I saw in this sentence another censure, and I am glad
to see from your letter that such was not your intention, although it
was so construed by the very few persons whom I consulted.

I thank you very much for the support you offer me and still more
for the generous terms in which you couch the offer. Although my
attitude has already been defined in an official letter, I believe it ray
duty to speak of it more fully.

I never have held, nor do I hold now, any grudge against anyone,
least of all against you. Hence it is not my intention to attack anyone,
but I must defend myself from the many things that have been said
against me here^ and if in doing so I should indirectly attack anyone
I shall feel very sorry.

If I were the only one concerned I should make an end of it right
here and ask for my retiremient, as I have been wanting to do for some
time. But when I returned to Spain I found part of the nation led
astray in its judgment of these matters in their relations to the future,
and the navy made the subject of unjust attacks, and looking upon •
me as embodying in my conduct its spotted honor; and I can not betray '

the navy, and still less my country.

Therefore, as soon as judgment has been passed upon my conduct
or the case dismissed, I shall publish my whole correspondence, and,
unless my strength shall fail me, subject everything that has happened
to a critical examination without going into personalities, inspired only
by the interests of our country and the dangers which I see ahead for
the Canaries, the Balearic Islands, and Ceuta. If anything personal
should result from this (which I hope not), it will not be my fault.

In closing this letter, i>ermit me to assure you of my profound respect,
and to remain as ever, yours, etc.,

Pasoual Oebveba.

APPET^DTXES

Which in ThemselveB Justify Many of the Statements Contained in the Text

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPEDITION OF THE SQUADRON OF RESERVE

TO THE UNITED STATES COASTS (MAY 27).

The Minister (Aufion) to the Admiral (Odmara).

Honored Sir: The eqnipmeut of the squadron under your excel-
lency's worthy command having been completed and the ships sup-
])lied with provisions and coal, you will arrange for its immediate
departure for the harbor of Las Palmas, where without loss of time
you will replenish the coal consumed and take whatever quantity of
provisions you may deem necessary, according to the respective pur-
IK)8es for which the different units are intended. At Las Palmas you
will form three divisions of the squadron.

The lirst,^ composed of the battle ship Carlos F, cruisers RdpidOy
Patriota^ and Meteoro, and dispatch boat Oiralda, will remain under

1 Description of first division.

Namo of ship.

Carlos V
R&pido..
Patrioia.
Meteopo.
Giralda .

Daily coal

Coal

lioi

capacity.

At 11.22

Ton*.

knots.

Toiia.

2, 000

70

2. 302

66

2, 740

(a)

1, 945

99

430

23

At 15
knots.

Tons. .
169

158

(a)
230

48

a Not known.

your excellency's immediate command. The second division, composed
of the battle ships Pelayo and Vitoria^ and destroyers OsadOj Atidaa,
and Proserpina^ will be placed under the orders of the oldest captain,
being the commander of the Pelayo^ Gapt. Jos6 Ferr^ndiz y Nino.
The third division, of which the auxiliary cruisers Buenos AireSy
Antonio L&pez^ and Alfonso XII will form part, will be commanded by
Gapt. Jose Barra^a y Fernandez de Gastro.

Tlie squadron will leave the harbor mentioned united, and in order
that its subsequent movements may not be surprised it will shape its

147

148

coarse for the West Indies until at a sufficient distance from the
Oanaries and from the course most frequented by the ships crossing
those waters; or the whole squadron will perform evolutions within
sight of said islands, simulating tactical exercises while waiting for
nightfall, when each of the divisions, upon previous orders to be issued
by your excellency, will proceed in the proper direction for the purposes
hereinafter set forth.

The first division under the command of your excellency will shape
its course for the Bermudas, and at a proper distance from those islands
you will detach a fast vessel to acquire at Hamilton all possible infor-
mation, besides such as the Government will communicate to you
through our consul, Jos^ Garcia Acuna, a resident of said port, as to
the location, number, and quality of the hostile forces distributed along
the Altantic coast, it being understood that the communication with
the Bermudas must be confined to the one vessel referred to and only
for a length of time absolutely necessary for the purpose indicate<l, the
rest of the division to pass out of sight of the islands, so that its pres-
ence in said waters may not become known.

Taking into account the information you may acquire, and eluding
an encounter with superior forces, your excellency will choose such
point on the United States coasts as you may deem best adapted —
Charleston, if possible — to carry out in the direction from south to
north a series of hostile acts, in the energy of which you will be guided
by circumstances, against fortified positions as well as against such
places as, owing to their industrial, military, or commercial importance,
will justify the operation and make it worth while. I call your excel-
lency's attention to the expediency of your course along the coast being
from south to north as indicated. Key West being the enemy's prin-
cipal base of operations, the forces detached to oppose your operations
will follow you instead of going to meet you, as would otherwise be the
case.

Tour excellency will determine to what point the hostilities should
he carried, remembering that the object of these hostilities is not only
to make reprisals for the enemy's unjustified acts on our own coasts,
but principally to call his attention toward the north, dividing his
forces and thus facilitating the movements of the third division and at ^
the same time those of Admiral Cervera's squadron. You might find
it expedient (but this is not imposed upon you as a duty) to go up
north as far as to permit you to detach a cruiser to Halifax, in order
that Lieut. Bam6n Carranza, who is assigned to Canada, may give you '
such information as he may have acquired beforehand. Having accom-
plished on the United States coasts the object indicated, and following
the route which offers the greatest security, you will try, unless reasons
of greater importance should prevent, to pass north of the island of
Mariguana, or Turks Island, and collect at the latter the information
which the Government will take care to forward to you there.

149

From that favorable position you may proceed at yonr discretion to
the southern coast of Oaba, aronnd Cape Maysi, and enter Santiago
Harbor; or, following said coast, enter Havana Harbor, or passing north
of the Keys, enter the harbor of San Juan de Puerto Rico. Any prizes
you may be able to capture during this expedition, if the conditions of
the vessel or the nature of the cargo make it worth while, you will
dispatch to the Peninsula, with a suitable prize crew on board, or incor-
porate in your division, as the case may be. If the services such prizes
can render do not compensate for the trouble they require, it will be
better to get rid of them by sinking them or setting them on fire, after
transshipping whatever you may deem serviceable, in any event the
personnel and flags, the portable armament, and the ship^s papers.

As to the second division, in order that its separation from the rest
of the squadron may remain unknown as long as possible, and also in
order that it may be in a position to reach speedily, if need be, any
given point of the Peninsula or the Canaries, where its defensive action
may be required, will cruise between parallels 30 and 36 north latitude,
the ninth meridian west, and the coast of Africa, for ten or twelve
days from the date when it begins to maneuver independently, which
is probably the time it will take your excellency to reach the United
States coast, after which the second division will proceed to Cadiz to
receive further orders.

The third division, upon leaving your excellency's flagship, will pro-
ceed to the latitude of Cape St. Boque, to cut off the route of the
vessels plying between the eastern coast of the United States and
South America or the Pacific. It will remain on this route, cruising as
far as the tenth degree north latitude, as long as its radius of action
(calculated by that of the ship having the smallest radius) will permit,
including the return. The object of this expedition will be to capture
the greatest possible number of prizes, concerning which the com-
mander of the division will observe what I have previously stated
relative to the prizes which your excellency may take.

In case of injury or any other unfortunate circumstance making it
necessary for any of the ships of this division to seek a port, you will
see, provided there is a possibility of choice, that preference be given
to the French colonies. With the necessary prudence, the commandet
of these forces will detach one of his ships to Fort de France, Marti-
nique, where it will receive orders from the Government and acquire
such information as may be of importance to him. But if from unfore-
seen causes he should not find upon his arrival the orders referred to,
it will be understood that the division is to return to the harbor of Las
Palmas, following the shortest route and carefully eluding the hostile
forces, if the power of the latter renders this necessary.

It is the desire of the Government that your excellency, as well as the
commanders of the second and third divisions, when navigating inde-
pendently, will proceed within the scope of the general outline traced

160

above, bnt with all tlie liberty of action tLat may be necessary to
insure the success of the plan, with the undeistanding that he who
caases the greatest amount of damages to the enemy without endanger-
ing his own forces will best fulfill his mission. If the vicissitudes of the
voyage give your excellency an opportunity to join Admiral Gervera's
squadron, you will do so at once, and the forces will remain anited
until the Oovernment decides that it is expedient to separate them
again, or until both commanders in chief, or in case of diif'erenoe of
ox^inion, the eldest commander, should deem such separation necessary.

As to the ports that may be touched, the engagements that may be
sustained, as well as any visits, reconnoissances, and captures that may
be made, your excellency, as well as your subordinates, will adhere to
the terms of international law, seeking to obviate any motive for claims
on the part of neutral powers. The Queen and the Government are
confident that this expedition, intrusted to the zeal of your excellency
and your subordinates, will be carried out in such manner as to cam
the approval of the nation and serve as a brilliant example of what may
be accomplished, in spite of the scarcity of resources, by energy, intel-
ligence, and good will placed at the service of the King and the country.

Madrid, May 27^ 1898.

II.

27*6 Admiral (Cdmara) to the Minister {Auiidn).

Cadiz, June 15^ 1698.
I can assure your excellency that all are cooperating with me for
immediate departure, and if we do not sail as speedily as desired it is
owing to difficulties impossible to overcome, in spite of the most earnest
desire. I repeat that the utmost coal capacity of the Rdpido and
Fatriota is only 3,000 tons. Carlos Y will refill bunkers as far as pos-
sible while the 3.94-inch armament is being completed, having until
now been busy with speed trials. I shall confer with the Captain-Gten-
eral of the Departamento, after inspecting the ships, in order to settle
any difficulties that may present themselves, and to fulfill your wishes,
which are my own as well. I hope to be ready next week.

III.

The minister of war (Correa) to the minister of marine (Aundn), Cadiz.

Madbid (not dated — about middle of June).
The military governor of Cadiz transnntted to the minister of marine
the following telegram from the minister of war:

(To be deciphered by yonr excellency personally.) Kindly advise miniRter marine,
in strict confidence, that I have received very serions news from the Philippines and
that the Government considers it necessary for the squadron fitted oat, or part of
same, to leave immediately in order to calm anxiety of public opinion and rnisc
spirit of fighting forces through knowledge that reenforcements are coming.

1

151

IV.

Tfie minister of marine {Aun6n) to the commander in chief of the squad-
ron of reserve (Cdmara).

June 15, 1898.

Honored Sib : The equipment of the squadron under your excel-
leucy's worthy command having been completed, the ships provisioned
and coaled, the necessary papers issued, and the troops and supplies
having been embarked in the transports mentioned in the inclosed mem-
orandum, you will arrange for the immediate departure of the squadron
in a southwesterly direction, timing yourself so that you will be near the
Strait of Gibraltar by nightfall. After nightfall you will dismiss the
trans- Atlantic steamers Alfonso XII and Antonio Lopez to carry out
independently their respective orders from the ministry of war. With
the remainder of the squadron and the convoy you will pass through
the Strait of Gibraltar at the necessary speed, so that by daybreak you
will be in the Mediterranean and out of sight of the lookouts of that
place.

When this has been accomplished you will dismiss those of the colliers
whose rate of speed will not permit them to follow the speed of the
squadron, and will shape your course for Suez, avoiding as much as
possible passing within sight of land. The coal consumption of the
deep draft ships should be proportioned methodically, so that upon
arrival at Suez they may be as nearly alike as possible, so as to facili-
tate the passage through the canal under statutory conditions without
the necessity, or with the least possible necessity, of transshipping or
unshipping anything.

Upon arrival at Port Said, and upon notifying this ministry by cable
of the condition in which the expedition reaches that city, and the
facilities or difficulties that may present themselves for passing through
the canal and the means to be employed for overcoming such difficulties,
if any there be, yon will receive orders to continue or modify your course.
In the former case, or in case you should not be able to communicate with
the Government, you will replenish the destroyers with the necessary
coal to enable them to return to iViahon, and will instruct them to pro-
ceed to that place either directly or with such stops as you may consider
necessary.

Thereupon the remaining ships will pass through the Suez Oanal, and
take on board pilots and such Arabic personnel as you may deem neces-
sary to lighten the arduous work of the firemen in the Red Sea. You
will choose a point on the Red Sea or on the Island of Socotra, or any
other point you may deem suitable for the purpose, and there i)rovision
and coal the ships, taking the coal from the slow colliers, provided they
have rejoined the squadron, leaving these vessels enough coal for the
homeward voyage and dispatching them back to Cartagena.

If the slow colliers have not rejoined the squadron and you have no

152

news of them, yoa may take coal from the colliers accompanying tbe
squadron and continue tbe voyage, leaving behind for the former, if
possible without endangering the necessary secrecy, instructions to
rejoin the squadron, or stay at Suez, or return to Spain, as yon may
think best. From Socotra you will proceed to the Laccadive Islands,
in one of which you may perhaps have a chance to complete the coaling
of the squadron, and from there, unless it should be necessary for any
of the ships to touch or be detached, to a port in Ceylon, you will
continue your voyage in the manner hereinafter indicated.

From any point where the colliers of the squadron may lighten their
cargo you may dispatch them back to the Peninsula, or the nearest
place where they can renew their cargo, giving them instructions in
the latter case as to where to rejoin the squadron. From the Lacca-
dives you may choose your route according to circumstances, either
passing from the north through the Strait of Malacca and coaling again
at some anchoring place on the northern coast of Sumatra; or, passing
through the Strait of Sunda, touching at Singapore or Batavia if
deemed necessary, and proceeding thence to Labuan, Borneo; or, finally,
passing south of Sumatra and Java and through the Strait of Lombok,
going thence directly to Mindanao, without stopping at Labuan.

If either of the first two routes is adopted, you can communicate at
Labuan with Madrid, stating the condition in which the ships arrive,
and receive the confirmation or modification of these instructions, after
which you may proceed with the united squadron, or detach ships, as
in your judgment may be most effective, to Balabac, Jolo, Basilan, or
Zamboanga, reeuforce the detachments with the landing troops, or, if
possible, enter into communication with the authorities at Manila for
the purpose of cooperating in the future.

As it is the main object of the expedition to assert our sovereignty
in the Philippine Archipelago, and as it is impossible to tell what will
be the condition of the islands at the comparatively remote date of
your arrival at Mindanao, you will from that time on make your own
plans and take such steps as will lead to the attainment of the total or
partial success of this enterprise, according to circumstances, either
assisting the Bisayas, or running along the eastern coast of the archi
pelago to efi'ect a landing of the forces on the opposite coast of Luzon,
provided the conditions of the territory in the part nearest the lagoon
and Manila admit of doing so; or passing around the north of said
island to operate upon Subic or Manila, if the information you may
acquire as to the hostile forces wiU permit you to meet them without
signal inferiority on your side, and even detaching the convoy of
troops, with more or less escort, or without it, if deemed expedient, in
order to facilitate movements or conceal the true object.

If you succeed in communicating with the Governor-General of the
Philippines, you will consult with him and proceed, within the means
at his disposal, to do anything that may lead to the defense or recou-
quest of the archipelago, but always trying to operate carefully, as the

153

ordinance prescribes, so as to obviate all encounters that have no pros-
pect of success, considering it an essential point to avoid the useless
sacrifice of the squadron, and under all circumstances to save the honor
of arms.

The Oovernment, which realizes the difficulty of the mission in-
trusted to you and the deficiency of means which it has been possible
to furnish you, traces these general outlines to show the final object it
seeks to attain ; but at the same time you are fully authorized to depart
therefrom whenever circumstances promise greater chance of success
by following a different course.

If in the course of your voyage you should find it necessary to enter
any port on account of injuries or from other causes, you will remem-
ber the expediency of preferring French colonies or the territory of
the Kingdom of Siam. Any prizes which you may be able to capture
during the expedition you will man properly, incorporate them in the
squadron, and send them to a Spanish port, or destroy them by fire or
sink them, according to circumstances and the services they may ren-
der or the impediment they may represent, first transshipping to the
vessels of the squadron everything considered serviceable, in any event
the personnel and fiags, portable arms, and the ship's papers.

It is the desire of the Government that your excellency, as well as the
captains of the ships or groups of ships, who may on certain occasions
operate independently, will proceed within the scope of the general
outlines traced above, but with all the liberty of action that may be
necessary to insure the success of the plan, with the understanding that
he who causes the greatest amount of damage to the enemy without
endangering his own forces will best fulfill his mission, and that Her
M$\jesty, the Government, the nation, and his own conscience, will be
satisfied if each one in his sphere follows in all of his actions the letter
and spirit of our ordinances.

As to the ports that may be touched, the engagements that may be
sustained, as well as any visits, reconnoissances, and captures that
may be made, your excellency, as well as your subordinates, will adhere
to the terms of international law, seeking to obviate any motive for
claims on the part of neutral powers.

A few days after the departure of the squadron there will be dis-
patched to join the squadron at Suez the trans- Atlantic steamer Isla
de Luzon with provisions, coal, lubricating material, supplies, and
the personnel that has remained behind on account of sickness or from
other causes. To this vessel you can transship the troops on board the
Buenos Aires in order that the latter may be better adapted for any
military operations with which she may be charged.

The Queen and the Government are confident that this expedition
intrusted to your excellency and your subordinates will be carried out
in such a manner as to earn the approval of the nation and serve as a
brilliant example of what may be accomplished, in spite of the scarcity

154

of resources, by energy, intclHgeuce, and good will placed at the serv-
ice of the King and the coantry.

The above is commauicated to yoa by royal order for year action.

Bam6n Aun6k.

Cadiz, June 15^ 1898.

MEMORANDUM RKFRRRED TO.

Group A, — Figbting ehips which are to go to the dcetinfttion of the expedition,
Pelayo, Carlos V, Patriotay Rdpido.

Group B. — Fighting ships which are to retam from the canaly AudtLz, Osado, JPro^
erpina.

Group C. — Transports of troops, Buenos Aires, Panay. ^

Group D. — Colliers, Col6n, Covadonga, San Jugnstin, San Francisco.

Group E, — Ships destined for different purposes which are to sail with the squad*
ron and separate from it, Alfonso XII, Antonio Ldpez, Giralda, Pi^lago.

ORDER OF SAILING.

1

0 Audaz, n 0 Osado»

0
2

0

4

0
3

0

1

0
12

0
6

0
5

0
11

0
8

0
10

0
9

0
7

0

0

Proserpina,

0

Giralda.

Pi6lago,

1, Pelayo; 2, Carlos V; 3, Patriota; 4, Rdpido; 5, Buenos Aires; 6, Panag; 7, Cotdn;
S, Covadouga; 9, San Francisco; 10, San Agustin; 11, Alfonso XII; 12, Antonio Ldpez,

Y.

Hie Admiral (Camara) to Hie Minister (Aundn).

Poet Said, June 30, 1898.
After waiting four days for decision of Egyptian Government to
transship coal to Pelayo, the transshipment has been prohibited, and we
have been notified to leave at once all Egyptian ports. In view of
critical aspect of qaestion, and with assistance of Spanish minister at
Port Said and consul, have succeeded in gaining time to receive full
instructions from your excellency by telegraph. If I were to pass
through canal at present without coaling here or at Suez, should have
to tow Pelayo all through Red Sea, there being no port where transship-
ment could.be effected until reachiug Babel -Mandeb. If to avoid

155

international conflict it should be impossible for me to remain here nntil
1 receive your excellency's instructions, shall go out to Mediterraueau
and wait outside of territorial waters for your telegrams.

VI.

The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cdmara) to the Minister

(Aunon).

Oaptaincy-Gknehal of the

Squadron of Besebve, Staff.

Honored Sir : From the ICth, the day of our departure from Cadiz,

until that of our arrival in this harbor, the weather has been perfect and

the health and spirit of the crews excellent, so that we have been able to

practice military exercises every morning and evening. On the 17th

the Patriota, Rdpido, and Buenos Aires took the three destroyers in tow,

but several times during the voyage the lines parted, and on the third

day the Buenos Aires collided with the Proserpina so hard that the iron

cable was lost, so that she could not again tow the Proserpina. I then

ordered the Carlos V to take the latter in tow, which was done without
difficulty. As I have already stated, the lines of all the ships parted
several times as the result of the bad arrangement and lack of strength
of the bridles which the destroyers carried.

The towing ships furnished coal and provisions to the vessels towed.
This operation was always carried out as rapidly as possible, and the
only drawback was that the squadron had to reduce its speed. The
destroyers sustained several injuries to their engines, which were
remedied with the contrivances on board. The Audaz was the only
one that had injuries of any importance, the piston of the air pump
being broken, which is detaining the vessel in this port. The flagship
sustained some minor injuries in the feed-water api)aratus and the air
pump of the port engine, which were remedied without trouble. On
the morning of the 26th, when near Port Said, a dense fog compelled
us to moderate our speed for an hour. When it was over we went
ahead at full speed and entered the canal at 11.20 o'clock, casting
anchor at noon.

Yours, etc.. Manuel de la GAmara.

On board the Pelayo, Port Said, July i, 1898.

VII.

The Minister {Aunon) to the Admiral (Cdmara)^ Cart1iagena»

Madrid, July 23, 1898.
When the torpedo-boat destroyers have rejoined your squadron, start
for Cadiz with the Pelayo, Carlos 7, lidpido, Patriots, Buenos Aires^
and the destroyers, keeping close to the shore, so as to be seen from

166

Spanish cities, exhibiting when near them the national flag, illaminated
at night by searchlights, wliich are also to be thrown npon cities. If
you meet any coast guard vessels, communicate with them. Advise me
in advance of honr of sailing. The colliers that have onloaded or trans-
shipped the good coal they carried may proceed to Cadiz, either with
squadron or alone.

HARVARD INCIDENT.

Rear- Admiral Cervera to tlie United States Admiral {McNair)j Superinr

tendent of the Naval Academy.

Most Excellent Sib: Upon my arrival at Portsmouth, N. H., I
read in the papers of an event that occurred on board the Harvard^ and
which has cost tbe lives of six of my sailors and resulted in many others
being wounded. As I know, on the one hand, the spirit of discipline
among my men, whose conduct is of the very best, and see, on the other
hand, for myself the generosity and extreme courtesy with which we
are being treated by the American nation, which fact I have had the
pleasure of expressing in writing to Admiral Sampson and Captain
Goodrich and take pleasure in confirming here, I did not believe this
piece of news, which I took to be one of the many inventions which
may be seen in the press every day, but when the Harvard arrived
yesterday I learned, to my surprise, that it was true.

Any act which costs the lives of six innocent men is extremely seri-
ous, and when to this is added the fa<3t that they are defenseless pris-
oners of war, tbe seriousness is increased, as your excellency is well
aware. In view of the spirit of justice and generosity shown us by
this nation, prisoners though we are, I must believe and do believe that
a full and impartial investigation has probably been made, for the pur-
pose of clearing up the facts and in order that justice may be done to
prevent the repetition of an act like the one in question. If the gener-
osity of the United States Government would go so far as to advise me
of the result of the investigation that has probably taken place, and
whether any of my men have been examined, or only their slayers, also
as to the measures adopted, I should be extremely obliged for this new
favor. If, furthermore, I may be authorized to communicate this infor-
mation to my Government, with such remarks as the reading may sug-
gest to me, the whole civilized world will recognize therein a gigantic
progress in the rights of men.

If the United States Government does not deem it expedient to grant
my request, I shall not again speak of this matter while I remain a
prisoner.

I beg that your excellency will pardon me for troubling you, although
it is simply love of justice and of my subordinates which inspires these

linos.

Pasoual Gebvera*
Annapolis, Md., July 21^ 1898.

157

Tlie Rear-Admiral {Cervera) to the United States Admiral (MoN'air)^

Superintendent of the Naval Academy,

Most Excellent Sib: On the 2l8t of July last I had the honor of
forwarding to your excellency a letter, in which I referred to the inci-
dent that took place on board the Harvard which cost the lives of six
of my Bailors, and through which others were wounded, some of whom
have since died. Your excellency did me the kindness of sending nie
a letter from his excellency the Secretary of the Navy, which letter
kindly informed me that as soon as steps could be taken to get wit-
nesses together I should be notified of the fact. It is not impatience
and far less doubt that puts the pen in my hand, for that would be an
insult to this great nation, and God save me from falling into such a
grave error. It is simply the desire to contribute, so far as is in my
power, toward establishing the truth in the interest of justice. I inclose
you at the same time a copy of the report made to me by Lieut. Com-
mander Juan Aznar. Not wishing to hurt your excellency's kind feel-
ings, I refrained from sending it before, but seeing now by the papers
that the regiment whose members fired upon my men is returning fiom
Cuba, I thought that the opportune moment had arrived.

Yours, etc., Pasoual Cebyeba.

Annapolis, Md., August 29j 1898.

document beferred to.

Most Excellent Sir : As the person most prominent among the
prisoners taken on board the United States auxiliary cruiser Harvard^
I have the honor to give you an account of all the happenings from the
moment 1 became separated from your excellency on the Nimaniba
beach. Once ashore, the balance of the crew of the Infanta Maria
Teresa^ including the wounded, marched toward the interior of the thick-
wooded land, and finding a clearing in which we were safe from the
explosions of the vessel, intended to camp there for the night. About
3 o'clock in the afternoon there appeared a lieutenant of the United
States Navy, accompanied by an armed squad of sailors, and with pro-
visions sufficient to last more than one day, who announced to us, after
inquiring insistently if we had been ill treated by the insurgents, that
we were to remain there under the protection of the United States tiag
until the next day, when he would return to take us away in a large
boat. The vessel, which happened to be the Harvard^ came up that
same night and sent boats ashore to take us away, when we embarked
after some difficulty, owing to the sea breaking with some force.

While in the act of embarking there came up 250 men of the Oquendo^
who had been detained at the camp by the insurgent leader Gebrero,
and they were also taken on board the Harvard, Having boarded the
latter vessel at about 9 o'clock in the evening, each officer was provided

158

with a fatigno salt and a pair of Rhoes, and we were shown to oor
quarters in the first-class saloon, where we were ordered to remain &om
10 o'clock in the evening till 6 the next morning, and cautioned not to
hold any communication during the day with the noncommissioned ,

officers and men, who had been placed on the upper deck aft. The '

wounded were treated that same night on the deck of the ship by the
two surgeons of said ship, aided by those of the Oquendo^ Guinea and
Parra, and transferred the next morning to the hospital ship Solace, %

In spite of all our efforts to separate the noncommissioned officers firom I

the men, it could not be done, and they kept together, corralled, so to
sx)eak, in the after part of the - ship, guarded by the Massachusetts
volunteers.

On the same day, the 4th, a list was made of all the prisoners, which,
with the changes that occurred until the day of landing in Portsmouth,
N. H., I have the honor to inclose to your excellency. At 2 o'clock in
the morning of the 5th, while I was in my stateroom, I was summoned
to the cabin of the commander of the vessel,. Gapt. S. Gotten. This
gentleman in the presence of the executive officer expressed to me his
regrets for the events that had taken place on board the vessel an hour
before, and which had resulted in the killing of several prisoners.
According to the investigations made by the captain, which he com-
municated to me, the incident happened as follows:

One of the prisoners at 11.30 of that night went forward of the lines
indicated by means of cables stretched from port to starboard. The
sentry ordered him to go back, and as he showed resistance in obeying,
the sentry fired. The firing woke up the 600 men who, I repeat, were
crowded aft, and jumped up naturally excited. The watch, which was
under arms, ordered them to sit down, and as they did not obey, fired a
volley which resulted in the immediate death of five and the wounding
of about fourteen, also causing several to jump overboard. The latter
were picked up by the ship's boats.

When the captain had finished speaking, I stated to him how much I
deplored ,the act; that I could assure him that our people were incapable
of doing anything that would have made the firing necessary, and that
the disregard of the order, first of the sentry and then of the watch,
must have been due to their ignorance of the language, and that, had
the watch been composed of members of the Eegular Army instead of
volunteers, the thing would certainly not have occurred. As we were
not allowed to communicate with our people during our stay on board
the Harvard, I was not able to obtain information as to what happened
that night. I could have only a moment's talk with the quartermaster
of the Teresa^ who told me that the men had jumped up, thinking that
the ship was on fire.

As all the witnesses are in Portsmouth, I don't think it would be dif-
ficult to find out exactly what occurred, which will, without doubt, lead
to trouble, to judge by the expressions of regret for what occurred, on

aMnar^^Mwawii*

159

the part of some of the ship's officers. The wonnded were cared for
by oa^ own surgeons, and transferred the next day to a hospital ship,
except one who died that same night.

On the 5th, at noon, the bodies of the unfortunates shot the previous
night were slid overboard. The shix)'s crews in line, with their officers
at their head were present, as well as our people in line and also the
military guard of the ship, who presented arms during the ceremony
and fired three volleys at the moment the bodies fell to the water. The
latter were wrapped in the Spanish flag and received the prayer and
benediction of the chaplain of the Teresa before being committed to
the deep.

Before the 7th it had been impossible to separate the warrant and
petty officers from the men, the former being placed in the third-class
passenger cabins and the first-class seamen in the emigrant's steerage,
with the privilege of ascending to the deck aft. All were provided
with a change of underclothes, soap, and a towel. From the night they
picked us up until the 8th we stood off between Altares and Punta
Cabrera. At noon of the 8th we anchored off Playa Este, and the ship
began coaling. In the afternoon they brought on board as prisoners 4
officers and 200 men of the Cristdbal Coldn^ and landed the Massachu-
setts volunteers, who were replaced by 40 marines.

At 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 10th we sailed for Portsmouth,
in which port we cast anchor at 7.30 on the morning of the 15th. Dur-
ing the trip many cases of fever broke out among our people with fatal
results for some, their deaths occurring on the dates your excellency
will find recorded in the list herewith inclosed. At 9 of the morning
of the 16th all the petty officers and men were sent to the navy-yard
with Lieut. Adolfo Galandria, ex<?ept ^ sick who remained on board
for observation, and were landed on the 18th with Surgeons Guinea
and Lallemand.

At 5.30 in the afternoon of the same day we went to sea, and anchored
off Annapolis at 5 o'clock yesterday afternoon. Before terminating, I
think it my duty to call your attention to the marks of consideration
and respect shown to us by Captain Cotton, of the Harvard^ who
endeavored to make our stay on board his ship as pleasant as possible.
This is all I have the honor to communicate to your excellency in the
fulfillment of my duty.

Yours, etc., Juan B. Aznab,

lAeute^iant' Commander,

Naval Academy, Annapolisy July 21^ 1898.

A true copy : CebverA.

The Secretary of the United States Navy Department to Admiral Cervera.

Sir: The Superintendent of the Kaval Academy has placed before
the Department translations of your letter of the 20th ultimo and the
report of Lieutenant-Commander Juan Aznar, therein mentioned, with

160

respect tx) the nnfortunate incident which occurred on board the U. S. S.
Harvard on the night of July 4 last, resulting in the killing and woand-
ing of certain Spanish sailors, prisoners of war on board that v^sseL
When your former communication, that of July 21, on this subject was
received, this Department immediately, under date of the 23d, addressed
a letter to the honorable the Secretary of War transmitting, with a
copy of your letter, all the other papers relating to the matter which
were in its possession.

This action was taken because, while the incident occurred on board
a vessel of the Navy, this Department recognized the fact that the
firing was actually done by men belonging to the Army. At the same
time the opinion of the Secretary of War was requested as to whether
the subject was a proper one for joint investigation or whether the
inc^uiry should be conducted by the War Department alone. No reply
having been received, this Department subsequently, August 18 last,
addressed to the Secretary of War a further communication on the
subject. I deem it proper to add that copies of your letter of August
29 and of Lieutenant-Commander Azuar's report were on yesterday
transmitted to the honorable the Secretary of War, inviting attention
to the prior corresiwndeiice, and in view of the urgency which this
matter presents, the Spanish prisoners under the control of this Departr
ment being soon to be released, and it being understood that the regi-
ment to which the soldiers who did the shooting belong may be shortly
disbanded, early consideration of the subject was earnestly requested.

In this connection it is proper to add that at the time the affair
under consideration occurred Gapt. Charles S. Cotton, the commanding
officer of the Harvard j made an investigation of the circumstances, and
the results of this investigation were communicated to Rear- Admiral
Sampson, the commander in chief of the squadron, who, upon review
of the matter, considered that no further inquiry was necessary.

Renewing the expression of sincere regret conveyed to you in this
Department's letter of the 23d of July last that so unhappy an inci-
dent should have occurred, and assuring you that such steps as may be
practicable will be taken to promote any further investigation of the
matter which may be necessary and proper, so far as this Department
is concerned,

I am, very respectfully, Chas. H. Allen,

Acting Secretary.

Washington, September i, 1898.'^

*Aftcr my return to Spain I received the resnlt of an inquiry made by order of the
ministry of war by Judge- Advocate-General of Volunteers Edgar Dudley on the
subject of this bloody and disgraceful iucident. The conclusion reached was that it
was an accident for which no one was responsible. All these documents were
forwarded by me to the minister of marine.

1

LIST OF THE MOST IMPORTANT DOCUMEN'l'S.

DOCUMENTS PBIOB TO THE WAB.

Jan. 8, 1898. — Cablegram from General Blanco to the minister of colonies, concern-
ing economic bituation of the navy in Cuba.
30, 1898. — Letter from the admiral to Mr. Spottorno and certificate in which it
is stated that the latter was preserving in his possession a collec-
tion of documents intrusted to him by the admiral.
Feb. 3, 1898. — Letter from the admiral to Minister Moret upon t|ie necessity of pro-
viding for the pay of the men of the squadron.
6, 1898. — Official letter from the admiral to the minister setting forth the con-
dition of the squadron.
16, 1898. — Letter from the admiral to the minister of marine upon the situation

of the naval forces of Spain.
25; 1898. — Official letter from the admiral to the minister upon the comparative

strength of the naval forces of both countries.
26; 1898. — Letter from the admiral to the minister emphasizing his former official
letter and requesting that his opinion be made known to the Queen
and to the council of ministers.
Mar. 4 and 7; 1898.— Letters exchanged between the minister and the admiral making

comparisons of forces.
16; 1898. — Letter from the admiral to the minister expressing among other things
the necessity of avoiding the war and <fT correcting the mistaken
conception existing as to the naval forces.
Apr. 4, 1898. — Telegram from the admiral to the minister asking permission to go* to

Madrid to torin a plan of campaign, and reply from the minister.
4 and 6; 1898. — Letters from the admiral and the minister relative to the fore-
going telegrams.
7, 1898. — ^Telegrams from the admiral to the minister insisting upon the neces-
sity of forming a plan of campaign, and reply of the minister.

FBOM CADIZ TO CAPE YEBDE.

kpT. 8, 1898. — InHtrnctions received at Capo Verde.

19, 1898. — I^etter from the admiral to the minister upon the condition of the
ships and the international situation.

20, 1898. — Proceedings setting forth the opinion of the admiral and his captains
as to the ultimate destination of the squadron.

21, 1898. — Official letter commenting upon the foregoing proceedings.

21, 1898.— Telegram from the admiral to the minister persisting in the forego-
ing opinion, and reply of the minister.

22, 1898. — Telegram from the admiral to the minister disclaiming responsibility
of the order to sail for Puerto Rico.

22, 1898. — Telegram from tlie admiral to the minister asking whether war had
been declared, and reply of the latter.

22, 1898. — Interesting letter from the admiral to the minister.

10742 11 161

162

22, 1898. — Telegram from the admiral to the minieter innsting upon the dis-

astroas resalts of sailing for America, and requesting that all his

official and confidential correspondence be made known to the

president of the council.
23, 1898. — Telegram Arom the admiral to the minister asking if war kad been

declared.
23, 1898. — Proceedings of meeting of general officers of the navy, held at Madrid*
24, 1898.— Telegram from the minister to the admiral, relative to the meeting

of general officers, and stating in addition that the United States

flag was hostile.
24,1898. — Letter from the admiral to the minister, in answer to telegram

ordering departure for West Indies.
25, 26, 27, and 28, 1898.— Telegrams from the admiral to the minister relative to

the difficulties of coaling.

FBOH CAFE TEBDE TO CURASAO AKD SAHTIAOO DE CUBA.

May 5, 1898. — ^Letter from the admiral to Mr. Spottomo, inclosing copy of a tele-
gram from Villaamil to Sagasta.
May 12, 1898. — Proceedings of the meeting of captains held off Martinique.

14 and 15, 1898. — ^Telegram from tho admiral to the minister, announcing

arrival at Curasao, and reply of the latter.
15, 1898 — ^Report of voyage up to arrival at Curasao.

SAHTIACIO DE CUBA.

May 19 and 20, 1898.— Telegrams from the admiral to the minister announcing arrival

at Santiago de Cuba, scarcity of coal, and difficult situation of the
city.

21, 1898. — ^Telegram from Admiral Manterola, stating the lamentable condition
of naval forces of the navy-yard.

22, 1896. — ^Telegram from the admiral in answer to the foregoing.

23, 1896.— Telegram from the minister to the admiral, informing him of sailing
of hostile fleets.

24, 1898. — Telegram from the admiral to the minister, giving an account of the
situation and opinion of the council of war.

24, 1898. — ^Proceedings of the council of war on the situation.

24, 1898. — Letter from Rear-Admiral Rocha to the admiral, congratulating him
upon his arrival at Santiago de Cuba, and reply thereto^

25, 1898. — ^Telegram from the admiral to the minister, notifying him of block-
ade, and reply of the latter.

26, 1898. — Proceedings of the council of war, discussing possibility of sortie.

28, 1898. — Telegram from the Captain-General to the minister of war, relative
to supplies sent to Santiago de Cuba.
June 3, 1898. — ^Telegram from the admiral to the minister, advising him of operation

of Merrintao.
3 and 4, 1898. — ^Telegram from the minister of war to the Captain-General rela-
tive to operations of squadron, and reply of latter.
8, 1898. — Telegram from the minister to the admiral, relative to the authority

granted the latter.
8, 1898.— Proceedings of the council of war, setting forth its opinion as to sor-
tie of squadron.

11, 1898. — Official letter from the admiral to General Linares, requesting that
the battericH at the mouth of the harbor keep the hostile fleet at
a distance at night, and reply of the latter.

163

22, 1898. — Telegram from Admiral Manterola, transmitting a telegram from the
minister giving instrnctions how to order ammanitioH; and reply
thereto.

23,1898. — Telegram from the admiral to the minister, relative to progress
made hy the enemy, and his plans in view of the situation.

24, 1898. — Proceedings of the conncil of war held relative to the possibilities of
sortie.

24 and 25, 1898. — ^Telegram from the minister to the admiral, placing sqnadron
nnder orders of General Blanco. Reply.

25, 1898. — Telegram from the admiral to the Captain-General, placing himself
at his orders and setting forth condition of squadron.

25, 1898. — Letter from General Linares to the admiral, stating desire of General
Blanco to know his opinion. Reply.

25, 1898. — Telegram from the admiral to the Captain-General, giving his opinion.

26, 1898. — Interesting telegram from the Captain-General to the admiral relft>
tive to sortie.

26 and 27, 1898. — Telegram from the minister to the admiral relative to sortie,
" and reply.

27, 1898» — ^Telegram from the admiral to General Blanco, replying to his tele-
gram of the 26th relative to the first order to sail.

28 and 29, 1898. — Telegram from the Captain-General to the admiral, giving him
instructions as to sortie, and reply.
July 1, 1898. — ^Telegram from the minister of marine to the Captain-General, approv-
ing instructions for the sortie of the squadron.
1, 1898. — Proceedings of the council of war relative to the order to go out.
1, 1898. — Urgent telegram from the Captain-General to the admiral giving the

order to go out.
1, 1898. — Urgent telegram from the same ordering departure to be hastened.
2, 1898. — Urgent telegram from the Captain-General to the admiral ordering
him to go out immediately.

80BTIE FROM SANTUOO DB CUBA.

July 4, 1898. — Telegram from the admiral to the Captain-General giving an account

of the battle sustained at the sortie.
9, 1898.— Report of the battle.

12 and 18, 1898. — Telegram from the Captain-General to the admiral in reply to
his telegram relative to the battle. Reply of the latter.

AT AlflfAPOLIS.

Aug. 20-23, 1898. — Communications relative to the granting of liberty on promiBe

not again to take up arms.
31, 1898. — Unconditional liberty.

EV SPAllf.

Sept. 20, 1898. — Report upon arrival at Santander.

Aug. 7, 1898. — Official letter from the Captain-General to the Admiral acknowledg-
ing receipt of report of the battle.

Oct. 8, 1898. — Official letter from the Admiral to the Captain-General in answer to

the foregoing.

Sept. 15, 1898. — Letter from General Blanco to the Admiral, with which he accom-
panied his official letter acknowledging receipt of report of the
battle. Answer.

Appendices, which in themselves justify many of the statements contained in the
text.

ADDEI^IDUM.

Letter from Admiral Cervera to Mr. Juan Spoftomo y Biernetj died in
the letter and certificate on podges — and — of the texU^

Puerto Real, March 14^ 1898.

DEA.B Juan: Three days ago I received your letter of the 9tU.^

• • *

•

The conflict with the United States seems to be averted or at least
postponed, but it may revive when least expected, and each day con-
firms me in the belief that it would be a great national calamity.

As we hardly have a squadron, wherever it may go it must be as a
whole, because to divide it would, in my judgment, be the greatest of
blunders, but the next greatest would perhaps be to send it to the
West Indies, leaving our coasts and the Philippine Archipelago
unprotected. For my part, I am not eager for the sad glory — ^if there
can be any glory in going to certain defeat— of perishing at the head
of the squadron. If this falls to my lot I shall be patient and fulfill
my duty, but with the bitterness of knowing my sacrifice fruitless; and
before I go Berdnger and C^inovas must heal* what I say to you.

Still, if our small squadron were well equipped with everything
necessary and, above all, well manned, something might be attempted;
but you are right in saying that there is no ammunition but that on
board, and I add that worse than this is the lack of organization in
every respect, the result of many causes, conspicuous among which are
the absurd economy in coal, the continual sending of the ships from
place to place, and the local exigencies.

What you say to me concerning myself does not surprise me, for
Ber^nger believes me his enemy, but, in truth, I am not the enemy of
him or of anyone. Yes, I am the enemy of the system which leads to
this disorder and to this disorganization, and I instinctively call to
mind Admiral Byng, hung at Plymouth from a similar cause; Persano,
after the battle of Lissa; Mathews, exonerated after the battle of Gape
Sici(i; Bazaiue, condemned to death after the battle of Metz, and now

* Aft«r the whole book* had gone to print, Mr. Si)ottoruo sent this letter, cited in
the letter of January 30, 1898, which will be found on page — and in the certificate
on page — . It being impossible to include it in the book in its proper place, it has
been added at the end.

^ The stars represent family matters.
164

165

Baratieri, who is jnst being tried by a council of war and already antic-
ipates that he will be condemned to death or to imprisonment for life.

And thas it is that when the people are disorganized their govern-
ments (the products of such disorganization) are disorganized also, and
when some logical disaster takes place they do not seek the true causes,
but always cry "treason " and look about for the poor victim, who
expiates the faults which were not his. For these reasons I was very
vacillating before accepting the charge; but, having accepted it, I will
fulfill it with the consequences which it may entail, and, as I said
before, I will do my duty, but I shall recall the words of Jesus Christ
and, not for myself as. much as for poor Spain, say: ^'O, my Father,
if it be possible, let this cup pass from me."

Butler seems to me a very good choice, but I pity him, as I would any-
one upon whom the lot should fall.

There is no occasion ever to divulge these things and less now, for
which reason I enjoin upon you great secrecy as to what I say to you;
but at the same time I beg you not to destroy this letter, but to preserve
it, in case it should some day be expedient to make known my opinions
at this time.

Your cousin, PASCUAii.

\

I

[

\

i

_. O- — OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. -
Wab Noteb No. VIU.

. INFORMATION FROM ABROAD.

SQUADRON OF ADMIRAL CERVERA,

CAFTADI TlCTOE H. COHCAS Y PALAU,

FbnneTb/ Cominanifre of tlie armored cruiser In/ajtia Maria Tereta, and Chi^ of

. Staff of Kiid Si[aailron in tiu naval bailk of Santiaifo de Ctiba,

yi«e-PrHld«nt of the a«D^ftphioal 8ooi«tT of Hkdrid.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

WASHINGTON:

govbbnment printing office.
1900.

A '- /" *

INTRODUCTORY.

This number will probably close the series of ''War Notes" on the
Spanish- American war. The object in making and publishing these
translations has been to give to history from reliable sources, where
the writers were actual participants, a correct version of the Spanish
side of the war. It has sometimes occurred that these writings con-
tain unverified statements and harsh expressions, which at a later
date, when the writers are better informed, and time has exercised its
mollifying influence, would not be made, and it has been questioned
by some whether it is not proper to omit such portions from the publi-
cations of this oflSce. The accepted view, however, has been that the
series should be presented as written. In the case of Captain Concas's
book, it seems proper that reference should be made, as is done in the
footnotes, to portions of Chapter XII, wherein he comiments on his
alleged loss of valuables on board the U. S. S. Gloucester^ and criticises
the surgeon of the Sokice^ the commander of the marines at the prison
barracks near Portsmouth, N. H., and the personnel of the regiments
that were on board the Harvard when the unfortunate affair of the
prisoners occurred. It is to be borne in mind that in this chapter
Captain Concas has recorded impressions formed by him at a time
which was doubtless one of great mental depression and was certainly
a period of severe physical suffering. Under such circumstances
criticism is perhaps to be expected. In other parts of his work he is
cordial in his praise and gratitude for kindness shown by our officers
and men. He is a brave and able officer and was badly wounded at
Santiago. His book is valuable both professionally and historically.

Richardson Clover,
Commander^ JJ, 8, N.^ Chief IrvteUigence Officer,

Navy Department, Jammry 2^^ 1900.

Approved.

Wm. S. Cowles,

Acting Chief of Bureau of Navigation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Chapter 1 9

Why silence has been preserved until now — Estimates of public opinion —
DiflSculty of oflBcers in active service to comment on such recent events —
Opportunity to save the country lost — The Spanish press, and the press
of the United States, England, France, and other countries, especially
with reference to professional writers.

Chapter II 15

Intention of the Spanish Government to avoid the war at any cost not
carried out — Condition of our forces — Naval officers were prohibited by
law from speaking publicly of the relative forces — A second Trafalgar —
Why the patriotism of the press was not resorted to — Lecture of Mr.
Concas before the Geographical Society — Diplomats and naval men gave
warnings in good season — Voyages of the Maine, Vtzcayaj and Oguendo —
Telegram to Manila to give the United States fleet a friendly reception —
Scattering of our ships — Preparation of any kind prohibited — Situation
in which the war was accepted — Influence of United States naval officers
in Congress — Castelar and his ideas of the United States — Anglomaniacs —
Without the support of public opinion military forces may gain victories
but can not achieve success.
Chapter III 23

YillaamiPs flotilla and diplomatic exigencies — Voyage of Admiral Cer-
vera's squadron to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands — Cruisers Oquendo
and Vizcaya join the squadron — Arrival of instructions by the collier
San Francisco — Coal at St. Vincent — Memorable council of war on April
20, 1898 — Discussion of plans — The Philippines in most urgent need —
Plan to return to the Peninsula contrary to instructions — Telegram to
the Government — Communications of the day following, which have
disappeared from the archives — Telegrams to the Government calling
upon it to save the country — Telegram from Mr. Moret: God bleas
you! — Council of admirals at Madrid — Unofficial exertions of some of
them — Letter of Sefior Silvela against the departure of the squadron —
Finis Hispanise!
Chapter IV 36

Documents and comments thereon.
Chapter V 42

Departure from Cape Verde and voyage to the West Indies — ^The squad-
ron— Its arrival off Martinique — Lack of information; our consul —
Steamer Alicante; information received from her captain.
Chapter VI 46

Council of war in West Indian waters — Habana, Cienfuegos, Santiago de
Cuba, and San Juan de Puerto Rico — Curasao — ^The telegraph — Coal in
time of war — ^The Oregon — At Curasao; no news — ^The nin to Santiago —
At Santiago — Instructions for the squadron to return to Spain — ^Remon-
strances of the Governors-General of Cuba and Puerto Rico.

5

6

Ohapthb VII 52

Military and political situation of Santiago — Toast of the archbishop —
Starvation — Condition of the army — ^Defenses at the harbor entrance —
Coal and engines — Fraternal relations between the army and navy — Gen-
eral Linares and Admiral Cervera — Councils of war on board the Maria
Teresa — Study of possible operations — The blockade — Council of war of
May 26 — Opinions relative to the sortie; belief that the Government
wished the prompt destruction of the squadron so as to obtain peace —
Attacks upon Santiago — The Merrimac — Situation after the landing of
Shafter— The blockade at night — 1,000 sailors of our squadron disem-
barked— Our valiant Captain Bustamente, chief of staff of the squadron,
mortally wounded — Telegrams and comments thereon — ^The squadron
pressed* to go out — Instructions, "Go out at once*' — Bemarks on the
departure from Cape Verde.
Chaptbr VIII 64

Situation of the squadron — Important data and defects of the materiel —
Comprehensive comparison with the hostile fleet.
Chapter IX 68

Embarkation of the landing companies — Conditions of the harbor entrance
unfavorable from a tactical point of view, which circumstance deter-
mined the character of the battle.
Chaftbr X 71

The 3d of July, 1898 — Poor Spain! — Detailed description of the battle.
Chapter XI 85

Technical chapter — Cruisers and battleships — Disparity of casualties in
all naval battles — Our firemen — ** Fighting bunkers *' — Coal bunkers —
Liquid fuel — How coal consumption should be designated to be intelli-
gible to the general public — Ventilators; ashes — Pipe joints and steam
cocks — Steam piping of auxiliary engines — ^The temperature below the
protective decks — Electric motors and central station — Fire mains —
Empty cartridge cases — ^Auxiliary artillery parks — Broadside firing —
Temporary parapets — Torpedoes — Lifeboats — ^Turrets — ^Transmission of
commands — Clothing and effects of crews — Coaling and its effect on the
armament — Extra meals — The battle hospital and its horrors — Torpedo-
boat destroyers and their crews — Dualism of command as the result of
the telegraph, and how it might be solved in China — ^Portable arma-
ment— The wounded.
Chapter XII 101

The shipwrecked on the beach — Camp of insuigent leader Cebreco — Crews
of the Oquendo and Maria Terem — Care of the wounded and burial of the
dead — ^Assistance lent by the Americans — ^The crews of their boats plun-
der our sailors — ^The Oloucester—H.OBpital ships Olivette and iSb^oc^— Inci-
dents, both good and bad — The hospital at Norfolk and admirable con-
duct of Drs. Clebome and Kite — Reporters kept out — Mr. Arthur C.
Humphreys, who had been our consular agent — The Harvard and its '

horrors; dead, wounded, and dying men on board upon her arrival at
Portsmouth — Portsmouth; unkind treatment of prisoners — Noble con-
duct of Admiral McNair toward our prisoners at Annapolis — Instructions
from United States Government to treat the prisoners with every possible
consideration — Correspondence inspected — ^Things were well generally,
but not as well as they say — Secret information — According to the Gov-
ernment at Washington, it was the Spanish Government that placed
difficulties in the way of our liberty — Our steamer not permitted to pro- j

ceed to a maritime departamento--Our dear comrades go to Santander I

to receive us. !

Chapter XIII 113

K^sum^.

PREFACE.

The 3ci of .Tilly, 180B.

**Alas for the vanquished! " is an old saying, but we should now add:
"Alas for those who are sent out to be vanquished!" For no matter
how many may fall in the struggle, there can never be enough to cover
the mistakes of others and the treason to the country; for it certainly
is treason to lead the country to ruin and to the loss of ten million
inhabitants, while invoking romanticism and legends. Political men
should know that these are not the reality; that they do not now and
never did constitute war, and that the nations which have had recourse
to them have ended by disappearing from the map of the world. —
{Defense of Admiral Montojo^ of the Sqiuxdro7i> of the I^hilippines^
iefore the Supi*eine Council of the War and Navy, — CoNOAS.)

CHAPTEB I-

It is some time since peace has been concluded and diplomatic rela-
tions with the United States renewed. The Spanish Government is
no longer composed of those political elements that have been the
cause of our disaster, that enforced silence upon us, calling it disci-
pline, while we had to listen to insults, and that purposely kept the
people in ignorance of the facts of which they alone bear the respon-
sibility. The supreme council of war and navy, after slow and
minute proceedings, has rendered its judgment of complete exonera-
tion relative to the great disaster of Santiago de Cuba, and in view of
the easily impressed character of the Spanish people we may almost say
that it has already become a matter of past history, though surely not
for those families who are still weeping for their lost friends, nor for
us who have covered with our blood the decks of the Spanish ships,
and who, to fill the bitter cup to overflowing, have since had to suffer
the terrible torment of having to keep silent before those who have
torn our country and its flag to pieces, and before whom we, who are
among the few Spaniards that can boast of having left nothing undone
that their duty required of them, proudly raise our heads, con-
scious that we have been loyal in council, soldiers in danger, and
slaves to our duty.

Has the hour arrived when matters will be cleared up? Acxjording
to foreigners nothing has been said in Spain in explanation of matters
of such gravity, with the honorable exception of the letters of
Admiral Cervera which were published in La Epoca, of Madrid, and
those foreigners are right in asking that everything pertaining to the
matter should be made public. The Spanish people, also, ask why
we do not defend ourselves. Many of them are not honest in asking
this question, for they know perfectly well that the law relating to
courts-martial and the exigencies of discipline have tied our tongues,
for reasons erroneously called considerations of state, though no con-
sideration, either in that sense nor in a purely military sense, has
been shown any of us.

Captain Mahan, of the United States Navy, one of the men who have

had the greatest influence on the war, in speaking of the manoeuvres

9

10

of our squadron in his famous articles entitled The War on the Sea
and its Lessons, says on this point:

What Cervera's actual reasonings were is unknown to the writer, and probably will
remain unknown until he sees fit to publish them, or imtil he has appeared before
the court-martial which, by the almost universal practice of naval nations, awaits a
commander who has lost a ship or incurred a considerable disaster, a practice merci-
ful as well a just, bringing to light a man's merits as well as his faults, if such there
be, and confronting idle gossip with an authoritative expert judgment. The course,
being usual, implies no antecedent ijnplication of blame, and therefore is never invid-
ious as regards an indi\ddual. Until it is decided whether such a court shall be con-
vened, it is not to be expected that the Spanish admiral will reveal the line of his
defense, or lay himself open to attack by the statement of inferences and decifions,
which at the time of their formation may have been sound and yet in the event
have proved unfortunate.

In the absence of certain knowledge, conjectural opinions, such sa the writer has
here educed, * * *.

While a man of the profound knowledge of Captain Mahan told the
whole world that he spoke only from conjectures, there are few men
in Spain who have not constituted themselves infallible judges over
us, reminding us at the same time, first, of our military duties, then
of our duties as being under court-martial, and finally exacting silence
from us for political reasons, since in the opinions of some our declara-
tions might be of international significance. Sad it is that we who
have had a share in the bloody tragedy of July 3, 1898, in the waters
of Santiago de Cuba, can not make such explanations as we deem best
for the interests of our country. But as no one prohibits us from
arranging the data which are already known to the whole world, and
which, when confirmed by one of us, assume a guaranty of reliability
which they might not otherwise have, future generations will at least
be able to judge whether that sad battle was a natural encounter of
the war, or whether it was brought about by politicians, designated
by the misnomer of statesmen, who in cowardly fear of an uprising
did not hej^itate to sacrifice the whole country, on the extremely orig-
inal theory that the disaster, imposed by the law of necessity, would
compel the people to resignation. As though disasters, on the con-
trary, had not always been the true reason for great social disturbances
and the cause of cruel and exorbitant demands on the part of the
enemy. And on this occasion the tranquillity and good sense of the
Spanish people when brought face to face with misfortune is the best
proof that there was neither rhyme nor reason in the exaggerated
fear of our statesmen.

For all these reasons we shall abstain from expressing opinions
wherever the rocks and reefs of discipline do not permit us to go
ahead, and let the reader find between the lines what it is not now pos-
sible for us to discuss. For instance, in referring to a telegram of July
3, 1898, from our Government to the Captain-Genei-al of Cuba, which
was published in large capitals in the New York Journal, in which

11

telegram the Captain-General was consulted as to whether the block-
aded squadron could go to the Philippines and return to Cuba without
loss of time, we shall not add any of the considerations which such a
consultation would suggest to us, though the telegram is not sufficient
in itself to explain the fatal policy of the campaign. We shall only
quote it such as it has circulated through the press of the whole world,
without even putting it in large letters; for if we were to adopt that
type of letters to quote similar matters, there would be very little left
to be printed in ordinary type, and this book would look like one of
those devotional books which are printed with a view to being read
almost in the dark.

The naval battle of Santiago will surely not be forgotten for many
a year. And if God should work a wonder so that the Spanish peo-
ple will some time know a little more of what is going on in the world
than they do now, it is possible that ihepros and cans will then be dis-
cussed in this country as something new. Therefore, when we who
have had a share in this disaster have been called home by the Lord,
we want to impress upon those who shall then wear the uniform of the
Spanish navy to keep alive the defense of the memory of those who
were not afraid, upon their return to Spain, of the stones and insults
thrown at them by the Spanish rabble for having insisted on the
opinion that we ought not to go to war nor the squadron to the West
Indies, always invoking the salvation of the country; of the count/ry
abandoned^ insulted^ and travvpled upon hy the enerny^ as Admiral
Cervera said literally in his official letter of April 21, in which he
reported on the council of war convened at Cape Verde Islands. At
that council we were sad prophets of coming disasters which it was
still time to reduce to reasonable, though bitter, terms that would not
involve the whole country in the catastrophe. And if duty and dis-
cipline carried the squadron to the disaster predicted ("and so
Cervera went forth with his four gallant ships, foredoomed to his
fate by folly or by national false pride, exhibited in the form of polit-
ical pressure disregarding sound professional judgment and military
experience " — these are the words of Captain Mahan, of the United
States Navy, who is known the world over as the foremost naval writer)
and to its total ruin, we knew at least how to fight and how to die, even
though under circumstances of the greatest strategic absurdity known
to military history, and for which we, the admiral and his captains,
jointly and separately, disclaim positively before history, before our
country, and before every Spaniard without exception, all manner of
responsibility, in whole and in part.

We do not claim that these pages are an official history of the events.
That history will be furnished by the admiral by publishing the docu»
ments themselves. Moreover, it would confine us to too narrow limits.
Our intention is simply to furnish a chronicle in regular order.

12

derived from authentic sources, which no one would dare deny me,
as I was not only in command of Admiral Cervera's flagship, but also
his chief of staff on the memorable day of the battle when m^y
beloved comrade, Bustamente, who held that important post, lay
ashore mortally wounded. This chronicle is designed to set the peo-
ple right; for public opinion is formed from the daily press, which is
more intent on reporting events rapidly than on reporting them well,
and the historical information furnished by it often requires rectifica-
tion and explanation from beginning to end.

We do not mean to open up a discussion with the entire press, for
so many and such different opinions have been put forward all over
the world that it is quite impossible for one work to embrace them
all, nor would it be within human power to read them all. We shall
confine ourselves to making certain statements, in wGich everyone
who does us the honor of reading these pages will find the solution of
the doubts which have been raised against the navy, treating with
proper disdain the writings of some foreigners, probably youthful
officers of no experience whatever and of great presumption, whose
writings do not deserve the honor of criticism nor any attention
except that of their own insignificance.

In taking notice of the press, which is the more necessary as no one
else -has hitherto spoken freely of the events of the war, we must
observe that it is characterized by different nationalities rather than
different criterions.

Strange to say, it is the United States press that has treated the
battle of Santiago do Cuba and the causes that brought it about with
the greatest accuracy, fairness, and charity. Aside from the facts
that everyone is prone to praise his own people, wherein the Anglo-
Saxon race excels particularly; that the Americans have concealed or
misrepresented more than one defeat which their flotilla experienced
in the West Indies, which, however, did not affect the outcome of the
war; and their evident desire to conceal the decided advantages which
they have derived from the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines,
the statements of the Americans have been on the whole very fair;
and the writings of such men as Mahanand others we may consider as
a defense of ourselves and at the same time as a judgment against the
inefficiency of our politicians. Translations of these writings, though
abbreviated — but not in those parts in which the navy is criticised —
have been published in our newspapers and hardly am/one had read
them,.

The publications of the United States Navy Department also are
very noteworthy and of great value in the study of the war, for sel-
dom has the public been furnished a collection of such truthful data.
But while recognizing this circumstance, we believe that these publi-
cations lack one requisite which, according to Balmes, is indispensable
in telling the truth, and that is that the whole truth should be told:

13

and in this respect the report of the United States Bureau of Naviga-
tion, in the original as well as in the translation, has omitted matters
which may have seemed inconvenient, or which do not redound to the
credit of the Americans. This must not be forgotten when we have
recourse to that source of information.

The English scientific press has treated the matter with that decorum
which a not overconscientious miss might employ to save appearances.
That is the tone adopted by all the English constructors who had a
share in the building of our cruisers and were responsible for some of
their defects, for which no one, however, has blamed them, and which,
moreover, are not of importance, for such defects might be found in
any other ships, no matter how great the reputation of their building
yards. We will mention, for instance, that one of the constructors,
who was a very skillful engineer, forgot the 5.6-inch anmiunition
hoists, which he subsequently built himself by an installation of his
own invention, which turned out to be pretty bad, as would naturally
be the case with anything in the construction of our modern ships not
provided for from the beginning. But as the constructor and those
associated with him knew very well that these hoists T^ere among the
things that must necessarily function badly in the first serious encounter
of the cruisers, he hastened to publish in Engineering a series of
explanations which absolutely lacked truthfulness. And there were
many similar instances on which we shall not waste time. In the daily
press the tenor has been much lower, for even over the signature of
people of high standing articles have appeared of such shameful ser-
vility for anyone who has any regard for his professional dignity
that they have been ridiculed by the whole world, especially by their
cousins on the other side of the Atlantic. Some of their admirals,
afraid of losing tlie prestige which they have so well earned in the
maritime world, have changed their opinions; and it is curious to watch
the acrobatic feats they execute when they give free reins to their
opinions ami judge the facts, and when, as though in obedience to an
order from the foreign office, they plan campaigns and perform other
skillful acts which seem hardly possible in men of such practical minds.
Really, it seems impossible, absolutely impossible, that in a country of
such naval intelligence as England so many high officers should have
written so many utterly ridiculous opinions without superior orders
to praise the Americans at any cost. Nothing else could be expected
of the only nation in Europe which, with the same object in view
has seriously sustained the tale of the blowing up of the Maine from
the outside by means of a torpedo. While I was in America, many
Americans in talking to me of this tale made fun of it — that is to say,
of these English articles; however, business is business; but in the end
everything must be paid for, as Spain has paid for the great political
mistake she made when she aided the British colonies in achieving
their independence.

14

From the point of view of criticism we will speak of one note^
worthy article, which is important on account of its great circulation,
having appeared in Brassey's Naval Annual for 1899, written by Col.
Sir George Clarke with a freedom of criticism that truly honors hina,
especially as he has heard only one side, which serves to demonstrate
what we have said before; for in conclusion of his article, on page
174, he states explicitly that he has obtained his information from
different oflScers of the United States Navy, which, as already stated,
with the exception of concealing some minor defeats, has furnished
the most correct report of the events.

The press of France, Italy, and Germany has treated Spain with
more moderation and its navy with greater fairness. But in its evi-
dent desire to be generous, for which we are truly grateful, it is often
led aside from the path of truth, and what should be justice has come
to be charity.

There finally remains the Spanish press. We forgive it from the
bottom of our hearte, though before God and before history it is prin-
cipally responsible for the disasters of our country. It is a severe,
moral lesson that public opinion in Spain, except in the case of a few
sound-minded men who were not led astray, has returned to the right
channel without the aid of the press — even in spite of the press — com-
pelling even the most hostile to recognize that the mistakes and respon-
sibility rest with the Government factors and not with those who, after
insisting that we should not go to Cuba, counted neither enemies nor
obstacles when they received the order to go out to meet death for
their country, though the}^ were convinced, not only of the futility of
the enterprise, but also of the fact that the order meant the delivering
up of all Spain to the mercy of the enemy.

In our country everything goes to extremes; soldiers must all be
heroes, martyrs, or traitors; the just medium is completely lacking;
but it is precisely in the just medium that conmion sense prevails,
which in war, jis in everything else, is needful at the dec^isive moment
In our country we would have qualified as a monstrosity the order
given Sampson, as appears from several telegrams published in the
Appendix to the Annual Report of the Secretary of the United States
Navy for 1898, not to go near the heavy guns of our coast defenses in
order not to expose his ships to being injured. We should have con-
sidered that cowardice, and preferred a squadron crippled and ren-
dered useless by a glorious battle without any objective, to a squadron
that has remained inta<!t and is ready to give the whole benefit of its
unbroken forces. If the Spanish press had so understood the best
interests of our country, it would not have defended what it did
defend, nor accused those whom it did accuse, and who, covered with
blood, might have asked the press when they learned that Watson was
threatening the coasts of the Peninsula, ''What have )^ou done with
our squadron i "

CHAPTER n.

One of the most disgraceful ciromnstanoes of this period of tne ^ar
was the firm resolution on the part of the Spanish Government to
obviate ihe war at any cost. This was not only the resolution of the
administration then in power, but of all the preceding ones without
distinction. But the relinquishment of the island of Cuba, which was
the only means of obviating it, never entered into this resolution,
although that, and that alone, could ward off the conflict which could
have no other outcome than the total ruin of Spain. Thus it was that
not the least preparation was made, either on land or on the sea, and
whUe the whole world was under the impression that we were fran-
tically getting ready for a struggle to the bitter end, the navy remained
entirely on a peace footing. The armored crusier Cri%t6bal Goldn did
not have her heavy guns. The firm of Armstrong, anxious to take
advantage of the opportunity, offered us two old guns, which the
admiral of the mediterranean squadron begged for with insistence,
as they were better than none at all; but this solution was not adopted
because it was not believed that the case was very urgent. The Pdayo^
Nximxinem^ and Vitoria^ which were in foreign building yards, would
not be ready nor have their new armament until September — ^that is, if
the constructors fulfilled their contracts — and the Ca/rloB 7" was having
her heavy guns installed at Havre, with great activity, it is true, but
she also lacked part of her secondary battery.

The Pdayo had 208 men on board, including the conunander, which
number is absolutely necessary to take care of her machinery and
armament ; the Canrloa V had in all 282 men, and the cruisers Nurrum-
ciu and Vitoria had 61 men each, while a crew of over 500 men was
provided for each one of these ships on a war footing. Moreover, it
takes a very long time to organize a modem warship, for even after
months had been spent in fitting them out they were not in condition
to render the best service that could be expected of their machinery
and armament. The figures given above show better than anything
else could, even to people not versed in these matters, that we were
on a complete peace footing.

On this subject our daily papers have published the semiofficial cor-
respondence of Admiral Cervera with the Government, in which the

former insisted time and time again on the danger that was threatening

15

16

us, on the unfinished condition of our ships that were being fitted out
abroad, on the impossibility of going to war, and on the probable
results. When this correspondence has been published in full it wOl
be given a place in the opinions of the whole world, with sorry reflec-
tions upon our statesmen who maintained a wholly untenable optimism.

On land not a single gun had been mounted on our coasts. The field
artillery in Cuba had not been increased by modem guns, although it
was evident that they would be needed against an Anglo-Saxon army,
better equipped with materiel than with personnel, and the only pre-
caution taken was that of sending to the Canaries and Balearic Islands
some troops that would have been of little avail if the hostile squadron
had made its appearance on our coasts, and if, as would have been the
natural result, it had brought its pressure to bear on our coast cities.

On the other hand, it is positively certain that several good ships
were offered to us, although this is not apparent from the letters of the
minister of marine, who was desirous of protecting his colleagues in
the cabinet. And it is also certain that this same minister, Mr. Ber-
mejo, made superhuman efforts to acquire these ships, but met with
no support — ^because there would be no war.

Although it is going back to the same subject, we shall call attention
a hundred times to the fact — amoral rather than material — that the
cruiser CristMl Coldn did not have her heavy guns, for when the
Government was not willing to accept those that were offered it, that
is to say, when it was decided that the Colon was not to have any heavy
guns, it must have been because it was positively convinced that
she would not require them, although the whole universe thought
differently.

While this was the spirit prevailing in the Government, strength-
ened by the belief that this, the most unjust war recorded in history,
would never be undertaken against us, the press embarked on an entirely
different campaign. For, aside from the natural protest caused by the
aggression of the United States, it lost no opportunity to misrepresent
that country's resources and elements of power, undervaluing its squad-
ron and making comparisons devoid of all common sense. Moreover,
it is well known that a nation Jike ours, whose coasts are not only acces-
sible, but where the repression of contraband is confined by law almost
entirely to capture when caught in the act, requires two complete belts
of surveillance, on land and on the sea, and the latter requires numer-
ous flotillas of fast vessels. The same was also needed for the coasts
of Cuba and the Philippines for active coast patrol. But such flotillas
do not represent any power in an international conflict, and to call
them a squadron would be the same as though we were to designate
under the name of regular army the police force, gamekeepers, and civil
guards, whose forces in every country, and especially in ours, repre-
sent many thousands of men. But every vessel has a name, and that

17

of a 40-toii launch is frequently twice as long and more high sounding
than that of a battleship; and so the press, believing it its duty to be
inspired by patriotic views, and without noticing whether the ship
whose name was mentioned was in Europe or in the West Indies, or
perhaps in the lagoons of Mindanao, in the Philippine Islands, hun-
dreds of feet above the level of the sea, simply counted the names and
figured up the total, and with the assistance of illustrations numerous
squadrons were conjured up, for when ships are taken out of the sea
and transferred to paper it is all a matter of different scales.

About this time there occurred a split in the navy, which we men-
tion especially because Mahan speaks of it to Vice- Admiral Berdnger,
former minister, referring to an interview published in the Heraldo
of April 8, 1898, in which said admiral made some statements which
he had also made in public while minister, to the effect that we had the
necessary means and elements to face the conflict.

While this was going on our navy followed step by step the devel-
opments in our relations with the United States, and when it found
that it would have to bear the brunt of the conflict, and would even
be charged with the mistakes of others, it tried by every possible
means to induce the ministry to compel the press to speak the truth.
'The alarm of the navy was justified, for while it was recognized at
Madrid that we should have to lose the island of Cuba, it was said
that this could not take place without a second Trafalgar to justify so
painful a loss. This phrase, a second Trafalgar, was attributed to no
less a personage than Antonio Cdnovas del Castillo; but we who have
had occasion to become intimately acquainted with this eminent states-
man believe this report utterly devoid of any foundation, for we feel
certain that he never would have gone to war for fear of the internal
disturbances which have dragged us into so mad a conflict.

This dissension in the navy increased when Admiral Cervera's
lettei*s became known; but we do not believe that either party was
entirely in the right, for while we do not deny that there was great
lack of discretion in the ministry, which was always controlled by the
idea that there would be no war, we must also recognize that a minister
interviewed by a newspaper correspondent could not possibly say that
we were irremediably lost. . Hence the testimony cited from the
Heraldo is of no more value than interviews of that kind usually are;
they can easily be invented and, as a matter of fact, frequently are
invented by reporters who are acquainted with the political opinions
and the position of the person interviewed.

Admiral Cervera's letters were confidential, even as regards the
officers under his immediate orders, and although the situation has
materially changed since then, in writing of these events to-day we
are confronted with the same difficulties that he was. If the accounts
are not signed by some one who has had an actual share in the events
14232— No. VIII 2

18

ttiey lack value in the eyes of the public, and if attested by the sig-na-
ture of one of us, how are we to write them and how comment on
them?

All the officers ,of the navy are constantly being asked by many
people why they did not tell the country the truth. But that is
unjust, for the truth has been told in every tone of voice and from
everj'^ quarter, only it was not signed with the names of the persons
telling it; and they did well in not signing it, for it might have been
said that they were seeking a way to be sent to prison in order to
escape the necessity of going out to meet the enemy.

This is the dilemma which military writers belonging to the service
have had to solve; and there is but one way of solving it, namely, to
leave the active service. There can be no other solution, when the
penal code provides severe penalties for any military person who
speaks highly of the enemy's forces. But unfortunately in Spain,
'when men have left the service, it has not always been in order to
work for their country and its armed forces; And that is why we
were restricted; for those among us who might have signed their
writings lacked the necessary prestige, and those who would have
been listened to could not sign them. But it will ever remain a severe
charge against the Government that it did not use its powerful influ-
ence to call upon the patriotism of the press, which would surely have
responded at once and abandoned an ill-advised campaign in favor of the
war, when the Government not only did not desire it, but had not
taken the least precaution to prepare for it in case events should be
precipitated.

While on our part not the least preparations were being made, the
United States was not neglecting the smallest details, as though the
war they were anticipating was to be fought against the most power-
ful nation. A captain of the United States Navy came to Spain and
imprudently we opened our navy-yards to him, so that he might inform
himself to his heart's content of the calm prevailing there and of the
backward condition of our ships under construction. Whenever it
was desired to send torpedoes to Cuba, the declaration of war was
threatened and hence those many orders and revocations which the
public could not understand. Objections were made to the construc-
tion of the torpedo-boat destroyers as well as to the purchase of the
Cristdhal Colon^ and il is the general belief in naval circles that some
of the work we were having done in England was interfered with, for
that is the only explanation of the delays and the many fines consequent
thereon, which finally amounted to £75,000.

The vigilance, even in the smallest details, went so far as to make
a lecture I delivered before the Geographic Society of Madrid, of
which I have the honor of being vice-president, the subject of violent
remonstrances; and I take pleasure in stating that I^aid very compli-

19

mentary things about the United States, which I should have liked to
hear said about Spain. But I was a sad prophet of what was to hap-
pen, which, however, 1 do not believe could have been news to anyone
who was well acquainted with the situation. And although the Geo-
graphic Socdety is of a purely scientific nature, the Government had to
interfere, and the president, Antonio Canovas dc Castillo, had to
request me to sign a letter written by himself, which I did, saying that
the defense rested with him.^

In speaking of the preparations made by the United States, 1 do
not have reference to those which are known to the whole world — for
the Americans stated themselves that months before the war they had
128 auxiliary' vessels fitted out and in readiness — but of the work done
in our country by their agents, who were powerfully aided by the
insurgent committee which the Cubans were maintaining at Madrid,
and relative to which we abstain from all comment, because, in the
first place, these are matters which are difficult to prove, and, in the
second place, because, after all, they only demonstrate that, as already
stated, we had overstepped the limits of the most ridiculous senti-
mental policy.

All this did not alarm the Spanish people, nor even the Govern-
ment, which treated the communications of the delegates of the
ministries of state and marine as exaggei*ations. For, though it may
seem strange, Spanish diplomats and naval men have for the last ten
years sounded the note of alarm, with what result we all know.* While
the storm over our heads was thus gathering in intensity, people used
to engage in discussions as to whether the resolutions of the United
States Congress would be joint resolutions or not, with a lack of
political understanding and instinct of preservation which has no equal
in modern history.

^ As it is not easy wholly to lay aside the personal part one has taken in these
events, I will state that, for fear I might enter upon some other course, as it was an
entirely personal matter, the minister of state, Jos6 Elduayen, wanted to smooth my
ruffled spirits with a splendid breakfast, and at the dessert he presented to me the
letter referred to, dictated by the president of the council, asking me, in the name of
the interests of the country, to sign it As stated above, I did so, though not with-
out remarking that this document would probably be misused by the persons to
whom it was to be delivered, saying that I did not havea vejy high opinion of them,
and I was not wrong, for it was soon after published in the New York papers.

On that occasion I filled no particular office of any kind; therefore my statements
could have only a literary value. It was the insurgent committee at Madrid that
had promoted this incident

* Among the documents of this class which are known to me are the noteworthy
communications of the Naval Officer Gutierrez Sobral in 1896, in which he states
that the attack upon our Philippines was sure to come, and that the United States,
before declaring war, would take possession of the Hawaiian Islands, to be used as
an intermediate base of operations. He also calls attention to the sending of a num-
ber of newspaper men to Japan to embark upon a campaign of defamation, on the
order of the campaign which the Cubans were carrying on in the United States and
Europe, thus using artless Japan in the interests of others, while apparently working
for what the Empire of the Rising Sun considered its legitimate spoils in the future.

20

• The Government believed at that tune that the granting of autonomy
would solve the Cuban problem. While the Cubans aspired to inde-
pendence, there is no doubt that they would have accepted autonomy
as a means for achieving more easily complete separation, without los-
ing the Spanish emigration, for without it — and this in spite of the
United States, or perhaps because of the United States — the island of
Cuba is fatally doomed to fall into the hands of the colored races.
Moreover, the discouragement of the insurgents was great; they saw
no hope of immediate victory, and there was no lack of sound-minded
Cubans and true patriots who gave their support in good faith to the
policy of autonomy as a transitional stage. Insurgent parties also
commenced to flock to it, and peace would have been reestablished
within a short time. It was then that the U. S. cruiser Mame was
sent to Habana to promote disturbances, and that the United States
squadron took up its position at Dry Tortugas, so as to be ready at a
moment's notice. Our Government answered by sending the armored
cruiser Oquendo to Habana and the Vizcaya to New York — to return
the call. This movement of ships deserves a place in the annals of
the continued policy of artlessness.

The letters of Admiral Cervera, published in La Epoca, and from
which we shall hereafter copy a few paragraphs, show that the com-
mander in chief of the squadron clearly foresaw what would and must
necessarily happen, and also demonstrates the incredible optimism of
the Government, with Senor Moret, minister of colonies, in the lead.^

The armored cruiser Vizcaya was about to be docked, had the
admiral on board, and was the least ready of all the ships of the
squadron, while the Teresa^ which was under my command, was the
only one that was in a condition to render immediate service. But on
account of the lecture referred to it was feared that I might not be
persona grata^ and so the Vizcaya started without having her bottom
cleaned, and the result was that when the war broke out she had not
been in dock for a year and had lost considerable speed.

* The report submitted to the Senate by the Governor-General of the Philippines,
Fernando Primo de Rivera, says on page 191: "The meddling of Sefior Moret in mili-
tary matters, his demands for data, his estimates of battles, his opinions as to whether
or not they were exp^ient to attain what was desired, etc., * * * his wanting
to handle everything, occupying himself with matters wholly foreign to his ministry,
were truly laughable. He did nothing to carry out the compromise I had worked
for, and, as no investigation was made of these sacred interests, I found myself under
the necessity of quafl&ng the bitter cup which he held out to me with that simplicity
which Sefior Moret, in his good faith or his innocence, always assumed. While such
was his conduct in political matters generally, in personal matters there are no words
to qualify the lack of respect for the sacred interests of Spain and for its representa-
tives in those countries."

General Marques de £stalla himself has authorized us to publish the following tele-
gram of March 5: **The minister of colonies to the Grovemor-General of the Phil-
ippines: As our relations with the United States are very cordial, your excellency
will receive its squadron in the same manner as other foreign squadrons have been
received in that harber."

21

While our cruiser was on her way to New York the Mcmie was
blown up (February 15, 1898), and one can easily imagine the anxiety
of all, including the Government, for the safe arrival of the Yizcaya in
the United States, with her bunkers almost empty.

In addition to the scattering of the ships at Habana, New York,
Cartagena, Toulon, and Havre, and to spread further anxiety among
the squadron, letters that were being received from Madrid repeated, as
common property, the idea expressed by the phrase of a second TrafaL-
ga/r to justify the loss of the island of Cuba, and a letter circulated
from hand to hand, in which D. M. B., a surgeon of the armada,
stated that upon the advice of Senior Moret it was destined to go to the
Philippines in place of the squadron, because the latter would prob-
ably be destroyed. Then the admiral, who was closely following
everything that happened and forming his opinions with that clear
judgment which characterizes him, asked witii insistence for permis-
sion to go to Madrid in order to formulate a plan of campaign, repeat-
ing again and again that if the war broke out the West Indies and the
Philippines would be lost, and that it would mean the iotal ruin of
Spain. The answer he received was that in inofnervts of intemat^/mal
crisis no deji/nite pla/ns com hefarrnvlated.

Consequently nothing, absolutely nothing, was done; no thought
even was given to what was to be done if the war should become a fact.^

So the supreme moment arrived, and the Government, which had not
enlightened the people and had made no preparations whatever, found
itself completely disarmed before the tremendous wave which threat-
ened to change all existing conditions in Spain. The Government
being afraid to do anything but accept the war to hide its own blun-
ders, the war was accepted, still in the simple belief that the disaster
would be confined to the island of Cuba, and that it would not mean
the total ruin of Spain, as Admiral Cervera had said, and as everyone
must have said who knew anything of elementary history.

We shall never weary repeating the fact — amoral rather than mate-
rial— ^which is apparent in everything we have hitherto stated, namely,
that the war was not desired by the Government nor by the people,
nor even by the press, which believed it impossible. An eminent
man, of the greatest influence in Spain, Emilio Castelar, to whom

* The United States Army and Navy desired the war. But when it is learned, if it
is ever learned, what efforts were made at Paris up to the last moment before the war
broke out, in which efforts our ambassador and the Spanish minister who had been
at Washington took part, it may possibly appear that the United States Grovem-
ment did not desire the war, and that, with the exception of Cuba, we might have
saved everything, including even the recognition of the debt.

The United States Navy had considerable influence in the Senate, and, supported
by public opinion, it pushed matters with great success, as may be seen from a com-
parison of the incidents of that period. How many things will be written, or could
be written, within the next fifty years!

22

monuments are being erected for having reestablished the discipline
of the army, in emulation of Juan de Robres, author of the peace
proposition and bard of universal love, but who spoke of the build-
ing of new ships as of throwing millions into the Nervi6n, had in his
writings spoken in such extravagant language of the United States of
North America as the purest expression of democracy, equality, and
progress, that there was hardly anyone in Spain, from the most uned-
ucated to the most learned, who did not feel the marvelous charm of
the harmonious prose of perhaps the most eminent writer that ever
lived. But we who remembered the history of Florida and of Louisi-
ana, the unjust campaign against Mexico, and how the Latin i*ace has
been robbed of the best territories of the world, which throws the lie
in the face of the whole universe against that so-called just and humani-
tarian policy, and the active part which the United States had taken
against our dominion in Cuba long before the first expedition of Nar-
ciso L6pez, and above all we who had lived among them were called
sectarians, impassioned men, little short of paitisans of the inquisition.
This went so far that the writer, about fifteen years before the events
herein recorded, felt himself isolated in the Geographic Congress of
Madrid, the Geographic Society and the Athenaeum of Madrid, the
center of the intellectual culture of all Spain, and was politely rebuked
because his opinion differed from the mad Anglomania of 99 per cent
of his colleagues. These bitter disenchantments had to come in
order to make the Geographic Society think it necessary tacitly to
beg my pardon, leaving in the heart of the citizen and the patriot the
sad satisfaction of having been right. We cite this case as one of the
thousand instances of such great moral deterioi-ation relative to every-
thing English or American that, without this chastisement sent by God,
the time might have come when, in order to be considered as belonging
to high life^ our women would have been required to debase themselves
by drinking whisky and brandy, or to send their fathers and husbands
to hospitals, as the people of pur sang do in that model country of
Moret's and Castelar's.

It was impossible for us, who plainly saw the storm approaching, to
make ourselves heard bv those who considered us mad. And if at this
moment all of Europe were to descend upon Spain with all her forces
on land and sea, although we are ruined, shattered, and in one of the
most critical periods this noble country has ever passed through, still,
if the whole country were to unite with us in one grand effort, morally
as well as materially, and with the powerful assistance of the will of a
nation, we should be in better condition than the navy was in the war
into which it was forced, and in which it had no more chance than a
detachment of the civil guard would have if sent out against a power-
ful party of highwaymen, simply as a matter of form, and as though
the hostility of the United States were merely the fancy of some idler.

CHAPTER m.

While the situation was shaping itself, as described in the previous
chapter, there had been prepared at Cadiz a flotilla of three torpedo
boats and three torpedo-boat destroyers, and after overcoming a thou-
sand difficulties, apparently of a naval nature, but in reality of a diplo-
matic chai-acter, it had put to sea and was at St. Vincent, Cape Verde,
awaiting the order to start for the West Indies. Its departure was
delayed in the vain hope of a peaceful solution, in view of the repeated
threat that its departure would be considered a casus hdli.

On April 8 Rear- Admiral Cervera left Cadiz to join this division,
with the armored cruiser Infanta Maria Teresa^ his flagship, and the
O/^istdbal Coldn^ the latter without her heavy guns, as previously stated.
The admiral did not carry with him any instructions from the Govern-
ment, but was to receive them at his destination by a collier which was
to follow him. This proceeding is the more incomprehensible, as the
collier left almost at the same time as the squadron.

To send instructions to a modern squadron by means of a steamer
of 8 knots speed, which was to stop at the Canaries for the purpose of
coaling, in place of giving them to the admiral himself, is a proceed-
ing which before the tribunal of history will stand as one of the
gravest charges of this period. But that is not all. It would have
been the most natural thing for Admii*al Cervera's squadron, if it was
irrevocably to go to the West Indies, to stop at the Canaries, where
it could have refitted in a few hours, not only because the navy had
contracts there, but also because the necessary appliances were to be
found there for shipping all needed supplies, in addition to the very
important circmnstance that the telegraph was at the disposal of
the Government and the cable was moored at Cadiz, so that it could
not be interfered with. All this led the admiral to believe that he
was sent to Cape Verde to get the torpedo-boat flotilla and convoy it
back to the Peninsula; for when war had once been declared it would
be impossible for said torpedo boats to cross the Atlantic.

Upon our arrival at St. Vincent, on April 14, we learned that the
armored cruisers Oqiiendo and Vizcaya were coming from Puerto Rico
to meet at the former harbor, as they did with mathematical pre-
cision. But two large ships more considerably aggravated the prob-

23

24

lem of coal, which has been the foundation of our disasters, those in
power having forgotten that modern tactics are the tactics of fuel.

The United States consul had bought all the available coal at Cape
Verde, and only after a thousand difficulties and by paying twice the
regular price did we succeed in obtaining 700 tons, which were sold
us upon orders from England, probably in the firm belief that the 10
vessels we had there, counting both large and small ones, would not
be able to do anything with that quantity.

In the meantime the collier Sfin Francisco arrived with the fatal
instructions.

We immediately proceeded to unload her and recoal all the ships,
which is a very difficult operation at St. Vincent, because the sea
coming from the island of San Antonio and striking ships headed
toward the breeze on the broadside renders it impossible in that harbor "
for one ship to go alongside of another, so that we had to do the coal-
ing by means of a few small coal lighters which the English company
let us have, though very unwillingly. It was a slow and arduous task,
and even with the coal brought by the 8cm Francisco and Cadiz there
was not enough to refill the bunkei*s.

Owing to the instructions, of which we shall speak hereafter, the
three torpedo boats did not return to the Peninsula with the steamer
Cddiz^ which had convoyed them. This steamer, which was originally
a passensfer steamer, had on board the main armament of the destrov-
ers, as well as the 'ammunition, torpedoes, and many other artici;s
which it is very difficult to ti*ansship when the order in which they are
arranged in the storerooms is changed, making it necessary at times
to take out things which have a whole cargo on top of them. And
worst of all, the squadron was so much in need of coal that it was
necessary to take it even from the bunkers of the CddAz^ which, as
above stated, was not a freight steamer, and how difficult that is can
hardly be realized except by those who have a knowledge of nautical
matters. The latter need not be told how slow and arduous a task is
transshipment under such circumstances.

The admiral opened the instructions with veritable anxiety, for
although he was in a measure prepared they must have affected him
deeply.

The instructions provided that the squadron was to go to Puerto
Rico, as its principal mission was to be to defend that island. The
admiral was authorized to go to Cuba. He was also given authority —
and the politicians qualified this as great liberty of action — ^to choose
his own route and accept or refuse battle with the United States
squadron, as he might deem best. This authorization meant nothing,
for in the first case it was self -understood, and in the second (*ase be
had to do the best he could.

The admiral convened a council of war, consisting of Captain

25

Paredes, second in command of the squadron; Capts. Diaz Moreu,
Liazaga, and Eulate, conmianders of the cruisers Cristdbal Colon^
Oquendo^ and Vizcaya^ respectively; Bustamente, chief of staflf;
Yillaamil, chief of the torpedo-boat flotilla; and myself, commander
of the Ma/ria Teresa^ flagship of the squadron. This memorable
council was held on the 20th of April on board the Cristdhal CoUn^
whose commander was sick at that time.

It is impossible to describe the impression which the reading of the
instructions made upon us. For the squadron to go to the West
Indies meant, as Captain Mahan says, the foredooming of the four
gallant ships; it meant the carrying of the war to Puerto Rico, for
wherever the squadron went there war must follow it; and it meant
the adding of one more to Spain's tribulations, since Puerto Bico was
as yet quiet. The harbor of San Juan, the only one the squadron
could enter, oflfered no military protection for ships, nor any coast
defenses to speak of, and it was no wonder that Admiral Sampson,
after the bombardment of May 12, said in his official report — and he
spoke the truth — that he decided not to continue the attack, although
he was satisfied and certain of the possibility of attaining the surrender
of the city, which he had not done because he did not have landing
forces to occupy it. We mention this in order to destroy the illusion,
which is still being clung to by some, that the United States squadron
was repulsed at San Juan.

In case the squadron went to Cuba it would be impossible for it to
reach Habana Harbor, which was the only military harbor, properly
speaking; for the enemy, who had several months ago established
their base of operations at Key West and Dry Tortugas, only five or six
hours distant from the capital of the Greater Antilla, would be sure to
watch very closely the only harbor possessing powerful artillery,
especially as the approaches of said harbor were very easy to control.
It was not known whether Cienfuegos was fortified; all we knew was
that it had some torpedoes, and the natural assumption was that this
harbor would be watched the most closely next to Habana, because it
was connected by rail with the latter. Cienfuegos, moreover, could
without difficulty be blockaded by the enemy, as the United States
squadron could lie at anchor at the neighboring reefs, and by means
of scouts at Cape Cruz could be informed in good season of the
approach of our ships and receive them with forces four times as
large.

The enemy at that time had in the Atlantic Ocean the battleships
Indicma^ lowa^ and Ma8sachvsetts^ which were invulnerable as far as
we were concerned, and each one of which represented greater power
than our whole squadron together, so that it was only in the highly
improbable case of meeting one of them alone that we had the slightest
chance of defeating her by ramming, and even then probably not until
we had lost half of our ships.

26

Besides these battleships they had the Tessas (a cruiser of the type
of our Vizcaya)^ the Brooklyn and Nefio York,, each far superior to any
one of our ships, two ships of the Columbia tj^pe, powerful auxiliaries,
besides a number of other cruisers and monitors, and over 120 vessels
armed for war purposes, which, while not strong individually, repre-
sented, when supported by a powerful nucleus of armor clads, a tre-
mendous force which it would have been madness for us to want to
oppose.

This whole force, even before the arrival of the Oregon^ could have
formed four groups or squadrons, each overwhelmingly stronger
than ours. For us there was no solution within human power but to
go to Habana, Cienfuegos, or Santiago de Cuba, or even San Juan de
Puerto Rico (although to go there would have meant to go in search
of destruction), and if each one of those four divisions had taken up
its position in front of one of the harbors which we had to enter, such
division could have compelled us to battle, with absolute certainty of
destroying our squadron. Even granting that such had not been the
case and that we had had the rare good fortune of forcing our way
through, it would have been with such injuries and losses that our
squadron would have been rendered useless for the rest of the cam-
paign, which would have ended the war for Spain, for the war was
the squadron, and nothing but the squadron. To suppose, as it was
supposed at that time, that the hostilities could be continued after the
loss of the ships shows a sad lack of knowledge of our military situ-
uation and of the meaning of modern squadrons.^

The Americans, on the other hand, did have such knowledge.
Taking into account injuries and accidents to machinery, the necessity
of renewing the coal supply and other difficulties from which no ship
is exempt, they formed only two squadrons in place of four, so that even
if two or more of the most powerful ships were temporarily absent,
the remaining forces would still be such as to exclude any doubt as to
the result. This is an admimble military precaution, even in case of
overwhelming superiority. If we had done such a thing it would
have given rise more than once to the question whether we were
afraid.

The (ibject of inilitai'y operations is final success and not proofs of
valor. But it is useless to discuss this point, for it will never be
understood in Spain.

On the other hand, the enemy had made all manner of preparations
months before the Mairie went to Habana. They occupied the sea of
operations, made sure of the powerful cooperation of the Cuban

* "Admiral Cervera's squaciron having been destroyed," said the London Times of
August 16, with good reason, **the war was practically at an end, unless Spain
want«<l to continue the struggle solely for the sake of honor, for there waa nothing
else she could save."

27

insurgents, through whom they received information, not only as to
Cuba, but as to all the Lesser Antilles, through which were scattered
many emigrants and sympathizers, and finally, they used for their
final preparations all those days which were occupied by the voyage
of our squadron.

On our part, leaving aside the defects of the ships, of which I shall
speak in connection with the battle, we would arrive with our engines
in the condition which is the natural result of a squadron crossing the
Atlantic, especially if it is remembered that the Oqiiendo and Vhcaya
had to make that voyage twice, without even a collier that would per-
mit us upon arrival partly to replenish the coal consumed and to
manoeuvre untrammeled without having to think of our bunkers.
Spain had at that time twelve heavy naval guns, and to divide this
already scant force by sending six to the West Indies and leaving the
other half in the Peninsula was so great a strategic mistake that it
alone would have been sufficient to make a name for the hostile
admiml who accomplished this by virtue of his manoeuvres.

In view of these considerations, which are rigorously exact and which
have since been repeated by all naval writers of the world, with the
exception of a few English publications in bad taste, we all agreed
that it would be mad, criminal, and absurd to go out to surrender the
country to the mercy of the enemy, for there was no doubt that the
less difficulties the campaign presented to them the more exorbitant
would be their demands.

It was the unanimous opinion of all that the Philippine Archipelago
was in the greatest danger, as appears from the official report of
which we give a copy hereafter, for we felt sure that the insurrection
would again arise there and support the attack from the outside. But
this was no time to go to the Philippines when the mother country
was in urgent need of us, for there was no doubt in our minds that if
the Americans, counting on the Cuban insurrection, first directed their
efforts against that island in order to facilitate the campaign, the war,
as is the case with all naval wars, must necessarily end on the coasts of
the unsuccessful nation. Therefore, the war would have to be con-
sidered terminated when the United States squadron threatened to go
to Spain, as would no doubt happen one way or another. And in this
connection we deny the combinations relative to sending reenforce-
ments to the United States squadron in the Philippines, which the
eminent writer* Mahan describes in detail at the conclusion of his
ai*ticles, explaining the wherefore of the movements of the forces
referred to; for if the United States squadron did not cross the
Atlantic when no one could prevent it from doing so, it was because
it did not please England, their ally, who did not want, to see her
cousins spread alarm on the Continent, which, without ex(^eption, was
pained to see our ruin, or because England realized that her friends

28

had gone a great deal farther than she had counted upon. While we
did not at that time clearly understand the part Great Britain played,
though we had our suspicionn, it was not so as to the outcome of the
war which we saw as clearly then — that is, while we were at the Cape
Verde Islands — as we do now.

It was therefore evident that the only possible solution was to return
to the coasts of Spain. That is what all military writers of the world
now say, and the English Admiral Colomb goes so far as to say that
Cervera should have done so, disobeying orders, even at the risk of
being shot, for he would thereby have saved Puerto Rico and the
Philippines for Spain, and there can be no doubt as to this. Thus we
were of unanimous opinion that the squadron should return to the
Peninsula. We therefore assembled all the fighting ships. We had a
nucleus of torpedo boats which, though small in number, were good
and adapted, even by themselves alone, to render permanent operations
on our coasts difficult for an enemy whose harbors were so far distant.
The enemy, in order to go to Spain, would have to divide their forces,
as we had had to divide ours to go to their country. Our fortifica-
tions, though not very powerful, were yet sufficient to keep at bay a
squadron which had no harbor near as a refuge for its injured ships,
and even if they should take from us some abandoned island and use
it as a base of operations, they would still be compelled, in order to
repair their ships thoroughly, to take them across the Atlantic, and
hence an injury to one of their principal ships would make a general
retreat necessary. Finally, all of Europe, including even England,
must have realized more clearly than it was realized in Cuba, where
the sympathy of the whole world had been estranged from us as the
result of calumny, that for the first time in history the guns of the
new continent were to knock at the harbors of old Europe, begfinning
with the oldest of her nations; but the turn of the others was sure to
come and then it would be too late for the latter to repent of having
abandoned us in the hour of need.

True that our return might have carried the war to the Peninsula,
but under such diflferent circumstances that surely not one of our
seaboard cities would have had to suffer; and when peace was con-
cluded, instead of our sorrowfully pleading for mercy, we might have
threatened to renew the war, especially as the invasion of Cuba by the
United States Army, while our squadron was intact at the Peninsula,
would probably not have taken place. This is the opinion of the
Americans themselves, and it has since been corroborated by the pru-
dence they observed, which, we state again, we do not censure, but
which, on the contrary, we consider worthy of professional and
political admiration.

At that council of war, which we compared at the time with the
council held on the eve of the battle of Trafalgar, expression was

29

given to the greatest energy and patriotism, and a vehement telegram
was drawn up addressed to the Government, in which we set forth our
opinions.

But one thing happened at this meeting which, we trust, will acquire
importance from the candor with which we relate it. The circum-
stances were known to all; each one had formed his own opinion con-
cerning them, as became evident from the statements made at the
meeting; but none of us knew anything of the exertions made by the
admiral, who had not spoken of them even to his chief of staff nor to
myself, his flag captain, although we were very intimate, for I had
been his executive officer on board several ships and his lifelong
friend, and this was the fourth ship which I commanded under his
flag as admiral. Thus, from a wonderful devotion to discipline, he had
preserved the most absolute secrecy and had carried on personally,
with the assistance of a son of his, who acted as his amanuensis, the
whole official and semiofficial correspondence, so that there had been
no interchange of ideas between us, and we knew nothing of the Gov-
ernment's strange proceedings, which was necessary if we were to
discuss matters of such vital importance with proper intelligence.

The telegram first drawn up in which we opposed the Government
appeared so vehement, although it would seem quite just and mild at
this time, that all of us, without exception, agreed to change it, and it
was thus that the following telegram, which, owing to the natural reac-
tion, was deficient in the opposite extreme, was approved and for-
warded on the evening of April 20:

In agreement with the second in command and the commander's of the vessels, I
suggest going to the Canaries. Ariete has boilers in bad condition; boiler of Azor is
very old. Vizcaya must be docked and have her bottom painted if she is to preserve
her speed. Canaries would be protected from a rapid descent of the enemy, and all
the forces would be in a position, if necessary, to hasten to the defense of the mother
country.

The proceedings of the meeting were signed by the commanders in
chief, Cervera and Paredes, and by Captains Lazaga, Diaz Moreu,
Eulate, Concas, Bustamente, and Villaamil, the latter, being the
youngest, signing as secretary.

At the conclusion of the council of war 1 returned to my ship
together with the admiral, to whom I privately stated my belief that
the telegram hardly expressed what had occurred at the meeting, and
1 insisted on my opinion set forth at said meeting that each one ought
to have given his views in writing and signed them with his name, as
these proceedings would pass into history and might constitute the
military testament of each one of us, the only thing, perhaps, that
would defend our memory, the honor of the navy, and the name which
was to be our legacy to our children, whom we should probably never
see again.

30

The admiral thought a moment, placed his right hand on his fore-
head, closing hin eyes for an instant, then laying his hand on my shoul-
der, he turned to Bustamente, who was writing, but listening at the
same time, and said to him: '* Victor is right!" and shaking me affec-
tionately, as I was still absorbed in profound meditation, he added:
' ' You write it out, then. " I told my beloved admiral that I could not do
so, because it would seem like disloyalty toward my comrades, as it
would appear to be my own personal views, when with slight differ-
ences the opinions of all had been the same. ''Precisely because all
were of the same opinion, you write it out as the expression of the
views of all the captains of the squadron; and now I command you to
do so," the admiral added kindly.

I did so, and Admiral Cervera accompanied the document with the
noteworthy communication which I copy below, together with my
views, as taken from the Madrid newspaper La Epoca, and which are
therefore public property, the same as all other document^!; which we
quote herein, regretting that we can not do the same with many others:

The MiNiHTEK OF Marine:

For lack of time I could not tell you yesterday about the council which met on
board the ColdUy and only sent you a copy of the proceedings. The council lasted
nearly four hours. The prev'ailing spirit was that of purest discipline, characterized
by the high spirit which animates the whole fleet, and especially the distinguished
coramandere, who are an honor to Spain and the navy, and whom it is my good for-
tune to have for companions in these critical and solemn circumstances. The first
and natural desire expressed by all was to go resolutely in quest of the enemy and
surrender their lives on the altar of the mother country; but the vision of the same
mother country abandoned, insulted, and trod upon by the enemy, proud of our
defeat — for nothing else could be expected by going to meet them on their own
gromid with our inferior forces — compelled them to see that such sacrifice would not
only be useless but harmful, since it would place Spain in the hands of an insolent
and proud enemy, and God only knows what the consequences might be.

I could sec the struggle in their minds between these conflicting considerations.
All of them loathe the idea of not going immediately in search of the enemy and
finishing once for all. But, as I said before, the vision of the country trampled upon
by the enemy rose above all other considerations, and inspired with that courage
which consists in braving criticLsin and perhaps the sarcasm and accusations of the
ignorant masses, which know nothing about war in general and naval warfare in
particular and Iwlieve that the Alfonso XII or the Cri^ina can be pitted against the
Iowa or MassaehusettSj they expressly and energetically declare that the interests of
the mother country demande<i this sacrifice from us. One of the captains had cer-
tain scruples a1)out expressing his opinion, saying that he would do what the
Government of His Majesty should be pleased to order; but as all of us, absolutely
all, shared these sentiments, it is hardly necessary to say his scruples were soon over-
come. My only reason for mentioning this is to give you an exact report of everj'-
thing that happened.

Another of the captains, certainly not the most enthusiastic, but who may be said
to have represented the average opinion prevailing in the council, has, by my order,
written down his ideas and I send you a copy of his statement, which reflects better
than I could express them the opinions of all. This document represents exactly the
sentiment which prevailed in the meeting.

81

Believing that I have fulfilled my duty in giving your excellency an accurate account

of all that happened, I reiterate the assurance of the excellent spirit of all.

Yours, etc.

Pascual Cervhra.
April 21, 1898.

Views of Capt. Victor M. Concas, commander of the battleship
Infanta Maria Terefta:

Concerning the subjects presented for discussion by the admiral of the fleet at the
council of war held on board the battleship Cristdbal Colthi/my opinion is as follows:

(1) The naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior to our own in
number and class of vessels, armor, and armament, and in preparations made, besides
the advantage given the enemy by the insurrection in Cuba, the possible one in
Puerto Rico, and the latent insurrection in the east, that they have sufficient forces
to attack us in the West Indies, in the Peninsula and adjacent islands, and in the
Philippines.

Since no attention has been paid to that archipelago, where it was, perhaps, most
urgent to reduce our \Tilnerable points, which could have been done with a single
battleship, any division of our limited forces at this time and any separation from
European waters would involve a strategic mistake which would carry the war to
the Peninsula, and that would mean frightful disaster to our coasts, the payment of
lai^^e ransoms, and, perhaps, the loss of some island.

As soon as this fleet leaves for the West Indies it is evident that the American
flying squadron will sail for Europe, and even if its purpose were only to make a
raid or a demonstration against our coasts the just alarm of all Spain would cause the
enforced return of this fleet, although too late to prevent the enemy from reaping
the fruits of an easy victory.

The only three vessels of war remaining for the defense of the peninsula — the Car-
los V, the PelayOy whose repairs are not yet finished, and the Alfonso XIITj of very
little speed, and even that not certain — are not sufficient for the defense of the Spanish
coasts, and in no manner for that of the Canaries. The yacht Giralda and the steam-
ers Germania and Normania, of the acquisition of which oflScial notice has been
received, are not vessels of fighting qualities and add no strength to our navy.

(2) The plan of defending the island of Puerto Rico, abandoning Cuba to its fate,
is absolutely impracticable, because, if the American fleet purposely destroys a city'
of the last-named island, in spite of all the plans of the Government on the subject,
and even though it would be the maddest thing in the world, the Government itself
would be forced by public opinion to send this fleet against the Americans, under
the conditions and at the point which the latter might choose.

(3) Even deciding upon the defense of Puerto Rico alone, the trip across at this
time, after the practical declaration of war, without a military port where the fleet
might refit on its arrival, and without an auxiliary fleet to keep the enemy busy —
who, I suppose, will make St. Thomas his base of operations — is a strat^ic error,
the more deplorable because there have been months and even years in which to
accumulate the necessary forces in the West Indies. It seems probable, judging from
the information acquired, that the supplies accumulated at St. Thomas are intended
by the enemy to establish a base of operations in the vicinity of our unprotected
Vieques (Crab Island) . For all these reasons the responsibility of the voyage must
remain entirely with the Government.

(4) Adding these three battleships and the Oriddbal ColdUy without her big guns,
to the two remaining in the Peninsula, and to the few old torpe<io boats which we
have left, it is possible to defend our coasts from the Guadiana to Cape Creus, includ-
ing the Balearic Islands and the Canaries, thanks to the distance of the enemy from
his base of operations. This defense, however, will have to be a very energetic one

30

The admiral thought a mouient, placed bis right hand on his fore-
head, closing his eyes for an instant, then laying his hand on my shoul-
der, he turned to Bustamente, who was writing, but listening at the
same time, and said to him: ^^ Victor is rightl'^ and shaking me affec-
tionately, as I was still absorbed in profound meditation, he added:
" You write it out, then. " I told my beloved admiral that I could not do
so, because it would seem like disloyalty toward my comrades, as it
would appear to be my own personal views, when with slight differ-
ences the opinions of all had been the same. ''Precisely because all
were of the same opinion, you write it out as the expression of the
views of all the captains of the squadron; and now I conunand you to
do so," the admiral added kindly.

I did so, and Admiral Cervera accompanied the document with the
noteworthy communication which I copy below, together with my
views, as taken from the Madrid newspaper La Epoca, and which are
therefore public property, the same as all other documents which we
quote herein, regretting that we can not do the same with many others:

The MiNiBTER OF Marine:

For lack of time I could not tell you yesterday about the council which met on
board the (hldriy and only sent you a copy of the proceedings. The council lasted
nearly four hours. The prevailing spirit was that of purest discipline, characterized
by the high spirit which animates the whole fleet, and es|)ei'ially the distinguished
commanders, who are an honor to Spain and the navy, and whom it is my goo<l for-
tune to have for companions in these critical and solemn circumstances. The first
and natural desire expressed by all was to go resolutely in quest of the enemy and
surrender their lives on the altar of the mother country; but the vimon of the same
mother country abandoned, insulted, and trod upon by the enemy, proud of our
defeat — for nothing else could l)e expected by going to meet them on their own
ground with our inferior forces — compelled them to see that such sacrifice would not
only be useless but harmful, since it would place Spain in the hands of an insolent
and proud enemy, and God only knows what the consequences might be.

I could sec the struggle in their minds between these conflicting considerations.
All of them loathe the idea of not going immediately in search of the enemy and
finishing once for all. But, as I said Ix^fore, the vision of the country trampled upon
by the enemy rose above all other considerations, and inspired with that courage
which consists in braving criticism and perhaps the sarcasm and accusations of the
ignorant masses, which know nothing about war in general and naval warfare in
particular and l)elieve that the Alfonso XII or the Crintina can be pitted against the
louHi or MassaehuseUs^ they expR^ssly and enei^getically dec^lare that the interests of
the mother country demanded this sacrifice from us. One of the captains ha<i cer-
tain scruples alxjut expressing his opinion, saying that he would do what the
Government of His Majesty should Ik? pleased to onler; but as all of us, absolutely
all, shared these sentiments, it is hardly necessary to say his scruples were soon over-
come. My only reason for mentioning this is to give you an exact report of every-
thing that hap[)ene<l.

Another of the captains, certainly not the most enthusiastic, but who may be said
to have represented tlie average opinion prevailing in the council, has, by my order,
written down his ideas and I send you a copy of his statement, which reflects better
than I could express them the opinions of all. This document represents exactly the
sentiment which prevailed in the meeting.

31

Believing that I have fulfilled my duty in giving your excellency an accurate account

of all that happened, I reiterate the assurance of the excellent spirit of all.

Yours, etc.

Pascual Cbrvbra.
April 21, 1898.

Views of Capt. Victor M. Concas, commander of the battleship
Infanta. Maria Tef^esa:

Concerning the subjects presented for discussion by the admiral of the fleet at the
council of war held on board the battleship Cristdbal CoI6n/my opinion is as follows:

(1) The naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior to our own in
number and class of vessels, armor, and armament, and in preparations made, besides
the advantage given the enemy by the insurrection in Cuba, the possible one in
Puerto Rico, and the latent insurrection in the east, that they have sufficient forces
to attack us in the West Indies, in the Peninsula and adjacent islands, and in the
Philippines.

Since no attention has been paid to that archipelago, where it was, perhaps, most
urgent to reduce our vulnerable pomts, which could have been done with a single
battleship, any division of our limited forces at this time and any separation from
Euro{)ean waters would involve a strategic mistake which would carry the war to
the Peninsula, and that would mean frightful disaster to our coasts, the payment of
large ransoms, and, perhaps, the loss of some island.

As soon as this fleet leaves for the West Indies it is evident that the American
flying squadron will sail for Europe, and even if its purpose were only to make a
raid or a demonstration against our coasts the just alarm of all Spain would cause the
enforced return of this fleet, although too late to prevent the enemy from reaping
the fruits of an easy victory.

The only three vessels of war remaining for the defense of the peninsula — the Car-
los Vj the PelayOf whose repairs are not yet finished, and the Alfonso XIIIj of very
little speed, and even that not certain — are not sufficient for the defense of the Spanish
coasts, and in no manner for that of the Canaries. The yacht Giralda and the steam-
ers Germania and Normania, of the acquisition of which official notice has been
received, are not vessels of fighting qualities and add no strength to our navy.

(2) The plan of defending the island of Puerto Rico, abandoning Cuba to its fate,
is absolutely impracticable, because, if the American fleet purposely destroys a city*
of the last-named island, in spite of all the plans of the Government on the subject,
and even though it would be the maddest thing in the w^orld, the Government itself
would be forced by public opinion to send this fleet against the Americans, under
the conditions and at the point which the latter might choose.

(3) Even deciding upon the defense of Puerto Rico alone, the trip across at this
time, after the practical declaration of war, without a military port where the fleet
might refit on its arrival, and without an auxiliary fleet to keep the enemy busy —
who, I suppose, will make St. Thomas his base of operations — is a strategic error,
the more deplorable because there have been months and even years in w^hich to
accumulate the necessary forces in the West Indies. It seems probable, judging from
the information acquired, that the supplies ac^cumulated at St. Thomas are intended
by the enemy to establish a base of operations in the vicinity of our unprotected
Vieques (Crab Island) . For all these reasons the responsibility of the voyage must
remain entirely with the Government.

(4) Adding these three battleships and the Oristdbal Coldnj without her big guns,
to the two remaining in the Peninsula, and to the few old torpedo boats which we
have left, it is possible to defend our coasts from the Guadiana to Cape Creus, includ-
ing the Balearic Islands and the Canaries, thanks to the distance of the enemy from
his base of operations. This defense, however, wnll have to be a very energetic one

30

The admiral thought a moment, placed his right hand on his fore-
head, closing his eyes for an instant, then laying his hand on my shoul-
der, he turned to Bustamente, who was writing, but listening at the
same time, and said to him: *' Victor is right!" and shaking me affec-
tionately, as I was still absorbed in profound meditation, he added:
'* You write it out, then. " I told m v beloved admiral that I could not do
SO, because it would seem like disloyalt\' toward my comrades, as it
would appear to be my own personal views, when with slight differ-
ences the opinions of all had been the same. "Precisely because all
were of the same opinion, you write it out as the expression of the
views of all the captains of the squadron; and now I command you to
do so," the admiral added kindly.

I did so, and Admiral Cervera accompanied the document with the
noteworthy communication which I copy below, together witii my
views, as taken from the Madrid newspaper La Epoca, and which are
therefore public property, the same as all other documents which we
quote herein, regretting that we can not do the same with many others:

The MiNiOTER OF Marine:

For lack of time I could not tell you yesterday about the council which met on
board the Coldnj and only sent you a copy of the proceedings. The council lasted
nearly four hours. The prevailing spirit was that of purest discipline, characterized
by the high spirit which animates the whole fleet, and especially the distinguished
commanders, who are an honor to Spain and the navy, and whom it is my good for-
tune to have for companions in these critical and solemn circumstances. The first
and natural desire expressed by all was to go resolutely in quest of the enemy and
surrender their lives on the altar of the mother country; but the vision of the same
mother country abandoned, insulted, and trod upon by the enemy, proud of our
defeat — for nothing else could be expected by going to meet them on their own
ground with our inferior forces — compelled them to see that such sacrifice would not
only be useless but harmful, since it would place Spain in the hands of an insolent
and proud enemy, and God only knows what the consequences might be.

I could see the struggle in their minds between these conflicting consideraHons.
All of them loathe the idea of not going immediately in search of the enemy and
finishing once for all. But, as I said before, the vision of the country trampled upon
by the enemy rose above all other considerations, and inspired with that couiBge
which consists in braving criticism and perhaps the sarcasm and accusations of the
ignorant masses, which know nothing about war in general and naval warfare in
particular and believe that the Alfonso XII or the Cristina can be pitted a^inst the
lo^mi or MassachuaetiSy they expressly and energetically declare that the interests of
the mother country demanded this sacrifice from us. One of the captains had cer-
tain scruples about expressing his opinion, saying that he would do what the
Government of His Majesty should be pleased to order; but as all of us, abeolut-ely
all, shared these sentiments, it is hardly necessary to say his scruples were soon over-
come. My only reason for mentioning this is to give you an exact report of every-
thing that happened.

Another of the captains, certainly not the most enthusiastic, but who may be said
to have represented the average opinion prevailing in the council, has, by my order,
wTitten down his ideas and I send you a copy of his statement, which reflects better
than I could express them the opinions of all. This document represents exactly tlie
sentiment which prevailed in the meeting.

31

Believing that I have fulfilled my duty in giving your excellency an accurate account

of all that happened, I reiterate the assurance of the excellent spirit of all.

Yours, etc.

Pascual Cervbra.
April 21, 1898.

Views of Capt. Victor M. Concas, commander of the battleship
Infanta Maria Teresa:

Concerning the subjects presented for discussion by the admiral of the fleet at the
council of war held on board the battleship CriMdlxil CoUm/ my opinion is as follows:

(1) The naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior to our own in
number and class of vessels, armor, and armament, and in preparations made, besides
the advantage given the enemy by the insurrection in Cuba, the possible one in
Puerto Rico, and the latent insurrection in the east, that they have sufficient forces
to attack us in the West Indies, in the Peninsula and adjacent islands, and in the
Philippines.

Since no attention has been paid to that archipelago, where it was, perhaps, most
urgent to reduce our vulnerable points, which could have been done with a single
battleship, any division of our limited forces at this time and any separation from
European waters would involve a strategic mistake which would carry the war to
the Peninsula, and that would mean frightful disaster to our coasts, the payment of
lai^e ransoms, and, perhaps, the loss of some island.

As soon as this fleet leaves for the West Indies it is evident that the American
flying squadron will sail for Europe, and even if its purpose were only to make a
raid or a demonstration against our coasts the just alarm of all Spain would cause the
enforced return of this fleet, although too late to prevent the enemy from reaping
the fruits of an easy victory.

The only three vessels of war remaining for the defense of the peninsula — the Car-
los Vj the PelayOj whose repairs are not yet flnished, and the Alfonso XIII, of very
little speed, and even that not certain — are not sufficient for the defense of the Spanish
coasts, and in no manner for that of the Canaries. The yacht Oircdda and the steam-
ers Germania and Nomiania, of the acquisition of which official notice has been
received, are not vessels of fighting qualities and add no strength to our navy.

(2) The plan of defending the island of Puerto Rico, abandoning Cuba to its fate,
is absolutely impracticable, because, if the American fleet purposely destroys a city'
of the last-named island, in spite of all the plans of the Government on the subject,
and even though it would be the maddest thing in the world, the Government itself
would be forced by public opinion to send this fleet against the Americans, under
the conditions and at the point which the latter might choose.

(3) Even deciding upon the defense of Puerto Rico alone, the trip across at this
time, after the practical declaration of war, without a military port where the fleet
might refit on its arrival, and without an auxiliary fleet to keep the enemy busy —
who, I suppose, will make St. Thomas his base of operations — is a strategic error,
the more deplorable because there have been months and even years in which to
accumulate the necessary forces in the West Indies. It seems probable, judging from
the information acquired, that the supplies accumulated at St. Thomas are intended
by the enemy to establish a base of operations in the vicinity of our unprotected
Vieques (Crab Island) . For all these reasons the responsibility of the voy^e must
remain entirely with the Government.

(4) Adding these three battleships and the Oristdbal Coldn, without her big guns,
to the two remaining in the Peninsula, and to the few old torpedo boats which we
have left, it is possible to defend our coasts from the Guadiana to Cape Creus, includ-
ing the Balearic Islands and the Canaries, thanks to the distance of the enemy from
his base of operations. This defense, however, will have to be a very energetic one

82

if the enemy brings his best ships to bear on us, and it will not be possible to save
the coasts of Galicia and of the north of Spain from suffering more or lees if the
enemy should bring along a fast division, nor even the protected coasts, from an
attack here and there, as our ships are too few in number to be divided.

(5) It is very regrettable that there are not enough vessels to cover all points at
one time; but duty and patriotism compel us to present clearly the resources which
the country gave us and the needs which present circumstances bring on the country
in danger.

(6) Lastly, I believe, with due respect, that the military situation should be laid
before the minister of marine, while I reiterate our profoundest subordination to his
orders and our firm purpose most energetically to carry out the plans of operations
he may communicate to these forces. But, after i)ointing out the probable conse-
quences, the responsibility must remain with the Government

VfCTOB M. CONCAS.*

St. Vincent, Cape Vebde, April £0, 1898,

These significant communications we suppose reached Spain on May
5. I say we suppose^ because, although duly acknowledged by the
then minister of marine, they do not appear in the archives, and
probably went astray at the council of ministers, since the latter was
the cause of the highly important order to the squadron to return to
Spain, issued on May 12, and of which we shall speak later. But,
treating this matter with due loyalty, as everything else herein set
forth, we must say that the Government had on that day no further
information than the telegram of April 20, above referred to, giving
an account of the meeting.

The answer was another telegram, ordering the departure to be
delayed and stating that a council of admirals was to be convened at
Madrid.

In the meantime the telegraphic correspondence with Madrid was
continued, as the result of the fact that we all went more deeply into
the question.

On April 21 Admiral Cervera addressed to the (jovernnrient the fol-
lowing significant telegram:

The more I think about it the more I am convinced that to continue voyage to
Puerto Rico would be disastrous. The captains of the ships are of same opinion
as I, some more emphatically.

On April 22 the admiral had to ask whether war had been declared.
On the same day the admiral telegraphed as follows:

I l)eg your excellency to permit me to insist that the result of our voyage to America
nuist be disajBtroiw for the future of our country. That is the opinion of all men of

*Aa it is always gratifying to present testimony in support of an opinion sustained
under very unusual circumstances, I beg to be permitted to stat€ in support of the
foregoing views that it appears from Admiral Sampson's telegram dated May 12 that
he sent the auxiliary cruiser Yale to St. Thomas in search of information; and from
hie telegram of May 8 that he told his Government, among other things, that **if
the auxiliary vessels he had asked for were sent to him he would proceed to San
Juan, probably destroying fortifications, establishing a temporary base at Culebra
Island, to the east of Puerto Rico," etc.

83

honor. I b^ your excellency to read this telegram and my whole official and con-
fidential correspondence to the president of the coimcil, in order to ease my
conscience.

In the meantime two telegrams had been received to the effect that
the mission of the squadron was the defense of Puerto Rico, and finally,
on the 24th, another telegram in which the minister said that the Gov-
ernment, in conjunction with the council of admirals, ordered the
depai*ture, adding that the United States flag was hostile. These tele-
grams will in due time be published in full, so that each one of them
will stand before history for the part it played therein.

YiQaamil, taking advantage of the circumstance that he was a
deputy, telegraphed on April 22 to Prdxedes Mateo Sagasta, premier
of the Government, stating that he considered the sacrifice of the
squadron as certain as it was useless and disastrous. And as the sub-
lime and the ridiculous are often closely connected, this telegram was
answered by Senor Moret, minister of colonies, by an English tele-
gram saying, '' Ood hless you,^^

The telegram ordering the departure of the squadron and the one
containing Senor Moret's blessing, which each one of us honestly
appropriated to himself, were answered by the admiral in a letter
dated the 24th and closed on the 27th, in which he said, among other
things:

As the act has been consummated, I will not insist upon my opinion concerning
it. May. God grant that I be mistaken I You see I was right when I told you
that by the end of April the Pelayo, Carlos V, VUoriaj and Numanda would not be
finished; that the Col6n would not have her big guns unless we took the defective
ones; that we should not have the 5.5 inch ammunition for the new guns, etc. With
a clear conscience I go to the sacrifice, but I can not understand the unanimous
decision of the general officers of the navy indicating disapprobation and censure of
my opinions, which implies that some one of them should have relieved me.

There was, therefore, no way out of the dilemma. The idea of
returning to Spain contrary to instructions, which was fermenting
in the minds of all, was sustained with energy by Capt. Diaz Moreu
as the only salvation of the country. But the opinion of the others,
though this point was not discussed at the council of war, was that the
ignorance prevailing in Spain as to the true situation was so great,
even among the most highly educated classes, that we should not only
be punished, but also ridiculed, and no one would ever'understand that
it was a heroic resolution and a sublime sacrifice. And hence we had
no choice but obedience, which for Spain was equivalent to the loss
of those of her colonies which she still had a chance of preserving.
Moreover, there was the council of admirals.

It was with profound sorrow that we realized that discipline forbade

our discussing that council, not to censure it for the decision it had

arrived at, but, on the contrary, to defend it from the charges which

history will bring against it, if at the time when it is written and when

"^14232— No. VIII 3

34

these matters can be talked about with entire freedom the admirals
composing said council should no longer be among the living to add to
their respective decisions a full account of everything that led up to
them, as they, and they alone, can do. Belo.w we give in full a letter
written by Senor Francisco Silvela, now president of the council of
ministers, who quotes the words of Senor Guillermo Chac6n, late
admiral, who was one of those who voted for the squadron going to
the West Indies. These words say more in favor of the said meeting
and of the above statements than anything I could add.

To this meeting were convened all the admirals residing at Madrid,
including those on the retired list, who are never called to such coun-
cils, because on account of their advanced age or invalidism, they
are not able to keep themselves posted as to the marvelous transfor-
mations of the materiel. The majority of them, however, were pol-
iticians, and it was from the standpoint of politics that the question
was laid before them, as the uprising of the very stones in the street
in Cuba as well as in Spain had to be represented to them. So one
of two things had to happen; either the politicians or the purely naval
men had to prevail at said meeting. And while we know a^d esteem
all the officers present and have no doubt that all maintained their
opinions with the independence that characterizes each one of them,
there will nevertheless always remain a question as to one of the opin-
ions, the one which carried the others along with it; for he who pro
nounced it, a politician par excellence^ was only twenty-sef en days
later called to the ministry of marine as though as a reward.

Four admirals voted against the departure of the squadron, though
their opinions varied in form, and favored rather concentration of all
the ships. Since then many a voice has been raised in favor of that
opinion; for the same thing that happened at our council of war at
Cape Verde occurred also at this meeting, namely, those present were
taken by surprise; and we know positively that, if in either case there
had been twenty-four hours' time between the convening of the coun-
cil and the all-important decision, the vehemence of our telegram
would have been such that it would have made even the blind see, and
the decision of the council of admirals would no doubt have been
unanimously to the effect that our fighting ships ought never to have
left the coasta of the Peninsula, neither united'nor separately.

Those who voted against the departure were Admirals Lazaga,
G6mez-Imaz, Mozo, and Butler; but the former two, believing that
they had not done enough and fully convinced that a national catastro-
phe was hanging over us, carried their efforts by conmion consent out-
side of the council, using every possible endeavor, for they believed —
and they were right — that there was still time to save our country.

We regret that Rear- Admiral Jos6 Gomez-Imaz has not been able
to authorize us to speak of the many efforts he made in certain quar-

35

ters, as they would redound in the highest degree to his patriotism
and the consciousness of his duty as a good Spaniard, and would also
honor those to whom he applied and who did all in their power. But
foilunately Joaquin M. Lazaga has authorized us to publish the share
he took in these last efforts to save the country and for which we feel
deeply grateful, because if he had not done so it might seem like an
argument in favor of our theory.

Admiral Lazaga went to see Senor Francisco Silvela, leader of the
Conservative party, who was deeply impressed and became convinced
of the disaster threatening us. He at once went to interview the
president of the council of ministers, in order to induce him to use
every endeavor against the depai-ture of the squadron, and the letter
we give below, and which we have been authorized to publish, tells
better than anything we might say what was the result of the patri-
otic efforts of Senor Silvela and Admiral Lazaga, and shows at the
same time that there were men in Madrid who shared our opinion and
who realized how statesmen should understand their duties.

The letter referred to is as follows:

Francisco SilvelOy 1 Serrano, Madrid, to His Excellency Joaquin M. Lazaga.

My Dear Friend: I have spoken to the president, as I told you I would, but
without any practical result. He said that the instructions to Cervera give him
absolute freedom as to his route; that the superior speed of his ships will permit him
to elude an encounter if he is not in condition to fight; that he can go to Cuba,
Puerto Rico, or United Stafes harbors, and can await, for a decisive battle, the ships
that will be sent from here to join him. This seems to me neither practical nor
possible. Admiral Chac6n haa told Villayerde that he too deems the concentration
of the squadron absolutely necessary, and tha^ it would be a great thing if Sagasta
could be made to see this. I have tried hard to convince him; but it is too late.
God protect our brave sailors! It is with them that rasta our only hope of salvation,
at least the salvation of honor. I shall* try to see you soon and give you further
details; but as I realize how anxious you must be I tell you this much, feeling sure
that it is safe in your hands.

Very affectionately, your friend, F. Silvela.

(Wednesday.)

But in spite of all, the telegram ordering the departure was con-
firmed. God had withdrawn his hand from Spain! The die had been
cast; and the Moret-Sagasta administration had written upon our
history the words: Finis IlispanuB!

CHAPTER IV.

Spanish statesmen, it is to be supposed, thought that the
honor of their country was better served by exposing to
the world ita incomprehensible incapacity than by making
terms with the United States, and parting with Cuba for
a 'consideration, before this incapacity was exhibited to
• the world. — {The Lessons of the Sparmh-Anierwan War. —

COLOMB.)

If we could have given the above lines to the public at the time of
the events to which they refer, tjiey would surely have passed from
hand to hand, not with a view to seeking our justification, nor that of
the disaster, but to put in practice Talleyrand's profound maxim that,
'' Whatever you may say and write will be repeated and turned against
you." But not even that can we hope for, we who are anxious to be
discussed even though unfairly, since the facts speak so loudly for
themselves that we need fear no controversy. But it would be in vain
for us to aspire to the interest of past times, when those who have the
greatest interest in hiding their responsibility, of which they have not,
like ourselves, been exonerated hy any tribunal, have succeeded in
throwing upon this period of history the great remedy of politicians,
time, and with it, public indifference.

This being the case, we claim the protection of history and of our
comrades in the navy, Spanish as well as foreigners, in conjunction
with fair-minded men who make a study of the development of this
drama, to constitute an honest, intelligent, and absolutely independent
jury to whom we do not hesitate to submit our cause, since circum-
stances have taken from us universal suffrage.

In order to complete the necessary data to strengthen the conviction
of what we have stated in the previous chapter, it is necessary to make
the reader acquainted with part of the official documents which have
been published in full abroad, and some of which have been copied
by La Epoca, and others by El Correo Gallego, of Ferrol, in its sup-
plement of February 17, 1899, as also by several other papers.
We repeat again that we make mention only of those dociun^ents
which have been published, and not of those which should have been

published.
36

37

Before proceeding we will speak of a matter which will surely find
many imitators in future. Admiral Cervera, foreseeing not only acci-
dents to his flagship, but also the struggle of opposed interests which
always accompanies great historical events, especially when success
can not reasonably be hoped for, and considering the necessity of leav-
ing a testament of his military history, forwarded all his documents to
a safe person, who, in conjunction with two other men, likewise highly
respectable, drew up a certificate in which he acknowledged the receipt
of said documents. In the same manner, during the night of July 2,
the admiral placed in the care of the archbishop of Santiago de Cuba
all his other official and semiofficial documents up to said date, so that
these extremely important papers were not destroyed the next day by
the flames which devoured the flagship of the squadron.

We do not copy these documents, since they have already been pub-
lished in full and circulated through the whole world, and we shall com-
ment on them only briefly. It is sufficient for our object to give a few
precise extracts in defense of the theory which we have set forth rela-
tive to the preparations made in Spain prior to the war, leaving out
details which distract the attention from the principal facts, and at the
same time reducing the length which has kept many persons from
reading these documents.

Although the admiral conmienced his important correspondence on
December 3, 1897, it was not until February, 1898, when the events
became precipitated and the voyage of the cruisers Yizcaya and Oquendo
had been determined upon, that the admiral made his observations
with increased energy, as shown by an official letter dated February
6, 1898.

In his letter of the 7th he said, among other things :

I feel sure that absolute secrecy will be maintained, even as to my flag captain."

And this, as stated in connection with the council of war at Cape
Verde, is strictly true.
On February 9, in speaking of the guns of the Col6n^ he said :

And if we have no other guns, and these can fire even twenty-five or thirty
shots, we should take them anyhow, even though they are expensive and inefficient,
and we should lose no time about it in order that the vessel may be armed and sup-
plied with ammunition as soon as possible.

It is clear that this indicates a profound conviction that the declara-
tion of war was inevitable.
In his letter of February 11 the admiral said to the minister:

I always bear in mind what the press is in this country, and you will have noticed
that I avoid in my telegrams the use of phrases wliich might cause alarm or stir up
passion. With these private letters and confidential communications it is quite dif-
ferent, and I believe that I owe you my frank opinion, without beating about the
bush.

We wish to impress this remark on all fair-minded people, for the
press, the world over, wants everything discussed on the street, and

38

a hundred times have we heard the question asked in connection with
these matters, why we had not said so, as though we should and could
have consulted each Spaniard separately.

On February 12 the admiral asked what was to be the plan of
campaign in the prospective war with the United States.

On February 16, after showing the enormous disparity of the rela-
tive forces, the admiral said, among other things:

"* I dread to think of the results of a naval battle, even if it should be a suec^sful
one for us.

By these words the admiral expressed what countless writers have
said since, namely, that damages to our ships would have rendered
them useless for the remainder of the war, while the enemv's forces
were such as not to be much affected by injuries that some of the ships
might sustain, and their resources for repairing damages, in case they
should be material, were inexhaustible.

On February 25 he stated that none of the ships undergoing repairs
would be ready by the time the war would probably break out, and
he doubted whether the CoUn would be ready, and he was right.

In several letters he spoke of the vital question of the metal car-
tridge cases for the 5.5 inch guns. We shall refer to this matter in
connection with the sortie from Santiago.

His letter of February 26 contains the following memorable words,
which should forever remain engraved upon the hearts of all good
patriots:

I send to-day the official letter which I announced yesterday. Its conclusions are
indeed conflicting; but can we afford to cherish illusions? Do w^e not owe to our
country not only our lives, if necessary, but the exposition of our beliefs? I am very
uneasy about this. I ask myself if it is right for me to keep silent, and thereby
make myself an accomplice in adventures which u*Ul surely cause the toted ruin of Spain.
And for what purpose? To defend an island which was ours, but belongs to us no
more, because, even if we should not lose it by right in thfe war, we have lost it in
fact, and wath it all our wealth and an enormous number of young men, victims of
the chmate and bullets, in the defense of what is now no more than a romantic ideal.

It was perhaps believed that the admiral saw matters in too dark a
light, while in other quarters all was optimism, for on March 3 he said
to the minister:

I have deemed it my duty to express my opinion to the proper authorities — ^that is,
to you and to the whole Government through you — clearly and without beating
around the bush. Now, let orders be given to me; I will carry them out with energy
and decision.

As events followed each other in rapid succession, the admiral wrote
on March 7:

Whatever may be the direction given to the conflict — whether war, negotiations
direct or through a third party, an arbitrator, or otherwise — the longer the decision
is delayed the worse it will be for us. If it is war, the longer it takes to come the
more exhausted we will be. If it is negotiation of any kind, the longer it is i>ost-

39

poned the greater will be the demands, each time more irritating, which will be
presented by the United States, and to which we will have to yield in order to gain
time in the vain hope of improving our military position. And as our position can
not be improved, let us see what we can expect from a war under such conditions.

It would be foolish to deny that what we may reasonably expect is defeat, which
may be glorious, but all the same defeat, which would cause us to lose the island in
the worst possible manner.

In the same letter he says further on:

I have never thought of the forces which the United States have in the Pacific and'
Asia in connection with the development of events in the West Indies; but I have
always considered these forces a great danger for the Philippines, which have not
even a shadow of a resistance to oppose them. And as regards the American coasts
of the Pacific, the United States has no anxiety c^bout them on our account.

On March 16 the admiral begged again and again to be permitted
to go to Madrid in order to formulate a plan of campaign and to
explain the terrible danger of the situation. His words are not any
too strong when he says :

We can not go to war without meeting with a certain and friglttful disejster.
* * * The war will surely lead us to a terrible disaster, followed by a humiliating
peace and the most frightful ruin.

In conclusion, he asks to be allowed to go to Madrid to inform the
Government verbally. This request was reiterated with vehemence •
in his telegram of April 7, in reply to which he was told that he
would receive the instructions at Cape Verde.

We have purposely omitted to mention any of the answers which
these patriotic remonstrances received; but we must mention one
letter from the minister to the admiral, dated April 7, which has
already been published and the character of which impels us to speak
of it. It says, among other things :

But the President of the United States is surrounded by the waves which he him-
self has raised and which he is now trying to appease. * * * In the instructions
which you will receive a general idea is outlined which you will work out with your
captains, etc.

This phrase of the waves was repeated a great deal in Madrid, the
same as that of a second Trafalgar^ and serves as an apology for the
policy which Admiral Colomb censures with as much justice as severity.

The second sentence quoted from the letter referred to indicates that
the instructions had been written out. The admiral might therefore
have received them at Cadiz on the 8th before he left, either by the
same mail, or by a special engine or tender, or by telegram, which
would have been well worth while, but never by a collier.

We shall not comment on the remainder of this letter nor on any of
the others, out of affection, respect, and sympathy for the minister
who had the ill-fortune of holding the portfolio on that occasion. But
there is in connection with this particular matter something much
more serious which affects the whole Government, namely, while on

40

April 7 the departure of the squadron for Cuba had alreadj' been
determined upon and the instructions written out, a telegram was sent
to the Philippines on the 12th ordering the immediate return to the
Peninsula of the captain-general of the army^ Fernando Primo de
Rivera, who had recently surrendered the governorship-general of the
archipelago, and who, considering that the man who had relieved him
was new in the Philippines an^ that the circumstances were extremely
grave, urged the expediency of his remaining there under the orders
of the new captain-general, on account of his prestige in the country,
and also to take command of some of the army forces if the war shouIcT
break out. Thus, when the squadron, on April 11, had already passed
the Canaries on its way to Cuba, in accordance with the instructions
brought by the collier, Sefiior Moret, minister of colonies, on the 12th
ordered the return of a general whose services had unquestionably
been of the greatest value in the far east, especially as it was on the
part of the latter a tremendous sacrifice to remain there, since no
success could be expected. This is indeed a serious matter, which
reflects upon the statesmen of the Sagasta ministry, and while our
defective organization can not call them to account for it, God and
history will treat them more severely.

We should not have found fault if an order to start for Habana at
full speed had been received by telegram on April 7, as the concen-
tration could have been eflfected there with great ease some days before
the declaration of war, which in that case would have taken a very
diflferent turn.

It is reported that about this time very urgent telegrams were
received from the Philippines, Habana, and Puerto Rico, all asking
for the squadron. We are not acquainted with these telegrams, but
it seems to us they were very natural and not at ali reprehensible, for
it is clear that each one was pleading for his own church, which was
right. But these telegrams, which the Government is trying to use
as an excuse for having sent the squadron to the West Indies, can in
no manner exculpate it from its responsibility, for it was the part of
the Government to combine common interests, and what it did at the
last hour, when it invoked the salvation of the mother country, it should
have done at this time instead of procrastinating for several days, wh ich,
by gaining a few hours, resulted in the total ruin of Spain. We have
already said that to take the squadron to Puerto Rico would have meant
its loss as well as the loss of the island. This is what M ahan and Samp-
son have said, and even the United States Navy Department, and we
should hardly have believed it possible that Puerto Rico asked for the
squadron had we not seen it confirmed by telegrams of April 20 and
May 18, which we regret not to be able to insert here.

The request for the squadron by the Philippines was quite reason-
able, as there was time to improvise a port of refuge prior to the

41

arrival of larger forces. In Cuba, while the petition was not reason-
able, it would have been rational at least for the squadron to go there
as long as it was still possible to enter Habana Harbor without previ-
ous battle. But by the time the squadron started from Cape Verde its
voyage was equivalent to certain defeat, since it could no longer enter
Habana Harbor.

Our voice was not listened to; but we are nevertheless grateful for
having been considered men of honor and valor, as we unquestionably
were, for in spite of everything, those ships, the only ones which Spain
possessed, were left intrusted to our hands.

82

if the enemy brings his best ships to bear on us, and it will not be possible to 8av«
the coasts of Galicia and of the north of Spain from suffering more or leas if the
enemy should bring along a fast division, nor even the protected coasts, from an
attack here and there, as our ships are too few in number to be divided.

(5) It is very regrettable that there are not enough vessels to cover all points at
one time; but duty and patriotism compel us to present clearly the resources ii^hich
the country gave us and the needs which present circumstances bring on the coantrj
in danger.

(6) Lastly, I believe, with due respect, that the military situation should be laid
before the minister of marine, while I reiterate our profoundest subordination to his
orders and our firm purpose most energetically to carry out the plans of operations
he may communicate to these forces. But, after pointing out the probable conse-
quences, the responsibility must remain with the Grovernment

VfCTOR M- OONCAS.*

St. Vincent, Capb Verde, April ^0, 1898,

These significant communications we suppose reached Spain on May
5. I say we suppose^ because, although duly acknowledged by the
then minister of marine, they do not appear in the archives, and
probably went astray at the council of ministers, since the latter was
the cause of the highly important order to the squadron to return to
Spain, issued on May 12, and of which we shall speak later. But,
treating this matter with due loyalty, as everything else herein set
forth, we must say that the Government had on that day no further
information than the telegram of April 20, above referred to, giving
an account of the meeting.

The answer was another telegram, ordering the departure to be
delayed and stating that a council of admirals was to be convened at
Madrid.

In the meantime the telegraphic correspondence with Madrid was
continued, as the result of the fact that we all went more deeply into
the question.

On April 21 Admiral Cervera addressed to the (Jovermnent the fol-
lowing significant telegram:

The more I think about it the more I am convinced that to continue voyage to
Puerto Rico would be disastrous. The captains of the ships are of same opinion
as I, some more emphatically.

On April 22 the admiral had to ask whether war had been declared.
On the same day the admiral telegraphed as follows:

I beg your excellency to permit me to insist that the result of our voyage to America
must be disastrous for the future of our country. That is the opinion of all men of

'As it is always gratifying to present testimony in support of an opinion sustained
under very unusual circumstances, I beg to be permitted to state in support, of the
foregoing views that it appears from Admiral Sampson's telegram dated May 12 that
he sent the auxiliarA' cruiser Yale to St. Thomas in search of information; and from
hLs telegram of May 8 that he told his Government, among other things, that "if
the auxiliary vessels he had asked for were sent to him he would proceed to San
Juan, probably destroying fortifications, establishing a temporary base at Cnlebra
Island, to the east of Puerto Rico," etc.

I

88

honor. I beg your excellency to read this telegram and my whole official and con-
fidential correspondence to the president of the council, in order to ease my
conscience.

In the meantime two telegrams had been received to the effect that
the mission of the squadron was the defense of Puerto Rico, and finally,
on the 24th, another telegram in which the minister said that the Gov-
ernment, in conjunction with the council of admirals, ordered the
departure, adding that the United States flag was hostile. These tele-
grams will in due time be published in full, so that each one of them
will stand before history for the part it played therein.

VLUaamil, taking advantage of the circumstance that he was a
deputy, telegraphed on April 22 to Prdxedes Mateo Sagasta, premier
of the Government, stating that he considered the sacrifice of the
squadron as certain as it was useless and disastrous. And as the sub-
lime and the ridiculous are often closely connected, this telegram was
answered by Senor Moret, minister of colonies, by an English tele-
gram saying, " God hleas you.^^

The telegram ordering the departure of the squadron and the one
containing Sefior Moret's blessing, which each one of us honestly
appropriated to himself, were answered by the admiral in a letter
dated the 24th and closed on the 27th, in which he said, among other
things:

As the act has been consunmiated, I will not insist upon my opinion concerning
it. May. God grant that I be mistaken! You see I was right when I told you
that by the end of April the Pelayoy Carlos V, Vitoria, and Numanda would not be
finished; that the Col6n would not have her big guns unless we took the defective
ones; that we should not have the 5.5 inch ammunition for the new guns, etc. With
a clear conscience I go to the sacrifice, but I can not understand the unanimous
decision of the general officers of the navy indicating disapprobation and censure of
my opinions, which implies that some one of them should have relieved me.

There was, therefore, no way out of the dilenuna. The idea of
returning to Spain contrary to instructions, which was fermenting
in the minds of all, was sustained with energy by Capt. Diaz Moreu
as the only salvation of the country. But the opinion of the others,
though this point was not discussed at the council of war, was that the
ignorance prevailing in Spain as to the true situation was so great,
even among the most highly educated classes, that we should not only
be punished, but also ridiculed, and no one would ever understand that
it was a heroic resolution and a sublime sacrifice. And hence we had
no choice but obedience, which for Spain was equivalent to the loss
of those of her colonies which she still had a chance of preserving.
Moreover, there was the council of admirals.

It was with profound sorrow that we realized that discipline forbade

our discussing that council, not to censure it for the decision it had

arrived at, but, on the contrary, to defend it from the charges which

history will bring against it, if at the time when it is written and when

14232— No. VIII 3

44

ing but a buoy. With no small difficulty one of the boilers was
repaired; Villaarail then left her to her fate, knowing that we should
meet her on our course, and went on with the Furor.

Our exact destination was not known to any one outside of tiie
squadron, as the admiral, fearing some indiscretion, had not even
notified the Government of it. But as Admiral Cervera had tele-
graphed the minister of marine from Cape Verde on April 22: *'At
principal ports West Indies, where these ships are likely to touch,
we should have confidential agents to give me authentic informa-
tion." He had reason to expect that he would find such information
at Martinique, not only as to what had occurred in the meantime, but
also as to the manner in which the enemy was carrying on the cam-
paign and, if possible, the distribution of his ships. It was therefore
natural to suppose that our consuls would be on the alert, and one can
easily imagine the disappointment of Villaamil when, upon his arrival
at Fort de France, he found that our representative was in the country.
The fact of his being a Frenchman and only a consular agent had noth-
ing to do with it, for he subsequently showed so much interest and
zeal in the discharge of his duties that, if he had had the least intima-
tion, he would unquestionably have been in the city to lend his coop-
eration in favor of Spain.

Not being accompanied by our consul, Villaamil was received ungra-
ciously by the governor, and would have obtained no information
whatever had it not been for the hospital steamer Alicante^ of the
Transatlantic Company, which was in port at Fort de France, and
whose captain, Antonio Genis, kept a diary of everything that occurred;
but as his source of information was the daily press it was not wholly
reliable. However, it was all Villaamil could obtain, in addition to the
statement on the part of the governor that we could not get any coal,
and that the ship carrying fuel which the Government had promised
was not there; also, that we were prohibited from going out, as he
said that the United States auxiliary cruiser Ha/rva/rd had just put to
sea from a neighboring port.

One can easily appreciate the situation of Villaamil, who knew that
the admiral was rapidly advancing and would wait for him on the open
sea. Therefore, before the detention of his ship could be carried into
eflfect, he weighed anchor at midnight, and, assisted by some of the
boats of the Alicante^ in which her captain himself illuminated the
buoys of the harbor entrance, he escaped at full speed, running at
the rate of 20 knots an hour, and went in search of the squadron.

Something occurred in this connection which can easily happen in
war, and which caused a misapprehension on either side.

The commander of the Harvard^ as may be seen from documents
since published by the United States Government, believed tliat he
was blockaded by one of our torpedo boats; which was not the case,

45

since the Furor had gone to Fort de France, not only without knowing
whether there were any hostile ships in those waters, but also with
positive instructions to elude any encounter that might interfere with
the principal object of his mission.

On the other hand, as the governor had told Yillaamil that the
Harvard had gone out, the latter believed that she had about six
hours' start of hin», and when he saw a large steamer on the coast, he
believed himself discovered and even pursued, which, as since ascer-
tained, was likewise incorrect.

Incidents like these, which are so common in war, furnish a plausi-
ble explanation for three alleged engagements, two in the West Indies
and one in the Philippines, in which the Americans, perhaps mis-
taking some wreckage for torpedo boats, imagine that they have
destroyed three of our torpedo boats. This is wholly inaccurate, for
they could hardly have fought or destroyed any when there was not a
shadow of a torpedo boat in either place.

A question arises here, which has since been discussed, but which
at that time seemed very clear to us, namely, that it would be the
. telegraph rather than hostile scouts that would betray us, and as a
matter of fact that is what happened. Without it the squadron
would have passed at night between two islands, and once in West
Indian waters it could have gone, without previous notice, to what-
ever harbor it deemed most expedient. But it was absolutely neces-
sary to obtain information and coal, as anyone will realize (for it will
be remembered that the admiral did not even know positively whether
war had been declared), and so there was no choice but to proceed to
some coast in search of news and coal.

The hour agreed upon had passed and there was great anxiety.
Silence was imposed upon the ships which were advancing with all
lights extinguished, except a screened light at the stern to guide the
next cruiser. All the men were stationed for general quarters, ready
for any emergency, until shortly after 2 o'clock a. m., when we saw
the signal agreed upon thrown upon the clouds by the searchlights of
the Furor^ and we answered; and so we were once more in communi-
cation with our valiant destroyer and her plucky commander.

By 3 o'clock a. m. Villaamil was alongside of the flagship, and
from him we heard of the disaster at Manila on May 1; we further
learned that a powerful squadron was oflf San Juan; he also had some
information as to the blockade established by the enemy and as to the
' movements of the hostile squadrons, though guaranteed only by news-
paper reports. In view of this information we felt sure that the tele-
graph had already^ announced our arrival; that the trans- Atlantic
steamers Harvard and St. Louis had sighted us; that we were right on
the scene of war, and that the enemy had gained control of it, without
any opposition whatever, having preceded us there by a number of
days.

CHAPTER VI-

On May 12 we approached the western coast of Martinique for the
purpose of leaving the destroyer Terror* in territorial waters, with
instructions to proceed to Fort de France to repair her boilers, since
in her present condition she was an impediment to the fleet.

A few miles to the westward the squadron stopped and the admiral
convened the commanders while the other two destroyers were being
coaled. At this meeting it was decided to proceed to Cura^o, which
resulted afterwards in our going to Santiago de Cuba. These manoeu-
vres have since been discussed ])y all naval experts the world over, and
we will therefore speak at length of the considerations and reasons
which led to these operations.

In the first place it had been reported for some time that the United
States was negotiating for the purchase of the island of St. Thomas.
We had therefore good reasons to suppose that the enemy would have
a station there, if only a merchant vessel, so that the squadron, which
we had been told was at San Juan, would be notified of our arrival
that very same day, and as said squadron could have no other object
in view but to await us, it was highly probable — almost certain — that,
knowing us to be to the southward, the hostile fleet would cut oflf our
passage at Cape Maysi and Mole St. Nicolas, or at Gibara, from which
points the hostile squadron was 450 and 600 miles distant, respectively;
while we, passing to the southward of Santo Domingo, since to the
northward an encounter was certain, were 950 miles from Cape Maysi,
and still further from Gibara, without being able to elude an encounter
with much superior forces, if we wanted to go to Habana through the
old Bahama channel, which encounter would probably have taken place
at a distance of not less than 400 miles from Habana. In that case,
the hostile forces being overwhelmingly superior, our ships, if evetfi
slightly injured, were hopelessly lost, for under such circumstances,
and when harassed by the enemy, ships can not run hundreds of miles.

The only harbors which, as stated, we could enter were: First. San

Juan, which we had to discard altogether, because, as the United States

admiral has said with good reason, he could have taken it whenever

he pleased. Second. Habana, which we had to suppose to be well

guarded, and it was indeed, since the Americans themselves have since

said tliat it was considered highly invprdbable that we should attempt to
46

L

47

enter Hdbana; and it must be understood that it was better guarded
by the squadrons at a distance than those near by, because, in spite of
the blockade, it would have been difficult to prevent ships, whether
injured or not, from placing themselves under the protection of the
batteries of the city, while an encounter at a distance from Habana
meant the total destruction of our squadron. Third. Cienf uegos, which
we also supposed guarded, especially since, our squadron having been
sighted to the southward, it was from here that our passage to Habana
could be most effectually cut off; moreover, this harbor, situated at
the head of Cazones Bay, is a veritable rat trap, very easy to blockade,
and from which escape is more difficult than from any other harbor of
the island. We knew there were torpedoes there, but no fortifica-
tions to amount to anything, and, moreover, the entrance is very diffi-
cult to defend against'a serious attack from the sea.

On the other hand, we were 1,250 miles distant from the latter harbor,
while from Habana, or Dry Tortugas and Key West, the enemy's base
of operations, they had to make a run of only 500 miles to cut us off.
For these reasons Cienf uegos Harbor was not seriously considered by
us at that time. Later, when starvation stared us in the face at San-
tiago de Cuba, the former harbor was thought of as a possible solution,
but not on the day of our arrival at Martinique.

There remained as the only solution going to Santiago de Cuba,
the second capital of the island, which we had to suppose, and did
suppose, well supplied with provisions and artillery in view of the
favorable conditions of the harbor entrance. Moreover, the southern
coast of the island offered chances of sortie on stormy days and an open
sea for operations, after we had refitted and made repairs. But as we
also supposed that the fortifications there were not sufficient to afford
us much support in the sortie, it was not at that time decided to go to
said harbor in the hopes of a solution which would permit us to force
our way into Habana Harbor. The distance from Martinique to Santiago
is about 950 miles, so that the hostile squadron, which was at San Juan,
could easily have arrived there ahead of us. But we never believed
that it would do so, thinking that Admiral Sampson, though it has since
come to light that he did not know of our arrival, would do what he
actuall}"^ did do, namely, to cover the remotest possibility, the entrance
to the only fortified point, Habana.

Moreover, the Government had notified us that we should find a
collier at the island of Curasao; and as we were not more than 480
miles from said island, and by going there should lose only about 200
miles on our way to Cuba, it was decided to proceed to Cura9ao,
because, if we had a collier with us, we could have disappeared in the
Caribbean Sea and, though at great risk, reached Habana, and our
entering the harbor, though we might have to suffer more or less in
the attempt, would not have been prevented by anyone, provided
always that the battle had taken place within sight of the forts.

48

There are such strange ideas prevailing as to naval matters, espe-
cially in Spain, that it is perhaps not superfluous to say that, after
hostilities have broken out, warships cannot, as in time of peace, nor
as passenger steamers can, proceed to a port with empty bunkers; for
if their course should be intercepted it is absolutely necessary for them
to have coal in order to be able to manoeuvre and not be compelled to
remain on the open sea without the possibility of moving. Hence,
while the squadron had coal enough to go from Martinique to Cien-
f uegos under conditions of peace, it would have been highly imprudent
to proceed to any distant harbor of Cuba, as is shown in the case of
the Oquendo which reached Santiago de Cuba with hardly 100 tons of
coal. Therefore, as we had good reason to believe that we should
find at Cura^o the coal which the Government had promised in its
telegram of April 26, and also news which we needed more than any-
thing else, it was decided to go to Curasao as the best solution.

In this connection Mahan says:

It may very well be, alao, that Cervera, not caring to meet Sampson, whose force,
counthig the monitors, was superior to his own, thought best to disappear onoe
again from our knowledge. He did, indeed, prolong hLs journey to Santiago, if that
were his original destination, hy nearly 200 miles, through going to Curasao, not to
speak of tlie delay in coaling. But, if the Dutch allowed him to take all that he
wanted, he would in his final start be much nearer to Cuba than at Martinique, and
he would be able, as &r as fuel went, to reach either Santij^, Cienfuegos, or Puerto
Rico, or even Habana itself — all which possibilities would tend to perplex us. It %»
scarcely prohcMe, however, that h£ would have attempted the last named port,

Mahan thinks it would have been of advantage to him if Admiral
Cervera's squadron had gone into Habana Harbor, because, being*
near the United States base of operations, it would have made the war
•easier and he would at the same time have covered our naval base. As
to this point, it was as a matter of fact covered from the moment that
the squadron was blockaded, and it seems to us it is very difficult to
say what would have happened.

On the one hand the landing of troops, which was so easy at Santi-
ago, would have presented insurmountable difficulties here, but on the
other hand the bombardment of Habana, which is always possible to
effect with impunity from a great distance at night, or even in day-
time, in spite of the forts, was a problem which we were inclined to
consider very much against us; for among the inhabitants of the
island, including the Spaniards who had accumulated wealth and
gained a firm foothold in these cities, there was no one disposed to
remember the example of Cadiz except in popular songs, and we
believe it quite possible that a wholesale uprising in the country, until
then apparently quiet, would have left the Captain-General with only
an insignificant contingent of his forces for fighting a battle. We
therefore deem it ver}'^ risky to venture an opinion as to what would
have been the course of events, for even though American writers

49

pretend to deny it, the insurrection in Cuba would have ended the
war, and the island, as Admiral Cervera said in his letter of Febi-uary
26, 1898, which we have previously quoted, was no longer ours
anyway.

For all these reasons there was among us no doubt as to the choice;
for though the city of Habana, terrified by the bombardment, would
have delivered us to the enemy without hesitation, still the burning
ships could have returned to the harbor under the protection of the
forts and the greater part of them would have been saved as well as
their crews. These considerations must have presented themselves
from the moment that the mistake was made to send an inadequate
squadron to the West Indies.

Having concluded this digression, which was suggested by the many
discussions on this subject, in which we have always found the best
and most fair-minded support in the opinions of those who were our
enemies, we will now return to our squadron, which was proceeding to
Curasao in line ahead, with the flagship in the lead and the destroyers
on the beam, to facilitate our manoeuvres in accordance with the cir-
cumstances. The speed of the ships was regulated so as to time our
arrival at a convenient hour, and it is almost superfluous to say that
the fires were lighted under all the boilers and that the ships were
ready for any emergency.

It was about this time, namely, on May 18, that the Oregon cast
anchor at Barbados. The United States Government was under the
impression that it might be the object of the manoeuvres of our squad-
ron to go in search of that ship, which we, however, supposed to be
in the Pacific. This illustrates how the commander in chief of our
squadron was supplied with information.

Upon reaching Curasao on the morning of May 14 the squadron was
detained at the harbor entrance. After lengthy and unpleasant nego-
tiations, the governor stated that the conditions of neutrality permitted
him to allow only two ships to enter and that these could not remain
more than forty -eight hours; also, that we could ship only a limited
quantity of coal. It was about 2 o'clock p. m. by the time the armored
cruisers Infanta Maria Teresa and Vizcaya entered the harbor, while
the Colon ^ Vquendo^ and the destroyers, Furm^ and Phddn^ remained
outside.

It was with difficulty that we acquired the coal available, which, if
I remember right, amounted to only 400 * tons, and we proceeded to
get it on board, working frantically, shipping also such provisions as
we could obtain. Nothing can give an idea of the anxiety of that
night of May 14, when we interpreted every noise we heard as an
attack upon our comrades, and we could not even go to their assist-
ance, for the harbor of Curafao, which is closed by a bridge, is com-
pletely cut off from the outside at sunset.
14232— No. VIII 4

50

In the meantimo we had ascertained the sad fact that the anxiousir
looked-for collier was not there, nor was there any news for us; and
a.s though ill luck were pursuing us even in the least details, one of
those two days was a holiday and everything was strictly closed up,
so that we could not even buy postage stamps for our letters, which
we had to intrust to the consul to be mailed the next day.

On the evening of the loth, as daylight was fading, the two cruiisers
Went out, having to leave in the harbor launches with coal and provi-
sions, but did not rejoin the other ships until it was quite dark, owing
to the fact that a man of the crew of the Pluton had fallen overboard,
but f ortunatelv he had been rescued.

When the line had been formed again with every precaution made
necessary by the grave situation, we proceeded at an economical speed
on account of the Oqicendo and Col&n^ which were short of coal, and
timing ourselves so as to reach Santiago de Cuba at daybreak, the
squadron shaped its course for that harbor, which the admiral indi-
cated by signals to be our destination. All the ships were in complete
readiness to open fire.

During the night of May 18, off Jamaica, we crossed two trans- Atlantic
steamers which left us in doubt as to whether they were auxiliary
cruisers or not. But soon one of these vessels passed within sight of
us, making signals with the Morse alphabet and with a search light in
operation. But she did not discover us, as we were proceeding with-
out lights, with the exception of a small screened lamp at the stern, of
such feeble light that it could not be discerned beyond a distance of
three cables, which was the distance maintained between our ships.

We paid no attention to these cruisers or merchant vessels, for as
their presence seemed to indicate that there were hostile forces at San-
tiago it was necessary for us to reach that harbor before daylight,
whether to fight at the entrance, or whether to force our w^ay through
before being defeated in case the enemy was superior. The admiral
did not have the least information as to whether there were hostile
forces there, and if so, what they consisted of.

At dawn of May 19 the squadron was off Santiago, without having
seen a hostile ship. The destroyers therefore made a reconnoissance
of the coast, while the large ships entered the harbor, where they cast
anchor in complete security at 8 o'clock a. m. of that day. This was
very fortunate, as the Oquendo and Colon^ which had not been able to
enter Curasao, had very little coal left, especially the former, which
had hardly 100 tons.

In the meantime the Government and the authorities in the West
Indies had exchanged some telegrams and orders, which we regret not
being able to transcribe here, but which we have no doubt will be pub-
lished in full in due season.

51

One thing is certain, namely, that the Government, on May 12,
ordered the return of the squadron to the Peninsula, having no doubt
changed its opinion on account of the disaster at Manila, as also of
the communications from Cape Verde, which must have reached Mad-
rid on May 5, and the bombardment of San Juan, which took place
that same day, the 12th, and demonstrated that the defense of that
» island was a mistaken idea.

To this telegram vehement remonstrances were made by the gov-
ernors general of Cuba and Puerto Rico, as we have since learned, who
predicted revolution if the squadron should withdraw. These blessed
fears of revolution, the cause of our disasters in the Old World as well
as the New! and yet experience has shown that there was no founda-
tion for such fears in either continent.

It is also reported that one of these governors advanced the astound-
ing theory that the defeat of the squadron would increase the enthu-
siasm, on which we abstain from commenting. But while all this was
going on without coming to the knowledge of Admiral Cervera, who
had not received the telegram of the 12th, he could conjecture it from
another telegram dated May 19, from which, though some words were
ambiguous, it was plainly to be seen that the Government canceled the
telegram relative to the return to Spain.

It was too late. Even if we had received the order we lacked the
necessary colliers, without which it is madness in time of war to send
a squadron out to sea, as it would be madness to send an army corps
into a campaign without provisions and cartridges except such as the
soldiers might carry in their knapsacks.

The squadron was at Santiago. By a miracle it had arrived there
intact, and there was nothing to be done but to suffer the consequences
of its departure from Cape Verde.

CHAPTER YU.

Nothing can be compared with the disastrous condition of Santiago
the day of our arrival, and the stupendous ignorance of the Spanish
residing there must be counted among the most disastrous features,
for they had no conception whatever of the true condition of things.

Without pretending to describe the location of Santiago, except as
to what relates strictly to the situation of the squadron, we will give
a few particulars for the benefit of those who are not familiar with
that locality.

Santiago de Cuba, although it is the second capital of the island,
had no other communications than those within its zone of cultivation,
and a country road leading to Manzanillo, another to Holgufn, and a
third to the neighboring port of Guant&namo. These roads could very
easily be cut off by felling heavy trees across them and by flanking
them from the impenetrable underbrush on either side, so that it
would be a serious enterprise to conduct any force over them. On the
other hand, the south front of the island is a virgin and impenetrable
forest, communication with which had always been by sea.

Although the city was in realit}^ besieged by the insurgents, it was
still able to obtain some vegetables for its own maintenance owing to
the field being occupied by military detachments which were defended
in small blockhouses. But the city, which like all those of Cuba
depended upon imports for its principal supplies, was feeling the
effects of being closed in and the poorer classes that of hunger a
month before any hostile ship had appeared off the entrance of the
harbor.

The merchants, all of whom were Spanish, had ceased ordering goods,
as they anticipated the country's defeat, and no one was willing to
endanger interests, the fate of which was very imcertain, or to furnish
goods on credit not knowing who would pay in the end. Even the
Spanish Bank had only 4,000 silver dollars on hand, for the sake of
appearances. This ridiculous sum is the best picture we could draw
of the difference which existed between what everyone thought and
the falsehoods which fell from their lips.

Notwithstanding all this, there was a great deal of foolish talk, and
as this might seem exaggerated we will relate that at a banquet given

52

53

in honor of the squadron, while the officers of the army and navy were
continually talking of duty, which ought to have opened the eyes of
even the most blind, the archbishop himself proposed a toast to our
assault upon the Capitol of Washington. This toast was received with
feverish enthusiasm by some and with profound sorrow by us who
knew that our fate was already decided and that we were irredeemably
lost. But this did not prevent the Spanish themselves from ta.king
advantage of the occasion, as was shown during the latter half of June,
when, in order to do honor to Admiral Cervera, who had not eaten
bread for two weeks, I bought for him from a Spaniard a small barrel
containing 50 pounds of flour and had to pay for it $42 in gold. And
while this is not considered anything in particular, and the same thing
happens everywhere, what is unpardonable is the fact that while
clutching their money they still pretended to be ardent patriots.

We have purposely left until the last the consideration of the mili-
tary side of the question in regard to which the commander in chief,
Arsenio Linares, lieutenant-general of the army, had no illusions.

The troops of the army at Santiago were completely exhausted by
three years of warfare in that horrible climate, with arrears in pay
amounting to thirteen months, and impossible food, the result of this
lack of pay. They were much more like specters than soldiers, and
nothing but the steadfastness of the Spanish people could keep them at
their posts. And when we say people we do not mean to refer only to
the private soldiers, for an infantry officer whom Admiral Cervera
invited one day to his very modest table was unable to eat, such being
the condition to which the stress of circumstances had brought these
honorable defenders of Spain; a condition which affected all the mili-
tary forces from the general down, while the Spanish in general and
the conunissary department in particular lived in a very different
manner.

In regard to the defenses, those of the city consisted of a number of
bronze guns of the earliest m,odels, which came from France after the
war with Italy, and the effects of which could not be other than to
cause the needless death of some of the gunners at their sides, and this
fact, so little understood and still less appreciated, is called military
honor by^ those responsible for it in order to clear themselves.

At the harbor entrance, and this is the most interesting, five 6-inch
bronze guns had just been mounted which bore the date 1724. It is
true these pieces had been rifled to improve their appearance, but in
view of the height of the hill upon which they were placed, it was evi-
dent that the enemy could always station themselves beyond their
range.

The navy had furnished four Gonzdlez-Hontoria guns of the 1883
model by removing them from the Reina Mercedes^ two of which had'
been placed on the Socapa by the army engineers in charge of mount-

54

ing them, and two at Punta Gorda for the defense of the channel, and
at the time of our arrival, ahnost a month after the declaration of war,
they had finished mounting only one. In conclusion, the fortress of
the Morro had a few mortars, but inasmuch b& the fortress was in
ruins they could not be fired and were entirely abandoned.

Surely nothing was wanting in these circumstances to induce the
admiral to leave the harbor as early as possible, but the Oquendo and
Vizcaya had just been twice across the Atlantic, their engines having
been in /)peration for many days, and it was absolutely necessary to
put out the tires. Those of the other ships had also been in operation
since the 29th of March, and they needed a general cleaning. The
boilers especially needed to have their water renewed if they were to
maintain their efficiency, as naturally they had not been able to change
their water on account of movements, alarms, and orders from Spain
without the admiral being able to interfere, since for six months we
had held ourselves in constant readiness, without being able to stop
the engines for more than twenty-four hours, and always lighting and
putting out our fires; circumstances which are so well known to every
officer of the navy that we mention them solely for the benefit of those
who wrongly believe that engines are like the old sails, always ready to
render their most efficient service, without knowing that those of the
trans- Atlantic steamers undergo a thorough repair every two weeks
and are handled with incredible care.

So the fires were put out and the question of renewing the water of
the boilers was discussed. Almost 600 tons of water, without count-
ing the reserve! A work which was impossible from lack of appli-
ances, for there was nothing but our boats, which at the most were
only partially adequate for this work. The water lighters of the har-
bor carried at the most but 6 tons, and moreover there were only
three or four of them, and they made but two trips a day.

The coal supply of the six ships also had to be renewed, and this
work was undertaken with frenzy. What coal there was belonged to
the State and was on a cay belonging to the naval station, where it was
difficult for the lighters to come alongside, and where with all the
means at our command, and with all that we could hire for their weight
in gold, and in spite of the energetic aid of the army, we were not
able to ship more than 150 tons of coal daily, an insignificant amount
for six ships which even before relighting the fires of the engines,
which was almost immediately, consumed 4 to 5 tons of coal per day
solely for lighting, winches, cooking, and steam launches. Every-
thing which was required for rapid coaling — lighters, tugs, and even
baskets — was lacking, and we had to use the sacks which we had
bought at Cape Verde for use on the destroyers, but which were
"Insufficient for the larger vessels.

In this work, as in all that occurred at Santiago, there was the most

55

admirable accord between the army and navy, the two vying with
each other in harmon}^ and disinterestedness, and furnishing a most
patriotic example, beginning with the two commanders in chief, Lieu-
tenant-Genei-al Linares and Admiral Cervera, who were in constant
communication and who did all they could to assist each other. The
artillery of the cruiser Mercedea had been disembarked, and being the
only one which merited the name, had, together with its officers, been
placed under the orders of the artillery officers of the army. Later,
the landing companies were added to the defense of the city, and
always in the first line, as they were the only men well fed, and thus
far had not been exposed to the evils of the climate. We never hag-
gled about our services, and the general in chief of that district,
Arsenio Linares, mobilized his forces in order to furnish us with
water and coal from Daiquiri and whatever else he could get out of
his limited resources.

While this work was in progress the admiral convened a' council of
war, in view of the probability of our being blockaded, the difficulty
of defending the city from a serious atta<;k by land, and the fact that
the squadron could not wait for the season of hurricanes, for before
that time hunger would compel them to capitulate the city, as the
latter could not be eflfectively aided from Habana. The presence of
the squadron at Santiago de Cuba would carry the war to that city,
just as it would have carried it to San Juan, or wherever it might have
gone, and neither the city nor the harbor was in a position to sustain
it. As to the advisability of going to Cienf uegos, which has since
been so much discussed, we repeat what has already been said, namely,
that that harbor was a veritable rat trap, and that the defense of tor-
pedoes could have been destroyed from the sea with the greatest ease,
after which the American squadron could have forced the harbor with
no possibility of being prevented from land. Moreover, Schley was
stationed off Cienf uegos with the Brooklyn^ Texas^ Mamachvsetts^ and
lowa^ and it was impossible to enter that port or the Yucatan Channel,
for forces so important could not be simply for the blockade of Cien-
f uegos. Sampson was at Habana with the rest of the forces, and con-
sequently there was no other course but to remain where we were or
go to San Juan. And why to San Juan ? Certainly not to remain in
the harbor, for the disaster would have happened the sooner. Hence
the object in going to San Juan could only be to coal more rapidly
and put to sea before the arrival of the enemy, in order to make an
attempt to go to Habana or to return to Europe.

These observations, which we make here once for all, will serve
better than anything else to describe the circumstances prevailing at
that time.

Urged on by the dark future of Santiago, our ships were working
f i-anticall}^ at coaling when, on the 25th of May, thei'e appeared at the

56

mouth of the harbor several of the enemy's fast vessels which we
supposed were scouts belonging to Schley's squadron, which had left
Cienfuegos, apparently because of the bad weather prevailing for the
first time since our arrival.

The English steamer Restonnd was captured on that day off the
Morro, on her way from Cura^o with coal, and it could not be pre-
vented, for even if*the Colon had gone out, the only ship which could
get up steam quickly in consequence of her Niclausse boilers, the collier
would have been sunk and nothing would have resulted but the loss
of the coal which we so much needed.

On the morning of the 26th Schley's squadron appeared off Santiago
and at night withdrew to the southwest to take shelter under the lee
of the island of Jamaica from the storm prevailing.

On that day the Infanta Maria Teresa had 300 tons of coal in her
bunkers, the Oquervdo and Vizcaya 600 each, and the Colon 700. The
ships all had steam up and were ready to go out, for Admiral Cervera,
realizing that the blockade would begin the following day, which in
reality had been inaugurated the day before, had called a council of
war of his captains to determine what was best to be done.

The situation was as we have described it, being obliged to suppose
that the hostile squadron was closely guarding the channel at Cape
Cruz, that Sampson was coming down by way of the Old Channel
with the New York and the Oregon^ according to information from the
Government itself, and that Habana was sufficiently blockaded against
an attempt by our half -dismantled ships. There was, therefore, no
alternative but to go to San Juan. And to what end? To coal. And
could we coal at San Juan in twenty-four or thirty -six hours, which
was the latest that we could suppose the enemy would arrive, and in
this space of time stow away as much as 1,000 tons in each of our
cruisers? Before answering this question, and referring to certain
American writings which speak of the colliers at San Juan, we ought
to say that the following steamers of the Transatlantic Company had
already been officially offered to the squadron: First, at Cape Verde,
the steamer Cadiz^ which was a passenger steamer, whose storerooms
were filled with the equipment of the torpedo boats; later, at Marti-
nique, the steamer Alicante^ which was a completely equipped hospital
ship, the storerooms and hold of which were fitted up for this pur-
pose; and, finally, the Alfonso XIII^ at San Juan, the most luxurious
steamer of the Transatlantic Company, adapted for first-class pas-
senger traffic, and whose storerooms were reported to have a capacity
of little more than 1,000 tons burden. These vessels were conse-
quently not colliers, and could only be an impediment to the squadron.

These facts being evident, all agreed that it would be impossible to
coal at that place in the short space of time which the circumstances
demanded. The problem was further complicated by their being a

57

heavy swell at the mouth of the harbor, and the Coldn^ whose draft
aft was excessive, would be sure to touch bottom in going out.

Opinions were divided. Some thought we should go out in any
event, directing our course toward San Juan, and if we should perish
there it would be by the will of the Government, and if we succeeded in
getting to sea with all or part of the squadron it would be safe. Others
thought that, as it was quite possible and even probable that the
Col&H' would be lost at the mouth of the harbor, for which reason she
must be the last to make the sortie, the squadron would be reduced to
nothing. Public and official opinion which we thought so exaggerated,
and as a matter of fact it was so in Spain, would not have considered
the loss of the Coldn justified, and as we certainly could not have gone
out from San Juan either, it was better to remain at Santiago and
await events there. Two of those who had voted for the sortie
declared on their honor and conscience that they were convinced that
the Government at Madrid was determined that the squadron should
be destroyed as early as possible in order to discover some means of
attaining peace at an early date, and that they had therefore voted for
the sortie, not because it was logical, but because we would receive the
definite and military order to do so under still worse conditions.

Confronted by these terrible dilemmas, the admiral ordered the
mouth of the harbor to be sounded, and having asceilained- that
there would be but 8 feet of watei* under the keel of the Coldn in pass-
ing over the rocks of the bar, and as the swell presupposed serious
injuries if not her total loss in going out, notwithstanding that I had
been one of those who voted for the sortie, believing that our destruc-
tion was what the Government desired, I think that Admiral Cervera
was very wise in deciding to have the fires extinguished under eight
boilers of each ship and remain at Santiago in expectation of whatever
opportunity fortune might offer us. But such opportunity never pre-
sented itself, as it never does when the disproportion of forces is so
great and when all the fundamental principles of naval strategy have
been disregarded.

At dawn of May 26 the cruiser Minneapolis appeared at the en-
trance of the harbor, and at 11 o'clock in the morning the blockade was
established, but the manoeuvres of the hostile squadron up to the 29th
were incomprehensible to us.

It would not explain matters if we were to describe the coming and
going of the hostile ships, but we do want to mention their good for-
tune, for the sea, in general so rough to the south of Cuba, was so
smooth in this instance that the cruisers were able to coal, sometimes
having a steamer on each side, which could not be done even in the
majority of the harbors. As for the rest, the communication with
Jamaica, the real base of operations, was so manifest and barefaced
that if any doubt as to the complicity of England had existed, an

58

ascent to the Mon'o would have been sufficient to convince anyone of
the contrary.

A series of bombardments at the entrance of the harbor followed the
blockade and it is to be regretted that these have not been described
by foreigners, for it must be difficult to believe that a single 6.3 inch
gun was the sum total of the artillery which opposed the powerful
American squadron. In the attack upon the so-called fortifications of
the entrance, made by the squadron on the 6th of June, we had on our
side five rifled bronze guns of 6.3 inch, which, as has already been said,
showed by their date that they had been cast in 1724, and whose maxi-
mum range was 3,281 y^ards, within which the enemy never came. A
few iron howitzers of 8.27 inch, the maximum range of which was
4,373 yards, had not even been mounted, as the majority of them could
not be fired, and those which could were not able to reach the enemy,
who, either from precaution or because of the high position of our
batteries, always kept at more than 7,587 yards distance. The second
6.3 inch gun of the cruiser Reina Mercedes was not yet mounted, hence
there was but one of them which answered without being silenced by
the tremendous fire of the whole American squadron, which lasted a
little over four hours and, according to the New York papers, repre-
sented an expenditure of $2,000,000, while causing us only an insignifi-
cant number of casualties. They destroyed four huts belonging to the
families of the light house tenders without dismounting a single gun,
and the great tales related by the American press about the Morro are
absolutely incorrect, for that ancient fortress had but one mortar,
which was never fired, and was in such a state of ruin that orders had
been given to abandon it except for a few caverns in the living rock
back of the hill which served as a shelter for the troops. It is incom-
prehensible that so little damage was done considering how many shells
were directed against it, including a dynamite projectile thrown one
night by the Yesvmus.

Nevertheless this prodigality could not fail to be very profitable to
the blockading squadron, as it was a veritable battle drill without any
battle, properly speaking, a drill which has no precedent in the
world. From the military point of view it is a model of prudence
without parallel, for if the enemy had shortened the distance, although
they might not have been able to dismount the scant and antiquated
artillery defending the entrance, as the parapets would have concealed
the guns, they might, on the other hand, have been able to reach the
ships of the squadron, which of course was their object. But the
American vessels kept themselves at such a distance that not a single
projectile could have had any decided effect. In one of these bom-
bardments (on May 31) the admiral stationed the C(Mrh at the head of
the channel with her broadside bearing on the harbor entrance; but
that ship had only 6 inch guns, and although these were primed, the

59

fact that the hostile ships remained at a distance (7,000 yards accord-
ing to Schley's official report) at which heavy artillery only could be
effective, which was entirely lacking from our only protected ship,
made it advisable to recall her within the harbor, and Admiral Cervera
did so in order not to expose her to no purpose.

During these days Admiral Sampson resolved to prevent the sortie
by sending the English steamer Merrimac^ half full of coal and under
the command of Naval Constructor Hobson, to be sunk in the curve at
Diamante bank. The steamer, skillfully handled, was duly received
by the batteries of the Morro and Socapa. Hobson must have thought
that by hugging the shore they would not be able to fire at him, since,
being located on the heights at either side of the entrance, the hills
themselves would cover him, and this was the case. But hardly had
he entered the mouth of the harbor when all the rapid-fire batteries of
the submarine defenses, those of the two destroyers which were on
guard, and the battery of Punta Gorda opened fire upon the Merrirnac.
It seemed that the crew must surely become demoralized under this
fire and throw themselves with all haste upon a raft which they car-
ried alongside, but, on the contrary, it is inexplicable that no one was
even wounded under this downpour of iron at pistol range, and above
all that they did not drop the anchor or anchors which they had ready,
and whether across the channel or not, the boat would have been sunk
at the desired locality and the channel obstructed for ships as large as
ours. Along the outside of the Merrimcxi was a line of powder
charges for 8 inch guns so arranged as to inunediately sink the vessel
upon being fired. Some of these I afterwards opened in company
with our ill-fated comrade Bustamante, and the powder in them was
thoroughly wet. Evidently this was an impromptu device constructed
fi'om the elements on board and it seems very probable that none of
them functioned. The hostile collier was struck by two Whitehead
torpedoes, one a submarine, and a deluge of projectiles, and it is clear
that it took several minutes to sink her, which were sufficient for her
to be carried past the narrowest part of the channel and thus not to
obstruct it.

Constructor Hobson, whose heroism on this occasion was admirable
and merits the hearty congratulations of ^11, has written an account
of this enterprise which reads like a novel, which, however, does not
detract from the merit of his unquestionable bravery.

The blockade constantly grew more strict, the ships coming so close
at night that sometimes the cries of the watch could be heard, and
Admiral Sampson says they could not understand why we never fired
at their searchlights. This, nevertheless, was clearly explained by
the resistance which had been made to the bombardment, similar to
that at Strasburg, with which he had honored the empty hills at the
entrance of the harbor; for since we had only two modern guns with

60

a caliber of 6.3 inch, and only a hundred rounds each for the whole
period since the beginning of the war, every engagement was an occa-
sion for showing our lack of forces and even for exhausting our scant
supply of ammunition, while what was inexplicable to us was that the
squadron had not long before reduced our archaic batteries to per-
petual silence and made a more serious attack upon the entrance of
the harbor.

This explains why the dynamite cTuiQer Vesiwms was able to dis-
charge a number of her peculiar projectiles, but the only injury they
inflicted was to kill a poor gunner who was sleeping in the open air,
and upon whom one of them fell; but even a poor searchlight at the
entrance of the harbor and a few more guns to keep the enemy at a
distance would have made her fire, which was only at very short range,
impossible.

A rigorous blockade followed the landing of the army, as was to be
expected, and the weather gave us no hope whatever that the hostile
squadron would be forced to abandon its position. The situation on
land had grown much worse, for in spite of the fact that the Ameri-
cans are not willing to acknowledge the assistance which they received
from the insurgents, this was so decided that without them they would
certainly not have been able to attain their object. In fact, the same
day the troops were landed Santiago was left without any of the
resources which she had received from her zone of cultivation and the
sufferings from hunger increased. All conmiunications were cut off,
forests, roads, and mountains. Everything was infested by the Cubans,
and even the west coast of the harbor itself was unsafe, the American
Army being relieved of this painful service. The final yielding from
starvation was plainly foreseen — starvation which was decimating our
wretched troops, and which the inhabitants of the city, Cubans as well
as the majority of the Spanish, were not disposed to endure. And
thus the decisive moment was drawing near, and there was no other
course but to go out to unavailing death at the entrance of the harbor,
or to blow up our ships at the last moment, disembarking the rapid-
fire guns and all our forces for the defense of the city.

The American Army was advancing, being aware of our Iftck of
modern artillery, for two 3.54 inch Krupp guns and two 6 inch Mata
howitzers, the only guns of this class which the city had, were at the
mouth of the harbor, and although Escario's brigade, which was on
its way from Manzanillo, was expected and arrived the day following
our sortie, still the greatest aid which could have been given to the
city would have been the landing of the rapid-fire guns; but this could
not be done, because the idea of the sortie of the squadron dominated
all else in Habana and Madrid.

As many as 1,000 men were disembarked from the squadron for the
aid of the city, under the command of the chief of staff of the former,

61

Capt. Joaquin de Bustamente. About 400 of these men fought in the
battle of July 1, in which El Caney was taken by the eneniy, also in
consequence of oui* having no guns. The valiant defender of this
place, Gen. Vara de Ray, was killed while sustaining the action under
conditions so agonizing that General Linares found it necessary to take
the convalescents from the hospital to send them to the trenches.
That general having been seriously wounded, as well as nearly all the
commanders and oflScers of the army, who themselves, rifle in hand,
took a share in the actual fighting, it was the naval column which,
with its valiant commander at its head, repelled the attack, illustrating
once more that what is needed for war are sound and weU-fed men
such as our robust sailors, who, as yet unaffected by the climate, were
in a condition to sustain the battle.

In this battle fell wounded, never to rise again, our learned and
valiant Capt. Joaquin de Bustamente, an eminent electrician and the
inventor of the torpedoes which bear his name, and whose writings
will insure to him a place among the most illustrious of the service.

On the night of this day the situation of the city was desperate
and would become more so if we were to withdraw our sailors, as the
Captain-General had telegraphed to Gen. Jos^ Toral, upon whom the
command had fallen. But the idea of our sortie prevailed over all
else in Habana and Madrid, which, nevertheless, was not so urgent
since the capitulation did not take place until two weeks later.
Escarrio's brigade arrived the following day, and as the climate could
not fail to have its effect upon the encamped forces of the enemy, each
day gained was a victory for us. On the other hand, we regarded
with anxiety the heights on which were located the defenses for the
harbor entrance, against which General Shafter did not direct his
forces, more regardful of his own interest certainly than that of his
country, for if he had done this, following the natural and sound
councils of the Admiral of the squadron, as appears from what they
themselves have since published, there would not have been so great
a loss of life, nor would the outcome of his expedition have been so
uncertain, in spite of the terrible condition in which they found our
troops as well as the defenses of the city.

During this interval a veritable correspondence by telegraph was
held between Admiral Cervera, General Linares, Captain-General
Blanco, and the Government, which we hope to see published in f uU,
for that hitherto published in our newspapers is only a portion of it.
We will, therefore, give here only as short an account of it as possi-
ble, in order that this narrative may not be incomplete.

On the 20th of May General Blanco, who had requested the coming
of the squadron, asked for reenforcements for it, when he surely must
have known that there were none, and announced that we were going
to be blockaded, which was also well known before we left Spain.

62

A multitude of telegrams from Spain and Habana showed the anxiety
oyer a situation which seemed to them a new state of things, while it
was only what had been foreseen and foretold by Admiral Cervera.

The New York Journal published the following telegram in very

large type :

Madrid, June 5, 1S9S,
Captain-General Blanco, Habana:

Very serious situation in Philippines compels us to send there ships and reenforce-
ments of troops as early as possible. To be able to cope with hostile squadron at
Manila it will be indispensable to send an equally strong fleet there. At present
only two war ships there, and one of them I believe can not pass through canal. The
only thing w^e can do is to send all the ships of Cervera' s squadron that can get
out of Santiago. But before deciding the Grovemment wishes to know your opinion
as to effect the withdrawal of Cervera's fleet might produce in Cuba. This move-
ment would be only temporary, and as soon as object is attained in Philippines the
squadron would return to Cuba without loss of time and strongly reenforced.

CoRREA, 3iimaler of War.

On June 3 General Blanco announced the possibility of a revolu-
tion, that the army might rebel, and that the salvation of Spain and
the dynasty rested in Cuba. These telegrams, like the foregoing, we
are not permitted to comment upon.

On the 21st of June General Blanco asked to be given authority over
Cervera's squadron. In this connection we must call attention to the
injustice shown by this request, for the squadron was, in fact, not only
already under the orders of the Captain-General, but even of General
Linares, commander in chief of the army at Santiago de Cuba.

As we have already said, history will make all these telegrams
known in full, and we will speak of only the last three. On July 1
Admiral Cervera received a telegram in which, among other things,
was the following:

In conformity with the opinion of the Government, you will reembark those of
your crews which were landed, taking advantage of the first opportunity to go out
of the harbor with all your ships.

He convened a council of war on that day, and while the battle was
raging on land, by unanimous consent, he telegraphed to General
Blanco, stating that if his landing forces were reembarked the city
would surely be lost. On the 2d the answer to this was received,
expressed in the following unequivocal terms:

Eeembark landing troops of squadron as fast as possible and go out immediately.

The following telegram was published with the foregoing when it
appeared in the newspapers of Spain:

Captain-General Blanco, Habana:
The instructions given by your excellency to Admiral Cervera are approved.

CORREA.

These telegrams were translated from Spanish into English and
from this language again into l;^panish by our newspapers, so that they

63

differed slightly from the originals, but these differences were not
essential either as to form or substance. By publishing the transla-
tions instead of the originals we keep within the law.

The hour f orseen at Cape Verde had arrived, and the departure of
the squadron from that place for Cuba was the source and cause of the
inevitable disaster which was not even lessened by giving to the squad-
ron a small convoy with which we would at least have been able to come
off with more military honor by attempting some enterprise upon our
arrival at the West Indies. But this would not have prevented the
disaster, for once the error had been committed, it only remained to
deteimine the place of our defeat. As for the time when this occurred,
it was not in reality the 3d of July, but in April, when, anticipating
seditious movements in Spain and the West Indies, even going so far
as to make the absurd mistake of supposing that the volunteers could
b3 placed side by side with the regular army, the most elementary
principles of strategy and the interests of the country were forgotten,
^ven by the members of the Government who were not willing to rec-
ognize that, just as military men must give their lives in a holocaust
for the country, political men should also make some sacrifice for it,
and take at least a little risk before they permit the Crown of Spain to
lose 10,000,000 of its subjects.

CHAPTER YIU.

Although we have spoken of this in an earlier chapter, we will state
again the condition of both squadrons, giving the details more in full.

The armored cruisers Infanta Maria Teresa^ Vlzcaya^ and Oquendo
were protected at the water line by a compound steel belt 11.8 inches
thick, which extended over two-thirds of their length. Theoretically,
this protection was vulnerable to 8, 12, and 13 inch guns, but practi-
cally we had to suppose it vulnerable only to the fourteen 12 and 13
inch guns with which we would be confronted.

These ships each had two 11 inch guns mounted in strong, perfectly
protected barbettes, practically invulnerable save to the fourteen guns
referred to above, except in case of a casualty such as occurred in
the forward barbette of the Oqxieivdo^ in which a projectile entered
between the gun and the gun port.

These ships had in addition — and this should have constituted their
principal strength — ^a battery of ten 5.6 inch R. F. guns with their
shields, but with no other protection of any kind, and exposed to all
the splintei's of the boats and their equipment. The ammunition hoisti$
for these guns were entirely unprotected, and their construction and
installation left much to be desired.

The I'apid-fire armament, in addition to being not very numerous,
had also no protection of any kind.

These ships were overloaded with wood, both in their decks and in
the quarters and installations, although the tables and benches for the
crews, the small boats, and whatever object it was possible to dispense
with, had been disembarked at Cadiz in order to clear the ship and
avoid conflagrations.

To sum up, these ships were protected in their so-called vital parts,
as if anything could be more vital than the lives of the crews, and even
as regards their being sunk they had to fear at the most not more than
18, or, if 3'ou will, 64 guns (of course we are speaking of the 3d of
July), while the upper works of these ships were vulnerable to 265
guns, in addition to all those of the auxiliary boats.

The cruiser Cndobal Cohm^ protected by a 6 inch armor of nickel

steel, had the ten 6 inch Armstrong guns of the main battery protected,

and six 4.7 inch and ten 2.24 inch Nordonfelt guns unprotected although
64

65

well installed. This ship, as was stated at the beginning, did not have
her big guns mounted.

In reference to the protection of this cruiser, we will say that her
water line was more exposed to the 8 inch guns; hence she could be
considered vulnerable to 64 guns, but invulnerable to the others.

As regards the enemy, the armorclads Indiana^ Oregon^ lowa^ and
Massachusetts were practically invulnerable to us. Their vertical armor
of harveyized steel 14 to 18 inches thick could have been pierced by
our 11 inch guns only with difficulty and at the muzzle of the gun and
on the proving ground, but under the conditions of war, they were
practically invulnerable and we could only have partially injured them
in the small turrets of the 6 and 8 inch guns. The remainder of our
guns in firing upon these ships had the same eflfect as barking at the
moon. Any one of these four ships alone would have been able to
oppose our whole united squadron, and all of them together, support-
ing each other, represented a force so colossal in comparison with
ours, that an officer who was certainly very competent estimated it
from a purely scientific point of view as the relation of 40 to 1.

The armored cruisers Brooklyn and New York were each superior
to ours, above all in having all the armament protected, and, being
more recently constructed, everything had been avoided in them
which could furnish food for flames.

The Texas, although better armed, was very similar to our ships of
the Ylzcaya class, having been constructed at the same period, and, in
conjunction with the others, was a very powerful ship, as ours would
have been had they had the support of some large armorclads.

We may not and should not depreciate the armament of the auxil-
iary vessels, which was very large; and these vessels are especially
useful because in the heat of battle they can fire with impunity, for,
as has been seen in many naval battles, no one pays any attention to
them.

In regard to gunnery, the enemy had had a great deal of practice, for
the}^ had spent two years preparing for the war, spending fabulous
sums in target practice, as shown in all the annuals of the world. In
addition to this, the great experience gained in the bombardments of
Puerto Rico, Santiago, and Daiquiri had served not only to train their
men, but to overcome the numerous difficulties arising from the com-
plicated mechanism of the mounts and breeches of modern guns,
and which were also experienced by Dewey's squadron at Cavitc on
May 1, and by Sampson's at San. Juan, as appears from the United
States official reports.

As for us, we had fired in practice but two shots with each gun of our
11 inch guns — which were of the very best — and therefore we had no
opportunity to acquire the skill so necessary to prevent what hap-
pened on board the Vizcaya in practice and on the Teresa in combat,
14232— No. VIII 6

66

namely, that after the first discharge of the stem guns we had no
means of closing the breech of either gun.

But the awful thing was what happened with the 5.5 inch gons.
These pieces, which constituted the real strength of the ships, were
tired, as every expert knows, with their charges inclosed in metal
cartridge cases like the charges for revolvers (we mention this for the
benefit of the uninitiated), and these cartridge cases, manufactured by
Armstrong at Newcastle, disastrously recalled by whatever artillery
material they furnished us, had given very bad results, as in discharg-
ing them gases escaped through the breech. Part of the breech-
block of a gun on the Maria Teresa had been blown off from this cause,
injuring several of the gunners and threatening a greater disaster.
As these cartridge cases are not manufactured in our country, others
were ordered abroad to replace the defective ones, and it is painful to
confess that owing to the formalities of contract and trials, which
occupied the time from the middle of 1896 to March, 1898, when their
manufacture was begun, almost two years had elapsed after negotia-
tion was begun before we received the first cartridge cases; circum-
stances which indicate once more how little the needs of the country
are recognized and how dearly these formalities cost in extreme
circumstances.

At the breaking out of the war there were only 300 rounds of the
new cartridge cases of this type, and these we distributed among the
three cruisers, I will not say willingly, for I* who had them on board
the Teresa^ gave them up very reluctantly, until the admiral, half
serious and half smiling, gave me definite orders to divide them up.
The others were assorted, and those which seemed best were tried on
board the Vizcaya^ and although no accident occurred, when these
cartridge cases were examined it was found that some of them were
without caps, and they might, therefore, easily have blown out the
breechblock of the guns, killing all the gunners. In consequence of
all this the following dilemma presented itself, either not to fire a shot
from these guns until the moment of battle, in which case, whatever
the injury, it would pass unregarded and fire would be kept up in any
event, or to fire with them and give the gunners the training which
was so necessary; but as it was possible for grave accidents to occur
all the batteries would, in that event, become demoralized in the most
dreadful manner.

It was necessary to choose and we chose the first alternative; that is
to say, we went into the battle under the fearful condition of not hav-
ing Jired a Singh shot from the 5,5 inch guns until we fired' a^aiivst the
eneniy^ and the inevitable occurred, for a gun on the Oqiiendo blew out
the breechblock, killing the whole gun crew, and I myself saw a splin-
ter of ebony removed from the head of one of the gunners of the Viz-
caya^ which showed that another breechblock had been blown out

67

either in whole or in part. This much at least is known, but it is
possible that there may have been many other accidents.

Nothing, therefore, was wanting to make our situation a gloomy
one, and as for the disaster, officially foretold by the admiral at differ-
ent times and fpr which he was censured, especiall}^ by those who were
in a measure responsible, it was obvious and inevitable. Nothing but
disaster could result, as all foreigners reiterated, saying that if the
squadron went out it would be annihilated, as nothing less could follow.

Nevertheless we do not desire that what we have just set forth should
give rise to an opinion similar to that deduced from the correspondence
of Admiral Cervera, leading to the supposition that the ships were in
an impossible condition. This is not the case. The correspondence
which has been published is not solely and exclusively upon the war.
It is a correspondence covering a period of many months, and has
reference to the wants and necessities which are experienced by all
the squadrons of the world. Admiral Cervera desired to publish the
documents as a whole solely in order that no one could think he had
mutilated the communications.

And thus it is that we never weary of repeating that the ships were
magnificent, that in the training of the personnel they were not sec-
ond to the best ships of any navy of the world, and that, except for
the cartridge cases for the 6.5 inch guns and the necessity of consum-
ing a great deal of coal in the training of our firemen, they had no
essential defect. The 'mistake consisted in sending them against
immenseh^ superior forces at the last moment and without auxiliary
elements. It was the same as if a few squads of cavalry should be
sent against inaccessible intrenchments after having given the enemy
time to fortify himself, to choose his position, and to assemble large
forces with which to annihilate them. This does not mean that the
squads were to be despised because this or that detail was lacking in
their service. The really detestable thing would be the command for
them to go out to certain death in order that their dead bodies might
offer an argument to the Spanish people which would justify the
necessity of asking for peace.

chj^^pteb rx.

July S, iSOS.

At daybreak the admiral convened his captains and brought to our
notice the contents of the telegram, the original text of which, and
not the tmnslation we have given, says at the end: "Your excellency
will go out immediately." He stated to us that the time for discussion
had passed, that we had done all that was within human power to avoid
the catastrophe, and that nothing was left now but to obey, to whicb
we all agreed. The learned and beloved Bustamente, who fell wounded
in the battle of the previous day never to rise again, was absent, in con-
sequence of which I performed the duties of chief of staff from the day
of his landing.

We unanimously agreed to make the sortie precipitately, because, as
the insurrectionists were in constant communication with the cit}', and
as it was not easy to conceal the sortie, we felt certain that Admiral
Sampson would know of it in a few hours, and that we would thus lose
the only hope which remained to us, that of engaging them before their
engines were entirely ready.

The admiral immediately proceeded to give us instructions for the
battle. These were based on the knowledge which he had of the usual
maneuvers of the enemy observed during the time of the blockade.
The enemy's ships, resting against Daiquiri on the east, and very close
to the shore, were in the habit of forming a great arc, with the hidiana
on the east, followed in a westerly direction by the Neic York^ Oregon^
lowa^ Massachusetts^ and Texas^ which latter remained approximately
to the south of the mouth of the harbor. Close inshore, toward the
west, there was a yacht which we supposed to be in constant communi-
cation with the insurrectionists, and supporting the yacht was the
Brooklyn in the center of the interval and far away from the other
ships, consequently leaving a large space open to the southwest between
the Teo^as and the coast.

Supposing, therefore, that the Brooklyn was at her usual station when
we came out, the Maria Teresa was to engage her in battle, endeavor-
ing to ram her, and while the rest of the enemy's squadron were grap-
pling with our flagship the other ships, headed by the Vizcaya^ without
delaying to succor the Teresa^ were to pass in column between her and
the coast and endeavor to escape. The destroyers were to ^lace them-
08

69

selves under the protection of the larger ships, and as soon as possible,
under forced draft, endeavor to steam away and to take no part in the
battle except in case a good opportunit}'^ should present itself. Upon
encountering any single ship, however, they were to improve the oppor-
tunity to attack her. Those of the ships which succeeded in escaping
were to gam Habana or Cienfuegos.

The words of the admiral were received with enthusiasm, and we
all clasped each other's hands fervently, as soldiers who knew how to
meet death and destruction, from which no power could save us.
There were harsh and well-merited denunciations of many statesmen
who remain as calm as if they owed nothing either to God or their
country, and we swore that if anyone of us should survive he would
defend the memory of those who perished in the encounter.

Four o'clock in the afternoon was set as the hour for the sortie,
if by that time the reembarkation of the forces of the squadron had
taken place; if not, the following morning.

Every captain now returned to his ship. I, as chief of staff, went
to see the general of division, Jos^ Toral, who, as has been stated,
was commander in chief at Santiago, and whom I met at 7 o'clock in
the morning under fire in the trenches before El Caney, and asked
him to order the reembarkation of the 1,000 men whom we had sent
ashore. An aid of the admiral left, at the same time, in the hands of
the archbishop all the original documents of the tragedy, which docu-
ments fortunately have now been recovered; and to this admirable
forethought of Admiral Cervera we who were fortunate enough to
serve under him, and the whole navy, owe the salvation of our honor
against interested imputations.

In connection with the sortie we have studied particularly one fea-
ture, which constituted the most essential point and which was to
determine the character of the battle. We find no explanation of the
fact that this point, which was the most decisive, has been passed
over unnoticed by all the professional writers who have occupied
themselves with this subject.

The entrance to the harbor of Santiago is a narrow channel about
1,100 yards^ in length, which is made still narrower near its outlet by
the location of Diamond Bank, which reduces its width to about 76
yards. These narrows take a slight turn, which makes it necessary in
coming out to steam at a moderate speed, in order not to run upon
the rocks on the opposite shore, and therefore it is impossible, when
several ships are going out, for more than one to be in the channel at
a time, otherwise there is danger of collision, if by chance some damage
should be done to the ship which goes out first or if it should run
aground, which would not be strange in view of the difficult character
of the maneuver. The situation would be the same as that of a regi-
ment of artillery passing through the gate of a fortress if one of its

70

pieces should get caught and the others crowd upon it in case they
were not able to draw back nor turn within the walls of the passage.

To this natural diflSculty of the harbor must be added the obstruc-
tion of part of the channel near Cay Smith caused by the sunken
Merrimae^ against which we would not only scrape, but the ships w^ould
have to turn before clearing it, for which reason the port screws would
pass within 3 or 4 yards of the hull of the wreck, with great risk of
being entangled in it or its rigging.

It was necessary, therefore, that the ships go out a considerable
distance apart, and although this circumstance in itself would not be
prejudicial to our fire, it had, on the other hand, the serious drawback
that the ship which went out ahead, as well as each successive ship,
would have to suffer alone the fire of all the enemy's vessels, result-
ing in a battle of only two available guns against more than two
hundred.

This was the problem which presented itself to us and which we
were unable to avoid, and this is the tactical reason for the way the battle
unfolded itself; and I again call attention to the fact that foreign critics
have laid much stress upon the distance of one ship from another, but
have not considered the time, which was the most important factor.

The embarkation of the seamen who had gone ashore took place rapidly,
except those of the Vtzcaya., who were farther away on the road to
El Cobre and who arrived at 4 p. m. completely exhausted. For this
reason the admiral decided to suspend the sortie for this day, and allow
everybody to rest, since everything was in readiness and no further
preparations were necessary.

We will not conclude the narrative of this day without stating that
on land the firing continued very lively, so that at certain moments we
watched with new anxiety the heights at the entrance of the harbor.
At 2 o'clock in the morning, by order of the admiral, I went ashore
and for the last time communicated with Villaamil, who, with his
destroyers, was below the piers of the iron mines, where the firing
sounded so near that it seemed as if the enemv had surrounded that
position. However, nothing extraordinary occurred, and all the cap-
tains saw that their crews enjoyed a refreshing rest to prepare them
for the action of the following day.

CHAPTER X.

• July 3, 189B.

Poor Spain!

A foggy day dawned; the ships had all their fires spread; the guns
were loaded; the use of torpedoes was left to the discretion of each
commander, and the anchors were ready to be weighed. The men had
been given an extra ration. At 7 o'clock I went, by drder of the
admiral, with the gunboat Alvarado to the entrance to reconnoiter the
position of the enemy, who could not be seen from inside the harbor.

The enemy's ships were in the following order, beginning in the
east: The Indiana^ New Y(/r\\ Oregon^ Imoa^ Texas^ and Brooklyn^
and a number of auxiliaries, which I did not mention before. The
MoMochxisetts was absent; the Indiana was closer inshore than usual,
and the Brooklyn^ contrary to her position of the preceding days, per-
haps because it was Sunday and she could not communicate with the
land, was close to the Texas^ and in the intermediate space which she
before occupied there was a small yacht. The enemy, then, was pre-
senting an array of 14 guns of 12 and 13 inches; 38 of 8 inch, and 191
of smaller caliber, all rapid-firing guns, in addition to machine guns
and torpedoes. Of these guns 96 of larger caliber were perfectly
protected.

On our side we had only six 11 inch guns protected, and the others,
114 in number, were completely unprotected, and 30 out of the 40,
which constituted the mainstay of our armament, had their ammuni-
tion in the condition we have described. ^

The relative strength of the armament changed somewhat, because at
half past 8 in the morning the New Y<n*li\ with Admiral Sampson on
board, had gone to Siboney to confer with General Shafter, and by
the absence of that ship from the enemy's line there were temporarily
withdrawn 6 guns of 8 inch and 20 of less caliber.

In regard to distances, with a stadimeter which I carried I deter-
mined that of the Brooklyyi to be more than 7,656 yards, which was the
maximum range of my instrument. I calculated that the distance was
nearer 9,843 than 7,656 yards, since from an elevation of about 40 feet
above sea level her water line could scarcely be seen. Concerning this
matter of distances Admiral Sampson's report is not exact, and one

need only look at the official plan published in the United States to

71

72

understand this. It shows the Brooklyn about 5,468 yards from the
harbor entrance, which would have obliged the Teresa to pass about
328 yards from the flagship of Admiral Schley, which is what we
should have desired for our torpedoes and main battery; the Gloucester^
875 yards from the Morro, from which place the Mausers of the
garrison would have driven her away; the Vixen, 1,640 yards distant
from the only good gun of the Socapa, which would instantly have
made its presence felt; and, finally, the Indiana, about 3,826 yards from
the entrance of the harbor, and it is sufficient to remember that the last
of our ships to go out did so about thirty minutes after the first in
order to understand that if the Indiana had 'been stationed 3,826 yards
from the mouth and close to shore she would have awaited the Oquendo
at the sortie, which she could have done with impunity, since a speed
of 4 knots per hour would have been sufficient to get abreast of the
Morro l)efore the Oquendo came out; that is, on the supposition that
the Indiana occupied the place which her admiral assigns to her. It is
true that the position of the Indimia was near the coast, but probably not
less than 2.5 miles from it, and about 8,746 yards from the mouth of
the harbor. It is very easy to reconstruct the position of the ships at
the moment of the sortie, because from the Teresa, in doubling Cay
Smith, only the Texas could be seen, and soon afterwards the lotca,
forming an arc of about 9,843 yards radius stretching to eastward of
the harbor. The captain of the Iowa himself states that he fired at 6,000
yards, which, added to our advance toward the enemy's line, coincides
with what we have stated respecting distances, contrary to what Admiral
Sampson says. Moreover, if what he himself affirms were true, it
would have been his duty to court-martial all of his captains for not
having sunk our squadron at the very entrance of the harbor.

Neither does the official plan of battle as given by Admiral Samp-
son conform to the reports of his commanders, for the captain of the
Texas says that he was 1,500 yards off the Morro, which, according to
Sampson's report, could not have been the case. The captain of the
Imm, which was by her side, states that he was between 3 and 4 miles
from Morro Castle. However, in other particulars it is compara-
tively acceptable, the documents published by the Navy Department,
as already acknowledged, being usually quite impartial, and excepting
that they always suppress everything disagreeable, they are, as stated,
models of fairness which we believe have few precedents.

Returning to the question of the plan of battle, we note that, on
the other hand, the one in Brassey's Naval Annual of this year, which
evidently originated with one of the American captains, is on the
whole, correct, except that the positions of the Texa^ and Brooklyn are
shown too far forward; for, if they had been so situated, the Iowa and
Texas could not have interfered with the Teresa as they did. Neither
is position No. 2 of the Brooklyn correct, which makes her appear

73

to advance toward us. What she did do was to make a turn which
brought us astern, as described by the chief engineer of the Oregon^
on pages 544 and 546 of the Engineering Magazine for January of tEis
vear, and whose plans are perfectly correct as to the position of the
American squadron.

We ought, however, to acknowledge the sincerity of all, since the
diflferences acquire importance only through the difficult circumstances
under which the battle took place.

Having returned to the flagship, I reported to the admiral the result
of my reconnoissance, and that a battle ship of the type of the Indiana
was absent from the enemy's line.

Immediately the admiral gave orders for hoisting the signal to
weigh anchor, and when all the ships answered that the anchors were
secured the signal for the sortie, "Viva Espana!" was given, which
was answered with enthusiasm by all the crews and the troops of the
army, who, entirely ready to help us, stood on the high banks which
form the shores of the harbor of Santiago.*

With the battle flag hoisted the Infanta Maria Teresa advanced
ahead of the other cruisers, which for the last time gave the honors
due their admiral, saluting him with huri!^hs that manifested the
spirit of the crews, worthy of a better fate. The Maria Teresa con-
tinued to advance rapidly without being detected until she was abreast
of the battery of the Estrella, whose evidently hurried signals and
an alarm gun from the Iowa showed that the hostile ships were taking
positions for battle.

We had just finished making the turn at Diamond Bank, amidst death-
like silence, everybody awed by the magnificent spectacle of the ships
issuing from the narrow passage between the Morro and Socapa. It
was a solemn moment, capable of making the calmest heart beat faster.
From outside the conning tower, which I did not want to enter, in
order, if I should fall, to set an example to my defenseless crew, I asked
leave of the admiral to open fire, and, that received, I gave the order.
The bugle gave the signal for the commencement of the battle, an
order which was repeated by those of the other batteries and followed
by a murmur of approbation from all those poor sailors and marines
who were anxious to fight; for they did not know that those warlike
echoes were the signal which hurled their country at the feet of the
victor, since they were to deprive Spain of the only power still of value
to her, without which a million soldiers could be of no service; of the
only power which could have weight in the treaty of peace; a power the
destruction of which would place Spain at the mercy of her enemy —

^It is not worth while to discuss the reports that the anchors were not ready
and the guns not loaded, which interested Spanish writers in search of popularity
have dared to surmise or invent.

Y4

the old Spain of Europe, not Cuba alone, as many ignorant persons
believed.

The sound of my bugles was the hat echo of those which history tells
us were sounded at the capture of Granada. It was the signal that the
history of four centuries of grandeur was at an end and that Spain
was becoming a nation of the fourth class.

"Poor Spain 1" I said to my noble and beloved admiral, and he
answered by an expressive motion, as though to say that he had done
everything possible to avoid it, and that his conscience was clear. And
this was true. As to civil duties, no one could have done more than he
did; for as concerns military duties they were so easy that they are
not worth the trouble of discussing them.

As for me, what a strange coincidence! A few years ago I had the
honor to represent in the caravel Santa Maria^ which is an exact copy of
that of Columbus, the glories of the fifteenth century, and on the 3d
of July it fell to my lot to give the signal for the end of this great-
ness. But the first was only a representation, while this was a frightful
reality.

The second gun of the deck battery was the first to open fire and
brought us back to this reality, too dreadful to allow us to think of
other things. Giving the cruiser all her speed, we poured out a
frantic fire with our whole battery, except the forward gun, which
we reserved to fire at close quarters. In compliance with the order
received, I put our bow toward the armored cruiser Brookkfn^ which,
putting to starboard,^ presented her stern to us and fired her two after
turret guns, moWng to southward. In the account of the battle given
by the engineer of the Oregon he confirms the fact that the Brooklyn^
seeing the intention of the Teresa to attack her, made the maneuver
which we have indicated. The position of the Brooklyn^ and the fact
of her being close to the others, which advanced as she receded, caused
the Texas and the Iowa to come between the Tei^eaa and the Brooklyn;
for this reason, as to keep on this course would have been to run the
danger of being rammed by these two ships, the admiral consulted
me, and we agreed that it was impossible to continue, so he ordered
me to put her prow toward the coast. At that time the Brooklyn ^ss
about 5,416 yards and the Texa^ and Iowa about 3,250 yards from us.

Behind the Teresa came the Vizcaya^ followed by the Colon^ and then
the Oqiietido; but after the Teresa came out of the harbor she was
entirely alone for about ten minutes, during which time she had to
suffer the fire of all the batteries of the enemy. This formed, as we
have said, the peculiar nature of that battle; that is to say, the Ameri-
can squadron was exposed to two guns of the Teresa^ but she to all
the guns of the enemy.

^ The turn was to starboard, although it would seem reasonable for it to have made
to port.

75

The Vtzcaya and ibe Goidn came out quite close to each other,
increasing, consequently, the distance between tikena and the Oqueiido;
and as the enemy^s ships continued to pick out the admiral^s ship for
their fire, and especially as our other ships had orders to follow inside,
they were beyond the range of the 6 pounder rapid fire guns, so that in
the beginning they suffered but little; and if their engines had been in
good condition and the Vizcaya'a bottom clean, they would have been
able to make a much longer resistance.

In the meantime, continuing with the Maria Teresa in order not to
lose the thread of the narrative, she was to run ashore. The Brooklyn
ran parallel with her, without any manifest intention to approach. The
Texas^ after the first attack, had followed in the wake of her flagship,
maneuvering apparently with indecision, but the lovxi^ which forged
ahead and consequently gained the distance she was obliged to run,
which was for her less than half of that the Teresa had to make, was
now about 2,166 yards from the stern of the Spanish flagship, when she
lodged in us two 12 inch shells, which, exploding on the poop, burst
the steam pipe of the main pump and broke some pipes of the engines,
which was the decisive cause of the loss of that ship.

In the descriptions which the chief engineer of the Oregon has pub-
lished he credits the Oregon with these shots, and while it is true that
in the end it was she that decided the destruction of the Vizcaya and
the Colon^ nevertheless at the beginning of the battle there must have
been much indecision, because, if she and the Indiana had advanced,
the Oquendo would not have come out of the harbor. Be that as it
may, we still believe that the hostile ship which dealt the deathblow to
our cruiser Maria Teresa was the lowa^ as the captain of the Oregon
himself speaks of the rapid advance of the latter battle ship.

What the captain of the Indiana says about the bursting of one of
his shells on the Maria Teresa^ I believe, can not be sustained, since
the same captain states that he fired on the destroyers from a distance
of 4,500 to 3,000 yards, and as these had come out of the harbor more
than one-half hour after the flagship of Admiral Cervera the latter
could not have been at a distance where the injuries inflicted by the last
ship in the enemy's line could be seen. The distances as given by the
commander of the Indiana himself indicate that he was at even a
greater distance from the mouth of the harbor than we ourselves sup-
posed, or that he did not make great haste to shorten it.

Every one knows how difficult it is to give a description of a naval
battle, which consists of a number of rapid individual movements, and
for that reason, before we proceed, we repeat that we do not propose
to furnish a literary description, but an absolutely professional mQi-
tary study, which it is impossible to endow with the life to which a nar-
rative of another kind lends itself.

It was at the moment the Maria Teresa received her deathblow that

76

the Oquendo came out of the harbor. But we will proceed with the
former, in order not to lose the trend of the battle.

When the decks were strewn with dead and wounded and the gun
crews had been relieved repeatedly; when various fires had broken out,
some of which had been extinguished; when it seemed apparent that
the Brooklyn alone would be able to keep up with us, as we could
easily keep ahead of the battle ships, the distance from which we had
had to shorten on account of the configuration of the coast, it was then
that the two 12 or 13 inch shells which burst on the poop, or some
other projectile, breaking one of our big steam pipes, caused our speed
to be diminished immediately and visibly, and we knew that we were
hopelessly lost. The steam permeated the poop, cutting it off com-
pletely, and invaded the turret, rendering it untenable. The fires
increased, as we could not reach them. The crew of one of the small-
caliber ammunition hoists were suflFocated; a number of brave men who
attempted to pass through the after gangways, led by a valiant officer,
perished in the fire.

At this moment, while, from the bridge, I was addressing the men
. who were fighting furiously amidst the frightful chaos which the deck
of the cruiser presented, and was trying to ascertain what had occur-
red on the poop, because from the bridge it was impossible to see
what had happened, which seemed to me like the explosion of a maga-
zine or a torpedo, I fell severely wounded, and with me the two officers
of the squadron staff, we three being the only ones left standing of
the many who had been stationed defenseless on the bridge.

During that furious struggle there was no time nor opportunity to
call the executive officer, and therefore the admiral himself took com-
mand of the ship, while I was carried to the sick bay.

The fire on the after deck of the Maria Teresa grew more and more
formidable, her speed diminishing every moment, and the havoc was
constantly increasing, as we were within range of the rapid firers. The
admiral therefore called the second and third officers and the lieuten-
ants who were in his immediate vicinity, and it was agreed that there
was no other recourse than to beach the ship, in order to prevent her
from falling into the hands of the enemy and to save the crew, for
which reason, putting her to starboard, the ship was run ashore about
6 miles from the mouth of the harbor.

We left the Oquendo coming out of the ^harbor; but at this juncture
the Indkimx^ the Ore^cni^ and the lowa^ having advanced with their
unerring line of tire, our cruiser received the concentrated fire of the
three powerful battle ships, which could fire at her with impunity, as
if shooting at a target, so that she was completely destroyed before
she came out.

The sortie of the Oquendo under these circumstances, coolly maneu-
vering to make the turn at Diamond Bank, is one of the grandest feats,

77

if not the grandest, performed in any navy, and the unfortunate cap-
tain, Juan Lazaga, who was killed in the battle, leaves behind him a
record of honor and glory which coming generations should remember
with respect. When the Oquendo came out of the harbor, she was already
completely lost, and it is strange that the American battle ships, which
ought to have surrounded her, did not capture or sink her then and
there, because witl^ the superiority they had they ought to have accom-
plished more than they did.

The Oquendo proceeded under full steam, passing very close to the
Teresa as the latter ran toward the shore, and with her whole port side
burning she was beached about a mile from the flagship, running
ashore at full speed, harassed throughout her course by the whole
American squadron, which was discharging but few guns at the FJis-
caya and the Colon and no longer firing at the Teresa^ and once more
there was a battle of all the American guns against a migle one of the
Oquendo; for a shell from an 8 inch gun had burst under the gun of
the forward turret, rendering it useless and killing an officer and the
whole gun crew.

Before we follow the other cruisers which remained afloat we will
occupy ourselves with the destroyers. Furor and Pluton^ which came
out after the Oquendo. These ships had orders to come out with the
bigger ones and to put themselves under their protection until, by vir-
tue of their speed, they were able to get out of the range of the fire,
as we have stated in discussing the plan of battle. We are ignoi*ant of
the reasons which their brave commander. Captain Villaamil, may have
had for issuing forth at such a great interval after the other ships.
Perhaps he thought that all the battle ships would engage in the pur-
suit, not taking into account that there were many auxiliary ships
which, for the destroyers, were more to be feared than the battle
ships themselves. It was these auxiliaries which, at very short range,
destroyed them, aided by the rapid-fire battery of the Indiana^ which,
as we have seen, was behind the others. These ships, so frail that
they can not be struck by a shell without receiving their deathblow,
were destroyed immediately at the sortie, the Furor going to the bot-
tom and the Plutdn dashing against the coast almost submerged, each
of the boats having lost one-third of its crew, most of whom were
killed.

We left the Ylzcaya and the Colon steaming westward, after forc-
ing the hostile line, followed closely by the Brooklyn^ the Texas^ the
Iowa, and the Oregon, which last, forcing her draft, proved on that
day to be the ship whose engines were the best managed. To add to
her bad luck the Vizcaya was left behind by her companion; there-
fore, being nearer, she was instinctively attacked by all the ships of
the enemy; the same circumstance of two of our gftns pitted against
all those of the enemy occurring again as before; and hardly had the

78

hostile ships gained in distance when fire broke out on the beautiful
cruiser, which all the heroic courage of her defenders could not con-
trol, and at about half past 11 she ran ashore at Aserraderos, her flag
consumed by the flames, like those of her two companions, so that
not one flag was lowered.

In this chase, and about half past 10, the Vizcaya made for the
Brooklyn^ with the object in view of shortening the distance and attack-
ing her, but the Oregon and the Iowa interfered in the same manner as
the Iowa and Texas interfered with the Maria Teresa at the beginning
of the battle, so that the Vizcaya had to put again to westward and to
go on fighting with them all.

The Vizcaya carried a beautiful silk flag, the gift of the historical
society of the ancient province of the same name, and knowing the ship
lost Eulate had it lowered and burned, hoisting another one to the
main truck, and this one was never lowered until the fire caused the
whole mast to fall into the flames devouring the poop, their pointed
tongues seeming to wait for the flag of our country to fall into them,
that it might never serve the enemy as a trophy.

The crews of the three ships had to jump into the water and the
wounded of the Maria Teresa and Oquendo were carried ashore by
those who could swim. The Vizcaya^ however, was fortunate enough
to save a boat; but she had run aground quite a distance from shore
and had there not been a reef close by the whole crew would have per-
ished by being burned or drowned.

The Vizcaya being lost, the Indiarui returned to her post off San-
tiago, the Colon being closely pursued by the Brooklyn and the Oregon
and also by the Texa^ and the Neijo Yo7*k^ which latter, upon hearing
the cannonade, had forced her draft in order to take part in the engage-
ment, and thus had a share in the destraction of the destroyers.

The Cristobal Colon was about 6 miles ahead of the other ships,
hoping to save herself. One may therefore imagine the despair of her
captain when the chief engineer came up to report that the good coal
had been almost consumed and that with what yet remained the revo-
lutions would be considerably reduced and, consequently, her speed
also after a further run of about 3 miles. Everything was done to
stimulate the enthusiasm and interest of the firemen; but the battle ship
Oregon^ which forged ahead with a speed of 16 knots, acxjording to the
official reports, gained rapidly on our cruiser, and she was irredeem-
ably lost.

The situation of the Cristdhal Coldn could not possibly have been
more critical. She was closely pursued b}^ the Oregon^ which could
sink her without herself receiving the least injury, and the Brooklyn^
an armored cruiser of more speed and better armament, and the New
York and the Texas steadil}^ gaining on her— a powerful combination,
from which it was impossible to escape; and to make the situation still

79

more dij£cult, the Oregon was located in the dead angle of the guns on
the upper deck. As already stated the Colon did not have her 30 ton
guns. Thus she could not fire without lying to, thereby losing her only
chance of safety.

If the defense had been continued, there would have been more casual-
ties, which appeals to that class of people who judge the actions in a
war by the number of victims, while these very often represent only
the incapability of the one who is in command. But the ship {Colon)
would certainly have fallen into the hands of the enemy, and that is what
the captain of the Oregon was trying to accomplish when he managed to
put himself between the shore and our cruiser. One recourse, how-
ever, was left, and that was to sink the Colon before the arrival of the
enemy; but that would have caused the whole crew to be drowned.
Though this is so monstrous a proceeding that it does not deserve to be
discussed, it is well to remind the Spaniards of the fact that it is pro-
hibited by law, for, as the commandant of a fortress at the surrender
has no power to order the whole garrison over the powder magazine and
blow it up with all of its defenders, likewise a commander can not in
cold blood give an order which will send 500 men to their death, though
this may be considered a very natural act by the great admirals around
the tables of the caf^; and, above all, this should not be done when it
is of no advantage to the country.

The ship being lost beyond human help, just as Admiral Sampson
states in his oflScial report. Commodore Paredes and the captain of the
Colon^ inspired by a high sense of duty, and before the enemy was
able to prevent it, ran the cruiser at full speed against the shore,
ordered the valves to be opened, and prepared for the bitter task of
lowering the flag — the last brave act in that bloody but fruitless
drama.

The beaching of the ships took place under decidedly favorable
conditions, because the coast is sandy, alternating with large groups
of rock.

The most fortunate ones were the Vizcaya and the Oquendo^ both of
which ran upon rocks, so that, with their bottoms stove in, it was im-
possible for the enemy to pull off their hulls. The Maria Teresa struck
only one rock on the starboard side, in consequence of which, and
because she had but little speed, she did not receive all the damage
that the admiral had intended. Moreover, I had arranged with the
two principal engineers every^thing necessary for sinking the ship, feel-
ing sure that it would be carried out. But as these worthy men were
killed and I severely wounded, that which was a secret among us three
could not be put into effect, nor could it be made public without
jeopardizing the moral courage of the whole crew; and when, after
beaching the ship, I was carried to the deck it was impossible to

80

go to the engine rooms, as the escaping steam and the conflagra-
tion in the battery made any attempt fruitless.

The Cristobal Colon was less fortunate than any of the others,
for, although going at a speed of 13 knots, she ran ashore on sand; and
if Admiral Sampson, with a more seamanlike spirit, had ordered the
divers to close the valves, he could most cei*tainly have saved the
cruiser, but with feverish impatience he towed her oflf with his own
flagship, the I^eiv York. Hardly had the ship been floated when she
began to list, at which moment, with great dexterity, he pushed the
Colon back again with the ram of his own ship toward the sandy shoal;
but it was too late, and, turning over, that noble and ill-fated
cruiser went to the bottom of the sea forever. The few Americans
and Spaniards who were still on board hastily saved themselves.

Admiral Sampson states in his official report that the valves had
been opened treacherously^ supposing that it was done after the flag
was lowered; but this is not correct, not only because neither the dis-
tance nor the condition of the ship made any precipitation necessary,
but also because the ship did not surrender until she was thought to
be a total loss. And it is certainly a strange pretension on the part of
the American people, not only in this but in other things, to attempt
to give lessons in morality when that which they profess is of a
peculiar kind, as the whole world knows.

Since, as we have said, we do not undertake to give a description
having literary merit, but simply a serious and entirely impartial
study, we will continue with the discussion of the battle before relat-
ing the incidents which followed thereafter, which discussion, added
to the chapter which we will exclusively devote to professional obser-
vations, will complete a study in which we hope that at least the officers
of the navies throughout the whole world will appreciate the spirit of
loyalty in which it is written.

The first subject which presents itself is the question of armament,
which in turn may be divided into three parts — training, distances, and
vulnerability.

In regard to training, ours had the disadvantage that, as we defiled
before the enemy, he passed rapidly from bow to stern before the
muzzles of our guns, and this explains why the Brooklyn^ which was
the ship that virtually ran parallel with the Teresa and the Vizcaya^
received 41 shells, certainly from these two ships, for she was never
within range of the fire of the Oquendo and only for a short time of
that of the best guns of the Colon,

As for the enemy, while his ships advanced toward ours, he kept
his guns trained on us; so that, as regards the training, properly
speaking, he was in a much more advantageous position than the
Spanish squadron, as long as it did not leave the circle in which all
the firing of the enemy converged. The superiority of the Ameri-

81

cans was due to the large amount of firing they had done, and even
the extremely pruderd bombardments of the Morro and Socapa, at San-
tiago de Cuba, had given them great practice in firing at long mnge.
Our 5.6 inch guns were fired for the first time on this occasion I

In the descriptions which have been made a posteriori of the effects
of the fire on our lost ships, they have even gone so far as to say to
which hostile ship each one of the projectiles belonged; and from this,
which seems to us ridiculous when we consider how difficult it is to be
able to fix even the position of the ships themselves, the conclusion
has been drawn that the Americans made 3 per cent of hits, which,
although an acceptable percentage under these circumstances and
when firing in actual war, we roundly deny, because the casualties
were enormous in the upper batteries, where projectiles scarcely show,
and it is certidn that the number of hits made is perhaps more than
double. But, in any case, this goes to demonstrate that we c^uld not
lessen the distances as we wished, especially as regards the ships in
the extreme west of the enemy's line, since the great secret of good
firing is to fire at short range, and the small number of hits in propor-
tion to the number of shots fired goes to support what we have said
about the distances in discussing the plan of battle.

On our part, we feel secure in asserting that the 41 hits in the
BrooMyn were made principally by the Teresa and the Ylzcaya; and
if we take into consideration that at the end of fifteen minutes the
Teresa WBs practically hors de combat^ and soon afterwards the Oquendo^
while the enemy during Hh^ whole oi the action had oZZ his guns in
service, we see that the proportion is not so unfavorable as it appears,
and perhaps superior to that of the American artillery.

During the whole battle, except at the sortie of the Oquendo and
the destroyers, we were at too long range for our Nordenf elt 6 pound-
ers, while ihe American batteries, situated in the high superstructures,
were much better than ours, which were located on the lower deck for
the sole purpose of defense against torpedo boats; and in order to give
a convincing proof that the number of hits found on our ships is very
much less than those which we actually sustained, we will state that
on the bridge of the Maria Teresa all who were outside of the con-
ning tower were killed or wounded, and I p&rsonally saw seven pro-
jectiles strike there, one of which, no doubt of large caliber, cut one
of my orderlies in two, and another put me and the whole staff out of
action.

The question of vulnerability was discussed when we compared the
ships, and aside from oUr deficient armament the distance augmented
the protection of the Americans, while our ships, neither at close
nor at long range, had any protection whatever in the upper works.
It appears from the American notes that there were found 27 hits in
the Teresa and 26 in the Vizcaya^ both of .which ships were rapidly
14232— VIII 6

82

consumed by fire, and the BrooMyn^ which received 41 shells, though
of smaller caliber, did not suflFer much, owing to her protection. The
cruiser Almiranfe Oquetido received, in all, 16 big projectiles and 46
6 pounders, and this is an additional proof of the absolute necessity
for protecting the upper works, so that the' accumulated damage
may form no obstruction.

We repeat again and again that the shots which our ships received
were much more numerous, because, if only those had hit which
showed their marks, it would have been impossible for the conflagra.-
tion to attain the proportions and rapidity that it did.

More than the casualties and damages — as the Teresa alone was-
injured by the bursting of a pipe in connection with the engines — it
was the conflagration that, determined the rapid destruction of the
squadron; for it was impossible to remain any longer cm board ship
with the two upper decks converted into one immense blaze. The
three cruisers were overburdened with timber, and the living spaces
constituted the greatest danger. Furthermore, with fires under all
the boilers ships attain a temperature so excessive that any com-
bustible material will ignite with the greatest facility; and for this
reason the greatest danger to these ships, and every one of their date,
lay in conflagrations from the moment when the battle became so fierce
that there was no time to extinguish them when they occurred.

In order not to interrupt our narrative we will reserve these details
for another chapter of a purely professional nature, the contents of
which will explain everything relating to the battle. '

That which had been foreseen and whfch could not fail to happen had
come to pass; the hour of the disaster had arrived to which the squad-
ron had been doomed by the instructions of the 7th of April and of the
29th, the day of our departure from Cape Verde; as for the rest, it
was only a question of the time and place when and wherQ it was to
occur. In this disaster were lost the four beautiful ships on which
we founded the hopes of a powerful navy. Of their crews, some
were on board the enemy's ships and others ashore, naked, starving,
wounded, and dying under the cruel, tropical sun, while their com-
rades, drinking the unwholesome water of a near-by brook out of
improvised cups made dt the leaves of trees, were trying to quench
the thirst of burning fever. And how terrible were the wounds! We
still remember with horror the frightful havoc caut^ed by the large
fragments of the modern shells. A boatswain of the Maria Tm^esa
had fourteen wounds; no one struck b}'^ American projectiles ^had less
than two, and of such size and capricious f rightfulness that not even
the most hardened could view without pity.

Among the missing was the brave commander of the Oqueixdo^ my
beloved life-long companion, Juan Lazaga, who will ever leave as
an example to all the seamen of the world the glorious memory of

88

ft

his sally out of the harbor of Santiago and the turn at Diamond Bank,
made as though it were an everyday occurrence, his ship already
totally destroyed and after an 8 inch shell had exploded in the forward
turret. Under these conditions he kindly dismissed the pilot and
with great composure took out his ship himself. We consider this
act one of the most admirable of the whole battle.

There were also missing his executive oflGicer, Sola, who was cut in
two by a shell; the third officer, Matos, the three lieutenants next in
rank, and 121 men of that heroic crew,- all killed.

There was missing the excellent Villaamil, the commander of the
destroyers, killed by a shell on the bridge of the Furor; also five of
the^ officers of the Maria Teresa^ and four of the Vizcaya^ whose sur-
vivors related how the poor gunner, Francisco Zaragoza, with gaping
wounds, asked for a piece of the silk flag which the flames were
devouring, and, wrapping it about him, gave up his soul to the
Creator; and with tears in their eyes they told how the midshipman,
Enrique Cheriguini, with both legs shot oflF qlose to the trunk, after
making preparations to die like a Christian, wrote a letter to his
parents, to whom he gave his last thoughts, knowing that God receives
in His arms all good children, and that his soul would be united with
Him, and with his last breath he wrote the last letter of his name.
There was also missing the second surgeon of the Maria Teresa^ who
bravely and calmly had been attending all in that frightful sick bay,
the awful aspect of which exceeded any horrors which man could
invent in his imagination; also 'my two poor engineers, and Higinio
Rodriguez, the captain of marines, all of whom had paid the frightful
tribute to the errors of others, only to give an easy victory to the
enemy and leave to him Cuba, the Philippines, and all Spain to do
with as he pleased. - Still, if this sacrifice had been for the good of our
country, we should not have considered it too much if all had died for
its greatness and prosperity.

The revised lists of casualties, made some months later, not counting
those who had saved themselves through the woods and reached
Santiago de Cuba, show a total of 323 killed and l51 severely wounded,
for there were few slightly wounded; that is to say, 22 per cent of
all the crews, an enormous number, especially taking into account the
proportion of dead to the number wounded, which is quite diflFerent
from what it usually is in a land battle; yet, though this number is
large, we were convinced before the battle that it would be much
greater, and that would have been the case if the fire had not hastened
the destruction of the cruisers.

The fact that we were often fighting just within the limit of the range
of the small-caliber guns caused many unexploded shells to fall upon
the decks of our ships, and there were many and repeated acts of valor
shown in throwing them into the water.

84

We could never complete this chapter if we were to undertake to
relate the innumerable acts of bravery, generosity, and courage; but
I can not do less than to mention one which I saw with my own eyes.
The Maria Teresa had already been abandoned, the flames mounting
up to the height of the funnels, and projectiles exploding on all sides —
a spectacle capable of awing the stoutest heart — and when everybody
thought that no living soul was left on the ^hip suddenly a man
appeared there calling for help. Instantly, without being incited by
anyone, the third boatswain, Jos^ Casado, cried out in a loud voice,
"I will not let that man die I" and threw himself into the water. He
climbed up the blood-stained sides of the ship with utter disregard of
the danger to his life, seized the man in distress, carried him down on
his shoulders, and, swinmiing with him to the shore, laid his precious
burden on the beach. It was hardly possible to believe that that
shapeless form was a man with fourteen wounds, who must have been
left aboard as dead.

We have no doubt that the country will know how to reward this
act of bravery, but if not, God, who sees and hears everything,
undoubtedly heard the tribute of admiration of 500 men, who forgot
their misfortune in order to admire the noble deed of one who shook
off the water on the beach as if he had done nothing unusual.

Fortunately, and perhaps on account of the number of projectiles
which passed through the water, we did not have to suffer from the
attacks of sharks. The account written on this subject by one of the
captains of the American battle ships is not correct, and when we after-
wards exchanged our impressions it was found — strange, perhaps, but
nevertheless true — that none of us remembered any such danger.

Thus ends this fatal expedition for Spain, and if the men who sent
us on it could have seen on the shores of Santiagb de Cuba the crews
of the Oqiumdo and the Maria Teresa at the borders of the woods, and
the crew of the Ylzcaya abandoned on a reef, everyone almost naked,
covered with blood, some breathing their last, looking over the sea
with awful silence, as though looking for the road to Spain and inquir-
ing, "Why has this happened?" — if those to whom the question was
directed had been there, and who perhaps may dare to argue the sub-
ject before some assembly, being accustomed to have rhetoric serve
them like the waters of the Jordan, I am sure that they would not
have answered.

«
1

CHAPTER XI.

This chapter, absolutely professional, should not be mis-
understood by those who read it and who are not sailors
experienced in matters of war.

Before concluding, we believe that all that has been written would
be incomplete if we did not add an absolutely professional chapter,
because up to date* all the nari-atives which have been given of the
battle of Santiago are based on conjectures, and hardly anybody has
been bold enough to venture upon any further conclusions than those
already deduced from the Chino- Japanese war, so that, as navy officers,
we can not* let the opportunity go by to give expression to the obser-
vations which the campaign in which we have taken part has sug-
gested to us. Moreover, for those who study this book seriously, the
observ^ations which follow will complete the analysis of the naval
battle of July 3.

We will leave aside the fact that ships should not contain wooden
fittings, and that cruisers ought not to engage in battle with battle-
ships, against which their guns are powerless, for nobody will do us
the injustice to suppose that we did not know that. Moreover, we
have proved that it was not Admiral Cervera who committed the error
of going to the Antilles of his own free will.

We are convinced that in all battles of the future there is bound to
occur what happened in this; that is to say, that for one of the com-
batants the casualties will be enormous and the destruction complete,
while for the other it will result almost without harm. In fact, two
ships equally protected can fight each other at long range, but from
the moment when, on account of some damage or under certain con-
ditions, an advantage be gained by one over the other, the repeated
pounding of the rapid-fire guns increasing the damages without giving
time for their repair, and securing the safety of the victor while the
antagonist loses the means of recovery, it will happen that the battles
will always present characteristics of inequality in regard to damages
sustained which could not be explained in a land battle.

The weakest point in our squadron was undoubtedly the machinery,
and especially its personnel. We remember having been impressed
some time ago by an article written by Admiral Freemantle, who said

85

86

that on the day of battle neither the engines nor the firemen would
give the results expected of them, a theory which was confirmed later
by one of the chiefs of staff of the English squadron which bombarded
Alexandria, who told me that in some of their ships it was necessary
to put guards of marines at the hatchways in order to make the firemen
stay below by force, where there was really no danger.

Not one of our firemen, fortunately, deserted his post; but with
fires under the ten boilers the ships made less speed than they would
ordinarily with only part of the generators in use. This involves
great problems relating to the engine personnel, to whom the respon-
sibility belongs, especially as there was a considerable number of
them in each boiler room; therefore it becomes necessary to solve
the problem of strengthening the morale without unduly increasing
the number of officers, since the two engineer officers are indispen-
sable for the principal engines; and though we recognize the fact that
there is nothing which is more awe-inspiring than the boiler room,
even including the ammunition rooms, and though there is nobody
who needs more courage than a fireman, placed as he is in a coal
bunker dark and silent as a tomb, we feel sure that if liiere is no solu-
tion found for this problem, many disillusions will result, less, how-
ever, in cases of such immense superiority as the American ships
undoubtedly had, under the protective decks of which there was no
other danger to the life of a man than that of dying of old age. From
this point of view, and others of which we will speak further on, it is
indispensable that the ships should have certain coal bunkers so
arranged that they can be kept as a reserve, so that, during battle, it
would not be necessary to have anybody in them. In the report of the
chief engineer of the Orego7i^ which we consider very sensible, he
speaks of fighting hunkers; and if these existed, and, as he says, had
a capacity of 700 tons of coal, the fact alone of having a reserve of
coal within easy reach, so that it is not necessary to place anyone in
the coal bunkers, and thus have all the firemen vigilant and available
for the boilers, is so noteworthy an advantage that the constructors,
for that circumstance alone, may lay claim to a principal part of the
success of that ship. We, therefore, state our opinion on this subject

In our war ships, as in all those of the world, the coal bunkers are
sacrificed to theories of defense rather than to the service of the engine.
There is no other wa}'^ of taking out coal except at the rate at which it
comes out of the bunker holes, and if it is necessary to reserve any it
must be kept in sacks, l)ecause the coal bunkers above the protective
deck usually have their opening below; moreover, as soon as the first
fuel is consumed which is close to the outlet, it becomes necessary to
cany it through sinuous coal bunkers, full of joists and angle irons,
so that there are very few war ships, if any, which can sustain their
maximiuu speed for twenty-four hours, l>ecause there is no arrange-

87

ment for taking out the necessary coal from the bunkers and putting
it in sufficient quantity at the furnace doors.

Though we ha^ie had but little practical knowledge of the use of
liquid fuel, it seems to us that it may offer a solution of the question
of fuel during battle, which will do away with the labor of many hands
and avoid the problem of ashes, with which we will occupy ourselves
presently.

The naval constructors, whose companies usually exercise consider-
able influence over the parliaments and press of their respective coun-
tries, lay great stress upon the question of coal consumption, dis-
coursing very opportunely about what is consumed per horsepower
per hour. But this is a figure that to the public mind means noth-
ing; therefore, we believe that from an instinct of self-preservation
all navies should dispense with a classification so scientific, and simply
say: For the development of 10,000 horsepower there are necessary,
in theory about 220 tons of coal, and in practice at least 240, in order
to maintain a given speed, and it will be more clearly seen that a ship
whose bunker capacity is 600 to 700 tons can not sustain that speed more
than a very few hours, for as soon as the coal recedes from the outlets
to the fire room there is no way of keeping up the necessary supply.
And we are not speaking of forced draft, because then the consump-
tion in many cases is almost doubled. In a battle, therefore, the coal
bunkers impose an additional difficulty to the many with which the
unfortunate naval constructor already has to contend.

On account of their relation to the coal, we will now discuss the ven-
tilators, which in practice have a very arduous duty to perform, for
the fine coal and the ashes with which the air is impregnated make life
in the boiler room impossible. The selected coal which is employed
at trials is split into perfectly regular pieces which look as if made in a
mold, and is not the ordinary coal which has to undergo two or three
transshipments and which is afterwards thrown, trampled upon, and
shifted from place to place before it reaches the fire room. There a
good part of it becomes a mass of powder which the ventilators thiow
in the air, making life unbearable. When, moreover, the red-hot ashes
have been drawn out, the ventilating system must be stopped or it
becomes impossible to live in an almost solid atmosphere, a large part
of which is on fire.

It is necessary, therefore, in the first place, that the ventilators should
lead directly to the furnaces and that there should be automatic appa-
ratus for drawing out the ashes, since coal inevitably contains dust and
must be piled up in front of the furnaces before they are charged.

We shall be asked, as we have been asked different times before,
" Did not the same thing happen on the Oregon. ? " We will reply sim-
ply that for the Omjon the battle was nothing more than an exercise;
that the engines of the other big American armor dads behaved badly ;

88

that the Brooklyn^ whose speed should have been 22 knots, did not
exceed 13.06 knots, and the New York^ with a recorded speed of 21
knots, made only 11.06. Thus there was an enormous difference in the
situation of both combatants; for on our part we could not draw out
the ashes while the ships were in one immense blaze, to which we were
also unable to attend. One of the chief defects of our ships was the
joints of the pipes which wasted steam as soon as the pressure reached
about 125 pounds. In order to go at full speed it was necessary to
increase the pressure considerably beyond that point, and as a conse-
quence cause damages and thus provoke a scandal (for as soon as a
ship goes into dock public opinion immediately pronounces it a serious
injury); therefore there was a circle of iron around us beyond which we
could never pass and yet out of which it was necessary to go under
the penalty when in front of the enemy of having to face the horrible
alternative either of not forcing the draft or of exposing the ship to
injuries which would render her useless. By this we mean to say only
that it is necessary to force the draft and cause such injuries as are
unavoidable. We should state, for the instruction of all, that the only
ship of both hostile squadrons which did so was the Oregon^ whose
speed proved so fatal to us.

And even at the risk of appearing trivial it will do no harm to say
that we were surprised in an extraordinary manner by the effect of a
small escape of steam from a joint which for some little time rendered
it impossible to see and to breathe under the protective deck, the steam
being the dry steam of the modern boiler, which burns the lungs as if
they were breathing flames, and is an enemy whose importance in many
cases is not suflSciently recognized. For this reason said joints should
all be elastic, or in order to avoid the danger referred to something
better than anything we know of to-day should be invented.

Like many other ships which navigate the ocean, our cruisers had
their auxiliary steam pipes so connected as to be without any other
stop valve than that at the outlet from the boiler, so that if, for
instance, the steam whistle should be damaged it became necessary to
stop the turrets, the ammunition hoists, the capstans, the electric light,
in fact everything except the steering gear, which had a special and
independent pipe system. The only one of these pipes which had a
stop valve was the steam pipe of the bilge pump; but instead of this
valve being placed under the protective deck it was located a meter
above it.

During our stay at Santiago blind covers were put on all the steam
pipes which projected above the protective deck, so that we could not
use the winch for the ashes, the whistles, the siren, nor even the cap-
stans, and were without means of operating the searchlight, so that
every time it was used it involved a great deal of labor not free from
danger in uncovering its steam pipe. The result was that these ele-

89

ments were lacking when they were most needed, burdening the men
with additional labor when it was most necessary for them to have .
some rest.

Consequently the main steam pipe of the big bilge pump remained
as it was; but as it burst during the battle, it was undoubtedly the
deciding factor in the loss of the Maria Teresa^ since the escape of
steam decreased her speed to such an extent that it was equal to an
abandonment of our hope of safety. It is difficult to be able to explain
the cause of the bursting of that steam pipe, for, according to the
investigation which I caused to be made after the battle, it appears
that it was from the effect of a shell; but this nobody could confirm,
since all who were at the place at the time were killed by the two
13 inch shells which exploded there, or asphyxiated by steam. I was
inclined to believe that the bursting of the pipe was due to the con-
cussion following the explosion of these two shell, but from the
above-mentioned investigation it rather appears that such was not the
case and that the concussion, which from the bridge sounded like the
explosion of a magazine, must have fractured some pipe of the star-
board engine, because the steam issued directly from the engine room
before the bursting of the steam pipe of the bilge pump so often men-
tioned, which may, perhaps, likewise explain the death of Chief
Engineer Juan Montero, who was among the missing, and who must
have perished by the steam from the pipes in the starboard compart-
ment in which he was stationed.

There are many ships which are in the same condition, and it is
indispensable that all men-of-war on which electric motors can not be
used should have stop valves on all steam pipes, and that these valves
should be under the protective deck, and also in each water-tight bulk-
head, and in all connections of the various compartments, since it
should not be forgotten that the mission of men-of-war is to destroy,
and that, consequently, if this contingency is not provided for, the
auxiliary engines become disabled just when they are most needed.

In connection with what we have said about steam and of the result-
ing accidents, the excessive temperature which exists within men-of-
war when all the machinery is in operation is such that we believe that
one of the most urgent problems to be solved is that of ventilation,
because without it life is made impossible in many parts of the ship,
and the life of the men should always be the first consideration every-
where. For this reason we believe that electromotors should be more
generally used wherever it is possible to apply them. A central station
could be placed below the protective deck, and here, the same as where
there Are steam pipes, means for lowering the temperature at any cost
should be provided.

In this high temperature is to be found the first and great danger of
fire; and since the diminution of combustible material has its limits.

90

as we shall see further below, we persist in what has been said about
the dangers incident to this excessive heat.

Aboard our three cruisers and during the battle all the pipes for
extinguishing fire were open, and the piunps made to work so that the
decks could be completely inundated, until on the Maria Teresa and
on the Oquendo and Vizcaya the fire main burst i^id a huge stream of
water fell upon the boilers, causing alarm instead of extinguishing the
fire mging above.

The investigation showed that it was a projectile which cut the pipe
on the Maria Teresa in two, but we are inclined to believe, rather, that it
was due to the lack of escape valves properly located and to an increase
of the pressure caused by some incident, either the closing of the out-
lets or the flattening of various pipes through some accident. As to
the Maria Terena^ it could also have been the concussion of the shells
which burst on her deck; but we are rather inclined to believe that
the lack of good and sufficient escape valves in the pipes was respon-
sible, resulting in an excess of pressure.

The piping of ships presents to day a most difficult problem which
requires the entire time of persons not occupied with other things, if
only to ascertain where all the valves and registers are located. In our
judgment, it is necessary once for all to do away with such complica-
tions, and although each thing serves only one purpose, it should have
the simplicity required of everything destined to render service in the
midst of destruction and death.

One of the first things to be disabled on the three cruisers were the
5.5 inch ammunition hoists, each of which could carry five projectiles
at a time with their complete charges. These were very heavy appa-
ratus and connected with each other in such a manner that, if one
was rendered useless, its companion was also put hors de combat. On
the Teresa every one of them was rendered unserviceable by the
enemy's fire, and one fell while ascending loaded, which caused the
bursting of one of our own shells, setting the pla^^e on fire; fortu-
nately, however, without blowing up the magazine; and the mii'acl^ was
repeated a few moments afterwards, when a 6 pound shell of the enemy
fell in the same shell magazine where it exploded without doing any
harm. The combination of the ammunition hoists, their ascent to the
guns, and the passage from the magazines is such that, in an unpro-
tected cruiser they can not be disabled by a projectile vrithout render-
ing the guns unservicable. A subdivision of the apparatus is
therefore absolutely necessary, even at the cost of carrying less guns;
if not, the ships will be powerless to fire after a single shell has struck.
Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the hoists should not be com-
bined, but rather that each one should have a counterweight if neces-
sary, in order to localize the damage.

There remains also without solution a practical method of handling

91

the metallic cartridge cas^s which come out hot from the guns. Thes6,
if they are allowed to remain on the deck, are a mater^l which, com-
ing in contact with a shell, could cause it to explode and thus become
auxiliaries of the enemy.

On board our ships were placed wet bags with which the gunners
30uld pick up these metallic cases; those of the 6.6 inch guns were
thrown within the rails and some into the water, and on the Coldn
in the cofferdams, which were well located for that purpose; in the
lower batteries they formed much of an obstruction, notwithstanding
that many fell into the water. The disposal of these cartridge cases
is ". problem which, so far as we know, has not been solved on any
man-of-war, but which, nevertheless, it is necessary to solve.

As it is not easy for the rapid-fire guns of small caliber of 2.9 to 2.2
inches (12 and 6 pounders) to be placed in casemates, nor to have hoists
leading directly to the guns, nor to have the rounds of ammunition
brought one by one instead of in boxes, we believe that it is necessary
to have in a convenient place a kind of steel box of sufficient thick-
ness in which to put the wooden boxes in which these projectiles come,
and by so doing avoid the inuninent danger of their bursting upon
being struck by a fragment of shell. Perhaps one of the interior
walls could be made thinner in order to direct the explosion toward
the more suitable place, which it should not be difficult to ascertain
by experiments, with the end in view, above all, to increase the morale
of all persons whose place is in said batteries.

Likewise, it seems to us that in naval battles, when the enemy is
more than 1,000 yards distant, the question of distances makes it nec-
essarj'' to return to broadside fire. It is not sufficient that the number
of officers be increased, nor that, the enemy being seen, each one should
have a small range finder to measure the distance of the enemy, for the
quick movements in a naval battle, and the fact that there can not be
an officer to each gun, renders necessary an organization of this serv-
ice very different from that which exists to-day, for the situation in
which a Barr and Stroud range-finder would have to be placed would
aUow it only a few seconds of life, as happened to the one on board the
Yizcaya^ the only one of the kind in the squadron.

Speaking of the batteries, we will state further that in ours all the
men's mattresses were suspended so as to form a kind of parapet
between each two guns, which, in our opinion, must have saved us
many casualties.

One of the things that technical men will particularly look for in
this chapter is probably the manner in which the torpedo problem was
solved.

The admiral allowed each commander to so^e the question accord-
ing to his own judgment. With the exception of the Colon^ whose
torpedoes were protected by armor, and which we will not here con-

92

sider, each of the other three cruisers acted differently in this matter.'
One carried the torpedoes completely ready in the tubes with the wu*
noses in position. Another carried the war heads of wet gun cotton
and the torpedoes in the tubes, but without the igniters. The tiiird
had the war heads and noses, which can be put on in two minutes,
in complete readineas outside of the torpedo rooms, but under the pro-
tective deck, while carrying the torpedoes themselves on the charging
platforms.

This diversity of opinion in a matter of such vital importance is an
additional proof of the fact that the question has msLuy pros and oons^
and as it has already been solved in every navy of the world by taking
a decided stand in favor of under- water tubes, we will only say that
for those ships which still carry torpedoes without proper protection
for the launching tubes it would be advisable to reduce the number of
tubes and utilize the weight gained thereby for strengthening the
armor, especially as in our opinion torpedoes are suitable for torpedo
boats, and for nothing else. ,

One question which requires urgent solution in connection with
war ships is that of lifeboats in battle. It seems hardly possible that
a large battleship full of men, many of them probably mutilated
after an action, should have no other means of rescue except for the
men to jump into the sea, which in some cases means seeking an even
worse death. We believe that boats with substantial bottoms, either
of cork or of light wood, which would continue to float even though
the sides are torn open, and so placed that they can be let into the sea
without the necessity of lowering them, would be an aid that every ship
should have, as not a single one can be sure that it will not be placed
under the most critical circmnstances. These boats should be placed
from port to starboard, so that by being liaised at one end they can be
rapidly thrown into the sea, in the literal meaning of the word.

Boats, Hke many other things, are not equipped with a view to war,
and our ships do not have a single boat carrying ropes to enable the
crews to reach the shore in a seaway, in spite of the example of our
whole coasting trade, forgetting that as soon as war is declared ports
and piers are but a myth for the ships of the navy.

At Santiago the Vizcaya kept one boat from being disabled by the
enemy, which saved the poor wounded and many others who could not
swim great hardships. The Oqueaxdo saved two of the side cleaners'
stages, by means of which it was possible to get a line to the shore, and
thus rescue many men. I made the serious mistake of throwing our
stages overboard when we went out, and, as the boats were literally
nothing but splinters, no line could be run until a United States boat
arrived, and in the meantime there was much suffering and anguish;
for a steam launch which was apparently in good condition and was
lowered into the waUn- capsized and was the c4iuse of further victims.

98

The boats mentioned above, though they were of little use, are
nevertheless necessaiy, if only to keep up the moral courage of the
crews, and we will add, in conclusion, that those of our boats which
were located on the gallows frames do not appear to have been the
cause of any special damt^e, although that is what we had feared.

Battle conning towers as now constructed are an admirable protec-
tion for attacking a city when it has no torpedo boats nor movable
defenses of any kind, but in order to manoeuvre a ship of large
dimensions, followed by several others, with the prospect of being
attacked by torpedo boats, and when one is in the habit of managing
her from very high bridges, it is almost impossible to remain inside.
When it is considered that the helmsman, two men for engine orders,
oflBcers for the speaking tubes and torpedo tubes, and the navigating
officer are all inside it will be realized that with this mass of humanity
it is impossible to move and that one is almost smothered, so that the
conmiander, in view of the immense responsibility weighing upon
him, has no recourse but to command the tower while walking up and
down the bridge in order to be able to direct the battle.

This entails the serious danger and the almost certain destruction
of the commander, when he should be protected as much as possible,
for in the solemn moments of a battle a relief in itself is a disaster.
It is therefore our opinion that, as has been done with the ships,
the thickness of the armor of the turrets should be decreased and
the turrets themselves increased in size, or at least armored para-
pets should be placed by the sides of the conning bridge. If the
battle tower is made more habitable it will become a great deal more
useful.

In any event, it is necessary to make it possible to observe the bin-
nacle from the tower and to spread out charts, and especially should
the towers be given sufficient dimensions so that the smokestacks and
superstructures will not totally obstruct the view aft. We have seen
in very modern ships a few towers that were larger than usual, but in
our opinion even these are far from adequate.

In passing we will state that the superstructures require very essen-
tial modification, because thev interfere more than anything else on
board ship with military operations.

Speaking tubes and other devices for transmitting orders should be
tested on days when target practice is held and when all the ships fire
at the same time. It is on such occasions that it will become apparent
of how little use they are.

For the batteries the bugle signals proved more useful than other
means, but as to the engines we had to stop all communication for fear
of orders being misunderstood.

In our opinion, even though all the tubes had to be sacrificed to one
tube leading to the engine, it would be well worth while to have tubes

94

of larger diameter than those now in use, surrounded by some insu-
lating substance which insures, safe communication.

Great sacrifices are being made nowadays to remove all combustible
material from on board ships; but the effects of the crews, which from
the standpoint of inflammabilty represent an immense amount of danger,
can not be dispensed with.

It should be remembered that the effects of a sailor are of greater
bulk than those of any army general in a campaign, and those of the
officers and petty officers, which are of course larger in proportion,
constitute a mass of combustible material that is positively dangerous.

There are men who carry the argument so far as to want to dispense
with cabins, berths, lockers, etc., under the impression that these are
simply a luxury for the convenience of the crews, while as a matter
of fact they are absolutely indispensable. The result of crowding
together so large a personnel in one small space is the same as it
would be in a store where it was necessary to keep thousands of differ-
ent bottles without having the shelves required to put each one in its
proper place; it would mean chaos, which is worse than anything else.
Without entering into details that would lead us too far in this con-
nection, we will mention that on a certain occasion when I was given
command of a ship and the minister of marine, who honored me with
his friendship, wanted to try an experiment of that kind — fortunately
making an exception in my case .and giving me a small cabin — the
disorder created on board was such that, if we were to relate all that
happened, it would seem like a farce unworthy of the good intention
which had inspired the measure, especially when the object had been
to make things easier for everybody. I will only add that circum-
stances made it possible for me to relinquish the command of the
ship, and I did so until a place should once more be assigned to each
man; for the disorder which resulted was such that not only the disci-
pline but the safety of all was endangered. .

We therefore deem berths absolutely necessary. But when a war
is anticipated^ an order should be given to ligM^n the effects. Com-
manders and officers should keep only their undress uniform, with the
exception of perhaps one or two staff officers, who may keep a second
uniform. The necessary books and instruments should be retained.
All citizens' clothing should be absolutely prohibited. In a word, the
effects should be confined to a chest and a blanket. The same thing
should be done in the case of all petty officers and, if possible, of the
men. This should be made practicable by having at each naval arsenal
a warehouse, in charge of a commissary or boatswain of the respective
ship, if possible, where, simply by means of cards and without the
formality of official papers, each man could dispose of his extra effects.

A measure of this kind is the more imperative as it frequently
becomes necessary during operations to transship officers, sailors,

95

wounded and sick^ and even the effects of the dead, and the result is
much confusion, especially as the crews of torpedo boats have to keep
most of their effects in the larger ships since their own do not have
room for anything.

Such a measure should be obligatory and subject to strict regula-
tions; otherwise it might seem as though each man wanted to save his
own, and there would be no lack of evil tongues to make fun of it in
the press and everywhere else. It might even seem like a herald of
ruia, when, as a matter of fact, it is a strictly military measure to get
rid of Civerything superfluous in anticipation of an engagement, for
on board of modern ships there is absolutel}'^ no room for anything
below the protective deck. We want to emphasize this for the bene-
fit of those who have never seen war ships except in illustrated papers.

We will now speak of the question of coaling, which we omitted in
connection with the engines, because in our opinion it has a different
significance from a military point of view.

We already know that in other and more fortunate navies this matter
has been more closely studied than in ours, although the ships which
we purchased abroad have not brought us anything new, and the
experiments hitherto made have borne mainly on the mode of shipping
coal speedily. For our part we believe that it is imperative at any
cost to take on coal through the ship's sides, even if it should thereby
become necessary to modify .the armor plates. For when the coaling
is effected through the decks, as it now is, the armament has to be
protected, the guns and all delicate apparatus must be carefully cov-
ered up — that is to say, the batteries are rendered unserviceable for
the time being and everything becomes impregnated with coal dust,
so that many things do not function properly. And since in an active
campaign ships have to be coaled every day, there results a constant
* fatigue and confusion which are opposed to all military principles.

While coaling is going on and immediately after it is finished the
batteries are in poor condition for an immediate battle, and if the}*^ are
to be washed after nightfall the men do not get the necessary rest.
We therefore insist on what we have stated, believing that all naval
oflScers will agree with us.

Moreover, modern ships do not have a sufficient number of cranes
properly installed, not only to enable them to take coal I'apidly from
lighters, but also to obviate the disorder inside of the ship and keep
the batteries clean and fi'ee from all obstruction.

In passing we will say that on board our ships we adopted the sys-
tem of having one half of the mattresses serve as a parapet and the
other half, without being unrolled, were used as pillows by the men
off duty. In a cold climarte this could not have been done without
prejudice to the health of the crews.

On a former occasion we have already expressed the opinion

96

officially that it is necessary in time of war to give the men a meal
at midnight. This is absolutely imperative for all firemen and for the
crews of torpedo boats and destroyers, whose strength must be kept
up by means of an extra amount of food.

During the late campaign the admiral obtained from the Govern-
ment a small extra allowance for tlje firemen and they were given a
meal at midnight.

This question can be easily solved, as there is no reason why the
navy should not be given the same extra allowance during a campaign
that the army enjoys; and it is our opinion that the whole crew should
he included in this midnight mess, not excepting the officers. Boat-
swains and others of similar rank, owing to their small pay, are
especiall}'^ badly off in time of war.

In connection with this question we will say further that the experi-
ence acquired at Santiago when the food supply had become scant,
especially in view of our arbitrary way of organizing the messes of
the lower classes, so that each man provides his food, so to speak, on
his own account, leads us to advocate that the commander of a ship
be given authority by naval ordinance to send anyone to the mess
kettle as he may deem expedient — in extreme cases and when abso-
lutely necessary, even officers. As it is now, the messes are very
numerous, and as the men when their supplies are exhausted resort
to the pantry, it is impossible to make any calculations as to the pro-
visions* on hand.

The only solution is to send them peremptorily to the mess kettle,
for boatswains, for instance, could not possibly pay 20 or 25 pesos
gold for a barrel of flour, which was the price to which it soon went
up at Santiago, and they asked for help just when the struggle was at
its worst, and made it still harder. Although they were preached to
and told that we should die of hunger, still as we could not get away
from there, and they had to be fed, the result was that the provisions
in store represented hardly one-half the number of days they would
have if they had been used only for the men for whom they had been
calculated.

Other navies, we know, are differently organized in this respect.

The operating room I There is nothing more awe-inspiring and hor-
rible than the operating room on board ship on the day of a battle.
It required the whole extent of my authority, when, I was carried down
to it, to impose the order and silence which the valiant Ensign Ramon
Rodriquez Navarro, who was down there in charge of the ammunition
hoists, was trying in vain to enjoin. The wounded in all the ships
refused to be taken to the operating room because of its being so diffi-
cult to get out of, they feared the most horrible death. On the Vizoaya
some of the wounded had to be installed in the battery with no other
protection than that afforded by the turret; they did not suffer much in

97

this spot, thanks to the faiit that the bow remained comparatively free
from injury. On the Oquendo they were installed on the orlop deck,
and some of the dying men were left there when the ship filled with
smoke. On the Teresa they were installed on the forward platform
under the protective deck, but near the pumps and ammunition hoists,
thanks to which circumstance and to the valor of the surgeons and the
officer above referred to, only dead bodies were left below. In any
event it is imperative to consider a question which has so much influ-
ence on the morale of the crew. The operating room should have a
large hatch with a good ladder through which the wounded can l>e
lowered without difficulty, which would at least inspire them with a
hope of safety. If the operating room could be located on the pro-
tective deck of protected ships, even though the space is intended for
other purposes and can be easily converted, the measure would no
doubt be of great moral influence; for it is certain that, except during
bombardments and cases which can not be designated as naval battles
proper, the wounded will rather incur the risk of new wounds than to
be buried withoxit being able to move in that place where even those
who are accustomed to live in those holes feel ill at ease in time of
peace and in the full enjoyment of their health.

The Cristobal Colon had her operating room well installed in what
constituted the machinists' workshop in the battery, and that is about
where it should be on board all our ships.

We will not conclude this chapter without expressing our opinion
as to torpedo-boat destroyers; it is true that we have not been on board
of them during a battle, but as these ships formed part of the squadron^
we are sufficiently familiar with them to find the opinions we held
concerning these vessels fully confirmed.

In the first place, torpedo-boat destroyers are what their name indir
cates and should not be employed for any other purpose, although the
probability is that they will continue to be used for everything; for
in time of war anything is used that is handy.

It should be taken into account that these vessels are in the same
condition that a man would be whose whole body were heart and to
whom any wound, therefore, would be mortal. And as these vessels
present a large target, it is our opinion that torpedo-boat destroyers,
whose unstable platforms render their fire very uncertain, will not
often succeed in approaching larger ships; and even in the case of tor-
pedo boats themselves we consider it doubtful whether they can do so
if the gunners of the ship to be attacked have any presence of mind.

In any event, we are sorry to say it is our opinion that these vessels
will not he good for wruything unless for three months previous they
have gone out of the harbor every single day, in all kinds of weather,
until the crews, from the commander down to the last fireman, have
become thoroughly familiar with their ship; and if in that space of
14232— No. VIII 7

98

time her engines should be injured, it is better for an injured ship to
be in a dockyard than to go to the bottom or fall into the hands of tiie
enemy.

We do not share the opinion of those who believe that the crews of
destroyers should be relieved by those of the larger ships, for the
sailors of large ships are not fit to serve on board of torpedo boats
until they have been navigating in them for some time; and those of
torpedo boats, even if they were to sleep four days in succession,
would consider that an injur}^ was being done them; they would want
to do nothing and only be in the way wherever they went.

E^h one must fill the post where accident has placed him, and the
crews of the destroyers and torpedo boats must not hope that, by
means of a relief or feigned exhaustion, they can evade their destiny.
Probably what occurs in our navy happens in others also, namely, as
the torpedo boats in time of peace are stationed at navy-yards, a num-
ber of sailors, gunners, and firemen live in them year after year, taking
part in all the exercises and becoming thoroughly familiar with them;
but when it comes to going out to war and leaving their families, there
is not a single one to be found, as though the earth had swallowed
them up. It is our opinion that these vessels should in daytime be sta-
tioned at a distance from the firing and should be guarded, so that the
crews may sleep quietly; but as for reliefs, we are of opinion that to
substitute new men for the dead is all that is necessarv.

We further believe, as experience has taught us, that the men serv-
ing on board of these vessels should not be more than 35 or, at most,
40 years old. It is sufficient for their commanders to have attained
the rank of lieutenants, as long as promotion continues to be as slow as
it unfortunately is in nearly all the navies of the world. Their crews
should undergo an examination in swimming — we hardly dare say in
gymnastics, although gymnastics, in connection with the study of war,
geography, and military strategy and tactics, are more needful than
the endless mass of useless mathematics required by our extensive
programs. But in any event the personnel of these ships should be
subjected to a rigorous physical examination and at all the na\nfr-vard8
they should have a gymnasium for their exclusive use.

Relative to the subsistence in time of war we repeat what we have
already said, namely, that the whole personnel, with the exception
only of the officers, should be included in a single mess, so that there
would not be more than two messes on board.

As for the hulls of these ships we will only state that they should
be equipped with appliances both for towing and being towed, as it
becomes frequently necessary for them to navigate in that manner.
The fine lines of the bow make it verv" difficult to handle the towline,
and it is therefore verj' necessary that it should be passed over a
roller, so that it can be easily detached. Villaamil put a copper

99

sprocket wheel on his towlines to bear the strain, and while the ves-
sels did not suffer, as the line terminated in a sprocket wheel 5 feet
from the bow, it was at times impossible even to cut the stream cable
in order to set the destroyers free. •

It may also be well to consider the arrangement of which Yarrow
made use in order to conduct the steam as much as possible outside of
the space where the men are at work in case of an injury to the boiler;
for in two of our ships the whole personnel in the* engine rooms was
killed. This is a sad experience which we should not forget, knowing
that war is conducted with men and not with automata, as supposed
in the romantic literature of those who know that they will never be
shut in during a battle with a boiler under 200 or 300 pounds pres-
sure. Nor can this experience ever be forgotten by an admiral who
knows the danger which may arise when during operations in war aU
the firemen and machinists are killed.

In our opinion, one of the compartments should also have a hatch
sufficiently large to make it possible to lower a wounded man through
it, which is impossible with the hatches they now have and which are
unnecessarily small and elaborate. Our torpedo boats built by
Thornycrof t did have such a hatch, which shows that it is by no means
an impossibility and that we are not asking for anything new, espe-
cially as the elaborate construction has no other object than to impress
the public and make the vessels more expensive, while the constructors
do not trouble themselves about the manner in which those who will
be called upon to handle them in battle are to manage them.

There is another matter we wish to mention, although not relating
directly to the battle, and that is the absence of the cruiser and scout-
ing service in the United States Navy. Although the latter had an
incredible number of auxiliarv vessels and almost fabulous means at
its disposal and no enemy, properly speaking, since at the time the
war broke out the island of Cuba was already lost to Spain, the
scouting service was really effected by telegraph, and hence the inter-
vention of the Secretary of the Navy at Washington and the minister
at Madrid, although the latter from different motives. It appears
from the Appendix to the Report of the United States Navy Depart-
ment, page 33, that there was created a naval war board, which
acted as an advisory board to the Secretary, and although in view of
the immense disparity of forces and circumstances the Americans
could not fail to succeed, the}' did what they wanted. It would be
very desirable if some writer of another nation, who could not be
accused of being prejudiced, would examine closely whether or not
the United States, considering its situation at the time of the war,
could not have done more than it did.

What we wish to point out by the foregoing lines is the danger
with which in future all admirals will have to contend in time of war.

100

if the main operations are to be directed from a distance by factors
and boards who will attribute to themselves the glory if such opera ^
tions are successful, but who will not be placed before a court-martial
if they are failures. Such boards do not have to contend with a
thousand and one difficulties which arise everywhere when it comes to
a practical execution of plans, especially in war when this must be
done on the battlefield and not on paper. Even nav^al officers fre-
quently forget these difficulties twenty-four hours after they have left
the command of a ship.

This method of directing the war is nowadays inevitable; but it is
our opinion that it can succeed only in a country like China, where,
judging from the ideas we have of that nation, we presume a decree
could be issued ordenng that, if an admiral is rewarded for successful
operations, the advisory board is to be rewarded likewise, but if, on
the contrary, he deserves to be hanged, then those in charge of direct-
ing the war, telegraph in hand, should without further ceremony be
hanged with him. And perhaps results will show that those whom
we consider extremely barbarous do not reason so very badly.

Not as a question of policy, but as a military question, we believe
that there is on board our ships an excess of portable armament for
some of the personnel. Firemen, for instance, of whom there are 100
on board of each of our cruisers, do not need any armament, nor do
some of the other contingents. By doing away with portable arms to
a certain extent a great saving could be effected, and it would, moreover,
remove one source of danger where there are so many.

If I had not been seriously wounded myself, I should add some
observations on the question of wounded, which I deem of great
importance; but under the circumstances they would appear too per-
sonal, and for that reason I leave them for some future occasion.

We will here terminate this chapter, which, in connection with the
description of the fight, will help naval officers who may read it to
form an idea of the battle. For those who do not belong to the pro-
fession we consider it of little interest; and we do not have much hope
that it will be of service to our navy, which the country, with incom-
prehensible misinterpretation of the true situation, looks upon with a
manifestly hostile spirit. But we hope, nevertheless, that our colleagues
the world over will appreciate a few observations made on the battle-
field and set forth in a simple manner by a man who knows that he is
saying nothing new, but is confirming ideas which have everywhere
been the subject of much discussion.

We will now return to our ill-fated crews, who, on the beaches and
reefs of the southern coast of Cuba, with the burning ships before their
eyes, were quietly waiting, in the consciousness of having done their
duty, for whatever fate might have in store for them.

CHAPTER Xn.

Although the treatment of the crews and the incidents which occurred
while they were prisoners of war are a question Qf secondary impor-
tance in the drama in which Spain lost her colonial power, we shall
speak of it briefly, not only as a matter of curiosity, but also because
the fate of these valiant men who fought against impossibilities can not
be indifferent to any good Spaniard.

The crew of the Coldn was transshipped without difficulty to the
United States ships. That of the Yizca/ya^ which, as stated, was on the
reefs at Aserraderos, was promptly rescued by the Iowa and some
auxiliary vessels before the tide had time to endanger the lives of all
those men cut off from the shore.

It was reserved to the crews of the Oquendo and Manria Teresa to
further taste the bitter cup of that fatal day.

About a hundred men from these two ships, guided by the pilot of
the Maria Teresa^ fled through the woods until they reached Santiago;
and during the march these men, naked and without weapons, fearful
all the time of falling into the hands of some ferocious insurgent party,
suffered the most terrible hardships, especially some of them who lost
their way and spent three days in the woods without food, and having
to climb trees to find out where they were, until they finally arrived
at the Socapa.

The men of the Oquerido were, moreover, divided into two groups.
One of them fell into the hands of a party of Cuban insurgents, who
fired on them, killing two men, until they discovered that the fugitives
had no weapons, when they conducted them to the camp of their leader,
Cebreco. The other group, guided by officers, followed a path along
the coast and joined the men from the Teresa about half a league from
the place where they were shipwrecked.

The crew of the Teresa was grouped around the admiral on the beach.
An attempt was being made to organize that camp of horror when a
United States boat appeared with orders to pick up Admiral Cervera.
To that end the admiral had once more to jump into the water with
his aids, taking with him also Commander Mac-Crohon, executive
officer of the Teresa^ who was very ill, and myself, who, having been

101

102

placed on an improvised stretcher, unable to make the least motioo
except with my left arm, was thrown into the sea, which was breaking
furiously on the beach, and I underwent the most excruciating suffer-
ing which it is within human power to endure.

The admiral left ashore the third officer of the Teresa^ Lieutenant-
Conmiander Juan B. Aznar, near that mass of wreckage of what only
a short time before formed two handsome cruisers. This distincfuished
officer, who is an honor to the navy, had an opportunity to display
his gifts under the most difficult circumstances imaginable. With
large fragments of the masts stretchers were improvised for the
wounded, who were placed under awnings of leaves made by the men
without any tools but their hands. The surgeons and their assistants
took the clothing from those who had any left and made bandages out
of it to alleviate the suffering as. much as possible. The men were
organized in groups of 50, each with an officer at its head, and it
must have been a deeply affecting spectacle to see them, without any
tools, simply with dry branches, dig graves for the burial of the dead
bodies that were thrown up on the beach, and to hear our priests pray
to God to receive the souls of these martyrs to duty.

Among the dead bodies those of Chief Machinist JosS Melgares and
Third-Class Gunner Francisco Martinez Cdnovas were identified.

While this work was going on an insurgent appeared on the beach
and invited Aznar to go with him and join the men who were at his
camp in order not to become prisoners of the Americans. But Aznar,
to whom the prospect of falling into the hands of the ferocious Calixto
Garcia was by no means pleasing, instead of consenting succeeded in
getting the men from the camp who belonged to the crew of the
Oquendo to come to the beach, which was facilitated by the fact that
at 3 o'clock in the afternoon a United States lieutenant had landed
with twelve armed men, no doubt at the suggestion of Admiral
Cervera, in order to prevent any intervention on the part of the
insurgents.

This officer brought with him large quantities of biscuit and cans of
meat, which seemed like a blessing from heaven to our half -starved
men. The embarkation was not conoimenced until nightfall, beginning
with the wounded, who had to be thrown into the sea and picked up
by the boats under the same frightful conditions as their conmiander
had been, with the exception of a few who were placed in a boat which
was run up on the beach for that purpose and which had then to be
floated again by being pushed off by officers, both Spanish and Ameri-
can, who, the same as all the men, worked with the utmost zeal and
energy. The work was continued until late at night, when all had
been installed on board the auxiliary steamer Harvard. It is to be
regretted that the men in charge of the boats of these auxiliary steam-

103

ers plundered the sailors, filching ?rom these unfortunates whatever
articles of value they had about them.*

The boat carrying the admiral went alongside the yacht Oloucester^
where we were received with full honors and great respect, passing
almost naked in front of the guard which presented arms. When we
had all been well fed and attended to as far as possible on that small
yacht, the admiral was transferred to the lowa^ and the seriously

^ When I entered the boat with Admiral Cervera my servant handed me in a hand-
kerchief 300 pesos gold and my watch, which he had taken care of, saying that it
was safer with me than with him, as they would take it away from him. When I
went on board the Gloucester I left my jacket in the boat, and the handkerchief with
all it contained was stolen from it. While I was lying on a stretcher and attended
with unparalleled kindness by Mr. George Lynn; a steward, to whom I shall ever
remain grateful, I asked him to lodk for my jacket, telling him that there was money
in it, which they might have eventually if they would only leave me what I needed
to telegraph to my family. But not until night was the jacket found, and it was
then in an officer's cabin. To recover it (for I had been taken on board entirely
naked, wrapped in a sheet) I had to say that they might cut ofi^ a sleeve because it
was in my way, as I understood that they wanted a souvenir. And as already stated,
neither the money nor anything else was left in the pockets.

I mention this incident because, in connection with another of a more serious
nature, which also occurred on board the Gloucester, it was reported to the superin-
tendent of the hospital at Norfolk. Wholly against my wishes and in spite of my
entreaties, the estimable superintendent reported it to his Government and an investi-
gation was instituted, a report of which has since been transmitted to me through
diplomatic channels. From this it appears that nothing was found out, although
Mr. Lynn's statement says that I had been looking for certain papers to telegraph
to my family, as though I had forgotten the address of the house where my wife and
children were languishing in the most cruel anxiety.

There is nothing of importance in this incident; it is simply one of those occur-
rences which are ine\atable in any campaign, and it would not deserve the time
devoted to it were it not for the pretense of an investigation of even such details,
which is far from the actual facts.

Note by 0. N. I. — ^The matter of the allied loss by Captain Concas of 300 pesos on
the board Gloucester was investigated by a board ordered by Lieut. Commander
Wainwright, consisting of Chief Eijgineer G. W. McElroy, Lieut. G. H. Norman,
and Asst. Engineer A. M. Procter, who reported:

''We do not find from an examination of the evidence adduced that Captain
Concas could have sustained any loss aboard the Gloucestery aside from the letters,
which he stated were not important and which in all probability never came aboard
the ship."

It will be noticed that Captain Concas connects the incident referred to ''with
another of a more serious nature which also occurred on board the Gloucester,*^ but
does not mention what it is. The incident referred to was the loss of a ring given by
Lieutenant Ardurius to one of the officers of the Gloucester for safe-keeping. On the
arrival of the Gloucester north this ring was promptly expressed to Lieutenant
Ardurius at the naval hospital at Norfolk. It failed to reach him, due to his
departure for Spain and delays in communication. The matter was investigated by
the Navy Department, and the ring was subsequently forwarded through official
channels to Lieutenant Ardurius in Spain.

104

wounded to the Olwette^ an army hospital ship, where we were
attended with admirable care by the surgeon, the captain, and the
supercargo of that steamer. Personally I owe thanks for many kind
attentions to Ck)nmiander Gustaf Gade, of the Norwegian navy, attach^
to the Norwegian legation in the United States, who was at that time
discharging the duties of his office in the United States squadron.

Two or three days later we were transferred to the Solace^ a hospital
ship of the Navy, which was under the command of my old friend Mr.
Dunlap, who greeted me like an old comrade. Unfortunately the hos-
pital part was in the exclusive charge of Dr. Streets, of whom I regret
not to be able to speak in such terms as I should desire, esi>ecially as
he too was an old acquaintance. He did not show me any of the con-
sideration due to my age, rank, and condition, and if I received the
most careful medical attendance, it was due to one of the assistant
surgeons, Dr. Stokes.' The men were poorly installed, still more
poorly fed, ill treated, and even robbed by the nurses, in spite of
courteous remonstrances which I nlade about this matter, in conjunc-
tion with the captain of the ship himself. The unfortunate sailors,
some of whom died for lack of care, arrived at their destination in
a pitiful condition, although I must say that they were given clean
clothes the last day before thev were landed at the hospital in Nor-
folk.^

To be just, however, it should be stated that there was not much
preference shown, for it seems to me that the wounded Americans did
not receive much better care than our men, nor was the extra time
devoted to them which the circumstances required and which so much
suffering made necessary. This must appear especially strange, as the
number of wounded on both sides was not excessive, and there was on
board an abundance of everything, which does honor to those who had
organized this service and to the generosity of the country toward
those who were to be victims of the war.

Upon our arrival at Norfolk, Va., on July 16, we were taken to the
naval hospital. At my request, the conmiander of the Solace accom-
panied me ashore, in order to obviate the annoyances caused by curi- •
osity. The reception accorded us at the hospital by the medical
director, Dr. Cleborne, and his assistant. Dr. Kite, will always consti-
tute one of the pleasantest remembrances of my life.

* Lieut. H. W. Harrison, who was a patient on board the Solace daring the whole
period that Captain Ck)ncafl was on board that vessel, and who is now a staff intelli-
gence officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence, states that Captain Concas and the
Spanish officers and sailors were treated with the greatest consideration and afforded
every luxury that could be expected under the circumstances; that they repeatedly
so expressed themselves to him. He further states that on one occasion Captain
Concas took offense at Dr. Streets' reply, when he made a request that the Spanish
officers on board be furnished with electric fans. . Dr. Street's reply was, ** No, there
are not enough to go around, and our own people must be supplied first" — O. N. I.

105

These gentlemen did all in their power to alleviate our physical and
mental suffering. They treated us with the greatest kindness, showing
us every attention and consideration, keeping from us with great deli-
cacy everything unpleasant, saving us from importunate visitors, admit-
ting those whom they thought we should be pleased to see, and sending
at once without our request for a body of Catholic Sisters of Charity.
All these attentions were not for me alone, whose rank might have jus-
tified some exception, nor for the officers, but for all; every sailor, as
well as the captain, found kind brothers in these gentlemen from the
first day to the last.

The medical care, the excellent diet, the avoidance of all conversa-
tion on the war, and the fact that the doors were closed to reporters
were sufficient to further the rapid convalescence of all, especially the
men whom the Solace had brought in such pitiful condition.

My first interview with Dr. Cleborne is worthy of mention, for no
doubt there was between us a bond of sympathy, due to the fact that
we had many ideas in common. When he had installed me in magnifi-
cent quarters he asked me whether there was anything he could do for
me; I answered that he would do me a great favor if he would deliver
me from the reporters, and the good doctor almost embraced me in
his enthusiasm. I repeat once more, these worthy men of the United
States Medical Corps, as physicians, gentlemen, and officers, left abso-
lutely nothing undone. Their families also showed us the most affec-
tionate hospitality and attention. We speak at length on this subject
because it is a pleasure to express our gratitude for the favors received.

Unfortunately, the military part at Norfolk was not at the same
standard, but affected an indifference which caused some slight trouble
and compelled the admiral to go there at the last hour. If he had not
done so, there would have been delay in the return of the wounded to
the Peninsula.

We do not wish to leave Norfolk without mentioning Mr. Arthur C.
Humphreys, who had been our consular agent there and who conducted
himself toward us with great chivalry, stating when he came to see
us that he had been our consul and that, while he knew his duties as an
American, there was nothing to prevent him from being our friend;
and such he proved himself indeed, not without some annoyance to
himself, which was due to the attitude assumed bv the commodore who

7 %/

was in conmtiand of that naval station.

We will leave this group of prisoners in the hot climate of Virginia
and return to the larger group, which on the night of the 3d was
embarked on board the Harvard and St, Louis,

The officers were well installed and treated kindly by the commander
of the former of these two ships. Captain Cotton; but the petty officers
and men were crowded together on the deck aft, with nothing to pro-
tect them from the burning rays of the sun in daytime and the damp-

106

ness at night except a thin awning. Owing to the inevitable disorder
incident upon editing under these circumstances and the scarcity of
water in such a climate the sight was a truly pitiful one, and at the
end of a week malaria broke out among those sound and robust men
and spread in an alarming degree, causing a nmnber of deaths.

Unfortunately the garrison of this ship did not consist of regular
troops, but of semisavage volunteers from the State of Massachusetts,
without discipline or training and with all the drawbacks and dangers
of new troops of that nature, who have an idea that to be soldiers
means to conmiit brutalities, especially when they can do so without
danger, and it was these troops that gave rise to the terrible incident
which we are about to relate, and which occurred atUl o'clock on the
night of July 4.

It seems that one of our sailors, suffering from the suffocating heat
in that place, rose from the deck and got on top of one of the boxes
which were inside of the limit of the space in which they were con-
fined. The sentinel told him in English to go back to his place, which
the sailor, of course, did not understand, and without further ceremony
the soldier raised his rifle and shot him dead. At the sound of the
discharge that mass of wholly defenseless men became excited, the
watch came running and, without motive or cause, commenced to fire
into that limited space filled with defenseless men, and their officers
did nothing to calm the insane terror of those Massachusetts volun-
teers until the officers of the navy arrived, who were able to put
down those cowards carried away by their fear.

Many of the unfortunates jumped into the water, others were
wounded and killed — how many it has been impossible to ascertain.
A fireman who had jumped overboard and was trying to regain the
steamer by mounting the ladder on the side was assassinated by one of
the officers of the volunteers, who killed him from the gangway with
his revolver. There were 5 dead and 14 wounded on the deck, a
comparatively insignificant number in comoarison with this horrible
incident.

Our officers, who were forward at the opposite end of this large
ship, knew nothing of what had occurred until 2 o'clock a. m., when
the commander called the senior .officer among us and told him
about it. By way of reparation the dead were buried with full military
honors, as though this were sufficient to make amends for the crime.

The admiral made two energetic complaints about this matter, with-
out any further result than a statement that an investigation would be
instituted.^

The wounded and sick received poor care, not only because their

* A day or two after the battle of ^ntiago the Harvard^ formerly the American Imer
Netv York, arrived af Siboney with 1,500 men for the army, who disembarked,
excepting two squads from the Thirty-fourth Michigan and the Ninth Massachusetts
Volunteers which were left on board under charge of the regimental quartermaster to

107

number was very large, but also on account of the professional zeal of
the United States surgeon, who would not pennit any help on our
part, though well aware that he and his assistant could not possibly
attend to everything. The Harva/rd arrived at Portsmouth, N. H.,
on July 16 with a large number of sick, among them 51 seriously ill
with fever.

The contingent from the St, Louis had arrived there on the 11th.
I copy below a paragraph from a letter which Lieut. Fernando
Bruquetas, formerly of the Teresa^ wrote to me, telling me about my
poor crew:

Two or three days after our arrival came the expedition of the Harvard^ com-
prising almost Jbhe whole of the surviving crew of the Teresa. It was about 2 o'clock
p. m. when they arrived under a scorching sun, half dead from hunger and thirst.
There were not enough of us— officers, sui^geons, attendants, and sailors — to carry those
who could positively not move to a spot where there was a little shade to give them
the first necessary aid. * * Water ! Water! * ' was the cry of anguish heard everywhere;
but, following medical directions, we gave them only a little water and that hot,
according to the condition of each. The majority of these unfortunates remained
sick during the whole time, and 31 of them died, though this is due particularly to
the ill-treatment they experienced subsequently, as you are aware.

The above is what my worthy officer said. We will now take up
again the account of what occurred.

The prisoners were installed on an island in the center of the harbor
of Portsmouth, N. H., where a few miserable wooden barracks had
been erected and were guarded with great military display, as though
the prisoners could have escaped by swimming to Europe.

The immediate chief of the prisoners was a low-born colonel of
marine infantry who allowed himself all kinds of indignities toward
the officers as well as the men, which was made possible through the
weakness of a retired admii*al who was in command. The result was
that some of the unfortunate sailors, devoured by fever and not even
permitted to go to the hospital, died without being given the necessary

look out for stores. On the night of July 3, 637 prisoners from the destroyed ves-
sels of the Spanish fleet were placed on board, under guard of a few marines and the
squads of the Michigan and Massachusetts regiments, the two regimental quarter-
masters and a young marine officer standing watch. About midnight of the 4th, the
quartermajster of the Michigan regiment being officer of the day, it appears that there
was trouble in keeping the prisoners within the prescribed lines. One of the prison-
ers climbed on top of a small deck house, where ammunition was stored, and when
one of the sentries passed through the prisoners to make him get down they crowded
around the sentry with menaces which made him think they were in open attack and
he cried for help. The prisoners surged and forced their way past the sentries, knock-
ing some of them down. The guard coming on deck, supposing this was a mutiny,
opened fire with the sentries. The sad result has been much deplored by our Gov-
ernment and people, but in view of the circumstances all must see that the action of
the guard is one for regret and not for condemnation. A special investigation was
made by the War Department and a copy of the report and ^proceedings were fur-
nished to the Navy Department, and on October 26, 1898, they were forwarded through
the proper diplomatic channels to Admiral Cervera. — O. N. I.

108

assistance. Fortunately, all this came to the knowledge of Admiral
Cervera, who obtained permission to visit the prisoners in that locality
and at whose instance some of this was reported to the Government at
Washington, which immediately relieved the admiral as well as the
colonel.* Even then the proper conditions of peace were. never fully

* Captain Concas seems to have been incorrectly informed. The following corre-
spondence refers to the subject here mentioned. — O. N. I.

Department of the Navy, Bureau of Navigation,

Washingtoriy D, G, Augud if, 18^.

Sir: Your attention is invited to the following quotation from a letter addressed to
Admiral Cervera by Lieut. Don Antonio Magaz:

*' The regulations have been complied with and are being complied with 8cra}m-
lously, notwithstanding the fact that on two occasions American sergeants have
notoriously abused their authority by raising their hands against our sailors, one of
the former being on one of the occasions completely intoxicated. I reported theee
occasions to the officer of the guard, and the latter I also made known to the colonel,
who offered to make a proper report, although I am unacquainted with the result;
all I know is that said sergeant continues to perform his duties. If justice has not
been done, I regret it, for the Americans have conducted themselves so correctly
with respect to us."

The Department requests that you make immediately a complete report concerning

this matter.

Very respectfully, A. S. Crowninbhield,

Chief of Buremu
The Commandant, Navy- Yard, Portsmouth, N, H,

Marine Barracks,
Nary- Yard, Portmwuih, N. H., Atigust 15, 1898,
Sir: 1. In obedience to the Bureau of Navigation's letter of August 12, 1898
(131968) , concerning the striking of certain Spanish prisoners by noncommissioned
officers of the Marine Corps, I have to report as follows:

2. The only cases reported to me of the kind referred to in the Bureau of Naviga-
tion's letter were:

First. That of Corpl. James Barrett, who did not strike a man, but caught him by
the neck and shoved him along rather roughly. In his defense Corporal Barrett
claims that the prisoner was sullen, insubordinate, and used a threatening manner
toward him. I reprimanded Corporal Barrett severely at the time, and afterwards
sent him out of the camp and put him on duty at the marine barracks. No report
was made to me that Corporal Barrett was under the influence of liquor. At this
time Corporal Barrett was acting police sergeant within the stockade.

Second. The case of Private Patterson, who struck a prisoner with a musket while
two prisoners were fighting. It was his only means of separating them, as the evi-
dence upon investigation showed. The men were not hurt in any way.

3. I issued an order at that time that no one should strike a prisoner, and that any
trouble should be reported to me at once and I would attend to it personally.

4. Almost all the reports made against Spanish prisoners in the camp have been
made by the Spanish officers themselves.

5. Lieut. Antonio Magaz some time since objected to my mode of investigation*
He said that in Spain when an officer reported a man that ended it. I told him that
with us it was different, and that not only were witnesses summoned, but that the
accused himself had a right to make a statement.

Very respectfully, Jambs Forney,

Colonel, U. S. M. C, Commanding.
The Commandant, Navy- Yard, Portsmouth, iV. H,

109

reestablished, but at least our physicians and priests were allowed to
minister to the men, and Lieut. Antonio Magaz, of the navy, who was
the senior officer there, was given proper authority, of which he made
use with a tact, skill, and gift of command which many a diplomat
might envy.

This is the more to be regretted as we know positively that the
orders from the Administration at Washington were very different,
and that neither pains nor expense was spared to make us comfortable
so that upon our return we might be able to praise the American
people. And thus it happened that while the unworthy colonel and
some of his subordinates tried in every possible way to inflict hard-
ships on the prisoners, the Administration furnished complete outfits
of. clothing to all the sailors and subaltern classes. The colonel
referred to threw these articles of clothing, or had them thrown, one
by one at the prisoners, and where they were hard articles, such as
brushes for instance, they were thrown by the men as though firing at
targets. They villainously disobeyed, in whole or in part, not only
the instructions from the Government, but also the true wish of the
American people.

Not wishing to dwell longer upon petty annoyances, although at the
time they may be the cause of great suffering, we will now speak of
the admiral, commanders, and officei*s who were taken to Annapolis
and installed in the Naval Academy, all the pupils of which were on
vacation. They were very well lodged at this place, as nothing had to
be improvised and they had only to take possession of the apartments
of the absent pupils. Admiral McNair, a very polished gentleman,
who, fortunately for us, had been placed at the head of this establish-
ment, pursued — in conformity with the orders of the Government, and
furnishing an example to all — ^a proper and highly conmiendable course,
which was equaled by that of the no less praiseworthy Dr. Cleborne,
of Norfolk. The whole personnel, from the Admiral down to the last
midshipman, deserve the highest praise.

In different ways, and sooner or later, all of our captains and officers
were permitted to go out on parole from 8 o'clock in the morning .
until sunset, and it is a pity that the Government of the United States
detracted from the merit of its conduct, to no purpose whatever, by
establishing an inspection of our private correspondence, which could
reveal no greater secrets than those furnished by the newspapers; and
this was the more ridiculous and futile because, from the moment we
went out and were able to post our own letters, all those of us whose
correspondence might have contained something of importance wrote
without the least interference, by way of England or France, where
we had plenty of friends to whom such letters could be sent.

Thus the treatment we received in the United States was on the
whole as humanitarian as possible, with the exception of the unworthy

110

colonel to whom we have referred, who is the only one of whom the
Appendix to the Report of the Navy Department for 1898 makes men-
tion in terms which are entirely incorrect. The treatment was espe-
cially kind on the part of the Government, whose orders, we repeat,
we are sure were decisive to the effect that we should be well cared
for, and it furthered this end with true generosity. But as to the
dithyrambics on this subject in which the Americans themselves
indulged, that old Europe might learn how prisoners were treated in
civilized countries, there is much to be said; for comparing the treat-
ment we received with that of Spain's Chilean prisoners in 1866-67,
when the whole Peninsula was given to the officers for a prison, and
allowances assigned to them that they might live as they desired; when
those who asked to go to the Paris Exposition were permitted to do so
on parole, while no one troubled himself as to whether they wrote to
their children or to their grandmothers, we find that there is a differ-
ence between the treatment of prisoners by the civilizations of the
Old World and that which we received in the United States, and that
it is the latter who still have much to learn.

- We are not complaining, far from it. We only wish to correct their
exaggerated self-praise, which if it were not ridiculous would be insup-
portable on the part of the United States, where it never occurs to any
one to ask if one likes a thing or not, but the classic ^^ What do you
admire more ? " These exaggerations were the more insupportable since
in this case they went so far as to take for history Zola's D^bficle, in
which, although there is doubtless much that is true, for the great mass
of prisoners makes the best intentions impossible, the innuendoes were
against Germany, whose sympathy for us stirred up all the ji7i{;oe8 as
well as those who were not.

The people in general could not have treated us better, and a great
many persons showed us minor attentions; for instance, in accordance
with the habit of that country, all the commanders received hundreds
of letters from all classes of society, including the ladies, the greater
part of which contained expressions of sympathy and disapprobation
.of the war, even those from many Protestant clergymen, while Admiral
Cervera received not hundreds but thousands of letters and telegrams
sent with the same object. These attentions were naturally accom-
panied by visits, during w^hich expressions of courtesy were exchanged.
Distorted versions of these appeared in the papers afterwards, attrib-
uting to both sides opinions they had never expressed, but which
sounded fine to the American people, who constitute, as it were, a
great mutual admiration society. But those civilities, which had no
special significance in that country, and which all Americans under-
stand, gave rise in Spain to very unfavorable comments against the
admiral, for here also there are masters in the art of distorting facts,
especially when there is something to be gained by so doing.

Ill

Fortunately it has come to the notice of no one, and we vientlxm it
tO'diiy with the greatest reserve^ that in consequence of my having one
day remarked that I liked flowers a number of the ladies of Norfolk,
who had already taken upon themselves the charitable mission of pro-
viding me with books, added that of making my room a veritable
garden, without my thinking at the time that in consequence of this I
was guilty of an act of high treason, or that my servant was when,
to my great regret, he ate the ices which usually accompanied the
flowers, as my serious condition did not permit me to relieve him of
this task.

It seems impossible that serious-minded men in Spain should have
given value and support to such newspaper stories from America, but,
rightly regarded, this circumstance does have value, inasmuch as it
shows the insignificance of those who talk thus, without, however,
depriving themselves of the pleasure of being present at the opera on
the very days of our two great naval disasters.

The hour of peace arrived, and the consequent return to Spain, and,
although the three groups of prisoners were now suffering no hardship
except the moral effect of their position, our eagerness to see ourselves
once more free made the hours which separated us from liberty seem
very long. To my amazement, and while various contested points were
still under discussion, I saw with my own eyes, in the hands of the
highest authority at Portsmouth, a telegram from the Secretary of the
Navy, in which it was stated that the difliculties in the way of our
liberty proceeded from Sagasta's cabinet.

Finally, after the unavoidable formalities had been disposed of, the
arrangements for our return were completed, and a committee, appointed
by Admiral Cervera and presided over by Lieut. Commander Juan B.
Aznar, chartered the steamer City of Rome^ which, after picking up at
New York the prisoners from Annapolis and Norfolk, went to Ports-
mouth for the crews, and on the 13th of September the shores of the
continent which Columbus had discovered, in an e\al hour for Spain,
faded from our view.

Where was the City of Rmne to go? The admiral requested that
we be permitted to go to some maritime departamento, and this is
what all would have desired, as there were hospitals there in which
immediate attention could be given to the many sick we had with us,
and especially to the wounded, many of whom were not yet able to
move. Moreover, at a departamento at least a third of the men could
have been furloughed to go home, and almost all the officers, even if
they had no families, would at least have friends and places where they
could find a home. The steamer could have gone to Cddiz and Ferrol
without increase of expense, but, as the Sagasta cabinet feared an ova-
tion in each of the said departamentos, the ship was sent to Santander,
whose hospitals were crowded with sick soldiers, and from where the

112

men had to be sent to the departamentos in military trains, at enormous
expense and with the prolongation of the sufferings of the unfortu-
nate sick and wounded, who did not want to be separated from their
companions.

We arrived at Santander on the 21st of September, and one of the
pleasantest experiences of our lives awaited us there. The first aux-
iliary steamer which arrived alongside brought a committee presided
over by two admirals and consisting of 43 conmianders and officers
from all the corps of the navy, who came to express to us approbation
of our conduct, of which they, better than anyone else, were able to
judge. Their presence, their patriotic words of comradeship and coun-
sel, and the messages sent by all the officers of the Armada were the
most perfect balm to the aching hearts of all, from the admiral to the
last sailor. And I must state for their honor and our own satisfaction
that the Government did all it could to prevent this manifestation^ and
while it did not go so far as to oppose it openly it at least succeeded
in depriving it of all significance.

This was the last public act in connection with our imprisonment,
and it is not expedient for any one of us who know the details to state
at this time how much was done to prevent these things being spoken
or written about when the Spanish people were actually thirsting to
know the truth, and not even to-day, perhaps, would it be possible to
make the account any more complete than we have done because a
number of proceedings and documents are not public property. And
therefore, since ^'If a person does not find consolation it is because he
does not seek it" (Spanish proverb), we are confident that if some day
it occurs to someone to reply to this book these documents so care-
fully hidden away will become a magnificent theme for a patriotic
panegyric.

CHAPTER Xin.

If Spain were as well sensed by her statesmen and public
officials as she is by her sailors she might yet be a great
country. — The Spanish-American War, Engineering ^ July SI, .
1899, p. 66.

We will here close the description of the events in which we have taken
an active part, which description we have given with the restrictions
imposed by the recency of these occurrences, but also with the right
to legitimate defense, which the country itself demands of us, and
against the interested silence which those who have been the cause of
all our misfortunes would like to impose upon us with ati injustice
for which we can only find compensation in the above lines of a Euro-
pean review of great weight, which, in conmienting upon the opinions
sustained on the subject of the disaster, makes outside of Spain a
statement which history will make in our own country perhaps long
before we dare hope for it.

The w#r was accepted by Spain when the island of Cuba was virtu-
ally lost, when in the Peninsula the sending out of one more man
threatened an uprising more serious than any previous one, when our
troops lacked the most indispensable necessaries, when the arrears of
pay were the principal cause of the inadequate nourishment and con-
sequent deterioration, and when the greater part of the Spanish resi-
dents of Cuba, under the designation of reformers, autonomists,
etc., made common caiise with the insurgents while deriving fabulous
profits from contracts for supplies and transports.

Under these circumstances it was madness on our part to accept a
conflict with an immensely wealthy nation, having a population four
times as large as ours and situated at a gunshot's distance from the
future battlefield of its military aspirations, possessing an army and a
navy anxious for easy victories to raise themselves in estimation and
importance and acquire a place which they had not hitherto occupied
in their country, and, in order to attain this, promoting that preemi-
nently American spirit of hostility against Europe; a country in
which every white man is the descendant of an immigrant and where
every immigrant looks with grim envy upon the history of his native
land, from which he believes himself excluded by privileges, by lack
of prestige, or by fancies derived from novels, perhaps, which do not
14232— No. VIII 8 113

114

acknowledge the all too prosaic truth that when a man emigrates it is
simply because he does not hav^e a dollar. Among the people of the
United States the liesire to make history stands above everv other
consideration^ and we have been incredibly stupid when we oflfered it
to them gratis and at our own expense.

When the war commenced the outcome was, as a matter of fact,
already decided, even if a less powerful nation than the United States
had taken part against us. Subsequent results only would have been
diflFerent; we should probably not have suffered the loss, for the pres-
ent at least, of the Philippines. That the island of Cuba was lost and
would have to be conquered back and that it was impossible for us to
do so was well known in Spain from the very beginning.

When nations go along without a political objective it does not make
much difference whether their generals win battles or lose them; the
latter is perhaps even preferable, because the solution is thus arrived
at more promptly. It was because we had a political objective, even
though we went from one defeat to another, that we succeeded in eject-
ing the invader from Spain at the beginning of the present century.
It is thanks to her political objective that Italy has become a great
nation, in spite of her lack of success in the battlefield. A nation only
need show its determination to make an energetic resistance in order
to weaken the tenacity of the aggressor, whose -political ideal can never
be as firm as that represented by a people with its army and statesmen
who know how to fulfill their exalted missions* Sometimes ^militarv
genius, supported by revolutionary ideas like those which marked the
last years of the previous century, msLj temporarily rule over all
Europe; but when the armies and the people unite in a political ideal,
all they need, even after a hundred defeats, is one successful encounter
to send the victor to St. Helena.

Did Spain have a political objective, a policy, during the historical
moments of which we are speaking?

Future generations will hardly believe it possible that the recent
events actually occurred. The war was not desired, and yet nothing
was done to ward it off. Peace was desired, but nothing was done to
preseiTe it. With a loud voice our statesmen declared that they
wanted peace at any cost, and yet they wanted it to cost nothing.
They were well aware that the lack of men in the field had conmfienced
to be. felt, that the people complained of the redemption from service
by purchase, and that it would be impossible to send any considerable
contingent of troops to Cuba; but no thought was taken of what was
to be done when it should become neoessar}^ to send such a contingent.
Yellow fever, typhoid, and ansemia were rapidly decimating the con-
tingent of our forces in Cuba, and nobody thought of who was to carry
the guns when they were dropped b}' the soldiers who were taken to
the hospital or the cemetery. The debt increased fabulously. Mediaeval

115

means were resorted to and fraudulent money was coined, for silver
money deserves no other name. And still the pay of the troops was
over a year in arrears, and the poverty of the country increased the
privations of all classes of people, and no solution was sought, except
by c^'iminal procrastination, of the problem as to what our forces on
land and sea were to live on the following month. The conflict had
become inevitable, and the country was assured that our relations were
cordial and that there was no cause for alarm. It was well known that
our proud enemy was making preparations, and we were not even
peimitted to think of what was to be done when the aggression should
become a fact. Long before the beginning of the war it was decided
to send the squadron to the West Indies, but only to recall it when
the war broke out. There was some thought of concluding peace, and
the only point on which any energy was shown was that the squadron
should go out to certain destrjuction, and thus leave Spain wholly at the
mercy of the enemy. When the squadron had been destroyed and
when the whole world knew that there was no help for us, valuable
time was lost, and Santiago and Manila fell, while absolutely nothing
was done in the meantime.

Instead of making terms while the squadron was yet intact at San-
tiago, and when that city and Manila could keep up the defense for
some tiijae, they waited until all was lost, although they knew before-
hand that all must thus be lost.

In this whole period may be seen the "^to-morrow" which never
arrives, for there is no to-morrow for him who loses his life to-day.
Miracles do not descend from heaven to change the face of the eaiiii
upon the wish of an impossibility.

The political idea which ruled our destinies was one fearful denial,
and by denials nothing can be attained. Was the object of our policy
war? — No. Was it peace? — No. Resistance? — No. The relinquish-
ment of Cuba? — No. Was it determination to defend ourselves? —
Not either. To allow ourselves to be killed? — Still less. Was it
believed that Cervera Tvould be victorious in the West Indies ? — No.
Was it believed that he would be defeated? — No. Would he be
relieved from his command on account of his opposition to every-
thing that was being done ? — No. Finally, did we want battles ? — No,
and a thousand times no. For we have been assured, though we have
not been able to ascertain the source of the statement, that it was
believed true in Madrid that Seuor Moret, minister of colonies, had
said that the war would not be of any importance, because as soon as
the Americans had sunk three or four of our ships peace would be
concluded. We recommend Senor Moret's theory to the statesmen of
the great nations of Europe as something truly novel.

The only thing that comforts us is the fact that our brothers, the
Cubans, and let us also call the Filipinos b}' that name, do not give

116

the lie to their i*ace nor their education; for both believed that the
United States was working solely fb?* love^ as subsequent events have
demonstrated.

It may be said that all this is already a matter of history, although
the wounds of all who feel themselves Spanish are still shedding blood,
and their eyes tears; and if histor}' teaches, will this history teach the
Spanish ? We do not dare hope so. The historically hostile attitude
of the countr}'^ toward the nav5% the situation of our capital, the
Mohammedan indifference of the nation regarding its international
relations, due perhaps to the disenchantment of the policies of the
houses of Austria and Bourbon, and the necessit\% brought about by
our disturbances, of withdrawing within ourselves — all these cause the
ministries of state and navv, which in all civilized countries form the
axis upon which rests their prosperity, to be in our country' like two
islands lost in the mist of inditference, of iwhich public opinion take^ no
thought and which never excite the enthusiasm of the people except to
destrov them.

It is, therefore, useless for us to think of alliances, of relations with
other nations, of mutual guarantees which at least would render the
ambitions of the powerful dangerous.

It is likewise useless to think of battleships, cruisers, and torpedo
boats if, when the crisis comes, we are not permitted to make the
least preparation for war, and if our ships are to be scattered over the
whole world, as though the policy of the country sought in its own
destruction the prompt solution of conflicts, which must always come
in the nature of surprises in a country that has no international policy,
and as the result our nationality goes to pieces.

It is useless also for us to have diplomats if they are not to lie
listened to and if, when they announce a storm threatening the coun-
try, they are to be treated Vith disdain as though they were making
an unnecessarx' fuss about nothing. It is useless to send to these dip-
lomats high-sounding documents, which in our country are the remedy
for everything, instead of sending them battleships, which is the medi-
cine employed by other nations, especialh' the most advanced, which
by such arguments open markets for their products and take posses-
sion of archipelagoes owned by others, for no other reason than that
t/tei/ luuhi in a ChrUtiuii arid gefW7*ous vmnner civilized the Indian tribes
of their country.

It was in vain that the navy in 1884 predicted the double cyclone
that menaced Spain, in the Gulf of Mexico on the one hand, and in
the Empire of the Rising Sun on the other, and that it urged the
necessity of completing the fleet inside of four years. If that had
been done the war would have been obviated, as our naval forces
obviated it in 1870 at Habana, where they were efliciently represented
bv General Caballero de Rodas, Governor-General of the island of

117

Cuba, on the occasion of a visit similar to that of the Maine. It was
in vain also that day after day, and step by step, the navy pointed
out the recent danger, in every tone of voice, from every quarter,
even as late as the eve of the disaster, July 2, 1898. And when the
catastrophe came, the rdles were changed by the brutal law of the
majority, and those who had refused to read and to listen proclaimed
themselves fully informed and brought charges of ignorance and
imprudence against us who had hazarded our very heads and reputa-
tions to declare officially and with the utmost energy that we ought
not to go to war and that, if the squadron went to the West Indies,
Spain would be left to the mercy of the enemy. And in view of this
brutal law of the majority, who know nothing about the world in
which they live and who drag the country to an abyss, at the bottom
of which it will be dashed to pieces, it is useless to expect considera-
tion, and still less justice. For the solace of our own consciences, even,
we have to turn our eyes sadly to foreign countries to read, among
others, in the foremost engineering review of the world, in an article
on the Spanish- American War, these words: ''If Spain were as well
served hy her statesmen and public officials as she is hy her sailors she
might yet he a great co^mtry.^'^

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